

November 28, 1989

Docket No. 50-374

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Nuclear Licensing Manager
Commonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

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Dear Mr. Kovach:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 53 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
NPF-18 LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2 (TAC NO. 71076)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 53 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle County Station, Unit 2. This amendment is in response to your letters dated September 7, 1988, May 25, 1989 and August 29, 1989.

The amendment revises the LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Technical Specifications by deleting the specifications added by Amendment 30 to allow installation and use of the Fine Motion Control Rod Drive (FMCRD) during the Unit 2 Cycle 2. The test for which the FMCRD was installed has been completed and the FMCRD was removed during the Unit 2 refueling outage that concluded in February 1989.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation supporting Amendment No. 53 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Paul C. Shemanski, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 53 to NPF-18
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

PDIII-2
LKokajko:km
10/16/89

PDIII-2
LLuther *LL*
10/19/89

OGC *Booth*
10/24/89

PDIII-2 *P.S.*
PShemanski
10/20/89

cp/1

*DFOL
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

November 28, 1989

Docket No. 50-374

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Nuclear Licensing Manager
Commonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. Kovach:

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Paul C. Shemanski".

Paul C. Shemanski, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 53 to NPF-18
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Commonwealth Edison Company

LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station
Units 1 & 2

cc:

Phillip P. Steptoe, Esquire
Sidley and Austin
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Robert Cushing
Chief, Public Utilities Division
Illinois Attorney General's Office
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Assistant Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street
Suite 12
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Resident Inspector/LaSalle, NPS
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Rural Route No. 1
P. O. Box 224
Marseilles, Illinois 61341

Chairman
LaSalle County Board of Supervisors
LaSalle County Courthouse
Ottawa, Illinois 61350

Attorney General
500 South 2nd Street
Springfield, Illinois 62701

Chairman
Illinois Commerce Commission
Leland Building
527 East Capitol Avenue
Springfield, Illinois 62706

Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Facility Safety
1035 Outer Park Drive
Springfield, Illinois 62704

Regional Administrator, Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road, Bldg. #4
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-374

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 53
License No. NPF-18


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated September 7, 1988, May 25, 1989, and August 29, 1989 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 53, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective upon date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John W. Craig". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "J" and "C".

John W. Craig, Project Director
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosure:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 28, 1989

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 53

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

DOCKET NO. 50-374

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

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3/4 1-3
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3/4 1-7
3/4 1-8
3/4 1-9
3/4 1-11
3/4 1-13
3/4 1-16
3/4 1-17
3/4 9-1
3/4 10-9
3/4 10-10
3/4 10-11
B3/4 10-2

INSERT

XI
XVI
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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be equal to or greater than:

- a. 0.38% delta k/k with the highest worth rod analytically determined,
or
- b. 0.28% delta k/k with the highest worth rod determined by test.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than specified:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, reestablish the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, immediately verify all insertable control rods to be inserted and suspend all activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours.
- c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS* and other activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and insert all insertable control rods within 1 hour. Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be equal to or greater than specified at any time during the fuel cycle:

- a. By measurement, prior to or during the first startup after each refueling.
- b. By measurement, within 500 MWD/T prior to the core average exposure at which the predicted SHUTDOWN MARGIN, including uncertainties and calculation biases, is equal to the specified limit.
- c. Within 12 hours after detection of a withdrawn control rod that is immovable, as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference, or is untrippable, except that the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod.

*Except movement of IRMs, SRMs or special movable detectors.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM

3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS

CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.1 All control rods shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, and 2.

ACTION:

- a. With one control rod inoperable due to being immovable, as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference, or known to be untrippable:
 1. Within 1 hour:
 - a) Verify that the inoperable control rod, if withdrawn, is separated from all other inoperable control rods by at least two control cells in all directions.
 - b) Disarm the associated directional control valves* either:
 - 1) Electrically, or
 - 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
 - c) Comply with Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.c.
 2. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
 3. Restore the inoperable control rod to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With one or more control rods trippable but inoperable for causes other than addressed in ACTION a, above:
 1. If the inoperable control rod(s) is withdrawn:
 - a) Immediately verify:
 - 1) That the inoperable withdrawn control rod(s) is separated from all other inoperable withdrawn control rod(s) by at least two control cells in all directions, and
 - 2) The insertion capability of the inoperable withdrawn control rod(s) by inserting the control rod(s) at least one notch by drive water pressure within the normal operating range**.
 - b) Otherwise, insert the inoperable withdrawn control rod(s) and disarm the associated directional control valves* either:
 - 1) Electrically, or
 - 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves

*May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

**The inoperable control rod may then be withdrawn to a position no further withdrawn than its position when found to be inoperable.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTROL ROD MAXIMUM SCRAM INSERTION TIMES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time of each control rod from the fully withdrawn position to notch position 05, based on de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed 7 seconds.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

- a. With the maximum scram insertion time of one or more control rods exceeding 7 seconds:
 1. Declare the control rod(s) with the slow insertion time inoperable, and
 2. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2c. at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with three or more control rods with maximum scram insertion times in excess of 7 seconds.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time of the control rods shall be demonstrated through measurement with reactor coolant pressure greater than or equal to 950 psig and, during single control rod scram time tests, the control rod drive pumps isolated from the accumulators:

- a. For all control rods prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER following CORE ALTERATIONS* or after a reactor shutdown that is greater than 120 days,
- b. For specifically affected individual control rods following maintenance on or modification to the control rod or control rod drive system which could affect the scram insertion time of those specific control rods, and
- c. For at least 10% of the control rods, on a rotating basis, at least once per 120 days of operation.

*Except movement of SRM, IRM or special movable detectors or normal control rod movement.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTROL ROD AVERAGE SCRAM INSERTION TIMES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.3 The average scram insertion time of all OPERABLE control rods from the fully withdrawn position, based on de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

<u>Position Inserted From</u> <u>Fully Withdrawn</u>	<u>Average Scram Inser-</u> <u>tion Time (Seconds)</u>
45	0.43
39	0.86
25	1.93
05	3.49

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With the average scram insertion time exceeding any of the above limits, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
FOUR CONTROL ROD GROUP SCRAM INSERTION TIMES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.4 The average scram insertion time, from the fully withdrawn position, for the three fastest control rods in each group of four control rods arranged in a two-by-two array, based on deenergization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

<u>Position Inserted From</u> <u>Fully Withdrawn</u>	<u>Average Scram Inser-</u> <u>tion Time (Seconds)</u>
45	0.45
39	0.92
25	2.05
05	3.70

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

- a. With the average scram insertion times of control rods exceeding the above limits:
 1. Declare the control rods with the slower than average scram insertion times inoperable until an analysis is performed to determine that required scram reactivity remains for the slow four control rod group, and
 2. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2c. at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with an average scram insertion time(s) in excess of the average scram insertion time limit.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.4 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.5 All control rod scram accumulators shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*

ACTION:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2:
 1. With one control rod scram accumulator inoperable:
 - a) Within 8 hours, either:
 - 1) Restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status,
or
 - 2) Declare the control rod associated with the inoperable accumulator inoperable.
 - b) Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
 2. With more than one control rod scram accumulator inoperable, declare the associated control rod inoperable and:
 - a) If the control rod associated with any inoperable scram accumulator is withdrawn, immediately verify that at least one CRD pump is operating by inserting at least one withdrawn control rod at least one notch by drive water pressure within the normal operating range or place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
 - b) Insert the inoperable control rods and disarm the associated directional control valves either:
 - 1) Electrically, or
 - 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 with:
 1. One withdrawn control rod with its associated scram accumulator inoperable, insert the affected control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves within 1 hour, either:
 - a) Electrically, or
 - b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
 2. More than one withdrawn control rod with the associated scram accumulator inoperable or with no control rod drive pump operating, immediately place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

*At least the accumulator associated with each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTROL ROD DRIVE COUPLING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*.

ACTION:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism:
 1. Within 2 hours, either:
 - a) If permitted by the RWM and RSCS, insert the control rod drive mechanism to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod, and:
 - 1) Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and
 - 2) Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position.
 - b) If recoupling is not accomplished on the first attempt or, if not permitted by the RWM or RSCS then until permitted by the RWM and RSCS, declare the control rod inoperable and insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves** either:
 - 1) Electrically, or
 - 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
 2. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours, either:
 1. Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or
 2. If recoupling is not accomplished, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves** either:
 - a) Electrically, or
 - b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

*At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

**May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM

CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.7 The control rod position indication system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*.

ACTION:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one or more control rod position indicators inoperable within one hour:
 1. Determine the position of the control rod by:
 - (a) Moving the control rod, by single notch movement, to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator,
 - (b) Returning the control rod, by single notch movement, to its original position, and
 - (c) Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours, or
 2. Move the control rod to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, or
 3. When THERMAL POWER is:
 - (a) Within the low power setpoint of the RSCS:
 - (1) Declare the control rod inoperable,
 - (2) Verify the position and bypassing of control rod with inoperable "Full in" and/or "Full out" position indicators by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.
 - b) Greater than the low power setpoint of the RSCS, declare the control rod inoperable, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves** either:
 - (1) Electrically, or
 - (2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
 4. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

*At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

**May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS

ROD WORTH MINIMIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.4.1 The rod worth minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*, when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power setpoint.

ACTION:

- a. With the RWM inoperable, verify control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed control rod pattern by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff who is present at the reactor control console. Otherwise, control rod movement may be only by actuating the manual scram or placing the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.4.1 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, and in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 prior to reaching 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.
- c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 within 1 hour after RWM automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.
- d. By verifying the control rod patterns and sequence input to the RWM computer is correctly loaded following any loading of the program into the computer.

*Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.4.2 The rod sequence control system (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*[#], when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 20% RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power setpoint.

ACTION:

- a. With the RSCS inoperable:
 1. Control rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not begin.
 2. Control rod movement shall not be permitted, except by a scram.
- b. With an inoperable control rod(s), OPERABLE control rod movement may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod(s) in the RSCS provided that:
 1. The position and bypassing of inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, and
 2. There are not more than 3 inoperable control rods in any RSCS group.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.4.2 The RSCS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Performance of a self-test prior to:
 1. Each reactor startup, and
 2. Rod inhibit mode automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER.
- b. Attempting to select and move an inhibited control rod:
 1. After withdrawal of the first insequence control rod for each reactor startup, and
 2. Within one hour after rod inhibit mode automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

#Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1 The reactor mode switch shall be OPERABLE and locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position. When the reactor mode switch is locked in the Refuel position:

- a. A control rod shall not be withdrawn unless the Refuel position one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE.
- b. CORE ALTERATIONS shall not be performed using equipment associated with a Refuel position interlock unless at least the following Refuel position interlocks are OPERABLE for such equipment.
 1. All rods in.
 2. Refuel platform position.
 3. Refuel platform hoists fuel-loaded.
 4. Service platform hoist fuel-loaded.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5*[#].

ACTION:

- a. With the reactor mode switch not locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position as specified, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position.
- b. With the one-rod-out interlock inoperable, lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- c. With any of the above required Refuel position equipment interlocks inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS with equipment associated with the inoperable Refuel position equipment interlock.

* See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.3. ^{##}

[#]The reactor shall be maintained in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

^{##}The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Run or Startup/Hot Standby position to test the switch interlock functions provided that all control rods are verified to remain fully inserted by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

AMENDMENT NO. 53 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-374

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The proposed amendment to Operating License NPF-18 would revise the LaSalle Unit 2 Technical Specification by deleting specifications added by amendment 30 to allow installation and use of the Fine Motion Control Rod Drive (FMCRD) during the Unit 2 Cycle 2. This amendment would therefore return the Technical Specification to their original state. This amendment is in response to a CECO letter dated September 7, 1988. CECO letters dated May 25 and August 29, 1989 were received after this amendment was noticed and provided information that was clarifying in nature.

2.0 EVALUATION

By letter of February 25, 1986, Commonwealth Edison, the licensee for LaSalle Unit 2, requested a review and approval of General Electric Topical Report NEDO-31120, "LaSalle Unit Fine Motion Control Rod Drive Demonstration Test Description," dated December 1985. The proposed test consisted of replacing an existing peripheral (location 02-43) locking piston control and drive (1LPCRD) module with a Fine Motion Control Rod Drive (FMCRD) module for one plant fuel cycle (approximately 18 months). The purpose of this test was to demonstrate the capability of the FMCRD module in a reactor environment. At the end of the test period, the FMCRD module was to be removed for inspection and the plant restored to its pretest configuration. This request was approved for Unit 2 Cycle 2 in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated August 15, 1986.

Technical Specification Special Test Exception (3/4.10.8, 3/4.10.9, and 3/4.10.10) were added to the Technical Specification to allow testing of the FMCRD at the control location 02-43. These Technical Specification Special Test Exceptions are being deleted, along with the references to them contained in Technical Specifications 3.1.1, 3.1.3.1 through 3.1.3.7, 3.1.4.1, and 3.1.4.2 for Operational Conditions, since the FMCRD module was removed during the refueling outage that concluded in February 1989. Technical Specification 3.9.1 is being modified to delete the requirement to fully insert the FMCRD and disarm the motor electrically before core alterations. The basis for the Technical Specification Special Test Exception are also being deleted. These changes to the Technical Specifications will return the Specifications to their original state to coincide with the plant being returned to the pretest configuration. The staff finds the proposed amendment to be acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation and use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that this amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: Lawrence E. Kokajko
Roger Lanksbury
Paul Shemanski

Dated: November 28, 1989