September 4, 1991

Docket No. 50-346

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| CGrimes | DRP, Region III |

Mr. Donald C. Shelton, Vice President
Nuclear - Davis-Besse
c/o Toledo Edison Company
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43652

Dear Mr. Shelton:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 162 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 (TAC NO. 75518)

The Commission has issued Amendment No. 162 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. The amendment revises the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated February 1, 1990.

This amendment revises the control rod assembly position indication acceptance criteria and makes some administrative corrections. The applicable bases were revised to provide a more detailed discussion of the revised acceptance criteria.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:

Jon B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 162 to License No. NPF-3
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

| JBH for | JBH | | | |
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DOCUMENT NAME: 75518 AMD

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 162
License No. NPF-3

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated February 1, 1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(a) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 162 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 45 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Jon B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of issuance: September 4, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 162

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

| Remove | Insert |
|---|---|
| 3/4 1-20 | 3/4 1-20 |
| 3/4 1-21 | 3/4 1-21 |
| 3/4 1-22 | 3/4 1-22 |
| 3/4 1-23 | 3/4 1-23 |
| B 3/4 1-4 | B 3/4 1-4 |
| - | B 3/4 1-5 |

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

GROUP HEIGHT - SAFETY AND REGULATING ROD GROUPS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONS

3.1.3.1 All control (safety and regulating) rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within ± 6.5% (indicated position) of their group average height.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

a. With one or more control rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within one hour and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

b. With more than one control rod inoperable or misaligned from its group average height by more than ± 6.5% (indicated position), be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

c. With one control rod inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a, above, or misaligned from its group average height by more than ± 6.5% (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within one hour either:

1. The control rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or

2. The control rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

a) An analysis of the potential ejected rod worth is performed within 72 hours and the rod worth is determined to be $\leq$ 1.0% $\Delta k$ at zero power and $\leq$ 0.65% $\Delta k$ at RATED THERMAL POWER for the remainder of the fuel cycle.

b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.2.

GROUP HEIGHT - SAFETY AND REGULATING ROD GROUPS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONS

ACTION: (Continued)

c) A power distribution map is obtained from the incore detectors and $F_Q$ and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours.

d) Either the THERMAL POWER level is reduced to $\leq$ 60% of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within one hour and within the next 4 hours the High Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to $\leq$ 70% of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination, or

e) The remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within $\pm$ 6.5% of the inoperable rod within one hour while maintaining the position of the rods within the limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each control rod shall be determined to be within the group average height limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the asymmetric rod monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod position(s) of the rod(s), with the inoperable asymmetric rod monitor at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each control rod not fully inserted shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 2% in any one direction at least once every 31 days.

GROUP HEIGHT - AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD GROUP

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.2 All axial power shaping rods (APSR) shall be OPERABLE, unless fully withdrawn, and shall be positioned within ± 6.5% (indicated position) of their group average height.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one APSR inoperable or misaligned from its group average height by more than ± 6.5% (indicated position), operation may continue provided that within 2 hours:

a. The APSR group is positioned such that the misaligned rod is restored to within limits for the group average height, or

b. It is determined that the imbalance limits of Specification 3.2.1 are satisfied and movement of the APSR group is prevented while the rod remains inoperable or misaligned.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.2.1 The position of each APSR rod shall be determined to be within the group average height limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the asymmetric rod monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod position(s) of the rod(s), with the inoperable asymmetric rod monitor at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.2.2 Unless all APSR are fully withdrawn, the APSR shall be determined to be OPERABLE by moving the APSR rods at least 2% at least once every 31 days.

*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.2.

POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.3 All safety, regulating and axial power shaping control rod absolute position indicator channels and relative position indicator channels shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod group average positions within ± 1.5%.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With a maximum of one absolute position indicator channel per control rod group or one relative position indicator channel per control rod group inoperable either:

1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to ≤ 60% of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination and reduce the High Flux Trip Setpoint to ≤ 70% of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within 8 hours, or

2. Operation may continue provided:

a) The position of the control rod with the inoperable position indicator is verified within 8 hours by actuating its 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or, 100% position reference indicator, and

b) The control rod group(s) containing the inoperable position indicator channel is subsequently maintained at the 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or, 100% withdrawn position and verified at this position at least once per 12 hours thereafter, and

c) Operation is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

b. With more than one relative position indicator channel inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue for up to 24 hours provided all of the absolute position indicator channels are OPERABLE.

## ROD DROP TIME

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.4 The individual safety and regulating rod drop time from the fully withdrawn position shall be $\leq$ 1.58 seconds from power interruption at the control rod drive cabinets to 3/4 insertion with:

a. $T_{avg} \geq 525°F$, and

b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With the drop time of any safety or regulating rod determined to exceed the above limit, restore the rod drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 and 2.

b. With the rod drop times within limits but determined with less than 4 reactor coolant pumps operating, operation may proceed provided that THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination operating at the time of rod drop time measurement.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.4 The rod drop time of safety and regulating rods shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head,

b. For specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the control rod drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and

c. At least once every 18 months.

POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS (Continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.3 Each absolute and relative position indicator channel shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the relative position indicator channels and the absolute position indicator channels agree within 3.46% at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the asymmetric rod monitor is inoperable, then compare the relative position indicator and absolute position indicator channel(s) of the rod(s) with the inoperable asymmetric rod monitor at least once per 4 hours.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% Δk/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 70°F. This condition requires either 600 gallons of 7875 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage system or 3,000 gallons of 1800 ppm borated water from the borated water storage tank.

The bottom 4 inches of the borated water storage tank are not available, and the instrumentation is calibrated to reflect the available volume. All boric acid tank volume is available. The limits on water volume, and boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the solution recirculated within containment after a design basis accident. The pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section (1) ensure that acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) ensure that the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of a rod ejection accident. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met. For example, misalignment of a safety or regulating rod requires a restriction in THERMAL POWER. The reactivity worth of a misaligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used in the safety analysis.

The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment should not be included in computing the average group position for determining the OPERABILITY of rods with lesser misalignments.

3/4.1.3. MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

The maximum rod drop time permitted is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with $T_{avg} \geq 525°F$ and with reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied. A 1.5% group average position uncertainty is applied to the rod index curves. Therefore, the position indicators must be capable of supporting this accuracy. The Surveillance Requirement ensures this accuracy by keeping the RPI calibrated to a "known" position as indicated by the API. Using the API as a "known" position is valid provided two consecutive reed switches are not inoperable. Having one entire string (i.e., every other reed switch) inoperable is acceptable.

A specific surveillance of the reed switches is not required because:

1) When one or more reed switch fails closed, a large API indication of asymmetry occurs.

2) Two failed open reed switches in series result in a large indication of asymmetry.

3) Failed open reed switches not in series (up to every other switch) are bounded by the analysis.

Therefore, a reed switch condition not bounded by the analysis will be indicated by API system asymmetry indications.

Technical Specification 3.1.3.8 provides the ability to prevent excessive power peaking by transient xenon at RATED THERMAL POWER. Operating restrictions resulting from transient xenon power peaking, including xenon-free startup, are inherently included in the limits of Sections 3.1.3 Rod Insertion Limits), 3.1.3.9 (Axial Power Shaping Rod Insertion Limits), and 3.2.1 (Axial Power Imbalance) for transient peaking behavior bounded by the following factors. For the period of cycle operation where regulating rod groups 6 and 7 are allowed to be inserted at RATED THERMAL POWER, an 8% peaking increase is applied at or above 92% FP. An 18% increase is applied below 92% FP. For operation where only regulating rod group 7 is allowed to be inserted at RATED THERMAL POWER, a 5% peaking increase is applied at or above 92% FP and a 13% increase is applied below 92% FP.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

If these values, checked every cycle, conservatively bound the peaking effects of all transient xenon, then the need for any hold at a power level cutoff below RATED THERMAL POWER is precluded. If not, either the power level at which the requirements of Section 3.1.3.8 must be satisfied or the above-listed factors will be suitably adjusted to preserve the LOCA linear heat rate limits.

The limitation on axial power shaping rod insertion is necessary to ensure that power peaking limits are not exceeded.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 162 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-346

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 1, 1990, Toledo Edison (the licensee) proposed an amendment to the Technical Specifications for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). The proposed changes involve Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.1.3, "Movable Control Assemblies," and its bases. The proposed changes would revise the acceptance criteria in TS 3.1.3.3 to 1.5% for rod group average position uncertainty and for TS 4.1.3.3 to 3.46% for Absolute Position Indicator (API) to Relative Position Indicator (RPI) uncertainty. Also, TS 3.1.3.3 would be revised to reverse the terms, "absolute position indicator channel" and "relative position indicator channel" and an administrative correction from the terminology "Asymmetric Rod Fault Circuitry" to "asymmetric rod monitor" would be made.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

TS 3.1.3.3 currently states that the ". . . absolute position indicator channels and relative position indicator channels shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod positions within ±6.5%." TS 4.1.3.3 states that OPERABILITY shall be determined by ". . . verifying that the relative position indicator channels and the absolute position indicator channels agree within 6.5% . . ." In both instances, the Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Standard Technical Specification (STS) has a value of "(2.0%)". (Parentheses in the STS signify that the value should be plant specific.) When no documentation could be found to support the value of 6.5% of the group average height, the licensee had B&W perform analyses to determine what this value should be. From the analyses, the licensee determined that the specified values should be 1.5% of the control rod group average positions

for TS 3.1.3.3 and 3.46% for the agreement between relative position indicator (RPI) channels and absolute position indicator (API) channels for TS 4.1.3.3. This latter value was computed to the indicated level of precision (i.e., three significant figures) so as to agree with the digital readout of this value.

B&W applies a 1.5% uncertainty to the rod group average position as part of the maneuvering analysis for reload. This uncertainty accounts for the deviation of the indicated group average position from the true average position. The reload analyses are approved by the NRC staff; therefore, changing TS 3.1.3.3 to be consistent with NRC-approved reload analyses is acceptable.

An API channel consists of two staggered strings of magnetic reed switches mounted on the outside of the Control Rod Drive Mechanism Motor tube. The RPI is a small, pulse-stepping motor driven from the power supply for the rod drive motor coupled to a potentiometer to generate a voltage signal equivalent to position. During normal plant operations, the RPI is reset as necessary to match the API; therefore, the API is being used as the "known" position of a control rod assembly. In order to preserve the 1.5% uncertainty requirement for RPI system utilization, each API and RPI channel needs to be operable and agree with each other. A Monte Carlo analysis was performed to determine the amount of agreement necessary to ensure the 1.5% uncertainty requirement for the control rod group average position. From that analysis, a deviation of 3.46% between the API and RPI for a single control rod assembly was determined to be appropriate. The staff has reviewed the change from 6.5% to 3.46% and finds it acceptable.

The licensee has also proposed a change to TS 3.1.3.3 Action Statement b. This change reverses the terms "absolute" and "relative" when referring to position indicator channels. This change is consistent with the B&W STS. The NRC staff has reviewed this change and finds that the current TS is incorrect, and the change to be consistent with the B&W STS is acceptable.

The final proposed change consists of replacing the term "Asymmetric Rod Fault Circuitry" with the term "asymmetric rod monitor." This is an administrative change that the staff finds acceptable.

## 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

## 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that

the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 13670). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

## 5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Jon B. Hopkins, NRR

Date: September 4, 1991