

IP2 CONTAINMENT LINING CONCERNS Qs & As

Q I hear there's a 6.5-square-inch leak in the IP2 containment steel lining that's causing rust spots. If there's a hole that big and causing rust, why don't you require that the plant be shutdown to fix the hole?

A The NRC notes that a recent news article about rust, a hole in the IP2 containment and an upcoming test of containment, is misleading. There is a standard containment integrity analysis that includes an assumption of a 6.5-square-inch hole in that analysis. It appears that this reference to an analysis assumption taken from the correspondence between NRC and Entergy has been confused with being an actual hole. This is not the case.

Q Is the containment steel liner rusting away and if so, shouldn't the plant be shutdown until that is resolved?

A There are some rust spots on the IP2 containment steel liner. This known rusting situation has not been considered, and is not now considered, to be an issue with respect to continued plant operation. In recent correspondence between Entergy and the NRC, having to do with a request for a five year extension to the containment ten-year leak rate test, the NRC has requested Entergy to provide an update on the extent of the containment liner rust. This is a normal engineering request for technical information that relates to the Entergy test interval extension request, and isn't indicative of a concern about the integrity of the containment for present day plant operation.

Q Is this unusual for a plant to request this type of extension?

A No, other plants have made similar requests, which have been granted.

Q Didn't ConEd request an extension for the inspection of the old steam generators and didn't the NRC grant that request, which was then followed by the Feb 2000 tube failure.

A Yes, an extension to the inspection interval of those steam generators was granted and this preceded the Feb 2000 tube failure. The prior inspection and analysis work done by Con Ed to support that extension request was found to have been inadequate and the NRC learned some lessons from its own technical review of that extension request. Also, Con Ed received significant escalated enforcement action for their failure to adequately inspect and analyze steam generator tube data during the inspection that preceded the above extension request.

Q I read an article that talked about the containment rust coming from building flooding of some 200,000 gallons of water. Did this just happen and if so why hasn't this been made known by Entergy or the NRC.

A This is not a recent occurrence. There was an event in the 1980s involving flooding in the containment building. This flooding is believed to be associated with the containment

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liner rust spots that are being monitored and have been discussed in connection with Entergy's request for a five year extension to the containment leak rate testing. As we documented in NRC bulletin 80-24, "This accumulation was later determined to have amounted to over 100,000 gallons which flooded the reactor vessel pit and wetted the lower nine feet of the reactor vessel while the reactor was at operating temperature."

Note: As background, a majority of the service water went into the reactor vessel pit and not much of the containment liner was exposed. The only exposure to the liner was the 4-6 inches on the 46 foot elevation of containment all of the way around the circumference.

Q Did the licensee look at the damage from the water flooding that occurred back in the 1980s?

A The NRC evaluated the analysis performed by Westinghouse, Nuclear Energy Services, and Consolidated Edison on the reactor vessel integrity when exposed to service water. (documented in NRC inspection report 50-247/80-19) The NRC concluded that the immersion of the reactor vessel did not constitute a significant structural transient and had negligible effect on the life of the vessel.

Note: This inspection also noted that paint and protective caulking was cracking and peeling that was used to protect the containment liner. The inspectors also independently visually inspected the reactor vessel lower head region, and reviewed magnetic particle inspection examinations performed by Consolidated Edison. Other safety components evaluated during the inspection included incore instrument nozzles, residual heat removal piping, steam generator blowdown piping, and fan cooler unit piping.