

December 17, 1991

Docket No. 50-346

Mr. Donald C. Shelton, Vice President  
Nuclear - Davis-Besse  
c/o Toledo Edison Company  
300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, Ohio 43652

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Dear Mr. Shelton:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 167 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3  
(TAC NO. M73242)

The Commission has issued Amendment No. 167 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. The amendment revises the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated August 21, 1989, as supplemented September 1, 1989.

This amendment removes all line items using the term "status" from the Technical Specification (TS) tables regarding post-accident monitoring instrumentation, removes the line item on containment vessel hydrogen from the same TS tables, adds a monthly channel check for the hydrogen analyzers to TS 3/4.6.4, changes the bases regarding hydrogen analyzers, and makes several administrative changes.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

*/s/*

Jon B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-3  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 167 to License No. NPF-3
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

LA/PDIII-3/DRPW  
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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

December 17, 1991

Docket No. 50-346

Mr. Donald C. Shelton, Vice President  
Nuclear - Davis-Besse  
Centerior Service Company  
c/o Toledo Edison Company  
300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, Ohio 43652

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SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 167 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3  
(TAC NO. 73242)

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This amendment removes all line items using the term "status" from the Technical Specification (TS) tables regarding post-accident monitoring instrumentation, removes the line item on containment vessel hydrogen from the same TS tables, adds a monthly channel check for the hydrogen analyzers to TS 3/4.6.4, changes the bases regarding hydrogen analyzers, and makes several administrative changes.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jon B. Hopkins, Sr.".

Jon B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-3  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 167 to License No. NPF-3
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

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Toledo Edison Company

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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station  
Unit No. 1

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Columbus, Ohio 43235-2712



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 167  
License No. NPF-3


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated August 21, 1989, as supplemented September 1, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(a) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 167, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 45 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Jon B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-3  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of issuance: December 17, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 167

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
IV	IV
3/4 3-46	3/4 3-46
3/4 3-47	3/4 3-47
3/4 3-48	3/4 3-48
3/4 3-48a	-
3/4 3-49	3/4 3-49
3/4 3-50	3/4 3-50
3/4 3-50a	-
3/4 6-23	3/4 6-23
B 3/4 3-3	B 3/4 3-3
B 3/4 6-4	B 3/4 6-4

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.0 APPLICABILITY</u> .....	3/4 0-1
<u>3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS</u>	
3.4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL	
Shutdown Margin .....	3/4 1-1
Boron Dilution .....	3/4 1-3
Moderator Temperature Coefficient.....	3/4 1-4
Minimum Temperature for Criticality.....	3/4 1-5
3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS	
Flow Paths - Shutdown .....	3/4 1-6
Flow Paths - Operating .....	3/4 1-7
Makeup Pump - Shutdown .....	3/4 1-9
Makeup Pumps - Operating .....	3/4 1-10
Decay Heat Removal Pump - Shutdown .....	3/4 1-11
Boric Acid Pump - Shutdown .....	3/4 1-12
Boric Acid Pumps - Operating .....	3/4 1-13
Borated Water Sources - Shutdown .....	3/4 1-14
Borated Water Sources - Operating .....	3/4 1-17
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES	
Group Height - Safety and Regulating Rod Groups .....	3/4 1-19
Group Height - Axial Power Shaping Rod Group .....	3/4 1-21
Position Indicator Channels .....	3/4 1-22
Rod Drop Time .....	3/4 1-24
Safety Rod Insertion Limit .....	3/4 1-25
Regulating Rod Insertion Limits .....	3/4 1-26
Rod Program .....	3/4 1-30
Xenon Reactivity .....	3/4 1-33
Axial Power Shaping Rod Insertion Limits .....	3/4 1-34

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS</u>	
3/4.2.1 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE.....	3/4 2-1
3/4.2.2 NUCLEAR HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F_Q$ .....	3/4 2-5
3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F_{\Delta H}^N$ .....	3/4 2-7
3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT.....	3/4 2-9
3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS.....	3/4 2-13
<u>3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION</u>	
3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION.....	3/4 3-1
3/4.3.2 SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION	
Safety Features Actuation System.....	3/4 3-9
Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System.....	3/4 3-23
Anticipatory Reactor Trip System.....	3/4 3-30a
3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION	
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.....	3/4 3-31
Incore Detectors.....	3/4 3-35
Seismic Instrumentation.....	3/4 3-37
Meteorological Instrumentation.....	3/4 3-40
Remote Shutdown Instrumentation.....	3/4 3-43
Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.....	3/4 3-46
Fire Detection Instrumentation.....	3/4 3-52
Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation....	3/4 3-57
Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation...	3/4 3-62
<u>3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM</u>	
3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION	
Startup and Power Operation.....	3/4 4-1
Shutdown and Hot Standby.....	3/4 4-2
3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN.....	3/4 4-3
3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES AND PILOT OPERATED RELIEF VALVE - OPERATING.....	3/4 4-4

## INSTRUMENTATION

### POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.6 The post-accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE post-accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE required by Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.6 Each post-accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-10.

TABLE 4.3-6

REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication	M	N.A.
2. Reactor Coolant Temperature-Hot Legs	M	R
3. Reactor Coolant System Pressure	M	R
4. Pressurizer Level	M	R
5. Steam Generator Outlet Steam Pressure	M	R
6. Steam Generator Startup Range Level	M	R
7. Control Rod Position Switches	M	N.A.

TABLE 3.3-10

POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1

3/4 3-47

Amendment No. 36, 37, 68, 78, 167

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
1. SG Outlet Steam Pressure	1/Steam Generator
2. RC Loop Outlet Temperature	2/Loop
3. RC Loop Pressure	2/Loop
4. Pressurizer Level	2
5. SG Startup Range Level	2/Steam Generator
6. Containment Vessel Post-Accident Radiation	2
7. High Pressure Injection Flow	1/Channel
8. Low Pressure Injection (DHR) Flow	1/Channel
9. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	2/Steam Generator
10. RC System Subcooling Margin Monitor	1
11. PORV Position Indicator	1
12. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator	1
13. Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indicator	1/Valve
14. BWST Level	3
15. Containment Normal Sump Level	1
16. Containment Wide Range Water Level	1

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1

3/4 3-48

Amendment No. 84, 167

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
17. Containment Wide Range Pressure	1
18. Incore Thermocouples	2 per core quadrant
19. Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Level (Wide Range)	1

TABLE 4.3-10

POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. SG Outlet Steam Pressure	M	R
2. RC Loop Outlet Temperature	M	R
3. RC Loop Pressure	M	R
4. Pressurizer Level	M	R
5. SG Startup Range Level	M	R
6. Containment Vessel Post-Accident Radiation	M	R
7. High Pressure Injection Flow	M	R
8. Low Pressure Injection (DHR) Flow	M	R
9. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	M	R
10. RC System Subcooling Margin Monitor	M	R
11. PORV Position Indicator	M	R
12. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator	M	R
13. Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indicator	M	R
14. BWST Level	S	R
15. Containment Normal Sump Level	M	R
16. Containment Wide Range Water Level	M	R

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1

3/4 3-49

Amendment No. 26, 27, 29, 78, 78B, 167

TABLE 4.3-10 (Continued)POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
17. Containment Wide Range Pressure	M	R
18. Incore Thermocouples	M	R
19. Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Level (Wide Range)	M	R

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

HYDROGEN ANALYZERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen analyzers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one hydrogen analyzer inoperable, restore the inoperable analyzer to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen analyzer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by performance of a CHANNEL CHECK.

4.6.4.2 Each hydrogen analyzer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using sample gases containing:

- a. Zero volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen, and
- b.  $2.5 \pm 0.5$  volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

DELETED

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1

3/4 6-24

Amendment No. 43, 66

### 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### BASES

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#### REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

HOT STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost.

#### 3/4.3.3.6 POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION


The OPERABILITY of the post-accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. The containment Hydrogen Analyzers, although they are considered part of the plant post-accident monitoring instrumentation, have their OPERABILITY requirements located in Specification 3/4.6.4.1, Hydrogen Analyzers.

#### 3/4.3.3.7 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS - Deleted

#### 3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

Operability of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY. With the fire detector(s), local panel alarms, and connecting circuitry OPERABLE, the establishment of frequent fire patrols to inspect local fire panel(s) will provide the required fire detection capability.



Bases Figure 3-1 In-core Instrumentation Specification  
 Acceptable Minimum AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Arrangement

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage assumed for the system during the recirculation phase will not be exceeded.

#### 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

#### 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the required time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. Containment isolation valves and their required isolation times are addressed in the USAR. The opening of a closed inoperable containment isolation valve on an intermittent basis during plant operation is permitted under administrative control. Operating procedures identify those valves which may be opened under administrative control as well as the safety precautions which must be taken when opening valves under such controls.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the Hydrogen Analyzers, Containment Hydrogen Dilution System, and Hydrogen Purge System ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the maximum hydrogen concentration within the containment vessel at or below three volume percent following a LOCA.

The two redundant Hydrogen Analyzers determine the content of hydrogen within the containment vessel. The Hydrogen Analyzers, although they have their OPERABILITY requirements in this Specification, are considered part of the post-accident monitoring instrumentation of Specification 3/4.3.3.6, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.

The Containment Hydrogen Dilution (CHD) System consists of two full capacity, redundant, rotary, positive displacement type blowers to supply air to the containment. The CHD System controls the hydrogen concentration by the addition of air to the containment vessel, resulting in a pressurization of the containment and suppression of the hydrogen volume fraction.

The Containment Hydrogen Purge System Filter Unit functions as a backup to the CHD System and is designed to release air from the containment atmosphere through a HEPA filter and charcoal filter prior to discharge to the station vent.

#### 3/4.6.5 SHIELD BUILDING

##### 3/4.6.5.1 EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the emergency ventilation systems ensures that containment vessel leakage occurring during LOCA conditions into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere. This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in the safety analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 167 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-346

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 21, 1989, as supplemented September 1, 1989, Toledo Edison Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. The proposed changes would remove all line items using the term "status" in TS Table 3.3-10, "Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation," and TS Table 4.3-10, "Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements." In addition, the line item on containment vessel hydrogen would be removed from the above two tables, and a monthly channel check for the hydrogen analyzers would be added to TS 3/4.6.4, "Combustible Gas Control." Also, changes to the bases would be made to clarify that the hydrogen analyzers are part of the plant post-accident monitoring instrumentation. Finally, several administrative changes are proposed to be made for clarification purposes.

2.0 EVALUATION

TS Tables 3.3-10 and 4.3-10 have 14 of 34 items listed which utilize the term "status." Examples of these line items are "Auxiliary Feedwater Status," "SFAS Status," and "RPS Status." An exact definition for "status" that would cover all 14 line items cannot be determined. In fact, different definitions for each of the 14 line items cannot be definitely determined either.

A general understanding of the term "status" can be determined from Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, "Instrumentation for Light Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and

Following an Accident"; however, as stated above, no exact definition can be determined. As a result, the TS for these line items have little meaning, because they are subject to a large amount of interpretation.

NUREG-0103, Rev. 4, "Standard Technical Specifications for Babcock and Wilcox Pressurized Water Reactors," does not list any line items containing the term "status" in its corresponding TS Table. The licensee has determined that none of their 14 line items containing the term "status" are needed and, therefore, proposes to delete them.

The NRC staff has reviewed this issue and finds that these 14 TS line items are not meaningful and are not needed. Therefore, the NRC staff approves their deletion.

The licensee proposes to delete the line item on containment vessel hydrogen from TS Tables 3.3-10 and 4.3-10 and add a monthly channel check for the hydrogen analyzers to TS 3/4.6.4. Essentially, these changes just transfer the monthly channel check for the hydrogen analyzers from one TS to another TS. The licensee proposes this transfer, so as to keep all the TS requirements on the hydrogen analyzers in the same place in the TS. The NRC staff has reviewed this transfer of the monthly channel check and concludes that it is acceptable.

Along with the transfer of hydrogen analyzers monthly channel check, the licensee has proposed TS bases changes that state that the containment hydrogen analyzers are considered part of the plant post-accident monitoring instrumentation even though their operability requirements are located in TS 3/4.6.4. The NRC staff has reviewed these bases changes and finds them to just be clarifying changes. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that they acceptable.

The administrative changes proposed by the licensee consist of renumbering of items, clarifying title changes, and deletion of an expired footnote. The NRC staff has reviewed these changes and finds that they are administrative in nature. Therefore, the proposed changes are acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

### 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or a change to a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the

amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 49929). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). This amendment also involves changes in recordkeeping, reporting or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, with respect to these items, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

#### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Hopkins

Date: December 17, 1991