

DMB 016

January 12, 1984

Docket No. 50-346

Mr. Richard P. Crouse  
Vice President - Nuclear  
Toledo Edison Company  
Edison Plaza - Stop 712  
300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, Ohio 43652

Dear Mr. Crouse:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3;  
FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS

The Commission has issued Amendment No. 65 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. This amendment modifies the Appendix A Technical Specifications in response to Item 6 of your application dated July 10, 1981 (No. 731). Item 1 of your application was incorporated into the Technical Specifications with the issuance of Amendment No. 63, Item 4 was incorporated with the issuance of Amendments Nos. 42 and 64, and Item 2 was withdrawn by your letter of February 12, 1982 (No. 777). Items 3 and 5 are under review and will be acted upon separately.

This amendment modifies Technical Specification 3.7.10, relating to Fire Barrier Penetrations, to be consistent with the current Standard Technical Specifications for Babcock and Wilcox plants. We have also included a modification to Specification 6.9.2 to reflect the additional reporting requirement of Specification 3.7.10. We have discussed this with your staff, and they find this acceptable.

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A copy of the Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Monthly Notice.

Sincerely,

Albert W. De Agazio, Project Manager  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4  
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No.65 to NPF-3
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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Toledo Edison Company

cc w/enclosure(s):

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 65  
License No. NPF-3

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by The Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated July 10, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended as indicated below and by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment:


Revise paragraph 2.C.(2) to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 65, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
John F. Stolz, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 12, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 65

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

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3/4 7-47

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## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.10 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10 All fire barrier penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers) in fire zone boundaries protecting safety related areas shall be functional.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.7.10 The above required penetration fire barriers shall be verified to be functional:

- a. At least once per 18 months by a visual inspection.
- b. Prior to returning a penetration fire barrier to functional status following repairs or maintenance by performance of a visual inspection of the affected penetration fire barrier(s).

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

- e. Failure or malfunction of one or more components which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of system(s) used to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.
- f. Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.
- g. Conditions arising from natural or man-made events that, as a direct result of the event require plant shutdown, operation of safety systems, or other protective measures required by technical specifications.
- h. Errors discovered in the transient or accident analyses or in the methods used for such analyses as described in the safety analysis report or in the bases for the technical specifications that have or could have permitted reactor operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the analyses.
- i. Performance of structures, systems, or components that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specifications bases; or discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition.

### THIRTY DAY WRITTEN REPORTS\*

6.9.1.9 The types of events listed below shall be the subject of written reports to the Director of the Regional Office within thirty days of occurrence of the event. The written report shall include, as a minimum, a completed copy of a licensee event report form. Information provided on the licensee event report form shall be supplemented, as needed, by additional narrative material to provide complete explanation of the circumstances surrounding the event.

- a. Reactor protection system or engineered safety feature instrument settings which are found to be less conservative than those established by the technical specifications but which do not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems.

Amendment No. 8,12, 54

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1

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\*Routine surveillance testing, instrument calibration, or preventive maintenance which require system configurations as described in Section 6.9.1.9.a and 6.9.1.9.b need not be reported except where test results themselves reveal a degraded condition requiring corrective action.

- b. Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.
- c. Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems.
- d. Abnormal degradation of systems other than those specified in 6.9.1.2.c above designed to contain radioactive material resulting from the fission process.

#### SPECIAL REPORTS

6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office within the time period specified for each report. These reports shall be submitted covering the activities identified below pursuant to the requirements of the applicable reference specification:

- a. ECCS Actuation, Specifications 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
- b. Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation, Specification 3.3.3.3.
- c. Inoperable Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation, Specification 3.3.3.4.
- d. Seismic event analysis, Specification 4.3.3.3.2.
- e. Fire Detection Instrumentation, Specification 3.3.3.8.
- f. Fire Suppression Systems, Specifications 3.7.9.1 and 3.7.9.2.
- g. Fire Barrier Penetrations, Specification 3.7.10

#### 6.10 RECORD RETENTION

6.10.1 The following records shall be retained for at least five years:

- a. Records and logs of facility operation covering time interval at each power level.
- b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety.
- c. ALL REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES submitted to the Commission.
- d. Records of surveillance activities, inspections and calibrations required by these Technical Specifications.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

AND

CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-346

1. Introduction

By letter dated July 10, 1981, Toledo Edison Company proposed an amendment to Appendix A of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3. The subject change involves Section 3.7.10 of the Technical Specifications for Davis-Besse. The licensee has proposed to amend Section 3.7.10, "Fire Barrier Penetrations" (including cable penetration seals, fire doors and fire dampers) to specify:

With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration or verify the OPERABILITY of the fire detectors on at least one side of the nonfunctional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within seven days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the nonfunctional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status.

2. Discussion

Cable penetration seals, fire doors and dampers are required to be operable to maintain the integrity of fire barriers to prevent the spread of fire and to minimize the overall potential for fires affecting safety related areas and equipment. Fire barriers separating safety related areas are important fire protection features in nuclear plants. Due to structural or shielding requirements, many walls have a fire rating in excess of three hours. Other concrete walls have at least a two, or three hour rating. All openings through walls for doors, ducts or cable penetrations must have a door, damper, or penetration seal rating which is consistent with the required wall rating.

To prevent the potential spread of fire and limit its damage, fire doors, fire dampers and penetration seals are required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 to be OPERABLE. In the event that one or more fire barrier penetrations are inoperable or nonfunctional, within one hour, the licensee proposes, as compensatory action, to establish either a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or as an alternative verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the nonfunctional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

### 3. Evaluation

We find that these compensating measures for inoperable fire barrier penetration(s) provide reasonable assurance for the timely detection of a fire such that corrective action can be taken to prevent the possible spread of a fire beyond the fire barrier. In addition, the established time limits or reporting requirements will provide reasonable assurance that the licensee will restore nonfunctional fire barrier penetrations to operable status.

These actions are also consistent with previously analyzed requirements specified in the present Standard Technical Specifications. We, therefore, find that the licensee's proposed changes to Section 3.7.10 of the Technical Specifications acceptable. Technical Specification 6.9.2 is also modified to include the added reporting requirement proposed by the licensee.

### 4. Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

### 5. Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: January 12, 1984

The following NRC personnel have contributed to this Safety Evaluation:

C. B. Ramsey  
J. B. Ulie