

August 24, 1988

35

Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249

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LPhillips	TBarnhart (4)
ARM/LFMB	DHagan

Mr. Henry E. Bliss
Nuclear Licensing Manager
Commonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Dear Mr. Bliss:

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT TO ELIMINATE AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR DOWNSCALE SCRAM REQUIREMENT (TAC NOS. 67152/3)

Re: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.100 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-19 for Dresden Unit 2 and Amendment No.96 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-25 for Dresden Unit 3. The amendments are in response to your application dated April 25, 1988.

The proposed amendment eliminates the average power range monitor scram requirement, removes the bypass permissive on the main steam line high radiation scram, reinserts the bypass permissive on the turbine control-loss of oil pressure scram, provides clarification, and the correction of a typographical error.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the commission's biweekly Federal Register notices.

Sincerely,

151

Byron Siegel, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III
IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No.100 to License No. DPR-19
2. Amendment No. 96 to License No. DPR-25
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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PDR ADDICK 05000237
PDC

PDIII-2:PM
BSiegel:km
8/14/88

PDIII-2:LA
LLuther
8/2/88

SR&B
LPhillips
8/13/88

COG
RBuchmann
8/11/88

PDIII-2:PD
DMuller
8/10/88

DFol
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Byron Siegel, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III
IV, V and Special Projects

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See next page

PDIII-2:PM
BSiegel:km
8/14/88

PDIII-2:LA
LLuther
8/12/88

SRXB
LPhillip
8/13/88

OCG
R Buchmann
8/11/88

PDIII-2:PD
DMuller
8/10/88



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

August 24, 1988

Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249

Mr. Henry E. Bliss
Nuclear Licensing Manager
Commonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Dear Mr. Bliss:

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT TO ELIMINATE AVERAGE POWER
RANGE MONITOR DOWNSCALE SCRAM REQUIREMENT (TAC NOS. 67152/3)

Re: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3

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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the commission's biweekly Federal Register notices.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Byron Siegel".

Byron Siegel, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III
IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 100 to License No. DPR-19
2. Amendment No. 96 to License No. DPR-25
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Mr. Henry E. Bliss
Commonwealth Edison Company

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
Units 2 and 3

cc:

Michael I. Miller, Esq.
Sidley and Austin
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Mr. J. Eenigenburg
Plant Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
Rural Route #1
Morris, Illinois 60450

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Resident Inspectors Office
Dresden Station
Rural Route #1
Morris, Illinois 60450

Chairman
Board of Supervisors of
Grundy County
Grundy County Courthouse
Morris, Illinois 60450

Regional Administrator
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III
799 Roosevelt Road, Bldg. #4
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Mr. Michael E. Parker, Chief
Division of Engineering
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62704



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-237

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 100
License No. DPR-19

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated April 25, 1988 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B. of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-19 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 100, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Daniel R. Muller, Director Project
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 24, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 100

PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE DPR-19

DOCKET NO. 50-237

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4.1-5
3/4.1-6
3/4.1-7
3/4.1-8

INSERT

3/4.1-5
3/4.1-6
3/4.1-7
3/4.1-8

TABLE 3.1.1
 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

Minimum Number Operable Inst. Channels per Trip (1) System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Modes in Which Function Must be Operable			Action*
			Refuel (6)	Startup/Hot Standby	Run	
1	Mode Switch in Shutdown		X	X	X	A
1	Manual Scram		X	X	X	A
3	IRM High Flux	(LT/E) 120/125 of Full Scale	X	X	N/A	A
3	Inoperative		X	X	N/A	A
2	APRM High Flux	Specification 2.1.A.1	X	X(8)	X	A or B
2	Inoperative**		X	X(8)	X	A or B
2	High Flux (15% Scram)	Specification 2.1.A.2	X	X	N/A	A
2	High Reactor Pressure	(LT/E) 1060 psig	X(10)	X	X	A
2	High Drywell Pressure	(LT/E) 2 psig	X(7), X(9)	X(7), (9)	X(9)	A
2	Reactor Low Water Level	(GT/E) 1 inch***	X	X	X	A
2 (Per Bank)	High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volume (Thermal and dP Switch)	(LT/E) 40 inches above bottom of the Instrument Volume	X(2)	X	X	A or D
2	Turbine Condenser Low Vacuum	(GT/E) 23 in. Hg Vacuum	X(3)	X(3)	X	A or C
2	Main Steam Line High Radiation	(LT/E) 3 X Normal Full Power Background	X	X	X(11)	A or C
4(5)	Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure	(LT/E) 10% Valve Closure	X(3)	X(3)	X	A or C
2	Generator Load Rejection	****	X(4)	X(4)	X(4)	A or C
2	Turbine Stop Valve Closure	(LT/E) 10% Valve Closure	X(4)	X(4)	X(4)	A or C
2	Turbine Control - Loss of Control Oil Pressure	(GT/E) 900 psig	X(4)	X(4)	X(4)	A or C

Notes: (LT/E) = Less than or equal to.
 (GT/E) = Greater than or equal to.
 (Notes continue on next two pages)

NOTES: (For Table 3.1.1)

1. There shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for each function.
2. Permissible to bypass, with control rod block, for reactor protection system reset in refuel and shutdown positions of the reactor mode switch.
3. Permissible to bypass when reactor pressure less than 600 psig.
4. Permissible to bypass when first stage turbine pressure less than that which corresponds to 45% rated steam flow.
5. The design permits closure of any one valve without a scram being initiated. + |
6. When the reactor is subcritical and the reactor water temperature is less than 212°F, only the following trip functions need to be operable: |
 - a. Mode Switch in Shutdown
 - b. Manual Scram
 - c. High Flux IRM
 - d. Scram Discharge Volume High Level
7. Not required to be operable when primary containment integrity is not required. |
8. Not required while performing low power physics tests at atmospheric pressure during or after refueling at power levels not to exceed 5 MW(t). |
9. May be bypassed when necessary during purging for containment inerting or deinerting. |
10. Not required to be operable when the reactor pressure vessel head is not bolted to the vessel. |
11. Due to addition of hydrogen to the primary coolant, the Main Steam Line Radiation monitor setting will be less than or equal to 3 times full power background without hydrogen addition for all conditions except for greater than 20% power with hydrogen being injected during which the Main Steam Line Radiation trip setting will be less than or equal to 3 times full power background with hydrogen addition. + |

(Cont'd. next page)

NOTES: (For Table 3.1.1 Cont'd.)

Required changes in Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor trip setting will be made within 24 hrs. except during controlled power descensions at which time the setpoint change will be made prior to going below 20% power. If due to a recirculation pump trip or other unanticipated power reduction event the reactor is below 20% power without the setpoint change, control rod motion will be suspended until the necessary trip setpoint adjustment is made.

* If the first column cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that trip system shall be tripped.

If the first column cannot be met for both trip systems, the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken:

- a. Initiate insertion of operable rods and complete insertion of all operable rods within 4 hours.
- b. Reduce power level to IRM range and place mode switch in the Startup/Hot Standby position within 8 hours.
- c. Reduce turbine load and close main steam line isolation valves within 5 hours.
- d. In the refuel mode, when any control rod is withdrawn, suspend all operations involving core alterations and insert all insertable control rods within one hour.

** An APRM will be considered inoperable if there are less than 2 LPRM inputs per level or there are less than 50% of the normal complement of LPRM's to an APRM.

*** 1 inch on the water level instrumentation is greater than or equal to 504" above vessel zero (see Bases 3.2).

**** Trips upon actuation of the fast closure solenoid which trips the turbine control valves.

TABLE 4.1.1
 SCRAM INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL TESTS
 MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCIES FOR SAFETY INSTR. AND CONTROL CIRCUITS

<u>Instrument Channel</u>	<u>Group (3)</u>	<u>Functional Test</u>	<u>Minimum Frequency (4)</u>
Mode Switch in Shutdown	A	Place Mode Switch in Shutdown	Each Refueling Outage
Manual Scram	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Every 3 Months
IRM			
* High Flux	C	Trip Channel and Alarm (5)	Before Each Startup (6)
* Inoperative	C	Trip Channel and Alarm	Before Each Startup (6)
APRM			
High Flux	B	Trip Output Relays (5)	Once Each Week
Inoperative	B	Trip Output Relays	Once Each Week
High Flux (15% scram)	B	Trip Output Relays	Before Each Startup
High Reactor Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
High Drywell Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Reactor Low Water Level (2)	B	(8)	(1)
High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volumes (Thermal and dp Switch)	A	Trip Channel and Alarm (7)	Every 3 Months
Turbine Condenser Low Vacuum	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Main Steam Line High Radiation (2)	B	Trip Channel and Alarm (5)	Once Each Week
Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Generator Load Rejection	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Turbine Stop Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Turbine Control - Loss of Control Oil Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)

Notes: (See next page.)



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-249

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE


Amendment No. 96
License No. DPR-25

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated April 25, 1988 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-25 is hereby amended to read as follows:
 - B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 96, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Daniel R. Muller, Director Project
Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor
Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 24, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 96

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-25

DOCKET NO. 50-249

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4.1-5
3/4.1-6
3/4.1-7
3/4.1-8

INSERT

3/4.1-5
3/4.1-6
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			Refuel (6)	Startup/Hot Standby	Run	
1	Mode Switch in Shutdown		X	X	X	A
1	Manual Scram		X	X	X	A
	IRM					
3	High Flux	(LT/E) 120/125 of Full Scale	X	X	N/A	A
3	Inoperative		X	X	N/A	A
	APRM					
2	High Flux	Specification 2.1.A.1	X	X(8)	X	A or B
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2	High Flux (15% Scram)	Specification 2.1.A.2	X	X	N/A	A
2	High Reactor Pressure	(LT/E) 1060 psig	X(10)	X	X	A
2	High Drywell Pressure	(LT/E) 2 psig	X(7), X(9)	X(7), (9)	X(9)	A
2	Reactor Low Water Level	(GT/E) 1 inch***	X	X	X	A
2 (Per Bank)	High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volume (Float and dP Switch)	(LT/E) 37.25 inches above bottom of the Instrument Volume	X(2)	X	X	A or D
2	Turbine Condenser Low Vacuum	(GT/E) 23 in. Hg Vacuum	X(3)	X(3)	X	A or C
2	Main Steam Line High Radiation	(LT/E) 3 X Normal Full Power Background	X	X	X	A or C
4(5)	Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure	(LT/E) 10% Valve Closure	X(3)	X(3)	X	A or C
2	Generator Load Rejection	****	X(4)	X(4)	X(4)	A or C
2	Turbine Stop Valve Closure	(LT/E) 10% Valve Closure	X(4)	X(4)	X(4)	A or C
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 - d. Scram Discharge Volume High Level
7. Not required to be operable when primary containment integrity is not required. |
8. Not required while performing low power physics tests at atmospheric pressure during or after refueling at power levels not to exceed 5 MW(t). |
9. May be bypassed when necessary during purging for containment inerting or deinerting. |
10. Not required to be operable when the reactor pressure vessel head is not bolted to the vessel. |

(Cont'd. next page)

NOTES: (For Table 3.1.1 Cont'd.)

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* High Flux	C	Trip Channel and Alarm (5)	Before Each Startup (6)
* Inoperative	C	Trip Channel and Alarm	Before Each Startup (6)
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Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Generator Load Rejection	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Turbine Stop Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Turbine Control - Loss of Control Oil Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)

Notes: (See next page.)



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 100 TO PROVISIONAL

OPERATING LICENSE DPR-19 AND

AMENDMENT NO. 96 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-25

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-237 AND 50-249

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated April 25, 1988, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo or the licensee) submitted a request to amend to the Technical Specifications for Provisional Operating License No. DPR-19 and Facility Operating License DPR-25 for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The proposed amendment which would eliminate the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) downscale scram requirement (also referred to as the APRM/IRM companion scram) was submitted as part of the long term corrective action resulting from an event which occurred at Dresden Unit 2 and was reported in LER 87-022. The removal of the APRM downscale scram also eliminates the IRM scram which occurs in the RUN Mode simultaneous with the APRMs downscale.

Two additional unrelated Technical Specification changes to the Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Requirements Table would result in the elimination of the bypass permissive in the Main Steam Line High Radiation scram and the addition of the bypass permissive on the Turbine Control-Loss of Control Oil Pressure scram. The amendment also provides clarification and the correction of a typographical error.

2.0 DISCUSSIONS

a) APRM Downscale Scram

The Dresden Technical Specification Table 3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (scram) Instrument Requirements, requires that the IRM channels be capable of performing a scram function while the reactor is in the RUN Mode. Note 5 indicates that this scram function may be bypassed when the APRM's are on scale and the reactor mode switch is in the RUN position. The proposed change will delete this requirement and Note 5.

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Table 3.1.1 requires that at Neutron Flux APRM Downscale condition trip the reactor while the reactor is in the RUN Mode. The proposed change will delete this requirement and corresponding Note 13.

Table 3.1.1 recognizes that the APRM High Flux (15% scram) is not operative in the RUN Mode. The proposed change would clarify this requirement on the table and eliminate the need for Note 14.

Table 4.1.1 requires a functional test for the APRM Downscale scram. The proposed change will delete this requirement consistent with the changes made to Table 3.1.1.

The licensee stated that two problems exist with the Technical Specifications in Table 3.1.1. The first problem involves the requirement for an APRM downscale scram. The second problem involves the bypassing of the IRM channels when the reactor mode switch is in the RUN Position.

The APRM Downscale Scram functions exist in several early BWR plants including Dresden Units 2 and 3, but this function was deleted in the later BWR plants and the requirement removed from the standard BWR Technical Specifications (NUREG-0123, Revision 3). The licensee has stated that the only function performed by the APRM Downscale Scram is during the plant startup or shutdown. This scram function provides protection against operator error if the reactor mode switch were improperly switched. During a normal plant startup, the mode switch is usually placed in RUN position when the power is above 5%. If an operator were to prematurely place the mode switch in the RUN position, the APRM will be downscale and the IRM scram function will not be bypassed (the IRM Scram circuit will be bypassed when the mode switch is in RUN position and the APRM's are not downscale). If this should happen, all safety concerns are addressed without reliance on the APRM downscale scram function. The Control Rod Drop Accident is prevented by the APRM scram at the 120% thermal power setpoint, and the Rod Withdrawal Error is prevented by the APRM Downscale Rod Block system. Prematurely placing the mode switch in the RUN mode is also protected by the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure scram function (due to low steamline pressure when the reactor mode switch is placed in the RUN position). Another example of operator error can occur during power descent if the operator delays changing the reactor mode switch from the RUN mode to the STARTUP mode, thus bypassing the IRM's for a longer period of time and to a lower power level. The consequences of this error are no different than those described above for power ascension. The Control Rod Drop Accident and the Rod Withdrawal Error are protected by the APRM scram and the Rod Block system.

b) Main Steam Line High Radiation Trip

Table 3.1.1 of the Technical Specifications contains a note permitting this scram to be bypassed when the reactor pressure is less than 600 psig. This note was erroneously incorporated into the original Unit 3 Technical Specifications and then into the Unit 2 Technical Specifications with Amendment No. 9 in March 1971 in an effort to make the two Technical Specifications consistent. This change would eliminate this note from the Technical Specifications which is consistent with both the Quad Cities Technical Specifications and the BWR Standard Technical Specifications as well as the Dresden units actual plant design and operation.

c) Turbine Control-Loss of Control Oil Pressure Trip

Table 3.1.1 of the Technical Specifications does not allow the bypassing of the turbine control on loss of control oil pressure when the first stage turbine pressure is less than that which corresponds to 45% of rated steam flow. This bypass permissive was an original design feature which is identical to the one allowed for generator load rejection. The scram function of this bypass permissive is similar to that of the generator load rejection scram and in both cases the scram is anticipatory to the fast closure of the turbine control valves. The scram function was added to the Technical Specifications in June 1971 with Amendment 11 to DPR-19, the Provisional Operating License for Dresden Unit 2, and Amendment 3 to DPR-25, the Facility Operating License for Dresden Unit 3. The bypass permissive, however, was omitted from these amendments due to an oversight. The addition of this bypass permissive is also consistent with both the Quad Cities and the BWR Standard Technical Specifications.

3.0 EVALUATION

a) APRM Downscale Scram

The staff has reviewed the proposed Technical Specification changes associated with and the justification for removal of APRM downscale scram. The proposed changes clarify the intent of the original specification by clearly defining the scram functions needed to be operable in each mode of operation and do not involve any modification of the reactor protection system wiring or circuitry. The licensee is taking credit for the APRM scram and the APRM downscale trip in the Control Rod Block actuation circuitry. Since both the APRM scram and the Control Rod Block actuation circuitries are required by the plant Technical Specifications for operability and surveillance testing, there is reasonable assurance that those circuitries will perform their protective functions when needed. Furthermore, evaluations by General Electric (Reference 1) of premature placing of the reactor mode switch in the Run Mode during all types of plant startups and the delay of placing the reactor mode switch in the Startup Mode have shown that all safety concerns are addressed without reliance on the APRM downscale scram function. The staff has also verified that the standard BWR Technical Specifications and all later plants do not require the APRM Downscale Scram nor the IRM Scram when the reactor is in RUN Mode. Based on its review, the staff finds that the proposed changes are acceptable.

b) Main Steam Line High Radiation Trip

The staff has reviewed the proposed Technical Specification change related to the elimination of the Table 3.1.1 footnote permitting the bypassing of this trip function when the reactor pressure is less than 600 psig. Since the elimination of this provision, which was erroneously incorporated into the Dresden Technical Specifications, is consistent with the original plant design, FSAR requirements and with the Standard Technical Specifications, the staff has determined this proposed change is acceptable.

c) Turbine Control-Loss of Control Oil Pressure Trip

The staff has reviewed the proposed Technical Specification change related to the reinsertion of a Table 3.1.1 footnote permitting the bypassing of this trip function when the first stage turbine pressure is less than that which corresponds to 45% of rated steam flow. Since this bypass permissive, which was erroneously omitted, was part of the original plant design and is consistent with the Quad Cities and Standard Technical Specifications, the staff has determined this change is acceptable.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from J.A. Miller, Services Project Manager, General Electric Corporation to E.D. Eenigenburg, Station Manager, Dresden Nuclear Station, dated August 26, 1987.

Principal Contributor: B. Siegel

Dated: August 24, 1988