



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 18, 1996

Mr. Joseph J. Hagan
Vice President, Operations GGNS
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P. O. Box 756
Port Gibson, MS 39150

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 130 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
NO. NPF-29 - GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 (TAC NO. M95403)

Dear Mr. Hagan:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 130 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (GGNS). This amendment revises the GGNS Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your applications dated May 9, 1996, as supplemented by letter dated August 27, 1996.

The amendment revises Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 3.4.4.3, Safety/Relief Valves, 3.5.1.7, Automatic Depressurization System Valves, and 3.6.1.6.1, Low-Low Set Valves of the TSs. The revision states that the required surveillance of the valves is to verify that the relief-mode actuator strokes when the valve is manually actuated and the frequency of the surveillance would be in accordance with the inservice testing program for the valves. This revision will allow the surveillance of the relief mode of operation of the safety/relief valves (S/RVs) on the 4 main steam lines to be performed without physically lifting the disk of a valve off the seat at power.

You also submitted, in your application, changes to the Bases of the TSs that are associated with the above TS changes. The staff concludes that these changes are correct and are proper for the Bases of these SRs.

In your application of May 9, 1996, there was also an associated request for relief from inservice testing requirements in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for the S/RVs. This relief is needed to revise the requirements in the GGNS inservice testing program for these valves so that the program does not require stroking of these valves. This request for relief was addressed and granted in a separate letter to you on November 18, 1996.

You have made no other commitments in your letters for this amendment than the revisions to SRs 3.4.4.3, 3.5.1.7, and 3.6.1.6.1 of the TSs.

NRC FILE CENTER COPY

9611210114 961118
PDR ADOCK 05000416
P PDR

Mr. Joseph J. Hagan

- 2 -

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,


Jack N. Donohew, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-416

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 130 to NPF-29
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. Joseph J. Hagan

- 2 -

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Jack N. Donohew, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-416

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No.130 to NPF-29
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

DISTRIBUTION

Docket File	PUBLIC	PD4-1 r/f	JDonohew
J. Roe	P. Tressler	OGC (15B18)	G. Hill (2)
C. Grimes	ACRS	J. Dyer, RIV	J. Kilcrease, RIV f/r
L. Hurley, RIV	E. Adensam (EGAI)		F. Chery, RES

Document Name: GG95403.AMD (Based on EMEB SE Memo Dated 08/12/96)

OFC	PM/PD4-1	LA/PD4-1	BC/EMEB	OGC
NAME	JDonohew/vw	CMTN	RWessman	W... [unclear]
DATE	10/17/96	10/17/96	10/24/96	11/8/96
COPY	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

signed 11/18/96 jnd

DF01/1

200040

Mr. Joseph J. Hagan
Entergy Operations, Inc.

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

cc:

Executive Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P. O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway
P. O. Box 651
Jackson, MS 39205

Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W. - 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20005-3502

Director
Division of Solid Waste Management
Mississippi Department of Natural
Resources
P. O. Box 10385
Jackson, MS 39209

President,
Claiborne County Board of Supervisors
Port Gibson, MS 39150

Regional Administrator, Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

Senior Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Route 2, Box 399
Port Gibson, MS 39150

Nuclear Operating Plant Services
Bechtel Power Corporation
9801 Washington Boulevard
Gaithersburg, MD 20878

General Manager, GGNS
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P. O. Box 756
Port Gibson, MS 39150

Attorney General
Department of Justice
State of Louisiana
P. O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005

State Health Officer
State Board of Health
P. O. Box 1700
Jackson, MS 39205

Office of the Governor
State of Mississippi
Jackson, MS 39201

Attorney General
Asst. Attorney General
State of Mississippi
P. O. Box 22947
Jackson, MS 39225

Vice President, Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Director, Nuclear Safety
and Regulatory Affairs
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 756
Port Gibson, MS 39150



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCES, INC.

SOUTH MISSISSIPPI ELECTRIC POWER ASSOCIATION

ENTERGY MISSISSIPPI, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-416

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 130
License No. NPF-29

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The applications for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated May 9, 1996, as supplemented by letter dated August 27, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 130, are hereby incorporated into this license. Entergy Operations, Inc. shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Jack N. Donohew, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 18, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 130

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-29

DOCKET NO. 50-416

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE PAGES

3.4-11
3.5-5
3.6-21

INSERT PAGES

3.4-11
3.5-5
3.6-21

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.4.4.2 -----NOTE----- Valve actuation may be excluded. -----</p> <p>Verify each required relief function S/RV actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.</p>	<p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.4.4.3 -----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. -----</p> <p>Verify each required S/RV relief-mode actuator strokes when manually actuated.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for each valve solenoid</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.5.1.5 -----NOTE----- Vessel injection/spray may be excluded. -----</p> <p>Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.</p>	<p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.5.1.6 -----NOTE----- Valve actuation may be excluded. -----</p> <p>Verify the ADS actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.</p>	<p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.5.1.7 -----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. -----</p> <p>Verify each ADS valve relief-mode actuator strokes when manually actuated.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for each valve solenoid</p>
<p>SR 3.5.1.8 Verify the ECCS RESPONSE TIME for the HPCS System is within limits.</p>	<p>18 months</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.6.1 -----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. -----</p> <p>Verify each LLS valve relief-mode actuator strokes when manually actuated.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for each valve solenoid</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.6.2 -----NOTE----- Valve actuation may be excluded. -----</p> <p>Verify the LLS System actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.</p>	<p>18 months</p>



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 130 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-29

ENERGY OPERATIONS, INC., ET AL.

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-416

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated May 9, 1996, as supplemented by letter dated August 27, 1996, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (GGNS). The proposed changes are to Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 3.4.4.3, Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs), 3.5.1.7, Automatic Depressurization System Valves, and 3.6.1.6.1, Low-Low Set Valves, of the TSs. The proposed changes would state that the required surveillance of the valves is to verify that the relief-mode actuator strokes when the valve is manually actuated and the frequency of the surveillances would be in accordance with the inservice testing program for the valves. These changes would allow the surveillance of the relief mode of operation of each of the valves to be performed without physically lifting the disk off the seat at power.

In its application of May 9, 1996, as supplemented by letter dated August 27, 1996, the licensee also submitted changes to the Bases of the TSs that are associated with the proposed changes discussed above.

In the applications, there was also an associated request for relief from inservice testing requirements in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) for the safety and relief valves (S/RVs). This relief is needed to revise the requirements in the GGNS inservice testing program for these valves so that the program does not require stroking of these valves.

These valves were the subject of License Amendment No. 123, which increased the safety function lift setpoint tolerances that are listed in SR 3.4.4.1. The tolerances were increased from plus/minus 1 percent to plus/minus 3 percent, as approved in the staff's letter of June 12, 1996, in response to the licensee's application of February 22, 1996. This amendment approved a new frequency of removing the S/RVs and testing the safety lift setpoints during a refueling outage, beginning with Refueling Outage 8 commencing in October 1996. The new frequency is in accordance with the ASME Code inservice testing requirements for these valves.

9611210127 961118
PDR ADOCK 05000416
P PDR

2.0 BACKGROUND

The proposed changes to the TSs involve the S/RVs which are the overpressure protection for the reactor coolant system (i.e., reactor vessel, main steam lines, and associated piping) and are discussed in Section 5.2.2 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for GGNS. The overpressure protection includes the functions of automatic depressurization and of low-low set.

Each S/RV is a Dijkers, 8 X 10, direct-acting, spring-loaded safety valve with an attached pneumatic actuator. There are a total of 20 S/RVs installed on the 4 main steam lines. These valves have both a safety mode and a relief mode of operation.

As explained in the application, the S/RVs provide pressure relief based on the principle of vertically moving the stem that attaches directly to the valve disk. The force that provides the stem movement is provided by one of two sources: (1) the vessel pressure directly against the force of the stem spring (safety mode) or (2) the pneumatic actuator arm against the force of the stem spring (relief mode). The safety mode is never tested while the S/RV is installed in the plant. The testing of the relief mode of operation for a direct-acting S/RV provides verification that the control functions of electrical and pneumatic connections have been properly reconnected, and that the actuator arm will provide the necessary force to operate the S/RV.

The safety mode is the self-actuating function which is necessary to relieve system overpressure. The relief mode is accomplished by an automatic or manual control circuit which applies electric power to solenoids which provide control air to the pneumatic actuator piston. Eight of the S/RVs use the relief mode to perform the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function which is necessary for depressurizing the primary system to enable low-pressure injection systems for small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) scenarios. Also, six S/RVs, two of which are also ADS S/RVs, use the relief mode to perform the low-low set function which is necessary to prevent multiple simultaneous openings of the S/RVs and the associated containment loads. SRs 3.4.4.3, 3.5.1.7, and 3.6.1.6.1 assure the overpressure safety mode, ADS, and low-low set function relief modes, respectively, and are concurrently satisfied by performing the required testing of the S/RVs.

In past refueling outages, all 20 S/RVs were removed, bench tested for the safety mode setpoint according to the 1980 Edition of Section XI of the ASME Code through and including the Winter 1980 Addenda, and replaced with recertified S/RVs that had been verified to have zero seat leakage. After installation, each recertified S/RV was manually stroked to verify the relief mode function of the S/RV. This S/RV stroking was performed to satisfy ASME Code requirements for inservice testing of these Category B valves, as well as for meeting the current requirements in the above SRs.

The licensee stated that meeting the current requirements in SRs 3.4.4.3, 3.5.1.7, and 3.6.1.6.1 required physically lifting the disk off of the valve seat (i.e., the valve is stroked) and passing reactor steam through the valve. The licensee stated that, in order to prevent seat leakage from occurring, it is not desirable to open the S/RVs once they are installed at the plant. Seat leakage causes undesirable contamination and heating in the containment and contributes to further valve seat damage. The licensee also stated that performance trending data show that the S/RVs have an increased probability of leaking and experiencing safety mode setpoint drift in the negative direction (i.e., toward a lower setpoint) each time they are stroked.

3.0 EVALUATION

3.1 Proposed Technical Specification Changes

The licensee has proposed to change SRs 3.4.4.3, 3.5.1.7, and 3.6.1.6.1 to (1) allow stroking of only the S/RV actuator to demonstrate operability of the S/RVs in the relief mode and (2) conduct the SRs at a frequency in accordance with the inservice testing program for the S/RVs. The licensee proposed to perform the surveillance of the S/RV relief mode function without physically lifting the disk off of the valve seat at power. Not requiring the disk to be lifted means that reactor steam pressure is not needed to conduct the surveillances and, therefore, the surveillances do not have to be performed with the plant at power.

The licensee stated that, during the refueling outage, a sample of the S/RV population would be removed for safety mode setpoint testing in accordance with the plant inservice testing program, as now allowed by Amendment No. 123. This sampling provides for testing approximately one-third of the S/RVs during each outage with all being tested within approximately 5 years. The ASME Code also requires that additional valves, beyond the sample, be tested if S/RVs fail the setpoint testing.

The licensee also proposed that the frequency for the surveillances of the S/RV relief mode function would be in accordance with the inservice testing program for the valves and, therefore, following the setpoint testing discussed in the previous paragraph, the test sample of S/RVs would also be tested on the bench in the relief mode to verify that the pneumatic actuators function properly. After this test sample of S/RVs is replaced with recertified valves and the S/RV controls are connected to the newly installed valves (i.e., the valves are reinstalled on the main steam lines), the upper stem nut that couples the valve stem to the relief mode actuator would be moved up away from the actuator arm to allow an uncoupled actuation of the relief mode actuator (i.e., the disk would then not be coupled to the relief mode actuator and not move when the actuator is operated). The actuator would be remotely operated from the control room, and visual verification would be performed for proper actuator response and range of motion. After proper actuator operation has been verified, the upper stem nut would be returned to its operating stem location. Attachment 5 to the application dated May 9, 1996, showed pictures of an S/RV and where the stem nut is moved to allow an

uncoupled actuation. Page 2 of the attachment shows the washer and nut which are to lock the upper stem nut in its proper location.

The licensee further stated that the remaining installed S/RVs, which would not be removed as a part of the above testing sample, would continue to be tested for proper system function. As presently required by the plant TSs and administrative procedures, proper system function is demonstrated by providing an open signal to each S/RV and a check to verify that the actuator solenoid valve repositions. This test is conducted to meet SRs 3.4.4.2, 3.5.1.6, and 3.6.1.6.2 (companion SRs for the S/RVs to the three SRs proposed to be changed) to verify each S/RV system actuates on an actual or simulated automatic signal. As allowed by the note in the SRs, valve actuation may be excluded.

The relief-mode of operation involves the actuator solenoid valve repositioning to admit control air to the actuator cylinder which will move the cylinder piston and, through the actuator arm, the valve disk. This is an acceptable method to demonstrate the solenoid control function. To prevent the valve disks from moving during the test, the control air is isolated and the cylinder piston and valve disk do not move. The licensee concluded that the verification of proper actuator solenoid valve operation in the non-removed, remaining installed, S/RVs by conducting SRs 3.4.4.2, 3.5.1.6, and 3.6.1.6.2, and the proper relief-mode operation of the test sample of S/RVs provides assurance that all the S/RVs will perform as expected for relief-mode operation.

By phone call on August 16, 1996, the licensee explained why all the S/RVs were not tested by the method described above for the test sample of S/RVs that are removed from and later re-installed on the main steam lines. The licensee stated that there would be about 20 hours of occupational exposure in a radiation area that was not needed because SRs 3.4.4.2, 3.5.1.6, 3.6.1.6.2 are an accepted method to verify the S/RVs in the relief mode of operation will actuate on a signal.

3.2 Evaluation

3.2.1 Method to Demonstrate Operability of S/RVs

The staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed changes to SRs 3.4.4.3, 3.5.1.7, and 3.6.1.6.1, and agrees that the current requirements result in opening the valves during power operation, which could cause an undesirable transient in the reactor coolant system and failure of an S/RV to reclose would result in a LOCA. The licensee proposed the following two methods to demonstrate that the S/RVs meet the three SRs:

- The current method in the TSs that is described in the Bases for the three SRs. The manual activation of the valve with verification of the response of the turbine control valves or bypass valves, by a change in the measured steam flow, or any other method suitable to verify steam flow (e.g., tailpipe temperature or pressure).

- The new method described in Section 3.1 above.

The differences between the current TS testing and that proposed are (1) the proposed testing does not verify by actual stroking that the stem is properly coupled to the actuator, (2) the proposed sample testing of one-third of the total S/RV population each outage is less than the current testing of all S/RVs each refueling, and (3) the proposed testing does not verify, by successfully discharging the S/RVs, that the attached piping is not blocked. The second item is addressed in this section in terms of the reliability of the valves and in Section 3.2.2 in terms of the licensee's proposed change to the frequency of conducting the surveillances.

The potential concern regarding the first difference is that the stem may not be properly coupled to the actuator by the proper position of the stem nut after the S/RVs are installed and the actuators are stroked. This activity would be performed under plant quality controlled procedures which will require that the work be independently checked. The licensee has stated that, for the past seven cycles, all of the S/RVs have been removed and installed with only a single relocation failure which resulted in a solenoid valve failing to reposition. The licensee determined that, for this occurrence, the failure would have been detected by the proposed testing. The staff agrees that the licensee's good installation history and procedures adequately address concerns relative to the necessary repositioning of the stem nut.

The potential concern regarding the second difference is that the S/RVs may not be adequately reliable if they are only setpoint tested and stroked less often than currently performed. However, the 1980 Edition of the ASME Code, which is currently applicable to the licensee, requires only that a sample of S/RVs be setpoint tested in any test period. Further, more recent editions of the ASME Operations and Maintenance Code provide for the stroking of S/RV actuators only when setpoint tests, maintenance activities, or repair activities are performed. Therefore, the licensee's proposed testing frequency meets the more recent editions of the Code, which the staff has agreed are adequate for testing valves of this type. This frequency of testing the S/RVs was addressed by the staff and approved in Amendment No. 123.

Regarding the third difference, the licensee places Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) controls on all system openings when each S/RV is removed. The licensee states that the FME controls, as well as the horizontal orientation of the S/RV discharge pipe attachment, provide reasonable assurance that no obstruction will be admitted into the S/RV discharge piping. The licensee further states that, for the past seven maintenance outages, no failures related to line blockage have occurred. The staff agrees that this is acceptable for addressing this concern.

Using the methods for SRs 3.4.4.2, 3.5.1.6, and 3.6.1.6.2 to verify that the S/RVs that were not removed will function correctly for the relief mode of operation is acceptable. These valves were previously tested, or will be

tested in the future, by moving the upper stem nut when they are removed from the main steam line. When they remain in place, they will be tested by an accepted method to verify the S/RVs in the relief mode of operation will actuate on a signal. Also, the upper stem nut is locked in its proper location to prevent any movement of the nut while the valve is in place on the steam line.

The staff notes that, in the Bases for the proposed TS changes, the licensee retains the option to perform stroke testing of the S/RVs by actual manual actuation of the valve disks and observing indications of flow through the valves. This is also acceptable to the staff as a testing option.

3.2.2 Change Frequency of Surveillances

The licensee proposed to perform the three surveillances for the relief mode actuator in accordance with the ASME Code inservice testing program for the S/RVs. The purpose of this change is to have agreement between the TSs and the inservice testing program for these valves and to have the same sample size requirements for testing the S/RVs by the new relief-mode method as in the associated request for relief from the ASME Code inservice testing requirements for these valves. The request for relief was also in the application of May 9, 1996.

The request for relief was approved in the staff's letter of November 18, 1996. In that approval, the staff agreed that the ASME Code Category C setpoint testing, combined with stroking of the S/RV actuators was an acceptable alternative test method. The frequency for the Category C setpoint testing is once per five years which is consistent with the testing frequency approved for the safety function lift setpoint testing of the S/RVs in Amendment No. 123. The licensee's proposed testing frequency meets the more recent editions of the Code, which the staff has agreed are adequate for testing valves of this type.

Therefore, the licensee has proposed a testing frequency for the S/RVs that meets the ASME Code inservice testing requirements and is consistent with Amendment No. 123. Approving the proposed change will then have the TSs consistent with the ASME Code inservice testing frequency requirements for these valves. Based on this, the staff concludes that the proposed changes in frequency are acceptable.

3.3 Conclusion

Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated the adequacy of the proposed changes to SRs 3.4.4.3, 3.5.1.7, and 3.6.1.6.1 of the GGNS TSs. The proposed changes provide for testing of the S/RVs to demonstrate proper relief mode function without the need for actually stroking of the valve disks off of the valve seats while the plant is at power and the frequency of the surveillances would be in accordance with the ASME Code inservice testing program for the valves. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to SRs 3.4.4.3, 3.5.1.7, 3.6.1.6.1 are acceptable.

The changes to the Bases of the TSs for the SRs being revised were also reviewed, and the staff concludes that they are correct and are proper for the Bases of these SRs.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Mississippi State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 47971) accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: Charles G. Hammer
Jack N. Donohew

Date: November 18, 1996