April 13, 1990

Docket No. 50-346

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Mr. Donald C. Shelton
Vice President, Nuclear
Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza - Stop 712
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43652

Dear Mr. Shelton:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 147 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 (TAC NO. 75235)

The Commission has issued Amendment No. 147 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. The amendment revises the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated December 22, 1989.

This amendment deletes Table 3.6-2, Containment Isolation Valves, in its entirety from the Technical Specifications (TSs) and revises TS Sections 1.8.a.2, 4.6.1.1.a.1, 3.6.3.1, 4.6.3.1.1, 4.6.3.1.2, and Section 3/4.6.3 of the Bases to reflect the deletion of this table. A new Section 4.6.3.1.3 is added to the surveillance requirements as part of this revision. The effect of this TS revision is to remove the list of containment isolation valves from the Davis-Besse TSs, including their maximum permissible isolation times, while maintaining the requirement in the TSs to test these containment isolation valves. This list of valves and the associated information (e.g., the functional description and the required closure time) will be transferred and maintained in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

Thomas V. Wambach, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V & Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 147 to License No. NPF-3
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 13, 1990

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Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V & Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 147 to License No. NPF-3
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

cc:
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 147
License No. NPF-3

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated December 22, 1989 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(a) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 147, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 45 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John N. Hannon

John N. Hannon, Director
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V, & Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 13, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 147

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove	Insert
1-2	1-2
3/4 6-1	3/4 6-1
3/4 6-14	3/4 6-14
3/4 6-15	3/4 6-15
3/4 6-16	3/4 6-16
3/4 6-17	-
3/4 6-18	-
3/4 6-19	-
3/4 6-20	-
3/4 6-21	-
3/4 6-22	-
B 3/4 6-3	B 3/4 6-3

1.0 DEFINITIONS

DEFINED TERMS

1.1 The DEFINED TERMS of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

THERMAL POWER

1.2 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

RATED THERMAL POWER

1.3 RATED THERMAL POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2772 MWt.

OPERATIONAL MODE

1.4 An OPERATIONAL MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level and average reactor coolant temperature specified in Table 1.1.

ACTION

1.5 ACTION shall be those additional requirements specified as corollary statements to each principal specification and shall be part of the specifications.

OPERABLE - OPERABILITY

1.6 A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s). Implicit in this definition shall be the assumption that all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electrical power sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment, that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s), are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

REPORTABLE EVENT

1.7 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 of 10 CFR Part 50.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by the Safety Features Actuation System, or

2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except those approved to be open under administrative controls,

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,

c. Each airlock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that:

1. All penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except those valves that may be opened under administrative controls per Specification 3.6.3.1, and

2. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3.

---

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that verification of these penetrations being closed need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of $\leq L_a$, 0.50 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a, 38 psig.

b. A combined leakage rate of $\leq 0.60\ L_a$, for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P_a.

c. A combined leakage rate of $\leq 0.015\ L_a$ for all penetrations identified in Table 3.6-1 as secondary containment bypass leakage paths, when pressurized to P_a.

d. A single penetration leakage rate of $\leq 0.15\ L_a$ for the containment purge and exhaust isolation valve special test.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding $0.75\ L_a$ (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding $0.60\ L_a$, or (c) with the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding $0.015\ L_a$, restore the leakage rate(s) to within the limit(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

b. With a single containment purge and exhaust isolation valve penetration having leakage rate exceeding $0.15\ L_a$; restore the leakage rate to within limits in 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4 - 1972:

a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 ± 10 month intervals during shutdown at P_a, 38 psig, during each 10 year service period.

CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.2 At least two independent containment cooling units shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one of the above required containment cooling units inoperable, restore at least two units to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.2 At least the above required containment cooling units shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

   1. Starting (unless already operating) each unit from the control room, and

   2. Verifying that each unit operates for at least 15 minutes.

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each unit starts automatically on low speed upon receipt of a SFAS test signal.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3.1 All containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to required isolation times.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

**b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

**c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1.1 The isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work that could affect the valve's performance is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

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* Surveillance testing of valves MS100, MS101, ICS11A and ICS11B is not required prior to entering MODE 4 but shall be performed prior to entering MODE 3.

** The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. Selected valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation test signal, each Purge and Exhaust automatic valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.1.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

TABLE 3.6-2

DELETED

leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage assumed for the system during the recirculation phase will not be exceeded.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the required time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. Containment isolation valves and their required isolation times are addressed in the USAR. The opening of a closed inoperable containment isolation valve on an intermittent basis during plant operation is permitted under administrative control. Operating procedures identify those valves which may be opened under administrative control as well as the safety precautions which must be taken when opening valves under such controls.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the Hydrogen Analyzers, Containment Hydrogen Dilution System, and Hydrogen Purge System ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the maximum hydrogen concentration within the containment vessel at or below three volume percent following a LOCA.

The two redundant Hydrogen Analyzers determine the content of hydrogen within the containment vessel.

The Containment Hydrogen Dilution (CHD) System consists of two full capacity, redundant, rotary, positive displacement type blowers to supply air to the containment. The CHD System controls the hydrogen concentration by the addition of air to the containment vessel, resulting in a pressurization of the containment and suppression of the hydrogen volume fraction.

The Containment Hydrogen Purge System Filter Unit functions as a backup to the CHD System and is designed to release air from the containment atmosphere through a HEPA filter and charcoal filter prior to discharge to the station vent.

3/4.6.5 SHIELD BUILDING

3/4.6.5.1 EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the emergency ventilation systems ensures that containment vessel leakage occurring during LOCA conditions into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere. This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in the safety analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 147 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-346

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In its letter dated December 22, 1989, the Toledo Edison Company (the licensee) requested an amendment to the operating license for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, to remove Table 3.6-2, Containment Isolation Valves, from Appendix A Technical Specifications (TSs). This table contains a list of containment isolation valves, including a functional description of these valves and the maximum permissible closure time for each listed valve. The licensee also proposes to revise a number of TS sections to reflect the deletion of this table. Additionally, clarifications regarding the surveillance requirements of some of these valves have been added.

2.0 DISCUSSION

The purpose of Table 3.6-2 is to maintain a current listing of those containment isolation valves which must close within a specified maximum time to ensure primary containment integrity in the event of either a severe transient or an accident which could introduce radioactive material into the primary containment atmosphere or which could pressurize the containment. However, a change affecting any valve in this table necessitates a TS revision be accomplished by amending the license.

To minimize such TS revisions for relatively minor changes, the Commission issued its Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements. This policy statement recognized the advantages of improved TSs and endorsed the recommendations of the nuclear industry and the NRC staff for a program to develop improvements in TSs. An important element of that program is the implementation of line-item improvements in TSs. The licensee's proposed revision is in accord with this effort.

Specifically, the licensee's proposal would relocate the list of containment isolation valves and the associated information in Table 3.6-2 into the Updated

Safety Analysis Report (USAR). This revision would allow any future changes to the information in the subject table to be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. However, the proposed revision will not remove the TS requirement to maintain primary containment integrity and the associated limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) nor will it remove the requirement to perform surveillance testing periodically and after maintenance, repair or replacement work to demonstrate operability of the containment isolation valves.

The specific TS sections proposed for revision, in addition to deleting Table 3.6-2, are Sections 1.8.a.2, 4.6.1.1.a.1, 3.6.3.1 including the addition of footnotes, 4.6.3.1.1, and 4.6.3.1.2. Further, the licensee has proposed the addition of TS Section 4.6.3.1.3 and has proposed a revision of Section 3/4.6.3 in the Bases.

The proposed changes to TS Sections 1.8.a.2 and 4.6.3.1.2 are administrative in nature in that they reflect the proposed deletion of Table 3.6-2. The proposed changes to TS Section 4.6.1.1.a.1 and to Section 1.8.a.2 transfer into the body of the TSs, the first footnote of the present Table 3.6-2 related to those containment isolation valves which may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. The licensee is proposing to revise TS Section 3.6.3.1 so as to emphasize that each containment isolation valve is still subject to a maximum permissible closure time.

Additionally, the licensee is proposing to transfer the third and fourth footnotes of the present Table 3.6-2 into TS Section 3.6.3.1 as the first and second footnotes, respectively. The second footnote of the present Table 3.6-2 which identifies those containment isolation valves that are not subject to the Type C Tests of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 is not proposed for transfer into the text of the TSs. The licensee's basis for this particular deletion is that the subject note is intended only for clarification and that this reference information will be maintained in the tabular listing of containment isolation valves which is being established in the Davis-Besse USAR.

The licensee proposes to add the phrase "...that could affect the valve's performance..." to TS Section 4.6.3.1.1 so as to emphasize that relatively minor work on containment isolation valves does not require a surveillance test. The licensee's basis for this addition is that the proposed insertion of the phrase cited above clarifies the circumstances which would require retesting for operability.

The licensee is proposing to add a new section to the TSs (i.e., Section 4.6.3.1.3) to ensure that the surveillance requirements for inservice testing of the containment isolation valves in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, incorporate the requirement to verify by test, the maximum permissible isolation time for power operated or automatic containment isolation valves. Finally, the licensee is proposing to revise Section 3/4.6.3 of the Bases to reflect the proposed deletion of Table 3.6-2.

3.0 EVALUATION

The proposed revisions to the TS sections discussed above are administrative changes reflecting the deletion of Table 3.6-2 and are acceptable on the basis that the present limiting conditions of operation and the surveillance requirements related to the containment isolation valves remain unchanged.

Further, these proposed revisions are also acceptable in that the information presently contained in Table 3.6-2 will be transferred and maintained in a controlled document (i.e., the USAR). Moreover, any future changes to the information related to the containment isolation valves will be made in a formal manner subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 which will ensure that any proposed change (e.g., the required valve closure time) will be reviewed by the licensee for its potential impact on safety, including the preparation of "...a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change...does not involve an unreviewed safety question" (10 CFR 50.59(b)(1)). Since these licensee safety evaluations for changes to the USAR will be maintained for the life of the license and submitted to the NRC annually, the NRC staff finds that there is sufficient control on any prospective changes to the information affecting the safe operation of the subject containment isolation valves. Furthermore, the licensee's proposed revisions are consistent with the Commission's policy on line-item improvements in TSs.

The proposed addition to TS Section 4.6.3.1.1 is acceptable in that it is a clarification which does not affect the existing requirement to retest the containment isolation valves to determine their operability when any work which would affect valve performance has been performed.

On this basis, the NRC staff finds that the proposed revisions to the Davis-Besse TSs associated with the deletion of Table 3.6-2 are acceptable.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or a change to a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). This amendment also involves changes in record-keeping, reporting or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, with respect to these items, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: M. D. Lynch

Dated: April 13, 1990