

MAY 11 1978

Docket Nos. 50-277
and 50-278

Philadelphia Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Edward G. Bauer, Jr., Esquire
Vice President and General
Counsel
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101

Gentlemen:

In response to your request for license amendment dated November 4, 1976 as supplemented by letters dated February 28, April 14, June 16 and August 30, 1977, the Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 41 and 40 to Facility Operating Licenses No. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units Nos. 2 and 3.

These amendments incorporate provisions into the facility Technical Specifications which establish limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for suppression pool water level.

These requirements provide assurance that facility operation will be in accordance with the assumptions utilized in your facility's plant-unique analysis which was performed in conjunction with the Mark I Containment Short Term Program evaluation.

The enclosed license amendments reflect those changes to your original request for license amendment which have been agreed to in discussions with your staff.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors



Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 41 to DPR-44
2. Amendment No. 40 to DPR-56
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice

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Philadelphia Electric Company

cc:

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Philadelphia Electric Company
Assistant General Counsel
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Albert R. Steel, Chairman
Board of Supervisors
Peach Bottom Township
R. D. #1
Delta, Pennsylvania 17314



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-277

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 41
License No. DPR-44

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) dated November 4, 1976, as supplemented February 28, April 14, June 16, and August 30, 1977, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-44 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 41, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 11, 1978

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 41

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-44

DOCKET NO. 50-277

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove

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*No change to this page

TABLE 3.2.F

SURVEILLANCE INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels	Instrument	Type Indication and Range	Action			
2	Reactor Water Level	Recorder 0-60" Indicator 0-60"	(1)	(2)	(3)	
2	Reactor Pressure	Recorder 0-1500 psig Indicator 0-1200 psig	(1)	(2)	(3)	
2	Drywell Pressure	Recorder 0-70 psig	(1)	(2)	(3)	
2	Drywell Temperature	Recorder 0-400°F Indicator 0-400°F	(1)	(2)	(3)	
2	Suppression Chamber Water Temperature	Recorder 0-600°F Indicator 0-400°F	(1)	(2)	(3)	
2	Suppression Chamber Water Level	Recorder 0-2 ft. Indicator 0-2 ft.	(1)	(5)		
1	Control Rod Position	28 Volt Indicating Lights				
1	Neutron Monitoring	SRM, IRM, LPRM 0-100%	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

Amendment No. 41

-77-

SRAPS

PBAPS

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2.F

- (1) From and after the date that one of these parameters is reduced to one indication, continued operation is permissible during the succeeding thirty days unless such instrumentation is sooner made operable.
- (2) From and after the date that one of these parameters is not indicated in the control room, continued operation is permissible during the succeeding seven days unless such instrumentation is sooner made operable.
- (3) If the requirements of notes (1) and (2) cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a Cold Condition within 24 hours.
- (4) These surveillance instruments are considered to be redundant to each other.
- (5) In the event that all indications of this parameter are disabled and such indication cannot be restored in six (6) hours, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a Hot Shutdown condition in six (6) hours and a Cold Shutdown condition in the following eighteen (18) hours.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS****3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS****Applicability:**

Applies to the operating status of the primary and secondary containment systems.

Objective:

To assure the integrity of the primary and secondary containment systems.

Specification:**A. Primary Containment**

1. At any time that the nuclear system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure or work is being done which has the potential to drain the vessel, the pressure suppression pool water volume and temperature shall be maintained within the following limits except as specified in 3.7.A.2.

- a. Minimum water volume - 122,900 ft³
- b. Maximum water volume - 127,300 ft³

4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS**Applicability:**

Applies to the primary and secondary containment integrity.

Objective:

To verify the integrity of the primary and secondary containment.

Specification:**A. Primary Containment**

1. The suppression chamber water level and temperature shall be checked once per day.
2. Whenever there is indication of relief valve operation or testing which adds heat to the suppression pool, the pool temperature shall be continually monitored and also observed and logged every 5 minutes until the heat addition is terminated.
3. Whenever there is indication of relief valve operation with the temperature of the suppression pool reaching 160F or more and the primary coolant system pressure greater than 200 psig, an external visual examination of the suppression chamber shall be conducted before resuming power operation.
4. A visual inspection of the suppression chamber interior, including water line regions, shall be made at each major refueling outage.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- c. Maximum suppression pool temperature:
- (1) During normal power operation, 90F.
 - (2) During testing which adds heat to the suppression pool, the water temperature shall not exceed 10F above normal power operation limit specified in (1) above. In connection with such testing, the pool temperature must be reduced to below the normal power operation limit specified in (1) above within 24 hours.
 - (3) The reactor shall be scrammed from any operating condition if the pool temperature reaches 110F. Power operation shall not be resumed until the pool temperature is reduced below the normal power operation limit specified in (1) above.
 - (4) During reactor isolation conditions, the reactor pressure vessel shall be depressurized to less than 200 psig at normal cooldown rates if the pool temperature reaches 120F.

Primary Containment

The integrity of the primary containment and operation of the core standby cooling system in combination, limit the off-site doses to values less than those suggested in 10CFR100 in the event of a break in the primary system piping. Thus, containment integrity is specified whenever the potential for violation of the primary reactor system integrity exists. Concern about such a violation exists whenever the reactor is critical and above atmospheric pressure. An exception is made to this requirement during initial core loading and while the low power test program is being conducted and ready access to the reactor vessel is required. There will be no pressure on the system at this time, thus greatly reducing the chances of a pipe break. The reactor may be taken critical during this period; however, restrictive operating procedures will be in effect again to minimize the probability of an accident occurring. Procedures and the Rod Worth Minimizer would limit control worth such that a rod drop would not result in any fuel damage. In addition, in the unlikely event that an excursion did occur, the reactor building and standby gas treatment system, which shall be operational during this time, offer a sufficient barrier to keep off-site doses well below 10CFR100 limits.

The pressure suppression pool water provides the heat sink for the reactor primary system energy release following a postulated rupture of the system. The pressure suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during primary system blow-down from 1035 psig. Since all of the gases in the drywell are purged into the pressure suppression chamber air space during a loss-of-coolant accident, the pressure resulting from isothermal compression plus the vapor pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, the suppression chamber maximum pressure. The design volume of the suppression chamber (water and air) was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be condensed is discharged to the suppression chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression chamber.

Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in the specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is approximately 49.1 psig which is below the maximum of 62 psig. Maximum water volume of 127,300 ft³ results in a downcomer submergence of 4.4 feet and the minimum volume of 122,900 ft³ results in a submergence approximately 0.4 feet less.

3.7.A & 4.7.A BASES (Cont'd.)

The maximum allowable volume assures the integrity and functional capability of the Suppression Chamber (torus) during postulated LOCA pool swell effects on the torus support system. The majority of the Bodega tests were run with a submerged length of 4 feet and with complete condensation. Thus, with respect to downcomer submergence, this specification is adequate. The maximum temperature at the end of blowdown tested during the Humbolt Bay and Bodega Bay tests was 170°F and this is conservatively taken to be the limit for complete condensation of the reactor coolant, although condensation would occur for temperatures above 170°F.

Should it be necessary to drain the suppression chamber, this should only be done when there is no requirement for core standby cooling systems operability as explained in basis 3.5.F.

Experimental data indicates that excessive steam condensing loads can be avoided if the peak temperature of the suppression pool is maintained below 160F during any period of relief valve operation with sonic conditions at the discharge exit. Specifications have been placed on the envelope of reactor operating conditions so that the reactor can be depressurized in a timely manner to avoid the regime of potentially high suppression chamber loadings.

In addition to the limits on temperature of the suppression chamber pool water, operating procedures define the action to be taken in the event a relief valve inadvertently opens or sticks open. As a minimum this action shall include: (1) use of all available means to close the valve, (2) initiate suppression pool water cooling heat exchangers, (3) initiate reactor shutdown, and (4) if other relief valves are used to depressurize the reactor, their discharge shall be separated from that of the stuck-open relief valve to assure mixing and uniformity of energy insertion to the pool.

Because of the large volume and thermal capacity of the suppression pool, the volume and temperature normally changes very slowly and monitoring these parameters daily is sufficiently to establish any temperature trends. By requiring the suppression pool temperature to be continually monitored and frequently logged during periods of significant heat addition, the temperature trends will be closely followed so that appropriate action can be taken. The requirement for an external visual examination following any event where potentially high loadings could occur provides assurance that no significant damage was encountered. Particular attention should be focused on structural discontinuities in the vicinity of the relief valve discharge since these are expected to be the points of highest stress.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-278

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 40
License No. DPR-56

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) dated November 4, 1976, as supplemented February 28, April 14, June 16, and August 30, 1977, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 40, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 11, 1978

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 40

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-56

DOCKET NO. 50-278

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

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TABLE 3.2.F

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Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels	Instrument	Type Indication and Range	Action
2	Reactor Water Level	Recorder 0-60" Indicator 0-60"	(1) (2) (3)
2	Reactor Pressure	Recorder 0-1500 psig Indicator 0-1200 psig	(1) (2) (3)
2	Drywell Pressure	Recorder 0-70 psig	(1) (2) (3)
2	Drywell Temperature	Recorder 0-400°F Indicator 0-400°F	(1) (2) (3)
2	Suppression Chamber Water Temperature	Recorder 0-600°F Indicator 0-400°F	(1) (2) (3)
2	Suppression Chamber Water Level	Recorder 0-2 ft. Indicator 0-2 ft.	(1) (5)
1	Control Rod Position	28 Volt Indicating) Lights)	(1) (2) (3) (4)
1	Neutron Monitoring	SRM, IRM, LPRM) 0-100%)	

PRAPS

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2.F

- (1) From and after the date that one of these parameters is reduced to one indication, continued operation is permissible during the succeeding thirty days unless such instrumentation is sooner made operable.
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- (5) In the event that all indications of this parameter are disabled and such indication cannot be restored in six (6) hours, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a Hot Shutdown condition in six (6) hours and a Cold Shutdown condition in the following eighteen (18) hours.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSApplicability:

Applies to the operating status of the primary and secondary containment systems.

Objective:

To assure the integrity of the primary and secondary containment systems.

Specification:A. Primary Containment

1. At any time that the nuclear system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure or work is being done which has the potential to drain the vessel, the pressure suppression pool water volume and temperature shall be maintained within the following limits except as specified in 3.7.A.2.

- a. Minimum water volume - 122,900 ft³
- b. Maximum water volume - 127,300 ft³

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSApplicability:

Applies to the primary and secondary containment integrity.

Objective:

To verify the integrity of the primary and secondary containment.

Specification:A. Primary Containment

1. The suppression chamber water level and temperature shall be checked once per day.
2. Whenever there is indication of relief valve operation or testing which adds heat to the suppression pool, the pool temperature shall be continually monitored and also observed and logged every 5 minutes until the heat addition is terminated.
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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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Primary Containment

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The pressure suppression pool water provides the heat sink for the reactor primary system energy release following a postulated rupture of the system. The pressure suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during primary system blow-down from 1035 psig. Since all of the gases in the drywell are purged into the pressure suppression chamber air space during a loss-of-coolant accident, the pressure resulting from isothermal compression plus the vapor pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, the suppression chamber maximum pressure. The design volume of the suppression chamber (water and air) was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be condensed is discharged to the suppression chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression chamber.

Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in the specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is approximately 49.1 psig which is below the maximum of 62 psig. Maximum water volume of 127,300 ft³ results in a downcomer submergence of 4.4 feet and the minimum volume of 122,900 ft³ results in a submergence approximately 0.4 feet less.

3.7.A & 4.7.A BASIS (Cont'd.)

The maximum allowable volume assures the integrity and functional capability of the Suppression Chamber (torus) during postulated LOCA pool swell effects on the torus support system. The majority of the Bodega tests were run with a submerged length of 4 feet and with complete condensation. Thus, with respect to downcomer submergence, this specification is adequate. The maximum temperature at the end of blowdown tested during the Humbolt Bay and Bodega Bay tests was 170°F and this is conservatively taken to be the limit for complete condensation of the reactor coolant, although condensation would occur for temperatures above 170°F.

Should it be necessary to drain the suppression chamber, this should only be done when there is no requirement for core standby cooling systems operability as explained in basis 3.5.F.

Experimental data indicates that excessive steam condensing loads can be avoided if the peak temperature of the suppression pool is maintained below 160F during any period of relief valve operation with sonic conditions at the discharge exit. Specifications have been placed on the envelope of reactor operating conditions so that the reactor can be depressurized in a timely manner to avoid the regime of potentially high suppression chamber loadings.

In addition to the limits on temperature of the suppression chamber pool water, operating procedures define the action to be taken in the event a relief valve inadvertently opens or sticks open. As a minimum this action shall include: (1) use of all available means to close the valve, (2) initiate suppression pool water cooling heat exchangers, (3) initiate reactor shutdown, and (4) if other relief valves are used to depressurize the reactor, their discharge shall be separated from that of the stuck-open relief valve to assure mixing and uniformity of energy insertion to the pool.

Because of the large volume and thermal capacity of the suppression pool, the volume and temperature normally changes very slowly and monitoring these parameters daily is sufficiently to establish any temperature trends. By requiring the suppression pool temperature to be continually monitored and frequently logged during periods of significant heat addition, the temperature trends will be closely followed so that appropriate action can be taken. The requirement for an external visual examination following any event where potentially high loadings could occur provides assurance that no significant damage was encountered. Particular attention should be focused on structural discontinuities in the vicinity of the relief valve discharge since these are expected to be the points of highest stress.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 41 AND 40 TO FACILITY LICENSE NOS. DPR-44 AND DPR-56

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS NOS. 2 AND 3

DOCKETS NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278

I. INTRODUCTION

In conjunction with the Short Term Program (STP) evaluation of Boiling Water Reactor facilities with the Mark I containment system, the Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) submitted a Plant Unique Analysis (PUA) for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units Nos. 2 and 3. This analysis was performed to confirm the structural and functional capability of the containment suppression chamber and attached piping, to withstand newly-identified suppression pool hydrodynamic loading conditions which had not been explicitly considered in the original design analysis for the plant. As part of the STP evaluation, specific loading conditions were developed for each Mark I facility, to account for the change in the magnitude of the loads due to plant-specific variations from the reference plant design for which the basic loading conditions were developed.

The results of the NRC staff's review of the hydrodynamic load definition techniques and the Mark I containment plant unique analyses are described in the "Mark I Containment Short Term Program Safety Evaluation Report, "NUREG-0408, December 1977. As discussed in this report, the NRC staff has concluded that each Mark I containment system would maintain its integrity and functional capability in the unlikely event of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and, therefore, that licensed Mark I BWR facilities can continue to operate safely, without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, during an interim period of approximately two years, while a methodical, comprehensive Long Term Program is conducted.

As discussed in Section III.C of NUREG-0408, of all the plant parameters that were considered in the development of the hydrodynamic loads for the STP, only two parameters are expected to vary during normal plant operation; these are (1) the drywell-wetwell differential pressure; and (2) the suppression chamber (torus) water level. Subsequent to the submittal of the PUA, the licensee was requested to submit proposed Technical Specifications which assure that the allowable range of these two parameters during facility operation would be in accordance with the values utilized in the PUA.

Since early 1976, the licensee has been operating Peach Bottom Units Nos. 2 and 3 with differential pressure control and torus water level limits to enhance the safety margins of the containment structure while the PUA was being evaluated. This evaluation provides the basis for incorporating only torus water level Technical Specifications with the associated limiting conditions for operation and action statements relative to inoperable instruments.

By letter dated November 4, 1976, as supplemented by letters dated February 28, April 14, June 16, and August 30, 1977, the licensee proposed changes to the facility Technical Specifications. Our evaluation of these proposed changes follows.

II. EVALUATION

The licensee's submittal of November 4, 1976 proposed certain Technical Specification requirements for the purpose of assuring that the normal plant operating conditions are within the envelope of conditions considered in their PUA. These Technical Specification changes establish (1) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) for drywell to torus differential pressure and torus water level, and (2) associated surveillance requirements. All other initial conditions utilized in the PUA are either presently included in the Technical Specifications or are configurational conditions which have been confirmed by the licensee and will not change during normal operation. As indicated on Table III-1 of NUREG-0408 and by letter dated June 16, 1976, the licensee submitted a request to allow operation without drywell/torus differential pressure control.

His submittal included a report entitled, "Analysis of Torus Support System for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Stations Units 2 and 3 - Additional Analysis Report for Removal of Drywell-Wetwell Differential Pressure Controls," dated May 1977. This submittal is consistent with the Commission's letter dated May 18, 1977, which set forth the acceptance criteria for the removal or reduction of drywell-wetwell differential pressure controls.

The licensee has provided a description of the loads and the stresses in the structural elements of the most heavily loaded outer columns and saddles of the torus support systems resulting from pool swell loading superimposed upon the dead and the seismic loadings. The pool swell loadings are calculated for the maximum downcomer submergence with no drywell-wetwell differential pressure and are increased by thirty-three percent. Also included are the corresponding ultimate capacities and strength ratios, or the Code allowable capacities where these were met. The torus support systems include the reinforcement which was added to the original torus support systems during April and May of 1976 on Unit 2 and during January and February of 1977 on Unit 3.

For the conditions stated above, the stresses in the outer column and saddle base plates are substantially less than Code allowables; and the strength ratios in the outer column and saddle, and the outer column/torus and saddle/torus welds are less than or equal to 0.45. In addition, examination of Table 7-3 of the document entitled, "Analysis of Torus Support System For The Peach Bottom Atomic Power Stations Units 2 and 3, "Revision 1, dated October 1976, verifies, by inspection, that the ring girder stresses for this condition are below the Code allowable stresses. The acceptance criterion for this loading condition is that either the loads and stresses be below the Code allowables or the strength ratios be less than 0.50.

Based upon the above information, we have determined that sufficient margins of safety against failure currently exist in the torus and torus support structures to withstand the effects of dead loads, seismic loads, and pool swell loads without the drywell-wetwell differential pressure. Therefore, controls on the maintainance of the drywell-wetwell differential pressure need not be applied to Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 and the requirements to establish differential pressure control, as set forth in the Commission's Notice of Granting an Exemption from the requirements of General Design Criteria 50 "Containment Design Basis," of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 is hereby rescinded.

The torus water level is not expected to vary significantly during normal operation, unless certain systems connected to the suppression pool are activated. The torus water level would normally be monitored whenever such systems are in use. Therefore, we find that inclusion of periodic torus water level surveillance requirements in the Technical Specifications is not required.

We have reviewed the torus water level monitoring instrumentation system proposed by the licensee with regard to the number of available channels and the instrumentation accuracy. This type of instrumentation is typically calibrated at six-month intervals. To assure proper operation during such intervals, two monitoring channels for torus water level have been provided, such that a comparison of the readings will indicate when one of the channels is inoperative or drifting. The errors in the torus water level instrumentation are sufficiently small relative to the magnitude of the measurement (i.e., 10% of the difference between the maximum and minimum torus water level) that they may be neglected, based on the expected load variation with torus water level.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

CONCLUSIONS

The proposed Technical Specifications will provide the necessary assurance that the plant's operating conditions remain within the envelope of the conditions assumed in the Plant Unique Analysis (PUA) performed in conjunction with the Mark I Containment Short Term Program. The PUA supplements the facility's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) in that it demonstrates the plant's capability to withstand the suppression pool hydrodynamic loads which were not explicitly considered in the FSAR. We therefore conclude that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are acceptable.

Based on the considerations discussed above, we have determined that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: May 11, 1978

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKETS NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ET ALPEACH BOTTOM UNITS NOS. 2 AND 3NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments Nos. 41 and 40 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, issued to Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company, which revised the Technical Specifications for operation of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units Nos. 2 and 3, located in York County, Pennsylvania. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendments revised the Technical Specifications to incorporate requirements for establishing and maintaining suppression chamber water level, to maintain the margins of safety established in the NRC staff's "Mark I Containment Short Term Program Safety Evaluation", NUREG-0408. Operation in accordance with the conditions specified in NUREG-0408 has been previously authorized in the Federal Register on March 29, 1978 (43 FR 13111). The Commission's Safety Evaluation supporting these amendments provides the basis for rescinding the requirements to establish and maintain drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure control.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made

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
appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4), an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) application for amendment dated November 4, 1976, as supplemented by letters dated February 28, April 14, June 16 and August 30, 1977, (2) Amendments Nos. 41 and 40 to License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126. A single copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 11th day of May 1978.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "George Lear". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping "G" and "L".

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors