

August 12, 1994

Docket No. 50-346

Mr. John P. Stetz
Vice President, Nuclear
Centerior Service Company
c/o Toledo Edison Company
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 North State Route 2
Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449

Dear Mr. Stetz:

SUBJECT: CORRECTION TO AMENDMENT NO. 188 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE -
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 (TAC NO. M88774)

On June 28, 1994, the Commission issued Amendment No. 188 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The amendment revised the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated January 31, 1994.

This amendment included changes to page B 3/4 9-2. During the revision process, a change on the same page made as a result of Amendment 186 was eliminated. The corrected TS page is enclosed.

Please accept our apologies for any inconvenience this error may have caused.

Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
Linda L. Gundrum, Acting Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
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cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
Unit No. 1

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REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.6 FUEL HANDLING BRIDGE OPERABILITY

The OPERABILITY requirements of the hoist bridges used for movement of fuel assemblies ensures that: 1) fuel handling bridges will be used for movement of control rods and fuel assemblies, 2) each hoist has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel element, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly in a failed fuel container over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.8 COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one decay heat removal loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two DHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core ensures that a single failure of the operating DHR loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating DHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

In MODE 6, the RCS boron concentration is typically somewhat higher than the boron concentration required by Specification 3.9.1, and could be higher than the boron concentration of normal sources of water addition. The flowrate through the decay heat system may at times be reduced to somewhat less than 2800 gpm. In this situation, if water with a boron concentration equal to or greater than the boron concentration required by Specification 3.9.1 is added to the RCS, the RCS is assured to remain above the Specification 3.9.1 requirement, and a flowrate of less than 2800 gpm is not of concern.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM

Deleted

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1

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Amendment No. ~~38~~, ~~135~~,
~~186~~, 188

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