

August 13, 1996

Mr. William T. Cottle
Executive Vice-President &
General Manager, Nuclear
Houston Lighting & Power Company
South Texas Project Electric
Generating Station
P. O. Box 289
Wadsworth, TX 77483

SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - AMENDMENT NOS. 84
AND 71 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80
(TAC NOS. M94536 AND M94538)

Dear Mr. Cottle:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 84 and 71 to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80 for the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP). The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated May 1, 1996.

The amendments change the TSs to implement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, by referring to Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program." Part of your requested change, that regarding the frequency of leakage rate testing the normal containment purge valves and the supplementary containment purge valves, cannot be granted. We have provided the reasons in the related Safety Evaluation and have also enclosed the Notice of Denial.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 84 to NPF-76
2. Amendment No. 71 to NPF-80
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice of Partial Denial

cc w/encls: See next page

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Document Name: STP94536.AMD

OFC	LA/PD4-1	PM/PD4-1	BC/SCSB	OGC
NAME	PTressler	TAlexion/vw	CBerlinger	CHollen
DATE	7/24/96	7/26/96	7/29/96	8/6/96
COPY	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO

TWA signed on 8/13/96
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 13, 1996

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Executive Vice-President &
General Manager, Nuclear
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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Thomas W. Alexion".

Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 84 to NPF-76
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cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. William T. Cottle
Houston Lighting & Power Company

South Texas, Units 1 & 2

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY

CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO

CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS

DOCKET NO. 50-498

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 84
License No. NPF-76

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company* (HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL), and City of Austin, Texas (COA) (the licensees), dated May 1, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

*Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 84, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 13, 1996



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY
CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO
CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS
DOCKET NO. 50-499
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNIT 2
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 71
License No. NPF-80

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company* (HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL), and City of Austin, Texas (COA) (the licensees), dated May 1, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

*Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 71, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 13, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 84 AND 71

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80

DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2
3/4 6-5
3/4 6-6
B 3/4 6-1
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INSERT

3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2
3/4 6-5
3/4 6-6
B 3/4 6-1
6-18a

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Specification 3.6.3;
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With either the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding the allowances in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, restore the overall integrated leakage rate and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to within the allowances in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one containment air lock door inoperable:
 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed;
 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days;
 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and
 4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. By verifying leakage rates in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
- b. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.
- c. By verifying at least once per 7 days that the instrument air pressure in the header to the personnel airlock seals is ≥ 90 psig.
- d. By verifying the door seal pneumatic system OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by conducting a seal pneumatic system leak test and verifying one of the following:
 - 1) That system pressure does not decay more than 1.5 psi from 90 psig minimum within 24 hours, or
 - 2) That system pressure does not decay more than .50 psi from 90 psig minimum within 8 hours.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the safety analysis for a LOCA or steam line break accident. Measurements shall be made by fixed instruments, prior to determining the average air temperature.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 41.2 psig (P_a) in the event of a LOCA or steam line break accident. The measurement of containment tendon lift-off force, the tensile tests of the tendon wires, the visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, and the Type A leakage test are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35, "Inservice Inspection of UngROUTED Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," and proposed Regulatory Guide 1.35.1, "Determining Prestressing Forces for Inspection of Prestressed Concrete Containments," April 1979.

The required Special Reports from any engineering evaluation of containment abnormalities shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedures, the tolerances on cracking, the results of the engineering evaluation, and the corrective actions taken.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be sealed closed during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves sealed closed during plant operation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the Containment Purge System. To provide assurance that these containment valves cannot be inadvertently opened, the valves are sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevents power from being supplied to the valve operator.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 18-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 48-inch valves, the 18-inch valves are capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. There-

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guidelines values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure, P_a (41.2 psig). As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to $0.75 L_a$ before returning the Unit to service following performance of the periodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, and in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests. The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B and in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that: (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of 3.5 psig, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 56.5 psig during LOCA or steam line break conditions.

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA or steam line break event is 41.2 psig (P_a). The limit of 0.3 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 41.2 psig, which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

j) Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Testing Program", dated September 1995.

Peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA), P_a is 41.2 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , is 0.3% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

- a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. During the first unit start-up following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60 L_a$ for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ as-left and $\leq 1.0 L_a$ as-found for Type A tests.
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria for the overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_a$ when tested at $\geq P_a$.

The provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.2 do not apply to the test intervals specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.3 apply to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 84 AND 71 TO
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY
CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO
CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS
DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated May 1, 1996, Houston Lighting & Power Company, et al., (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80) for the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP). The proposed changes to the TSs would implement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, by referring to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program."

2.0 BACKGROUND

On September 12, 1995, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved issuance of a revision to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors" which was subsequently published in the Federal Register on September 26, 1995, and became effective on October 26, 1995. The NRC added Option B "Performance-Based Requirements" to allow licensees to voluntarily replace the prescriptive testing requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, with testing requirements based on both overall leakage rate performance and the performance of individual components.

By application dated May 1, 1996, the licensee requested changes to the TSs for STP. The proposed changes would permit implementation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B. The licensee has established a "Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program" and proposed adding this program to the TSs. The program references RG 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995, which specifies a method acceptable to the NRC for complying with Option B.

3.0 DISCUSSION

Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, provides assurance that the primary containment, including those systems and components which penetrate the primary containment, do not exceed the allowable leakage rate specified in the TSs and Bases. The allowable leakage rate is determined so that the leakage assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

On February 4, 1992, the NRC published a notice in the Federal Register (57 FR 4166) discussing a planned initiative to begin eliminating requirements marginal to safety which impose a significant regulatory burden. Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 was considered for this initiative and the staff undertook a study of possible changes to this regulation. The study examined the previous performance history of domestic containments and examined the effect on risk of a revision to the requirements of Appendix J. The results of this study are reported in NUREG-1493, "Performance-Based Leak-Test Program."

Based on the results of this study, the staff developed a performance-based approach to containment leakage rate testing. On September 12, 1995, the NRC approved issuance of this revision to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, which was subsequently published in the Federal Register on September 26, 1995, and became effective on October 26, 1995. The revision added Option B "Performance-Based Requirements" to Appendix J to allow licensees to voluntarily replace the prescriptive testing requirements of Appendix J with testing requirements based on both overall and individual component leakage rate performance.

RG 1.163, was developed as a method acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing Option B. This regulatory guide states that the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," provides methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with Option B with four exceptions which are described therein.

Option B requires that the RG or other implementation document used by a licensee to develop a performance-based leakage rate testing program must be included, by general reference, in the plant TSs. The licensee has referenced RG 1.163 in the proposed TSs.

RG 1.163 specifies an extension in Type A test frequency to at least one test in 10 years based upon two consecutive successful tests. Type B tests may be extended up to a maximum interval of 10 years based upon completion of two consecutive successful tests and Type C tests may be extended up to 5 years based on two consecutive successful tests.

By letter dated October 20, 1995, NEI proposed TSs to implement Option B. After some discussion, the staff and NEI agreed on final TSs which were enclosed to a letter from C. Grimes (NRC) to D. Modeen (NEI) dated November 2, 1995. These TSs are to serve as a model for licensees to develop plant specific TSs in preparing amendment requests to implement Option B.

For a licensee to determine the performance of each component, factors that are indicative of or affect performance, such as an administrative leakage limit, must be established. The administrative limit is selected to be indicative of the potential onset of component degradation. Although these limits are subject to NRC inspection to assure that they are selected in a reasonable manner, they are not TS requirements. Failure to meet an administrative limit requires the licensee to return to the minimum value of the test interval.

Option B requires that the licensee maintain records to show that the criteria for Type A, B, and C tests have been met. In addition, the licensee must maintain comparisons of the performance of the overall containment system and the individual components to show that the test intervals are adequate. These records are subject to NRC inspection.

4.0 EVALUATION

The licensee's May 1, 1996, letter to the NRC proposes to establish a "Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program" and proposes to add this program to the TSs. The program references RG 1.163, which specifies a method acceptable to the NRC for complying with Option B. This requires a change to existing TSs 4.6.1.1, 3.6.1.2, 4.6.1.2, 3.6.1.3, 4.6.1.3, and the addition of the "Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program" to Section 6.8.3.j. Corresponding Bases were also modified as necessary.

Option B permits a licensee to choose Type A; or Type B and C; or Type A, B, and C; testing to be done on a performance basis. The licensee has elected to perform Type A, B, and C testing on a performance basis.

The proposed TS changes discussed above are in compliance with the requirements of Option B and consistent with the guidance of RG 1.163, and the generic TSs of the November 2, 1995, letter and are, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

The licensee's May 1, 1996, submittal also proposed revising TSs 4.6.1.7.2 and 4.6.1.7.3 dealing with the frequency of leakage rate testing the normal containment purge valves and the supplementary containment purge valves. These valves use resilient seals. The licensee proposed to extend the present test intervals of 3 months for the supplementary purge valves and 6 months for the normal purge valves following the guidance of RG 1.163. RG 1.163 recommends testing of containment purge and vent valves at intervals not exceeding 30 months. However, the current test intervals are not based on Appendix J considerations and the licensee's proposal is therefore outside the scope of the proposed change to Option B. The current test intervals are based on the findings of Generic Issue B-20, "Containment Leakage Due to Seal Degradation," that valves with resilient seals should be tested more frequently than required by Appendix J. The background for this conclusion is discussed in IE Circular 77-11, "Leakage of Containment Isolation Valves With Resilient Seats," issued on September 6, 1977.

After some discussions with the staff, the licensee chose not to pursue this issue further. Since additional information would be required to continue this part of the review (for TSs 4.6.1.7.2 and 4.6.1.7.3), the staff denies this part of the proposed change.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 28616). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Lobe1

Date: August 13, 1996

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY

CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO

CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS

DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2

NOTICE OF PARTIAL DENIAL OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has denied, in part, a request by Houston Lighting & Power Company, an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80, issued to the licensee for operation of the South Texas Project, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located in Matagorda County, Texas. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of this amendment was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on June 5, 1996 (61 FR 28616).

The purpose of the licensee's amendment request was to revise the Technical Specifications (TSs) to implement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, by referring to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program." Included in this request was a proposed change regarding the frequency of leakage rate testing the normal containment purge valves and the supplementary containment purge valves (TSs 4.6.1.7.2 and 4.6.1.7.3).

The NRC staff has denied the portion of the proposed change regarding the frequency of leakage rate testing the normal containment purge valves and the

supplementary containment purge valves. These valves use resilient seals. The licensee proposed to extend the present test intervals of 3 months for the supplementary purge valves and 6 months for the normal purge valves following the guidance of RG 1.163. RG 1.163 recommends testing of containment purge and vent valves at intervals not exceeding 30 months. However, the current test intervals are not based on Appendix J considerations and the licensee's proposal is therefore outside the scope of the proposed change to Option B. The current test intervals are based on the findings of Generic Issue B-20, "Containment Leakage Due to Seal Degradation," that valves with resilient seals should be tested more frequently than required by Appendix J. The background for this conclusion is discussed in IE Circular 77-11, "Leakage of Containment Isolation Valves With Resilient Seats," issued on September 6, 1977.

After some discussions with the staff, the licensee chose not to pursue this issue further. Since additional information would be required to continue this part of the review (for TSs 4.6.1.7.2 and 4.6.1.7.3), the staff denies this part of the proposed change.

The licensee was notified of the Commission's denial of the proposed change by a letter transmitting Amendment Nos. 84 and 71.

By September 19, 1996, the licensee may demand a hearing with respect to the denial described above. Any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding may file a written petition for leave to intervene.

A request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch, or may be

delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. A copy of any petitions should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to Jack R. Newman, Esq., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-5869, attorney for the licensee.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated May 1, 1996, and (2) the Commission's letter to the licensee dated August 13, 1996, issued with Amendment Nos. 84 and 71 to NPF-76 and NPF-80.

These documents are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Wharton County Junior College, J.M. Hodges Learning Center, 911 Boling Highway, Wharton, TX 77488.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of August, 1996.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation