

May 19, 1993

Docket No. 50-298

Mr. Guy R. Horn
Nuclear Power Group Manager
Nebraska Public Power District
Post Office Box 499
Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499

Dear Mr. Horn:

SUBJECT: COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - AMENDMENT NO. 163 TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46 (TAC NO. M86319)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 163 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-46 for the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The amendment consists of revisions to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated April 23, 1993, as supplemented by your letter of May 7, 1993.

The revisions modify the TS to delete Section 3/4.5.H, "Engineered Safeguards Compartments Cooling," and the associated Bases section from the TS. These sections of the TS state that if the unit coolers serving the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps are out of service, the associated pumps shall be considered inoperable. These TS were deleted because they were redundant to TS 1.0, "Definitions," Section N, "Operable - Operability - Operating," which states that a safety-related system is operable only if all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electrical power sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for a safety-related system to perform its safety function are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Harry Rood, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 163 to License No. DPR-46
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Harry Rood".

Harry Rood, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 163 to
License No. DPR-46
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Mr. Guy R. Horn
Nuclear Power Group Manager

Cooper Nuclear Station

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
DOCKET NO. 50-298
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 163
License No. DPR-46

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Nebraska Public Power District (the licensee) dated April 23, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated May 7, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-46 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.163, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Terence L. Chan, Acting Director
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 19, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 163

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46

DOCKET NO. 50-298

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE PAGES

ii
123
128
215b

INSERT PAGES

ii
123
128
215b

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3.5 BASES (cont'd)

of service. Specification 3.5.F.4 provides that should this occur, no work will be performed on the primary system which could lead to draining the vessel. This work would include work on certain control rod drive components and recirculation system. Thus, the specification precludes the events which could require core cooling. Specification 3.5.F.5 recognizes that, concurrent with control rod drive maintenance during the refueling outage, it may be necessary to drain the suppression chamber for maintenance or for the inspection required by Specification 4.7.A.2.h. In this case, if excessive control rod housing leakage occurred, three levels of protection against loss of core cooling would exist. First, a special flange would be used to stop the leak. Second, sufficient inventory of water is maintained to provide, under worst case leak conditions, approximately 60 minutes of core cooling while attempts to secure the leak are made. This inventory includes water in the reactor well, spent fuel pool, and condensate storage tank. If a leak should occur, manually operated valves in the condensate transfer system can be opened to supply either the Core Spray System or the spent fuel pool. Third, sufficient inventory of water is maintained to permit the water which has drained from the vessel to fill the torus to a level above the Core Spray and LPCI suction strainers. These systems could then recycle the water to the vessel. Since the system cannot be pressurized during refueling, the potential need for core flooding only exists and the specified combination of the Core Spray or the LPCI subsystems can provide this. This specification also provides for the highly unlikely case that both diesel generators are found to be inoperable. The reduction of rated power to 25% will provide a very stable operating condition. The allowable repair time of 24 hours will provide an opportunity to repair the diesel and thereby prevent the necessity of taking the plant down through the less stable shutdown condition. If the necessary repairs cannot be made in the allowed 24 hours, the plant will be shutdown in an orderly fashion. This will be accomplished while the two off-site sources of power required by Specification 3.9.A.1 are available.

G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe

If the discharge piping of the Core Spray, LPCI, HPCI, and RCIC systems are not filled, a water hammer can develop in this piping when the pump and/or pumps are started. If a water hammer were to occur at the time at which the system were required, the system would still perform its design functions. However, to minimize damage to the discharge piping and to ensure added margin in the operation of these systems, this Technical Specification requires the discharge lines to be filled whenever the system is in an operable condition.

CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.12 (cont'd)

B. Reactor Equipment Cooling (REC) System

1. Both Reactor Equipment Cooling sub-systems and their associated pumps shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the vessel or the spent fuel pool, except as specified in 3.12.B.2 and 3.12.B.3 below.

2. From and after the date that any component that affects operability in one REC subsystem becomes inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding thirty days provided that during such thirty days all the active components that affect operability of the operable REC subsystem, the active components that affect operability of the Core Standby Cooling Systems, the diesel generator associated with the operable subsystem are operable.

The allowable repair time does not apply when the reactor is in the shutdown mode and reactor pressure is less than 75 psig.

3. Both REC subsystems with one pump per subsystem shall be operable as stated in 3.12.B.1 and 3.12.B.2 above during reactor head-off operations requiring LPCI or Core Spray system availability or Service Water cooling shall be available.

4. If the requirements of 3.12.B.1 through 3.12.B.3 cannot be met, the reactor shall be shutdown in an orderly manner and in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours or operations requiring LPCI or Core Spray system availability shall be halted.

4.12 (cont'd)

B. Reactor Equipment Cooling (REC) System

1. REC System Testing

<u>Item</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
a. Pump Operability	Once/Month
b. Motor operated Valve Operability	Once/Month
c. Pump flow rate Each pump shall deliver 1175 gpm at 65 psid.	Once/3 months and after pump maintenance
d. System head tank level shall be monitored.	Daily

2. When it is determined that any active component that affects operability of an REC subsystem is inoperable, all active components that affect operability of the operable REC subsystem shall be verified operable immediately and weekly thereafter.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 163 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46
NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-298

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 23, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated May 7, 1993, the Nebraska Public Power District (the licensee) submitted a request for exigent changes to the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes modify the TS to delete Section 3/4.5.H, "Engineered Safeguards Compartments Cooling," and the associated Bases section from the TS.

The deleted TS state that if the unit coolers serving the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps are out of service, the associated pumps shall be considered inoperable. These TS were deleted because they were redundant to TS 1.0, "Definitions," Section N, "Operable - Operability - Operating," which states that a safety-related system is operable only if all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electrical power sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for a safety-related system to perform its safety function are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

Thus, deletion of TS 3/4.5.H will not adversely affect the assurance of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pump operability, and will make the TS consistent with the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Standard Technical Specifications in this regard.

The specific changes made to the TS by this amendment are as follows:

- Page ii Section H, "Engineered Safeguards Compartments Cooling," is removed from the Table of Contents.
- Page 123 - Sections 3.5.H and 4.5.H, "Engineered Safeguards Compartments Cooling" are deleted from the Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements sections.
- Page 128 - Section H, "Engineered Safeguards Compartments Cooling," is deleted from the Bases section.

Page 215b - "engineered safeguards compartment cooling systems" is replaced with "Core Standby Cooling Systems"

2.0 EVALUATION

The current definition of operability of safety-related systems in the TS, Section 1.0.N, was incorporated into the TS by Amendment No. 99, issued on May 19, 1986. Since Amendment No. 99 was issued, operability of the ECCS pumps has been defined by TS 1.0.N, which states that "...all attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electrical power sources ...cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s)."

Prior to the incorporation of the above definition of operability into the TS, the operability of the ECCS pumps was assured, in part, by TS 3/4.5.H, "Engineered Safeguards Compartments Cooling," which stated that if the unit coolers serving the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps are out of service, the associated pumps shall be considered inoperable.

Thus, because the definition of operability in TS 1.0.N covers all required supporting systems, a dedicated TS requiring the ECCS pump area coolers to be in service is no longer required. In fact, TS 3/4.5.H has been redundant since Amendment No. 99 was issued on May 19, 1986. This redundancy did not result in operational difficulties until recently, as described below.

During the conduct of the its Design Basis Reconstitution Program for CNS, the licensee identified a design basis accident (DBA) scenario in which the plant would be outside its licensing basis. The previously analyzed DBA loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) consists of a Recirculation System suction or discharge line break, with a concurrent Loss-of-Offsite Power and failure of one diesel generator. This line break bounds all other large breaks and is the design basis accident for containment and ECCS performance analyses. In this case, the failure of one of the two remaining RHR Pumps after approximately 10 minutes is within the licensing basis of the plant in that core thermal limits are maintained for this event. In this case, the ECCS pumps available include one Core Spray pump, two RHR pumps for the first 10 minutes and one Core Spray pump and one RHR pump after 10 minutes. For long term cooling, the single Core Spray pump can maintain core cooling, and the single RHR pump can provide for suppression pool cooling. Therefore, under previously considered DBA conditions, the plant ECCS performance and LOCA analysis assumptions remain valid, and with respect to this event, within the licensing basis.

However, review of ECCS capability performed as part of the licensee's Design Basis Reconstitution Program identified a scenario where the AC dependence of the area coolers results in less than the analyzed number of ECCS pumps being available after 10 minutes. The licensee determined during this review that a Core Spray System line break in the opposite division from the assumed failed Diesel Generator would create a situation where only one RHR pump would be available to mitigate the accident.

Specifically, the northwest corner room of the reactor building contains one Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump powered by Division I AC power and one powered by Division II AC power. The fan for the room cooler is powered by Division I AC power. Likewise, the southwest corner room contains one RHR pump powered from each AC Division. The fan in the southwest corner room is powered from Division II AC power. If there is a LOCA due to a Core Spray System line break in the opposite division from the assumed failed Diesel Generator, a situation would occur in which less than the analyzed number of ECCS pumps would be available to mitigate the accident. That is, with a Core Spray line break, one Core Spray subsystem is lost due to the line break and one Core Spray subsystem is lost due to the assumed failure of the diesel. In addition, one RHR Pump is also lost in each loop due to failure of the diesel, leaving only one RHR Pump per loop. One of these RHR Pumps is assumed to fail after approximately 10 minutes due to the AC dependence of the area cooler, and its associated diesel generator failure, causing the RHR motor to overheat. This leaves a single RHR Pump to meet both the core and containment cooling requirements of the accident after 10 minutes. Due to the loss of both Core Spray subsystems and failure of three of the four RHR Pumps in the Core Spray line break scenario, the Cooper Nuclear Station would be outside the current licensing basis during plant operation.

Under current plant conditions, with the reactor shut down, this design concern is not a safety issue. As discussed above, the only event in which this issue would be of concern is a Core Spray System line break accident, which is not a credible event with the plant in a cold shutdown condition. However, prior to ASME Class I pressure testing and subsequent startup from the refueling outage, the licensee has committed to complete a design change to ensure that a loss of RHR pump area cooling will not cause the failure of one of the remaining RHR pumps due to pump motor overheating.

The design change being made to correct this situation consists of removing the RHR pump compartment hatches, replacing the hatches with grating, and providing curbing around the hatch opening to eliminate flooding concerns. This will allow sufficient natural circulation cooling of the RHR pumps to permit them to perform their safety function without the room coolers in operation. These changes do not impact plant piping, instrumentation and controls, or other components. Review and evaluation under the licensee's design change process has determined that the design changes associated with this amendment request is acceptable and will not have any adverse safety consequences.

In order to implement the above-described design change, the TS must be changed to delete TS 3/4.5.H, which requires that the ECCS pump room coolers be in service in order for the ECCS pumps to be operable. The design change discussed above will permit the ECCS pumps to perform their safety function without the room coolers being in service.

The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed deletion of TS 3/4.5.H and finds it acceptable, because existing TS 1.0.N is both necessary and sufficient to define the operability of all safety-related systems including the ECCS pumps.

Further, the definition of operability in TS 1.0.N is consistent with the definition of operability provided in the BWR/4 Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1433), which was the result of extensive development and review by both the NRC Staff and the industry. The Standard Technical Specifications do not contain dedicated requirements for secondary plant support systems such as the ECCS pump area coolers. This support function is accounted for within the definition of operability given in the Standard Technical Specifications. On the basis of the above discussion, the NRC staff hereby approves the deletion of TS 3/4.5.H and the associated bases from the Cooper Nuclear Station Technical Specifications.

3.0 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

The Commission's regulations, 10 CFR 50.91, contain provisions for issuance of amendments when the usual 30-day public notice period cannot be met. One type of special exception is an exigency. An exigency is a case where the staff and licensee need to act promptly, but failure to act promptly does not involve a plant shutdown, derating, or delay in startup. The exigency case usually represents an amendment involving a safety enhancement to the plant.

Under such circumstances, the Commission notifies the public in one of two ways: by issuing a Federal Register notice providing an opportunity for hearing and allowing at least two weeks for prior public comments, or by issuing a press release discussing the proposed changes, using the local media. In this case, the Commission used the first approach.

The licensee submitted the request for amendment on April 23, 1993. It was noticed in the Federal Register on April 30, 1993 (58 FR 26174) and May 6, 1993 (58 FR 26988), at which time the staff proposed a no significant hazards consideration determination. In its letter of April 23, 1993, the licensee requested that the amendment be issued prior to May 10, 1993, at which time the change was thought to be necessary to permit certain tests to be performed during the course of the current refueling outage. The licensee subsequently advised the staff by letter dated May 7, 1993, that the tests had been delayed to May 22, 1993, and requested that the amendment be issued by that date.

Therefore, the staff is issuing the amendment under exigent circumstances for the reasons set forth in 2.0 above. The licensee did not request emergency treatment of the amended application; the staff does not believe that an emergency situation exists. However, also for the reasons set forth in 2.0 above, the staff does believe that the amendment should be issued promptly.

There were no public comments in response to the notice published in the Federal Register.

4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Operation of the facility in accordance with this amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the operability of the ECCS pumps will not be affected by the amendment. The licensee is currently performing a design change to improve the natural air circulation characteristics in the RHR pump areas which will eliminate the need for the Engineered Safeguards Compartment coolers to assure RHR pump operability. The need for a specific TS requiring that these coolers be in service to assure operability of the ECCS pumps was eliminated with the changes to the TS definition of operability in the TS made by Amendment No. 99, issued on May 19, 1986. Since Amendment No. 99 was issued, operability of the ECCS pumps is assured by the TS defining operability, which states that "...all attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electrical power sources...cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s)."

Because the above definition of operability is in the TS, a dedicated TS for the ECCS pump area coolers is not required and is redundant. For those areas which will still require the area coolers to assure pump operability (Core Spray, HPCI, and RCIC areas), the TS definition of operability will provide the necessary controls, and appropriate actions will be taken in accordance with the individual system TS should their area coolers become inoperable for any reason.

The design change being performed by the licensee will ensure that an adequate number of RHR pumps will remain available to respond to the postulated Core Spray System line break accident. Further, the ECCS pump area coolers will continue to be surveillance tested and maintained through plant procedural controls. Therefore, this amendment will not result in a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The physical plant changes being made to correct this situation consists of removing the RHR pump compartment hatches, replacing the hatches with grating, and providing curbing around the hatch opening to eliminate flooding concerns. These changes do not impact plant piping, instrumentation and controls, or other components. Review and evaluation under the licensee's design change process has determined that the design changes associated with this amendment request will not result in a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the proposed change will only remove requirements from the TS which are redundant to other controls already provided for within the TS. These controls are provided in the Definitions

section of the TS, which require that all attendant support systems or components necessary for a given system or component to perform its function are also capable of performing their related support functions. In addition, plant procedural controls will ensure that the ECCS area coolers will continue to be adequately surveillance tested and maintained.

The plant change associated with this TS change consists of removal of the RHR compartment equipment hatches to provide for improved natural circulation cooling. No changes to plant piping or instrumentation and controls are associated with this design change. These changes have been evaluated under the licensee's design change process which has determined that these physical modifications will not create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.

Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the TS changes will not create a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The TS sections removed by this amendment are redundant to the controls provided in the TS Definitions section for the determination of operability. Therefore, their removal from the TS will not reduce equipment availability and will not create a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The physical plant changes associated with this TS change will maintain the ECCS pump operability, and will therefore, not create a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based on the above considerations, the staff concludes that the amendment meets the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92. Therefore, the staff has made a final determination that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Nebraska State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comment.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to this amendment. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: H. Rood

Date: May 19, 1993