50-346

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 22, 1996

Mr. John P. Stetz
Vice President - Nuclear
Centerior Service Company
c/o Toledo Edison Company
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 North State Route 2
Oak Harbor, OH 43449

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 205 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 - DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 (TAC NO. M94280)

Dear Mr. Stetz:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 205 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS), Unit No. 1. The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated December 12, 1995, and as supplemented by your facsimile transmission dated January 26, 1996.

This amendment revises TS 3/4.6.1.1, Containment Systems - Primary Containment -Containment Integrity; TS 3/4.6.1.2, Containment Systems - Containment Leakage; TS 3/4.6.1.6, Containment Systems - Containment Vessel Structural Integrity; TS 3/4.6.5.3, Containment Systems - Shield Building Structural Integrity; and associated Bases. The revisions adopt the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B for Type A containment leakage testing as modified by approved exemptions and in accordance with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.163, dated September 1995. Surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.1.2, SR 4.6.1.2.b, SR 4.6.1.2.c, and SR 4.6.1.2.i are deleted since the details in these requirements are included in the standards approved in Regulatory Guide 1.163. TS 3/4.6.1.6 and TS 3/4.6.5.3 which address containment building and shield building structural integrity are deleted since the requirements are addressed in revised TS 3.6.1.2.a. The reference to the exemption included in Bases 3/4.6.1.2 is deleted since the exemption is no longer applicable. Additionally, the Action statement associated with TS 3.6.1.2 was modified to reflect the action to take if the as-left rather than the as-found leakage exceeds 0.75 L_a.

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A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Linda L. Gundrum

Linda L. Gundrum, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-346

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 205 to License No. NPF-3
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Linda L. Gundrum, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-346

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 205 to License No. NPF-3
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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cc:
Mary E. O'Reilly
Centerior Energy Corporation
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43652

Manager - Regulatory Affairs
Toledo Edison Company
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant
5501 North State - Route 2
Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449

Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts
and Trowbridge
2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Regional Administrator
U.S. NRC, Region III
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, Illinois 60523-4351

Mr. Robert B. Borsum
Babcock & Wilcox
Nuclear Power Generation Division
1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
5503 N. State Route 2
Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449

Mr. John K. Wood, Plant Manager
Toledo Edison Company
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 North State Route 2
Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449

Robert E. Owen, Chief
Bureau of Radiological Health
Service
Ohio Department of Health
P. O. Box 118
Columbus, Ohio 43266-0118

Attorney General
Department of Attorney
General
30 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43216

Mr. James W. Harris, Director
Division of Power Generation
Ohio Department of Industrial
Regulations
P. O. Box 825
Columbus, Ohio 43216

Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
DERR--Compliance Unit
ATTN: Zack A. Clayton
P. O. Box 1049
Columbus, Ohio 43266-0149

State of Ohio
Public Utilities Commission
180 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43266-0573

Mr. James R. Williams
State Liaison to the NRC
Adjutant General's Department
Office of Emergency Management Agency
2825 West Granville Road
Columbus, Ohio 43235-2712

President, Board of County
Commissioners of Ottawa County
Port Clinton, Ohio 43452

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 205
License No. NPF-3

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated December 12, 1995, and supplemented by facsimile transmission dated January 26, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 205 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 90 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Linda L. Gundrum

Linda L. Gundrum, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of issuance: February 22, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 205

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove	Insert
VI	VI
3/4 6-1	3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2	3/4 6-2
3/4 6-3	3/4 6-3
3/4 6-4	3/4 6-4
3/4 6-9	3/4 6-9
3/4 6-32	3/4 6-32
B 3/4 6-1	B 3/4 6-1
B 3/4 6-2	B 3/4 6-2
B 3/4 6-5	B 3/4 6-5

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that:

   1. All penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except those valves that may be opened under administrative controls per Specification 3.6.3.1, and

   2. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3

c. By performing required visual examinations of the containment vessel and shield building in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions, and in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, dated September 1995.

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*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the Shield Building (including the annulus and containment) and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that verification of these penetrations being closed need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of $\leq L_a$, 0.50 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a, 38 psig.

b. A combined leakage rate of $\leq 0.60\ L_a$, for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P_a.

c. A combined leakage rate of $\leq 0.03\ L_a$ for all penetrations that are secondary containment bypass leakage paths, when pressurized to P_a.

d. A single penetration leakage rate of $\leq 0.15\ L_a$ for the containment purge and exhaust isolation valve special test.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With either: (a) the measured overall as-left integrated containment leakage rate exceeding $0.75\ L_a$, (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding $0.60\ L_a$, or (c) with the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding $0.03\ L_a$, restore the leakage rate(s) to within the limit(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

b. With a single containment purge and exhaust isolation valve penetration having leakage rate exceeding $0.15\ L_a$; restore the leakage rate to within limits in 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated as follows:

a. Perform Type A tests in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions, and in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, dated September, 1995.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Deleted

c. Deleted

d. Perform Type B and C tests in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option A, as modified by approved exemptions.

e. The combined bypass leakage rate shall be determined to be $< 0.03\ L_a$ by applicable Type B and C tests at least once every 24 months except for penetrations which are not individually testable; penetrations not individually testable shall be determined to have no detectable leakage when tested with soap bubbles while the containment is pressurized to P_a, 38 psig, during each Type A test.

f. Air locks shall be in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3/4.6.1.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

g. Each time the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves are opened, a special test shall be performed within 72 hours after valve closure or prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5, whichever is later. The special test is conducted by pressurizing the piping section including one valve inside and one valve outside the containment to a pressure greater or equal to 20 psig. The leakage rate per penetration shall not exceed 0.15 L_a.

h. The special test as defined in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.g shall be performed for the containment purge and isolation valves when the plant has been in any combination of MODES 3, 4, 5 or 6 for more than 72 hours provided that the test required by Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.g has not been performed in the previous 6 months.

i. Deleted

j. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

Page 3/4 6-9 Deleted.
Next page is 3/4 6-10.

Page 3/4 6-32 Deleted.
Next page is 3/4 6-33.

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation and air lock door requirements, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure of 38 psig, P_a. As an added conservatism, the measured overall as-left integrated leakage rate is further limited to $\leq 0.75\ L_a$, during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The special test for the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves is intended to detect gross degradation of seals on the valve seats. The special test is performed in addition to the Appendix J requirements.

USAR 6.2.4 identifies all penetrations that are secondary containment bypass leakage paths.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provide assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that 1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmosphere of 0.5 psi and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 40 psig during LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure obtained from a LOCA event is 37 psig. The limit of 1 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 38 psig which is less than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

Deleted

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The limitation on use of the Containment Purge and Exhaust System limits the time this system may be in operation with the reactor coolant system temperature above 200°F. This restriction minimizes the time that a direct open path would exist from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere and consequently reduces the probability that an accident dose would exceed 10 CFR 100 guideline values in the event of a LOCA occurring coincident with purge system operation. The use of this system is therefore restricted to non-routine usage not to exceed 90 hours in any consecutive 365 day period which is equivalent to approximately 1% of the total possible yearly unit operating time.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment

3/4.6.5.2 SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY

SHIELDING BUILDING INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive material from the containment vessel will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analysis. The closure of the airtight doors and blowout panels listed in Table 4.6-1 ensure that the Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) can provide a negative pressure between 0.25 and 1.5 inches Water Gauge within the annulus between the shield building and containment vessel and within the interconnecting mechanical penetration rooms after a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). This restriction, in conjunction with the operation of the EVS, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.5.3 SHIELD BUILDING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

Deleted

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 205 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-346

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 12, 1995, the Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees), submitted a request for changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS), Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications (TS). By facsimile transmission dated January 26, 1996, the licensees transmitted two revised TS pages to reflect administrative clarifications to the amendment application. The clarifications were the result of telephone conversation with the staff, as discussed in the evaluation below, and were not outside the scope of the original no significant hazards determination. The requested amendment would revise TS 3/4.6.1.1, Containment Systems - Primary Containment - Containment Integrity; TS 3/4.6.1.2, Containment Systems - Containment Leakage; TS 3/4.6.1.6, Containment Systems - Containment Vessel Structural Integrity; TS 3/4.6.5.3, Containment Systems - Shield Building Structural Integrity; and associated Bases. The proposed revisions adopt the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, for Type A containment leakage testing as modified by approved exemptions and in accordance with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.163 dated September 1995. The licensees propose to delete surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.1.2, SR 4.6.1.2.b, SR 4.6.1.2.c, and SR 4.6.1.2.i since these requirements contain details that are now included in standards that are referenced by the September 1995 version of Regulatory Guide 1.163. TS 3/4.6.1.6 and TS 3/4.6.5.3 which address containment building and shield building structural integrity are proposed to be deleted since the requirements are addressed in revised TS 3.6.1.2.a. The licensees propose to delete reference to the exemption included in Bases 3/4.6.1.2 since it is no longer applicable. Additionally, the licensees propose to modify the Action statement associated with TS 3.6.1.2 to reflect the action to take if the as-left rather than the as-found leakage exceeds 0.75 L_a.

2.0 EVALUATION

The proposed amendment was submitted to request approval to use 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, for Type A testing. A revision to Appendix J was published on September 26, 1995, and became effective on October 26, 1995. The Appendix J revision allows use of Option B, based on a performance-based approach to containment leakage testing, which allows performance of a Type A leakage test at a periodic interval based on the previous performance of the overall containment system as a barrier to fission product releases. A general visual inspection of the accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment system for structural deterioration which may affect the containment leak-tight integrity must be conducted prior to the test, and at intervals between tests if the test interval has been extended to its maximum permitted value of 10 years.

The licensees propose to change TS 4.6.1.2.a to require performing Type A tests in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions, and Regulatory Guide 1.163 dated September 1995. Additionally, the licensees propose to add a new surveillance requirement, SR 4.6.1.1.c, to TS 3/4.6.1.1, Containment Systems - Primary Containment - Containment Integrity to require visual examinations of the containment vessel and shield building in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions, and Regulatory Guide 1.163. The licensees provided additional information on these TS changes to add the applicable date of the Regulatory Guide and to revise the sentence for clarity. Based on the new SR, the licensees propose deleting TS 3/4.6.1.6, Containment Systems - Containment Vessel Structural Integrity, and its associated Bases, and TS 3/4.6.5.3, Containment Systems - Shield Building Structural Integrity, and its associated Bases. The licensees have reviewed the Type A testing performed at DBNPS and concluded that the overall containment leakage rate has consistently remained well below the surveillance test acceptance criteria. During the five previous Type A tests conducted, the leakage has never exceeded 52.6 % of L_a. L_a is the maximum allowable leakage rate at the peak containment internal pressure related to the design basis loss-of-coolant accident. Section V.B of Option B of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J requires licensees who wish to voluntarily adopt Option B, or parts thereof, to submit to the NRC an implementation plan and a request for a revision to TS, including a general reference in the plant TS to the regulatory guide or other implementation document used by the licensee to develop a performance-based leakage-testing program. Accordingly, the licensees propose the addition of SR 4.6.1.1.c and the proposed changes to SR 4.5.1.2.a to require Type A testing, including visual examinations and leakage testing, to be performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B as modified by approved exemptions, and in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163 dated September 1995. These changes are consistent with the revised Appendix J, Option B requirements and the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

The licensees propose to delete SR 4.6.1.2.b, 4.6.1.2.c and 4.6.1.2.i. SR 4.6.1.2.b describes testing requirements if any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 L_a. SR 4.6.1.2.c requires the performance of a supplemental test to verify the accuracy of the Type A test. SR 4.6.1.2.i requires all test

leakage rates be calculated using observed data converted to absolute values and error analyses be performed to select a balanced integrated leakage measurement system. The information included in these three SRs are redundant to requirements contained in ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994 which is included by reference in the Nuclear Energy Institute document, NEI 94-01, Rev. 0, dated July 21, 1995, and which is endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.163 dated September 1995. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

A change to SR 4.6.1.2.d is proposed to clarify that the requirements for Type B and C leak rate testing will remain in accordance with Appendix J, Option A. The proposed SR will state, "Perform Type B and C tests in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option A, as modified by approved exemptions." The staff finds this clarification acceptable.

The licensees propose to modify Action 3.6.1.2.a and Bases 3/4.6.1.2 to clarify that the acceptance criteria for measured overall integrated containment leakage rate is an "as-left" value. The change is proposed as a clarification only to ensure that action is required only if the result of the last Type A test is unacceptable. This change does not alter the requirements to determine an as-found leakage rate as required by the test methodology specified by Regulatory Guide 1.163 dated September 1995, and to evaluate the as-found leakage rate against the reporting requirements contained in Appendix J, Option B. Therefore, the staff finds the changes acceptable.

The licensees propose to delete the second paragraph of TS Bases 3/4.6.1.2. This paragraph discusses an exemption regarding the Type A test schedule. With the proposed adoption of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, the exemption is no longer applicable since Option B does not specify test schedules. The staff finds this change acceptable.

The licensees propose an administrative change to the Table of Contents to show that portions of TS 3/4.6.1 and 3/4.6.5 for the containment vessel structural integrity and shield building structural integrity, based on the evaluation above, are deleted. The staff finds the administrative change acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite,

and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 1637). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: L. Gundrum

Date: February 22, 1996