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May 3, 2002

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2002-003-00PLA - 5475FILE R41-2

Docket No. 50-387 License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-387/2002-003-00. This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), in that Unit 1 was in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications when required actions for inoperable Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation may not have been completed within the specified completion times. The condition was subsequently recognized and corrected. There was not a loss of safety function associated with the event, and there were no actual adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public.

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Bryce L. Shriver Vice President – Nuclear Site Operations

Attachment

cc: Mr. H. J. Miller Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406

cc: Mr. S. L. Hansell Sr. Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035

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NRC FORM 366		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY				APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004										
(7-2001)					cc	DMMI	SSION	Estimat 50 hour	ied burden p s. Reporte	oer n d les	esponse to comp sons learned are	ly with this	manda ed into :	tory in the lice	formation co	ollection request:
							to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F6) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 or buildings									
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)							e-mail to bis1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104) Office of Management and Budget Washington, DC 20503 # 6									
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)							means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.									
1. FACILIT	Y NAME							2. DOC	CKET NUM	BER	2		3. PAGE			
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4. TITLE																
Operatio	ns Prohib	ited By Te	chr	nical Specifications Due To				o Inope	noperable ATWS Recirc Pump Trip Breaker							
5.	. EVENT DA	TE	6. LER NUMBER			7.	REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED						
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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)																
Joseph J. Meter - Nuclear Regulatory Affairs						570 / 542-1873										
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT																
CAUSE	SYS		IPON	ENT	MANU- FACTURER	REI	PORTABLE	=	CAUSE		SYSTEM	COMPON	IENT	FA	ANU-	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
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16. ABST	RACT (Lim	it to 1400 spa	aces	s, i.e.,	approximately	15 si	ingle-spa	aced typ	ewritten lir	ies)						
On M	larch 4. 2	2002 at 01	1:20	) with	h Unit 1 in	Мос	ie 4 at	0% p	ower, ai	n Ir	strumentat	ion and	Con	trol	Technic	ian
perfo	rming a	24 month	loa	ic sv	vstem func	tion	al test	obser	ved tha	t ai	n Anticipate	d Tran	sient	Wit	nout Sc	ram
(ATWS) Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) 4.16 kV breaker did not trip as required. The Truck Operated Cell																
(TOC) switch contact in the rear of the associated 4.16 kV switchgear cubicle had failed to make-up properly.																
The TOC had excessive drive shaft and gear rotary motion, which allowed the TOC to over-travel when the																
breaker was "racked-in". The breaker was "racked-out" and returned to the "racked-in" position. The contact																
was checked for proper continuity and the logic system functional test was then completed successfully. The																
TOC was subsequently replaced with a design that is less susceptible to over-travel. An investigation																
showed that the contacts are not visible (i.e. "blind") when the breaker is in the "racked-in" position and there																
is no specific written guidance on now to verify that the contact is properly made-up. All other ATWS-RPT																
cubicles that have "blind" TOC contacts will be identified and it will be determined where verification of																
	contact alignment is necessary. Written guidance and training for monitoring the necessary "blind" TOC															

contact make-up after a breaker is "racked-in" will be established. The condition may have existed since the last time the breaker had been racked-in during the previous Unit 1 refueling and inspection outage in the Spring of 2000. This event is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.3.4.2 per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). There was not a loss of safety function associated with the event. There were no actual adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUME	ER	3. PAGE				
		SEQUENTI YEAR NUMBER	AL REVISION NUMBER					
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	05000387	2002 003	00	2 OF 4				

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

## **EVENT DESCRIPTION**

On March 4, 2002 at 01:20 with Unit 1 in Mode 4 at 0% power for a refueling and inspection outage, an Instrumentation and Control Technician (non-licensed, utility) performing a 24 month logic system functional test observed that Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) 4.16 kV breaker 1A20502 (EIIS Code: EB) did not trip as required. Investigation by Electrical Maintenance personnel (non-licensed, utility) identified that the Truck Operated Cell (TOC) switch contact 52-H2 in the rear of the associated 4.16 kV switchgear cubicle had failed to make-up properly. The TOC had excessive drive shaft and gear rotary motion, which allowed the TOC to over-travel when the breaker was "racked-in". This condition resulted in less than adequate contact 52-H2 make-up to trip the breaker on an AWTS - RPT instrumentation signal. The condition only affected the 52-H2 contact. Electrical Maintenance personnel "racked-out" breaker 1A20502 and returned it to the "racked-in" position. Contact 52-H2 was checked for proper continuity and the logic system functional test was then completed successfully. The TOC was then subsequently replaced with a design less susceptible to over-travel.

An investigation of the as-found condition by Engineering personnel (non-licensed, utility) determined that the degraded condition of contact 52-H2 had only affected the breaker's ability to trip on an ATWS-RPT instrumentation input signal. All other required functions of 1A20502 would have performed as designed. The condition of contact 52-H2 may have existed since the last time the breaker had been "racked-in" during the previous Unit 1 refueling and inspection outage in the Spring of 2000. Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) Basis for the ATWS - RPT Instrumentation (EIIS Code: JD) requires that instrument channels associated with a breaker that is incapable of operating be declared inoperable. The 'B' and 'D' ATWS-RPT instrumentation channels (Division 2 trip system) are associated with breaker 1A20502 and therefore should have been declared inoperable since the Spring of 2000. With the Division 2 trip system of ATWS-RPT inoperable and the Unit in Mode 1, Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.4.2 required actions were not completed since the condition of the TOC was not known.

## CAUSE OF EVENT

The failure of breaker 1A20502 to trip on an ATWS-RPT instrumentation input signal was attributed to inadequate make-up of TOC switch contact 52-H2 in the rear of the associated 4.16 kV switchgear cubicle. The TOC had excessive drive shaft and gear rotary motion, which allowed the TOC to over-travel when the breaker was "racked-in". This condition resulted in less than adequate contact 52-H2 make-up, and the inability to trip the breaker on an AWTS - RPT instrumentation signal.

An investigation of the event showed that contact 52-H2 is not visible (blind) when the breaker is in the "racked-in" position and there is no lamp indication to verify correct contact alignment. Additionally, there is no specific written guidance concerning verification of contact 52-H2 position.

## ANALYSIS / SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

This event is reportable as a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) in that Unit 1 was in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specification 3.3.4.2.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)									
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER	3. PAGE						
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER							
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	05000387	2002 003 00	3 OF 4						

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

Specifically, the Division 2 trip system for the ATWS-RPT instrumentation was apparently inoperable for approximately two years while Unit 1 was in Mode 1. This time period exceeded that allowable by the Technical Specifications. However, due to redundancy in the design, both Reactor Recirculation Pumps would have tripped as required during an actual ATWS event. There are two ATWS-RPT breakers in series provided for each of the two Reactor Recirculation Pumps. A trip of either breaker in the series will trip the associated Reactor Recirculation Pump. The Division 1 trip system trips one of the two breakers for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for each Reactor Recirculation Pump and Division 2 trips the other breaker for eac

In addition, the degraded condition of contact 52-H2 had only affected the breaker's ability to trip on an ATWS-RPT instrumentation input signal. All other required functions of 1A20502 would have performed as designed. This event did not constitute a loss of safety function. There were no actual adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

In accordance with guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 2, the due date for this report is May 3, 2002.

## **CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

Corrective actions that have been completed:

- The TOC switch associated with 4.16 kV breaker 1A20502 was replaced with a design less susceptible to over-travel and subsequently tested satisfactorily.
- All other Unit 1 and Unit 2 52-H2 contacts on ATWS-RPT breakers were checked for proper contact make-up and found satisfactory.

Corrective actions to be completed:

- Identify other 4.16 kV breaker cubicles that have "blind" TOC contacts and determine where verification of contact alignment is necessary.
- Establish and implement written guidance for monitoring the necessary "blind" TOC contact makeup after a breaker is "racked-in".
- Establish training for monitoring the necessary "blind" TOC contact make-up for Operations and Maintenance personnel involved with 4.16 kV breaker manipulations.
- Station personnel are still evaluating additional corrective actions. An update to this report will be made if additional corrective actions are specified.

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1. FACILITY NAME		2. DOCKET	2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER					
			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Susquehanna Steam Electric	Station - Unit 1	05000387	2002	003	00	<b>4</b> OF	4	
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is re	quired, use additional co	pies of NRC Form 3	66A)					
ADDITIONAL INFORM	ATION							
Past Similar Events:	None							
Failed Component:	4.16 kV Breaker 1A20502 TOC							
Manufacturer:	Westinghouse							
Model:	50DHP250							