

OCTOBER 28 1981

DMB 016

Docket No. 50-313

Mr. William Cavanaugh, III  
Senior Vice President  
Energy Supply  
Arkansas Power & Light Company  
P. O. Box 551  
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

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Dear Mr. Cavanaugh:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.60 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-51 for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated February 20, 1981, as supplemented May 29, 1981 and October 8, 1981. During our review of your proposed amendment, we found that certain modifications were necessary to meet our requirements. Your staff has agreed to these modifications and they have been incorporated in this amendment.

The amendment modifies the ANO-1 TSs to provide operational requirements, limiting conditions of operation, surveillance and test requirements for facility modifications made at ANO-1 to protect against degraded grid voltage damaging safety related equipment.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

*ORIGINAL SIGNED BY*  
JOHN F. STOLZ

John F. Stolz, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Licensing

CP  
1

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 60 to DPR-51
- 2. Safety Evaluation
- 3. Notice

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

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PDR ADCK 05000313 te for concurrences  
P PDR

OFFICE	ORB#4:DL	ORB#4:DL	C-ORB#4:DL	AD:OR:DL	OELD	C-PSB;DSI
SURNAME	RIgram	*GVissing;c	*JStolz	*TNovak	*STreby	*MSrinivasan
DATE	10/7/81	8/17/81	8/18/81	8/24/81	8/26/81	8/19/81

Docket No. 50-313

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Mr. William Cavanaugh, III  
 Senior Vice President  
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 Arkansas Power & Light Company  
 P. O. Box 551  
 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

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John F. Stolz, Chief  
 Operating Reactors Branch #4  
 Division of Licensing

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cc w/enclosures:  
 See next page

*no legal objection to amendment & FR notice only*

OFFICE	ORB#4:DL	ORB#4:DL	C-ORB#4:DL	AD-OR:DL	OELD	C-PSB:DSI	<i>no legal objection</i>
SURNAME	RIngram	GVising;cf	JStolz	JNovak	S. Treby	M. Srinivasan	<i>R. [unclear]</i>
DATE	8/21/81	8/17/81	8/18/81	8/24/81	8/26/81	8/19/81	

Arkansas Power & Light Company

cc w/enclosure(s):

Mr. David C. Trimble  
Manager, Licensing  
Arkansas Power & Light Company  
P. O. Box 551  
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Mr. James P. O'Hanlon  
General Manager  
Arkansas Nuclear One  
P. O. Box 608  
Russellville, Arkansas 72801

Mr. William Johnson  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
P. O. Box 2090  
Russellville, Arkansas 72801

Mr. Robert B. Borsum  
Babcock & Wilcox  
Nuclear Power Generation Division  
Suite 420, 7735 Old Georgetown Road  
Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Mr. Nicholas S. Reynolds  
Debevoise & Liberman  
1200 17th Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20036

Arkansas Tech University  
Russellville, Arkansas 72801

Honorable Ermil Grant  
Acting County Judge of Pope County  
Pope County Courthouse  
Russellville, Arkansas 72801

cc w/enclosure(s) & incoming dtd.:  
2/20/81, 5/29/81, 10/8/81

Director, Bureau of Environmental  
Health Services  
4815 West Markham Street  
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency  
Region VI Office  
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR  
1201 Elm Street  
First International Building  
Dallas, Texas 75270



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-313

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT NO.1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 60  
License No. DPR-51

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Arkansas Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated February 20, 1981, as supplemented May 29, 1981, and October 8, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.c.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-51 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.60 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
John F. Stolz, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 23, 1981

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 60

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-51

DOCKET NO. 50-313

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

42a  
43a  
45b  
45c  
45d (new page)  
56  
57  
57a  
72  
72a  
100

3.5.1.7 The Decay Heat Removal System isolation valve closure setpoints shall be equal to or less than 340 psig for one valve and equal to or less than 400 psig for the second valve in the suction line. The relief valve setting for the DHR system shall be equal to or less than 450 psig.

3.5.1.8 The degraded voltage monitoring relay settings shall be as follows:

- a. The 4.16 KV emergency bus undervoltage relay setpoints shall be > 3115 VAC but < 3177 VAC.
- b. The 460 V emergency bus undervoltage relay setpoints shall be > 423 VAC but < 431 VAC with a time delay setpoint of 8 seconds  $\pm$ 1 second.

for protective action from a digital ESAS subsystem will not cause that subsystem to trip. The fact that a module has been removed will be continuously annunciated to the operator. The redundant digital subsystem is still sufficient to indicate complete ESAS action.

The testing schemes of both the RPS and the ESAS enable complete system testing while the reactor is operating. Each channel is capable of being tested independently so that operation of individual channels may be evaluated.

The Automatic Closure and Isolation System (ACI) is designed to close the Decay Heat Removal System (DHRS) return line isolation valves when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure exceeds a selected fraction of the DHRS design pressure or when core flooding system isolation valves are opened. The ACI is designed to permit manual operation of the DHRS return line isolation valves when permissive conditions exist. In addition, the ACI is designed to disallow manual operation of the valves when permissive conditions do not exist.

Power is normally supplied to the control rod drive mechanisms from two separate parallel 480 volt sources. Redundant trip devices are employed in each of these sources. If any one of these trip devices fails in the untripped state, on-line repairs to the failed device, when practical, will be made and the remaining trip devices will be tested. Four hours is ample time to test the remaining trip devices and, in many cases, make on-line repairs.

The Steam Line Break Instrumentation and Control System (SLBIC) is designed to automatically close the Main Steam Block valves and the Main Feedwater Isolation valves upon loss of pressure in either of the two main steam lines.

The SLBIC is also designed to be reset from its trip position only when the system is shut down or the Main Steam line pressure is below 650 psig.

The Degraded Voltage Monitoring relay settings are based on the short term starting voltage protection as well as long term running voltage protection. The 4.16 KV undervoltage relay setpoints are based on the allowable starting voltage plus maximum system voltage drops to the motor terminals, which allows approximately 78% of motor rated voltage at the motor terminals. The 460V undervoltage relay setpoint is based on long term motor voltage requirements plus the maximum feeder voltage drop allowance resulting in a 92% setting of motor rated voltage.

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

#### REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 7.1

Table 3.5.1-1 (Cont'd)

Amendment No. 50, 60

-45b-

OTHER SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS

	1	2	3	4	5
<u>Functional Unit</u>	<u>No. of channels</u>	<u>No. of channels for system trip</u>	<u>Min. operable channels</u>	<u>Min. degree of redundancy</u>	<u>Operator action if conditions of column 3 or 4 cannot be met</u>
2. Steam line break instrumentation control system (SLBIC). (a) SLBIC Control & Logic Channels	2	1	2	1	Notes 9, 5
3. Pressurizer level channels	3	N/A	2	1	Note 10
4. Emergency Feedwater flow channels	2/S.G.	N/A	1	0	Note 10
5. RCS subcooling margin monitors	2	N/A	1	0	Note 10
6. Electromatic relief valve flow monitor	2	N/A	1	0	Note 11
7. Electromatic relief block valve position indicator	1	N/A	1	0	Note 12
8. Pressurizer code safety valve flow monitors	2/valve	N/A	1/valve	0	Note 10
9. Degraded Voltage Monitoring					
a. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage	2/Bus	1/Bus	2/Bus	0	Note 14
b. 460 V Emergency Bus Undervoltage	*1/Bus	1/Bus	1/Bus	0	Notes 13, 14

\* Two undervoltage relays per bus are used with a coincident trip logic (2-out-of-2)

Table 3.5.1-1 (Cont'd)

- Notes:
1. Initiate a shutdown using normal operating instructions and place the reactor in the hot shutdown condition if the requirements of Columns 3 and 4 are not met within 12 hours.
  2. When 2 of 4 power range instrument channels are greater than 10% rated power, hot shutdown is not required.
  3. When 1 of 2 intermediate range instrument channels is greater than  $10^{-10}$  amps, hot shutdown is not required.
  4. For channel testing, calibration, or maintenance, the minimum number of operable channels may be two and a degree of redundancy of one for a maximum of four hours, after which Note 1 applies.
  5. If the requirements of Columns 3 or 4 cannot be met within an additional 48 hours, place the reactor in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
  6. The minimum number of operable channels may be reduced to 2, provided that the system is reduced to 1 out of 2 coincidence by tripping the remaining channel. Otherwise, Specification 3.3 shall apply.
  7. These channels initiate control rod withdrawal inhibits not reactor trips at <10% rated power. Above 10% rated power, those inhibits are bypassed.
  8. If any one component of a digital subsystem is inoperable, the entire digital subsystem is considered inoperable. Hence, the associated safety features are inoperable and Specification 3.3 applies.
  9. The minimum number of operable channels may be reduced to one and the minimum degree of redundancy to zero for a maximum of 24 hours, after which Note 1 applies.
  10. With the number of operable channels less than required, either restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 30 days, or be in hot shutdown within 12 hours.
  11. With the number of operable channels less than required, isolate the electromatic relief valve within 4 hours, otherwise Note 9 applies.
  12. With the number of operable channels less than required, either return the indicator to operable status within 24 hours, or verify the block valve closed and power removed within an additional 24 hours. If the block valve cannot be verified closed within the additional 24 hours, de-energize the electromatic relief valve power supply within the following 12 hours.

Table 3.5.1-1 (Cont'd)

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Notes Cont'd.

13. Channels may be bypassed for not greater than 30 seconds during reactor coolant pump starts. If the automatic bypass circuit or its alarm circuit is inoperable, the undervoltage protection shall be restored within 1 hour, otherwise, Note 14 applies.
14. With the number of channels less than required, restore the inoperable channels to operable status within 72 hours or be in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

### 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems

#### Applicability

Applies to the auxiliary electrical power systems.

#### Objectives

To specify conditions of operation for plant station power necessary to ensure safe reactor operation and combined availability of the engineered safety features.

#### Specifications

- 3.7.1 The reactor shall not be heated or maintained above 200F unless the following conditions are met (except as permitted by paragraph 3.7.2):
- A. Any one of the following combinations of power sources operable:
    - 1. Startup Transformer No. 1 and Startup Transformer No. 2.
    - 2. Startup Transformer No. 2 and Unit Auxiliary Transformer provided that the latter one is connected to the 22KV line from the switchyard rather than to the generator bus.
  - B. All 4160 V switchgear, 480 V load centers and 480 V motor control centers in both of the ESAS distribution systems are operable and are being powered from either one of the two startup transformers or the unit auxiliary transformer.
  - C. Both diesel generator sets are operable each with:
    - 1. a separate day tank containing a minimum of 160 gallons of fuel,
    - 2. a separate emergency storage tank containing a minimum of 138 inches (20,000 gallons) of fuel,
    - 3. a separate fuel transfer pump, and
    - 4. a separate starting air compressor.
  - D. Both station batteries are operable and each is capable of supplying power to the 125V d-c distribution system. At least 2 of the 3 battery chargers are operable.
  - E. A least 2 of 3 d-c control power sources to the 125V d-c switchyard distribution system are operable.
  - F. The off-site power undervoltage and protective relaying interlocks associated with required startup transformer power sources shall be operable per Table 35.1-1.
  - G. The selective load-shed features associated with Startup Transformer No. 2 shall be operable if selected for auto transfer.

- 3.7.2 A. The specifications in 3.7.1 may be modified to allow one of the following conditions to exist after the reactor has been heated above 200F. Except as indicated in the following conditions, if any of these conditions are not met, a hot shutdown shall be initiated within 12 hours. If the condition is not cleared within 24 hours, the reactor shall be brought to cold shutdown within an additional 24 hours.
- B. In the event that one of the offsite power sources specified in 3.7.1.A (1 or 2) is inoperable, reactor operation may continue for up to 24 hours if the availability of the diesel generators is immediately verified.
- C. Either one of the two diesel generators may be inoperable for up to 7 days in any month provided that during such 7 days the operability of the remaining diesel generator is demonstrated immediately and daily thereafter, there are no inoperable ESF components associated with the operable diesel generator, and provided that the two sources of off-site power specified in 3.7.1.A(1) or 3.7.1.A(2) are available.
- D. Any 4160V, 480V, or 120V switchgear, load center, motor control center, or distribution panel in one of the two ESF distribution systems may be inoperable for up to 8 hours, provided that the operability of the diesel generator associated with the operable ESF distribution system is demonstrated immediately and all of the components of the operable distribution system are operable. If the ESF distribution system is not returned to service at the end of the 8 hour period, specification 3.7.2.A shall apply.
- E. Two station battery chargers may be inoperable for 8 hours, after which specification 3.7.2.A shall apply.
- F. One of the two station batteries and the associated distribution system may be inoperable for 8 hours provided that there are no inoperable safety related components associated with the remaining station battery which are redundant to the inoperable station battery and the operability of the diesel generator is verified immediately. If the battery is not returned to service at the end of the 8 hour period, specification 3.7.2.A shall apply.
- G. Two control power sources from the plant to the switchyard and the attendant distribution system may be inoperable for 8 hours, after which specification 3.7.2.A shall apply.
- H. If the requirements of specification 3.7.1.G cannot be met, either:
- (1) place all Startup Transformer No. 2 feeder breakers in "pull-to-lock" within 1 hour, restore the inoperable interlocks to operable status within 30 days or submit a special report pursuant to specification 6.12.3.2 outlining cause of the failure, proposed corrective action and schedule for implementation; or  
NOTE: The provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable
  - (2) apply the action requirements of Table 3.5.1-1, Note 14.

3.7.3 Any degradation beyond those conditions specified in 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 shall be cause to initiate a reportable occurrence report per specifications 6.5 and 6.12.

#### Bases

The electrical system is designed to be electrically self-sufficient and provide adequate, reliable power sources for all electrical equipment during startup, normal operation, safe shutdown and handling of all emergency situations. To prevent the concurrent loss of all auxiliary power, the various sources of power are independent of and isolated from each other.

In the event that the offsite power sources specified in 3.7.1.A (1 or 2) are inoperable, the required capacity of one emergency storage tank plus one day tank (20, 160 gallons) will be sufficient for not less than three and one-half days operation for one diesel generator loaded to full capacity. (ANO-1 FSAR 8.2.2.3) The underground emergency storage tanks are gravity fed from the bulk storage tank and are normally full, while the day tanks are fed from transfer pumps which are capable of being cross connected at their suction and discharges and automatically receive fuel oil when their inventory is less than 180 gallons. Thus, at least a seven day total diesel oil inventory is available onsite for emergency diesel generator operation during complete loss of electric power conditions.

Technical Specification 3.7.2 allows for the temporary modification of the specifications in 3.7.1 provided that backup system(s) are operable with safe reactor operation and combined availability of the engineered safety features ensured.

Technical Specifications 3.7.1.F and 3.7.1.G provide assurance that the Startup Transformer No. 2 loads will not contribute to a sustained de-graded grid voltage situation. This will protect ESF equipment from damage caused by sustained undervoltage.

Table 4.1-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Channel Description</u>	<u>Check</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Calibrate</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
30. Decay Heat Removal System Isolation Valve Automatic Closure and Interlock System	S(1)(2)	M(1)(3)	R	(1) Includes RCS Pressure Analog Channel  (2) Includes CFT Isolation Valve Position  (3) Shall Also Be Tested During Refueling Shutdown Prior to Re-pressurization at a pressure greater than 300 but less than 420 psig.
31. Turbine Overspeed Trip Mechanism	NA	R	NA	
32. Steam Line Break Instrumentation and Control System Logic Test & Control Circuits	W	Q	R	
33. Diesel Generator Protective Relaying Starting Interlocks And Circuitry	M	Q	NA	
34. Off-site Power Undervoltage And Protective Relaying Interlocks And Circuitry	W	R (1)	R (1)	(1) Shall be tested during refueling shutdown to demonstrate selective load shedding interlocks function during manual or automatic transfer of Unit 1 auxiliary loads to Startup Transformer No. 2.
35. Borated Water Storage Tank Level Indicator	W	NA	R	
36. Reactor Trip Upon Loss of Main Feedwater Circuitry	NA	PC	NA	

Table 4.1-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Channel Description</u>	<u>Check</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Calibrate</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
37. Boric Acid Addition Tank				
a. Level Channel	NA	NA	R	
b. Temperature Channel	M	NA	R	
38. Degraded Voltage Monitoring	W	R	R	
39. Sodium Hydroxide Tank Level Indicator	NA	NA	R	
40. Incore Neutron Detectors	M(1)	NA	NA	(1) Check Functioning
41. Emergency Plant Radiation Instruments	M(1)	NA	R	(1) Battery Check
42. Reactor Trip Upon Turbine Trip Circuitry	NA	PC	NA	
43. Strong Motion Accelerographs	Q(1)	NA	Q	(1) Battery Check
44. ESAS Manual Trip Functions				
a. Switches & Logic	NA	P	NA	
b. Logic	NA	M	NA	
45. Reactor Manual Trip	NA	P	NA	
46. Reactor Building Sump Level	NA	NA	R	

Amendment No. 28, 29, 30, 60

72a

## 4.6 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM TESTS

### Applicability

Applies to the periodic testing and surveillance requirements of the auxiliary electrical system to ensure it will respond promptly and properly when required.

### Specification

#### 4.6.1 Diesel Generators

1. Each diesel generator shall be manually started each month and demonstrated to be ready for loading within 15 seconds. The signal initiating the start of the diesel shall be varied from one test to another (start with handswitch at control room panel and at diesel local control panel) to verify all starting circuits are operable. The generator shall be synchronized from the control room and loaded to full rated load and allowed to run until diesel generator operating temperatures have stabilized.
2. A test shall be conducted once every 18 months to demonstrate the ability of the diesel generators to perform as designed by:
  - a. simulating a loss of off-site power,
  - b. simulating a loss of off-site power in conjunction with an ESF signal,
  - c. simulating interruption of off-site power and subsequent re-connection of the on-site power source to their respective busses, and
  - d. operating the diesel generator for  $\geq$  1 hour after operating temperatures have stabilized.
3. Each diesel generator shall be given an inspection once every 18 months following the manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service.
4. During the monthly diesel generator test specified in paragraph 1 above, the following shall be performed:
  - a. The diesel generator starting air compressors shall be checked for operation and their ability to recharge the air receivers.
  - b. The diesel oil transfer pumps shall be checked for operability and their ability to transfer oil to the day tank.
  - c. The day tank fuel level shall be verified.
  - d. The emergency storage tank fuel level shall be verified.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 60 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-51

ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-313

Introduction

By letter dated February 20, 1981, supplemented by letters dated May 29, 1981, and October 8, 1981, Arkansas Power and Light Company (the licensee or AP&L) requested amendment of the Technical Specifications (TSs), Appendix A, appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-51 for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1 (ANO-1). The proposed changes would provide operational requirements, limiting conditions of operation, surveillance and test requirements for facility modifications made at ANO-1 to protect against degraded grid voltage damaging safety related equipment.

Background

By letter dated August 23, 1978, in response to the NRC's generic letter of June 3, 1977, the licensee proposed modification of the emergency power system of ANO-1 which would protect against degraded grid voltage damaging safety related equipment. While the proposed modifications were being reviewed, an Abnormal Occurrence resulting in complete loss of offsite power to both units was reported by the licensee on September 16, 1978. It was determined that one of the causes of this event was the lack of sequencing of the engineered safety features loads (ESF) onto the offsite power source (Sequencing of ESF loads onto the offsite power source was a modification proposed by the licensee's letter dated August 23, 1978.) Consequently, an order was issued which required the implementation of the proposed modification of sequencing the ESF loads onto the offsite power source.

The remaining proposed modifications of the licensee's letter dated August 23, 1978, were implemented following our acceptance and supporting safety evaluation provided by letter dated December 17, 1979. In our letter of December 17, 1979, we also requested proposed TSs concerning the modifications to the emergency power system of ANO-1. In response, the licensee proposed the requested TSs by letter dated February 20, 1981, supplemented by letter dated May 29, 1981.

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### Discussion and Evaluation

The proposed TSs are consistent with the design of the modifications for protection against degraded grid voltage and our Safety Evaluation of December 17, 1979. The proposed TSs include operational requirements, limiting conditions of operation and surveillance and test requirements related to the 4160V emergency bus and the 480V emergency bus undervoltage relays, the alarm and bypass time limits for the bypass circuit for the 480V undervoltage relay during reactor coolant pump start, and the load shed features and subsequent sequencing of ESF loads associated with Startup Transformer No. 2. The proposed relay settings would provide drop out at 92% of motor rated voltage for the 480V Class IE Bus and at 78% of motor rated voltage for the 4160V Class IE Bus. This would protect against degraded grid voltage damaging safety related equipment.

We have reviewed the licensee's proposed TS changes and have made corrections to a reference to a note in Table 3.5.1-1 and the identifying number of a proposed entry in Table 4.1-1. The licensee agreed to these modifications. We have determined that the proposed TS changes, as modified, are responsive to our request of December 17, 1979, to provide for protection against degraded grid voltage damaging safety related equipment. These changes would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident or decrease the margin of safety and, therefore, are acceptable.

### Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: October 23, 1981

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-313ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 60 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-51, issued to Arkansas Power & Light Company (the licensee), which revised the Technical Specifications (TSs) for operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) located in Pope County, Arkansas. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment modifies the ANO-1 TSs to provide operational requirements, limiting conditions of operation, surveillance and test requirements for facility modifications made at ANO-1 to protect against degraded grid voltage damaging safety related equipment.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the licensee's application dated February 20, 1981, as supplemented by letters dated May 29, 1981, and October 8, 1981, (2) Amendment No. 60 to License No. DPR-51, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, Arkansas. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 23rd day of October 1981.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Licensing