



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 19, 1995

50-237  
50-249  
50-254  
50-255

Mr. D. L. Farrar  
Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Services  
Commonwealth Edison Company  
Executive Towers West III  
1400 Opus Place, Suite 500  
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO CLOSE OUT TSUP OPEN ITEMS (TAC NOS.  
M93644, M93645, M93646 AND M93647)

Dear Mr. Farrar:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 145 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-19 and Amendment No. 139 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-25 for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, respectively; and Amendment No. 167 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-29 and Amendment No. 163 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-30 for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments are in response to your application dated September 15, 1995.

As a result of findings by a Diagnostic Evaluation Team inspection performed by the NRC staff at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station in 1987, Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd, the licensee) made a decision that both the Dresden Nuclear Power Station and sister site Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, needed attention focused on the existing custom Technical Specifications (TS) being used at both sites.

The licensee made the decision to initiate a Technical Specification Upgrade Program (TSUP) for both Dresden and Quad Cities. The licensee evaluated the current TS for both Dresden and Quad Cities against the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) contained in NUREG-0123, "Standard Technical Specification General Electric Plants BWR/4." The licensee's evaluation identified numerous potential improvements such as clarifying requirements, changing the TS to make them more understandable and to eliminate interpretation, and deleting requirements that are no longer considered current with industry practice. As a result of the evaluation, ComEd has elected to upgrade both the Dresden and Quad Cities TS to the STS contained in NUREG-0123.

The TSUP for Dresden and Quad Cities is not a complete adoption of the STS. The TSUP focuses on (1) integrating additional information such as equipment operability requirements during shutdown conditions, (2) clarifying requirements such as limiting conditions for operations and action statements utilizing STS terminology, (3) deleting superseded requirements and modifications to the TS based on the licensee's responses to Generic Letters (GL), and (4) relocating specific items to more appropriate TS locations.

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
The application dated September 15, 1995, contains some of the TSUP open items from previous Dresden and Quad Cities TS amendments issued by the NRC.

The review guidance to be used by the NRC staff in the review of the TSUP is described in Section 2.0 of the enclosed Safety Evaluation (SE). The staff reviewed the proposed changes and evaluated all deviations and changes between the proposed TS, the STS and the current TS.

Based on discussions between ComEd and the staff, it has been mutually agreed upon that the NRC will review the sections of TSUP as they are submitted and provide ComEd an amendment for each submittal. This amendment closes open items from the amendments that had been issued as of September 15, 1995. It is our understanding that ComEd will submit another application after issuance of the remaining amendments to close the remaining open items. The applicable TSUP TS will be issued with each amendment and will become effective no later than June 30, 1996.

The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,



John F. Stang, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254, 50-265

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 145 to DPR-19  
2. Amendment No. 139 to DPR-25  
3. Amendment No. 167 to DPR-29  
4. Amendment No. 163 to DPR-30  
5. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: see next page

D. L. Farrar  
Commonwealth Edison Company

cc:

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Unit Nos. 1 and 2

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-237

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 145  
License No. DPR-19


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated September 15, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-19 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 145, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented no later than June 30, 1996.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stang, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 19, 1995



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-249

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 139  
License No. DPR-25


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated September 15, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-25 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 139, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented no later than June 30, 1996.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stang, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 19, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 145 AND 139

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-19 AND DPR-25

DOCKET NOS. 50-237 AND 50-249

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number.

UNIT 2/3

REMOVE\*

1-5

1-6

1-7

3/4.10-3

B3/4.10-1

5-1

5-2

5-3

INSERT

1-5

1-6

1-7

3/4.10-3

B3/4.10-1

5-1

5-2

5-3

\* The pages to be removed are from the approved TSUP amendment packages.



## 1.0 DEFINITIONS

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### PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (PCI)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (PCI) shall exist when:

- a. All primary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
  - 1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation valve system, or
  - 2) Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.7.D.
- b. All primary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
- c. Each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.7.C.
- d. The primary containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.7.B.
- e. The suppression chamber is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.7.K.
- f. The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration; e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings, is OPERABLE.

### PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP)

The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the current formulas, sampling, analysis, test, and determinations to be made to ensure that processing and packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71, State regulations, burial ground requirements, and other requirements governing the disposal of solid radioactive waste.

### RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP)

RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2527 MWT.

### REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE TIME

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval for each trip function from the opening of the sensor contact up to and including the opening of the trip actuator.

## 1.0 DEFINITIONS

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### REPORTABLE EVENT

A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.

### SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (SCI)

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (SCI) shall exist when:

- a. All secondary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
  - 1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation valve system, or
  - 2) Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic damper secured in its closed position, except as permitted by Specification 3.7.O.
- b. All secondary containment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed.
- c. The standby gas treatment system is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.7.P.
- d. At least one door in each access to the secondary containment is closed.
- e. The sealing mechanism associated with each secondary containment penetration; e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings, is OPERABLE.
- f. The pressure within the secondary containment is less than or equal to the value required by Specification 4.7.N.1.

### SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical assuming all control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn and the reactor is in the shutdown condition; cold, i.e. 68°F; and xenon free.

### SOURCE CHECK

A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of CHANNEL response when the CHANNEL sensor is exposed to a radioactive source.

### STEADY STATE LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (SLHGR)

The STEADY STATE LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (SLHGR) shall be the limit which protects against exceeding the fuel end-of-life steady state design criteria.

## 1.0 DEFINITIONS

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### THERMAL POWER

THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

### TRANSIENT LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (TLHGR)

The TRANSIENT LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (TLHGR) shall be the limit which protects against fuel centerline melting and 1% plastic cladding strain during transient conditions throughout the life of the fuel.

### TRIP SYSTEM

A TRIP SYSTEM shall be an arrangement of instrument CHANNEL trip signals and auxiliary equipment required to initiate action to accomplish a protective trip function. A TRIP SYSTEM may require one or more instrument CHANNEL trip signals related to one or more plant parameters in order to initiate TRIP SYSTEM action. Initiation of protective action may require the tripping of a single TRIP SYSTEM or the coincident tripping of two TRIP SYSTEMs.

### UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage in the primary containment which is not IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.

**3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION****B. Instrumentation**

At least 2 source range monitor<sup>(a)</sup> (SRM) CHANNEL(s) shall be OPERABLE and inserted to the normal operating level with:

1. Continuous visual indication in the control room,
2. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATION(s) are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and
3. Unless adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN has been demonstrated per Specification 3.3.A and the "one-rod-out" Refuel position interlock has been demonstrated OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.A, the "shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn<sup>(b)</sup>.

**APPLICABILITY:**

OPERATIONAL MODE 5, unless the following conditions are met:

1. No more than two fuel assemblies are present in each core quadrant associated with an SRM;

**4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS****B. Instrumentation**

Each of the required SRM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

1. At least once per 12 hours:
  - a. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK.
  - b. Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operating level, and
  - c. During CORE ALTERATION(s), verifying that the detector of an OPERABLE SRM CHANNEL is located in the core quadrant where CORE ALTERATION(s) are being performed and another is located in an adjacent quadrant.
2. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:
  - a. Within 24 hours prior to the start of CORE ALTERATION(s), and
  - b. At least once per 7 days.
3. Verifying that the channel count rate is at least 3 cps:
  - a. Prior to control rod withdrawal,
  - b. Prior to and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATION(s),
  - c. At least once per 24 hours.

a The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATION(s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits.

b Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.10.I and 3.10.J

## BASES

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### 3/4.10.A Reactor Mode Switch

Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.

The addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which are in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling platform. When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. If the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is blocked by the interlocks. With the mode switch in the refuel position only one control rod can be withdrawn.

### 3/4.10.B Instrumentation

The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core, whenever reactor criticality is possible.

The source range monitors (SRM) are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator during refueling operations and reactor startup. Requiring two OPERABLE source range monitors in and adjacent to any core quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant during such alterations. Requiring a minimum of 3 counts per second whenever criticality is possible provides assurance that neutron flux is being monitored. The SRM system is designed to provide a signal-to-noise ratio of at least 3:1 and a count rate of at least 3 counts per second. Criticality is considered to be impossible if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant and if these are in locations adjacent to the source range monitors (i.e., spatially separated).

Special movable detectors may be used during CORE ALTERATION(s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors. These special detectors must be connected to the normal SRM circuits such that the applicable neutron flux indication, control rod blocks and scram signals can be generated. The special detectors provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes during fuel loading since they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling provided they meet the location requirements of the specification.

When the Reactor Protection System shorting links are removed, the source range monitors provide added protection against local criticalities by providing an initiating signal for a reactor scram on high neutron flux.

## 5.0 DESIGN FEATURES

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### 5.1 SITE

#### Site and Exclusion Area

- 5.1.A The site consists of approximately 953 acres adjacent to the Illinois River at the point where it is formed by the confluence of the Des Plaines and Kankakee Rivers, in the northeast quarter of the Goose Lake Township, Grundy County, Illinois. The Exclusion Area shall not be less than 800 meters from the centerline of the chimney.

#### Low Population Zone

- 5.1.B The Low Population Zone shall be a five mile radius from the centerline of the chimney.

#### Radioactive Gaseous Effluents

- 5.1.C Information regarding radioactive gaseous effluents shall be located in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL.

#### Radioactive Liquid Effluents

- 5.1.D Information regarding radioactive liquid effluents shall be located in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL.

FIGURE 5.1.A-1

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

MIDAMERICAN ENERGY COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-254

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 167  
License No. DPR-29

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated September 15, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-29 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 167, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented no later than June 30, 1996.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert M. Pulsifer, Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 19, 1995



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

MIDAMERICAN ENERGY COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-265

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 163  
License No. DPR-30


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated September 15, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 163, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented no later than June 30, 1996.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert M. Pulsifer, Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 19, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 167 AND 163

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-29 AND DPR-30

DOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 50-265

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number.

UNIT 1/2

REMOVE\*

1-5

1-6

1-7

3/4.10-3

B3/4.10-1

5-1

5-2

5-3

INSERT

1-5

1-6

1-7

3/4.10-3

B3/4.10-1

5-1

5-2

5-3

\* The pages to be removed are from the approved TSUP amendment packages.

## 1.0 DEFINITIONS

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### PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (PCI)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (PCI) shall exist when:

- a. All primary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
  - 1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation valve system, or
  - 2) Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.7.D.
- b. All primary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
- c. Each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.7.C.
- d. The primary containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.7.B.
- e. The suppression chamber is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.7.K.
- f. The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration; e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings, is OPERABLE.

### PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP)

The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the current formulas, sampling, analysis, test, and determinations to be made to ensure that processing and packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71, State regulations, burial ground requirements, and other requirements governing the disposal of solid radioactive waste.

### RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP)

RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2511 MWT.

### REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE TIME

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval for each trip function from the opening of the sensor contact up to and including the opening of the trip actuator.

## 1.0 DEFINITIONS

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### REPORTABLE EVENT

A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.

### ROD DENSITY

ROD DENSITY shall be the number of control rod notches inserted as a fraction of the total number of control rod notches. All rods fully inserted is equivalent to 100% ROD DENSITY.

### SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (SCI)

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (SCI) shall exist when:

- a. All secondary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
  - 1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation valve system, or
  - 2) Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic damper secured in its closed position, except as permitted by Specification 3.7.O.
- b. All secondary containment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed.
- c. The standby gas treatment system is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.7.P.
- d. At least one door in each access to the secondary containment is closed.
- e. The sealing mechanism associated with each secondary containment penetration; e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings, is OPERABLE.
- f. The pressure within the secondary containment is less than or equal to the value required by Specification 4.7.N.1.

### SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical assuming all control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn and the reactor is in the shutdown condition; cold, i.e. 68°F; and xenon free.

### SOURCE CHECK

A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of CHANNEL response when the CHANNEL sensor is exposed to a radioactive source.

## 1.0 DEFINITIONS

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### THERMAL POWER

THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

### TRIP SYSTEM

A TRIP SYSTEM shall be an arrangement of instrument CHANNEL trip signals and auxiliary equipment required to initiate action to accomplish a protective trip function. A TRIP SYSTEM may require one or more instrument CHANNEL trip signals related to one or more plant parameters in order to initiate TRIP SYSTEM action. Initiation of protective action may require the tripping of a single TRIP SYSTEM or the coincident tripping of two TRIP SYSTEMS.

### UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage which is not IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.



**3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION****B. Instrumentation**

At least 2 source range monitor<sup>(a)</sup> (SRM) CHANNEL(s) shall be OPERABLE and inserted to the normal operating level with:

1. Continuous visual indication in the control room,
2. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATION(s) are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and
3. Unless adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN has been demonstrated per Specification 3.3.A and the "one-rod-out" Refuel position interlock has been demonstrated OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.A, the "shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn<sup>(b)</sup>.

**APPLICABILITY:**

OPERATIONAL MODE 5, unless the following conditions are met:

1. No more than two fuel assemblies are present in each core quadrant associated with an SRM;

**4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS****B. Instrumentation**

Each of the required SRM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

1. At least once per 12 hours:
  - a. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK.
  - b. Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operating level, and
  - c. During CORE ALTERATION(s), verifying that the detector of an OPERABLE SRM CHANNEL is located in the core quadrant where CORE ALTERATION(s) are being performed and another is located in an adjacent quadrant.
2. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:
  - a. Within 24 hours prior to the start of CORE ALTERATION(s), and
  - b. At least once per 7 days.
3. Verifying that the channel count rate is at least 3 cps:
  - a. Prior to control rod withdrawal,
  - b. Prior to and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATION(s),
  - c. At least once per 24 hours.

a The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATION(s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits.

b Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.10.I and 3.10.J

**BASES**

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**3/4.10.A Reactor Mode Switch**

Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.

The addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which are in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling platform. When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. If the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is blocked by the interlocks. With the mode switch in the refuel position only one control rod can be withdrawn.

**3/4.10.B Instrumentation**

The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core, whenever reactor criticality is possible.

The source range monitors (SRM) are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator during refueling operations and reactor startup. Requiring two OPERABLE source range monitors in and adjacent to any core quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant during such alterations. Requiring a minimum of 3 counts per second whenever criticality is possible provides assurance that neutron flux is being monitored. The SRM system is designed to provide a signal-to-noise ratio of at least 3:1 and a count rate of at least 3 counts per second. Criticality is considered to be impossible if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant and if these are in locations adjacent to the source range monitors (i.e., spatially separated).

Special movable detectors may be used during CORE ALTERATION(s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors. These special detectors must be connected to the normal SRM circuits such that the applicable neutron flux indication, control rod blocks and scram signals can be generated. The special detectors provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes during fuel loading since they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling provided they meet the location requirements of the specification.

When the Reactor Protection System shorting links are removed, the source range monitors provide added protection against local criticalities by providing an initiating signal for a reactor scram on high neutron flux.

## 5.0 DESIGN FEATURES

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### 5.1 SITE

#### Site and Exclusion Area

- 5.1.A The site consists of approximately 784 acres on the east bank of the Mississippi River opposite the mouth of the Wapsipinicon River, approximately three miles north of the village of Cordova, Rock Island County, Illinois. The Exclusion Area shall not be less than 380 meters from the centerline of the chimney.

#### Low Population Zone

- 5.1.B The Low Population Zone shall be a three mile radius from the centerline of the chimney.

#### Radioactive Gaseous Effluents

- 5.1.C Information regarding radioactive gaseous effluents shall be located in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL.

#### Radioactive Liquid Effluents

- 5.1.D Information regarding radioactive liquid effluents shall be located in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL.

FIGURE 5.1.A-1

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FIGURE 5.1.B-1

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 145 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-19,  
AMENDMENT NO. 139 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-25,  
AMENDMENT NO. 167 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29,  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 163 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

MIDAMERICAN ENERGY COMPANY

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254 AND 50-265

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 15, 1995, Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd, the licensee) submitted an amendment resolving some of the open items from previous amendments to upgrade sections of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, and the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The changes have been requested as part of their Technical Specification Upgrade Program (TSUP).

As a result of findings by a Diagnostic Evaluation Team inspection performed by the NRC staff at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station in 1987, ComEd made a decision that both the Dresden Nuclear Power Station and sister site Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, needed attention focused on the existing custom TS used at the sites.

The licensee made the decision to initiate a TSUP for both Dresden and Quad Cities. The licensee evaluated the current TS for both stations against the Standard Technical Specifications (STS), contained in NUREG-0123, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants BWR/4, Revision 4." Both Dresden and Quad Cities are BWR-3 designs and are nearly identical plants. The licensee's evaluation identified numerous potential improvements such as clarifying requirements, changing the TS to make them more understandable and to eliminate the need for interpretation, and deleting requirements that are no longer considered current with industry practice. As a result of the evaluation, ComEd elected to upgrade both the Dresden and Quad Cities TS to the STS contained in NUREG-0123.

The TSUP for Dresden and Quad Cities is not a complete adoption of the STS. The TSUP focuses on (1) integrating additional information such as equipment operability requirements during shutdown conditions, (2) clarifying requirements such as limiting conditions for operations and action statements utilizing STS terminology, (3) deleting superseded requirements and modifications to the TS based on the licensee's responses to Generic Letters (GL), and (4) relocating specific items to more appropriate TS locations.

The application dated September 15, 1995, proposed to resolve some of the items left open in previous TSUP amendments issued for Dresden and Quad Cities.

The staff reviewed the proposed changes and evaluated all deviations and changes between the proposed TS, the STS and the current TS. In no case did the licensee propose a change in the TS that would result in the relaxation of the current design requirements as stated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSAR) for Dresden or Quad Cities.

In response to the staff's recommendations, the licensee submitted identical TS for Quad Cities and Dresden except for plant-specific equipment and design differences. Technical differences between the units are identified as appropriate in the proposed amendment.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

Review Guidelines - The licensee's purpose for the TSUP was to reformat the existing Dresden and Quad Cities TS into the easier to use STS format. Plant specific data, values, parameters, and equipment specific operational requirements contained in the current TS for Dresden and Quad Cities were retained by the licensee in the TSUP.

The STS contained in NUREG-0123 were developed by the NRC and industry because of the shortcomings associated with the custom TS which were issued to plants licensed in early 1970's (i.e., Dresden (1971) and Quad Cities (1972)). The STS developed by the NRC and industry provided an adequate level of protection for plant operation by assuring required systems are operable and have been proven to be able to perform their intended functions. The limiting conditions for operation (LCO), the allowed out-of-service times, and the required surveillance frequencies were developed based on industry operating experience, equipment performance, and probabilistic risk assessment analysis during the 1970's. The STS were used as the licensing basis for plants licensed starting in the late 1970's.

For the most part, ComEd's adoption of the STS resulted in more restrictive LCOs and surveillance requirements (SR). In some cases, however, the STS provides relief from the Dresden and Quad Cities current TS requirements. In all these cases, the adoption of the STS requirements for LCOs or SRs do not change the current design requirements of either plant as described in each plant's UFSAR. In addition, the success criteria for the availability

and operability of all required systems contained in the current TS are maintained by the adoption of the STS guidelines in the proposed TSUP TS.

In addition to adopting the STS guidelines in the TSUP, ComEd has also evaluated GLs concerning line item improvements for TS. These GLs were factored into TSUP to make the proposed TS in the TSUP reflect industry lessons learned in the 1980's and early 1990's.

Deviations between the proposed specifications, the STS and the current TS were reviewed by the staff to determine if they were due to plant specific features or if they posed a technical deviation from the STS guidelines. Plant specific data, values, parameters and equipment specific operational requirements contained in the current TS for Dresden and Quad Cities were retained by the licensee in the upgraded TS.

Administrative Changes - Non-technical, administrative changes were intended to incorporate human factor principles into the form and structure of the STS so that they would be easier for plant operation's personnel to use. These changes are editorial in nature or involve the reorganization or reformatting of requirements without affecting technical content of the current TS or operational requirements. Every section of the proposed TS reflects this type of change.

More Restrictive Requirements - The proposed TSUP TS include certain more restrictive requirements than are contained in the existing TS. Examples of more restrictive requirements include the following: placing an LCO on plant equipment which is not required by the present TS to be operable; adding more restrictive requirements to restore inoperable equipment; and adding more restrictive SR.

Less Restrictive Requirements - The licensee provided a justification for less restrictive requirements on a case-by-case basis as discussed in this SE. When requirements have been shown to provide little or no safety benefit, their removal from the TS may be appropriate. In most cases, these relaxations had previously been granted to individual plants on a plant-specific basis as the result of (a) generic NRC actions, and (b) new NRC staff positions that have evolved from technological advancements and operating experience.

The Dresden and Quad Cities plant designs were reviewed to determine if the specific design basis was consistent with the STS contained in NUREG-0123. All changes to the current TS and deviations between the licensee's proposed TS and the STS were reviewed by the staff for acceptability to determine if adequate justification was provided (i.e., plant specific features, retention of existing operating values, etc.).

Deviations the staff finds acceptable include: (1) adding clarifying statements, (2) incorporating changes based on GLs, (3) reformatting multiple steps included under STS action statements into single steps with unique identifiers, (4) retaining plant specific steps, parameters, or values,



(5) moving action statements within a TS, (6) moving action statements from an existing TS to form a new TS section, and (7) omitting the inclusion of STS steps that are not in existing TS.

Relocation of Technical Specifications - The proposed TS may include the relocation of some requirements from the TS to licensee-controlled documents. Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to state TSs to be included as part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TS are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS.

The Commission has provided guidance for the contents of TS in its "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" ("Final Policy Statement"), 58 FR 39132 (July 22, 1993), in which the Commission indicated that compliance with the Final Policy Statement satisfies Section 182a of the Act. In particular, the Commission indicated that certain items could be relocated from the TS to licensee-controlled documents, consistent with the standard enunciated in *Portland General Electric Co.* (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 273 (1979). In that case, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board indicated that "technical specifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety."

Consistent with this approach, the Final Policy Statement identified four criteria to be used in determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TS, as follows: (1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of a primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design-basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety. As a result, existing TS requirements which fall within or satisfy any of the criteria in the Final Policy Statement must be retained in the TS, while those TS requirements which do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other, licensee-controlled documents. The Commission recently amended 10 CFR 50.36 to codify and incorporate these four criteria (60 FR 36953). The change to 10 CFR 50.36 was effective as of August 18, 1995.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

The following sections provide the staff's evaluation of the TS changes reflected in the licensee's proposed resolution of some TSUP open items. These proposed TS changes incorporate the guidelines of STS and requirements from current TS for both Dresden and Quad Cities. The proposed TS has been reformatted based on STS guidelines. Plant specific values for the listed parameters are included to be consistent with each station's UFSAR. Deviations between the proposed TS and current TS and between the proposed TS and STS are discussed below.

#### 3.1 Section 3/4.10.F

In an SE dated June 23, 1995, the staff stated: "Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.F, 'Crane Travel,' has been left as an open item. The licensee will re-submit this section in the clean-up package and will include the current Dresden TS Section 3/4.10.H, 'Loads Over Spent Fuel Storage Pool' requirements for both Dresden and Quad Cities. The current TS Section 3/4.10.F, 'Spent Fuel Cask Handling' will be relocated to administrative controls. The revised TSUP Section 3/4.10.F will be based on STS Section 3/4.9.7 and will incorporate the loadings of the current TS requirements (loads no heavier than the weight of a single fuel assembly and handling tool). These changes will be left as an open item, contingent upon their review and approval in the TSUP clean-up package."

By letter dated September 15, 1995, the licensee provided justification for not incorporating Dresden Custom TS Section 3/4.10.H; however, it did not justify the removal of Custom TS Section 3/4.10.F, "Spent Fuel Cask Handling." This will remain an open item to be addressed in a subsequent clean-up package. Bases pages B3/4.10-2 will also be held open for resolution of TS Section 3/4.10.F.

#### 3.2 Section 4.10.B.3

In an SE dated June 23, 1995, the staff stated: "Proposed TS 4.10.B.3 contains a new footnote (c) which allows for an SRM count rate of 0.7 counts per second (cps) provided the signal-to-noise ratio is  $\geq 2.0$ . This has been left as an open item. The inclusion of the provision would represent a relaxation of the current Dresden and Quad Cities TS. The licensee is currently reviewing this footnote and it will remain an open item contingent upon its review and approval in the clean up package."

The licensee has removed note c from the proposed TS 4.10.B.3. The revised TS is consistent with the current Dresden and Quad Cities TS and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.3 Section 1.0

In an SE dated February 16, 1995, the staff stated: "During the staff's review of TSUP Section 1.0 it was noted that the licensee did not incorporate

the STS definition for Reactor Protection System (RPS) response time testing. In subsequent discussions with the licensee, the licensee committed to resolve the staff's concern in a future TSUP application."

The licensee has incorporated an existing definition from Section 3.1.A of the Dresden and Quad Cities current TS as a definition for RPS response time in TSUP Section 1.0. This meets the current licensing basis for Dresden and Quad Cities and the staff finds this acceptable.

### 3.4 Section 5.1

In an SE dated June 14, 1995, the staff stated: "Proposed TSUP Section 5.1, 'Site,' incorporates the guidelines of STS Section 5.1 and all existing TS requirements from Section 5.1 for both Dresden and Quad Cities. Plant-specific Figures 5.1.B-1, Low Population Zone, are consistent with the safety analysis for the plant. The proposed Figures 5.1.B-1 provided in the December 15, 1993, submittal were unclear. This item is left as an open item contingent upon correction in the TSUP cleanup amendment. In addition, the licensee did not include the STS figure concerning the exclusion area. This item is also left as an open item. Based on discussions between the NRC staff and ComEd, Figure 5.1.A-1 for the Exclusion Area will be added in the cleanup amendment. The location and/or description of the Meteorological Tower will be added to Figure 5.1.A-1."

The current TS for Dresden and Quad Cities Stations includes the Low Population and Exclusion Area Maps. However, this type of information is contained in the UFSAR. Therefore, the licensee has deleted the proposed Low Population and Exclusion Area maps and has updated the site description of the current TS to include the exclusion area. The proposed textual descriptions more appropriately control any changes and sufficient details relating to these features exists in the LCO's. More detailed information is included in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The staff has determined that the requirements for these maps are not required to be in the TS under 10 CFR 50.36 or Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act. Further, they do not fall within any of the four criteria discussed in Section 2.0, above. This type of information is more appropriate in the UFSAR and meets the present staff recommendations and, therefore, it is acceptable.

### 3.5 Section 1.0 and 3/4.0

In letter dated February 16, 1995, the staff approved TSUP Sections 1.0 and 3.0/4.0 through Amendment Nos. 152 and 148 for Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2, respectively. In this letter it was stated that, "This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than December 31, 1995." By letter dated September 15, 1995, the licensee requested that the implementation date be extended to June 30, 1996, for Quad Cities. These amendments should be implemented along with the other approved TSUP section amendments which shall be implemented no later than June 30, 1996. This request to change the implementation date for Amendment Nos. 152 and 148 is administrative in nature and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.6 Section 3/4.4

In an SE dated June 8, 1995, the staff stated that the proposed TS 4.4.A.3 requires the standby liquid control pumps be tested pursuant to TS Section 4.0.E which specifies that test frequencies be as specified by Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. However, the SE also stated that current frequency of 31 days would not change. The proposed TSUP requirements imposes the Code frequency of 92 days. The current Inservice Testing (IST) program would replace the monthly frequency with quarterly tests as approved by the NRC. The licensee's submittal of October 15, 1992, related to Section 3/4.4 of the TSUP, indicated that the test frequency would be increased from 31 to 92 days. These quarterly tests are currently used at Dresden and Quad Cities as well as at other facilities with similar standby liquid control systems and have adequately demonstrated system performance. This change is therefore acceptable.

The IST program is based on the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a which provides controls to assure these tests are adequately tested. Based upon previous NRC approval of the IST program, the staff finds that sufficient regulatory controls exist under 10 CFR 50.55a to assure continued protection of the public health and safety, therefore, the TS change is acceptable.

### 3.7 Open Items

The following should be left as an open item, contingent upon its approval at a later date.

- Deletion of TS 3/4.10.F

### 3.8 Technical Specification Bases

The staff has reviewed TSUP TS Bases page B3/4.10-1 change and has found it acceptable.

### 3.9 Conclusion

The staff has reviewed all deviations between the STS guidelines and the proposed TS and the relaxation of current requirements. The staff has determined that the relaxations are consistent with plant design requirements and adequate justification has been provided to support these deviations. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed amendment changes for TSUP amendment open items acceptable.

### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

## 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 52220). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Pulsifer

Date: December 19, 1995

December 19, 1995

The application dated September 15, 1995, contains some of the TSUP open items from previous Dresden and Quad Cities TS amendments issued by the NRC.

The review guidance to be used by the NRC staff in the review of the TSUP is described in Section 2.0 of the enclosed Safety Evaluation (SE). The staff reviewed the proposed changes and evaluated all deviations and changes between the proposed TS, the STS and the current TS.

Based on discussions between ComEd and the staff, it has been mutually agreed upon that the NRC will review the sections of TSUP as they are submitted and provide ComEd an amendment for each submittal. This amendment closes open items from the amendments that had been issued as of September 15, 1995. It is our understanding that ComEd will submit another application after issuance of the remaining amendments to close the remaining open items. The applicable TSUP TS will be issued with each amendment and will become effective no later than June 30, 1996.

The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

John F. Stang, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254, 50-265

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 145 to DPR-19  
2. Amendment No. 139 to DPR-25  
3. Amendment No. 167 to DPR-29  
4. Amendment No. 163 to DPR-30  
5. Safety Evaluation

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