

February 12, 1999

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, President
Nuclear Generation Group
Commonwealth Edison Company
Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place, Suite 500
Downers Grove, IL 60515

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MA3832 AND MA3833)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 130 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 114 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments are in response to your application dated October 16, 1998.

The amendments revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to lower the power level (from 30 percent to 25 percent rated thermal power) below which the turbine control valve (TCV) and turbine stop valve (TSV) closure scram signals and the end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) signal are not in effect. The amendments also (1) delete from TSs the reference to turbine first stage pressure as a measure of rated thermal power, and (2) add a requirement to periodically verify that TCV and TSV scram trip functions and the EOC-RPT trip functions are not bypassed at greater than or equal to 25 percent rated thermal power.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
ORIG. SIGNED BY
Donna M. Skay, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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PDR ADDCK 05000373
P PDR

Docket Nos. 50-373, 50-374

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 130 to NPF-11
2. Amendment No. 114 to NPF-18
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: see next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 12, 1999

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, President
Nuclear Generation Group
Commonwealth Edison Company
Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place, Suite 500
Downers Grove, IL 60515

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MA3832 AND MA3833)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 130 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 114 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments are in response to your application dated October 16, 1998.

The amendments revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to lower the power level (from 30 percent to 25 percent rated thermal power) below which the turbine control valve (TCV) and turbine stop valve (TSV) closure scram signals and the end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) signal are not in effect. The amendments also (1) delete from TSs the reference to turbine first stage pressure as a measure of rated thermal power, and (2) add a requirement to periodically verify that TCV and TSV scram trip functions and the EOC-RPT trip functions are not bypassed at greater than or equal to 25 percent rated thermal power.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Donna M. Skay", is written over a horizontal line.

Donna M. Skay, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-373, 50-374

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 130 to NPF-11
2. Amendment No. 114 to NPF-18
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encs: see next page

O. Kingsley
Commonwealth Edison Company

cc:

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O. Kingsley
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- 2 -

LaSalle County Station
Units 1 and 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-373

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 130
License No. NPF-11

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated October 16, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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P PDR

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 130 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Donna M. Skay, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 12, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 130

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11

DOCKET NO. 50-373

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 3-4
3/4 3-5
3/4 3-8
3/4 3-39
3/4 3-40
3/4 3-41
3/4 3-44
B 3/4 3-3

INSERT

3/4 3-4
3/4 3-5
3/4 3-8
3/4 3-39
3/4 3-40
3/4 3-41
3/4 3-44
B 3/4 3-3

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION

- ACTION 1 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.
- ACTION 2 - Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted in the core and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within one hour.
- ACTION 3 - Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS* and insert all insertable control rods within one hour.
- ACTION 4 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours.
- ACTION 5 - Deleted
- ACTION 6 - Initiate a reduction in THERMAL POWER within 15 minutes and reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 2 hours.
- ACTION 7 - Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted within 1 hour.
- ACTION 8 - Lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within 1 hour.
- ACTION 9 - Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS,* and insert all insertable control rods and lock the reactor mode switch in the SHUTDOWN position within 1 hour.

*Except movement of IRM, SRM or special movable detectors, or replacement of LPRM strings provided SRM instrumentation is OPERABLE per Specification 3.9.2.

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

TABLE NOTATIONS

- (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the channel in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
- (b) The "shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn and during shutdown margin demonstrations performed per Specification 3.10.3.
- (c) An APRM channel is inoperable if there are less than 2 LPRM inputs per level or less than 14 LPRM inputs to an APRM channel.
- (d) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is unbolted or removed per Specification 3.10.1.
- (e) This function shall be automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is not in the Run position.
- (f) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required.
- (g) Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.
- (h) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
- (i) This function shall not be automatically bypassed when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- (j) Also actuates the EOC-RPT system.

Not required for control rods removed per Specifications 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u>
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High	NA	Q	R	1, 2, 5
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure ^(a)	NA	Q	R	1
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Valve Trip System Oil Pressure - Low ^(b)	NA	Q	R	1
11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position	NA	R	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
12. Manual Scram	NA	W	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
13. Control Rod Drive				
a. Charging Water Header Pressure - Low	NA	M	R	2, 5
b. Delay Timer	NA	M	R	2, 5

(a) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(b) The IRM and SRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1/2 decades during each startup and the IRM and APRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1/2 decades during each controlled shutdown, if not performed within the previous 7 days.

(c) Within 24 hours prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days.

(d) This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM channel to conform to the power levels calculated by a heat balance during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 when THERMAL POWER $\geq$ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The APRM Gain Adjustment Factor (GAF) for any channel shall be equal to the power value determined by the heat balance divided by the APRM reading for that channel.

Within 2 hours, adjust any APRM channel with a GAF > 1.02 . In addition, adjust any APRM channel within 12 hours, if power is greater than or equal to 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the APRM channel GAF is < 0.98 . Until any required APRM adjustment has been accomplished, notification shall be posted on the reactor control panel.

(e) This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM flow biased channel to conform to a calibrated flow signal.

(f) The LPRMs shall be calibrated at least once per 1000 effective full power hours (EFPH).

(g) Measure and compare core flow to rated core flow.

(h) This calibration shall consist of verifying the 6 ± 1 second simulated thermal power time constant.

(i) At least once per 18 months, verify Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Valve Trip System Oil Pressure - Low Trip Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is $\geq$ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Specification 4.0.2 applies to this 18-month interval.

* The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for a period of 24 hours after entering OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 or 3 when shutting down from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

INSTRUMENTATION

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4.2 The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.4.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.4.2-2 and with the END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.4.2-3.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

- a. With an end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.4.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the channel setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one or both trip systems, place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement(s) for one trip system and:
 1. If the inoperable channels consist of one turbine control valve channel and one turbine stop valve channel, place both inoperable channels in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
 2. If the inoperable channels include two turbine control valve channels or two turbine stop valve channels, declare the trip system inoperable.
- d. With one trip system inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. Otherwise, either:
 1. Increase the MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to the EOC-RPT inoperable value per Specification 3.2.3 within the next 1 hour or,
 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.
- e. With both trip systems inoperable, restore at least one trip system to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. Otherwise, either:

INSTRUMENTATION

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

1. Increase the MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to the EOC-RPT inoperable value per Specification 3.2.3 within the next 1 hour or,
2. reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.4.2.1 Each end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.4.2.1-1.

4.3.4.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

4.3.4.2.3 The END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each trip function shown in Table 3.3.4.2-3 shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least the logic of one type of channel input, turbine control valve fast closure or turbine stop valve closure, such that both types of channel inputs are tested at least once per 36 months. The time allotted for breaker arc suppression shall be verified by test at least once per 60 months.

TABLE 3.3.4.2-1

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM^(a)</u>
1. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	2 ^(b)
2. Turbine Control Valve - Fast Closure	2 ^(b)

- (a) A trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance provided that the other trip system is OPERABLE.
- (b) This function shall not be automatically bypassed when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

TABLE 4.3.4.2.1-1

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Turbine Stop Valve-Closure ^(a)	Q	R
2. Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure ^(a)	Q	R

(a) At least once per 18 months, verify Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and Turbine Control Valve - Fast Closure Trip Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is $\geq 25\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER. Specification 4.0.2 applies to this 18-month interval.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971 and NEDO-24222, dated December, 1979, and Appendix G of the FSAR.

The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a part of the Reactor Protection System and is an essential safety supplement to the reactor trip. The purpose of the EOC-RPT is to recover the loss of thermal margin which occurs at the end-of-cycle. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity to the reactor system at a faster rate than the control rods add negative scram reactivity. Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events. The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valves.

Analyses were performed to support continued operation with one or both trip systems of the EOC-RPT inoperable. The analyses provide MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) values which must be used if the EOC-RPT system is inoperable. These MCPR limits are included in the COLR and ensure that adequate margin to the MCPR safety limit exists with the EOC-RPT function inoperable. Application of these limits are discussed further in the bases for Specification 3.2.3.

A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system. Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one EOC-RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two stop valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system. For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stop valves. The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.

Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled. The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.

Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with the following:

1. NEDC-30851P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System", March 1988.



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-374

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 114
License No. NPF-18


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated October 16, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 114, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented prior to startup of L2C8.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Donna M. Skay, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 12, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 114

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

DOCKET NO. 50-374

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change. The page indicated by an asterisk (*) is provided for convenience only.

REMOVE

3/4 3-4
3/4 3-5
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3/4 3-39
3/4 3-41
3/4 3-43*
3/4 3-44
B 3/4 3-3

INSERT

3/4 3-4
3/4 3-5
3/4 3-8
3/4 3-39
3/4 3-41
3/4 3-43*
3/4 3-44
B 3/4 3-3

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 1 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.
- ACTION 2 - Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted in the core and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within 1 hour.
- ACTION 3 - Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS* and insert all insertable control rods within one hour.
- ACTION 4 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours.
- ACTION 5 - DELETED
- ACTION 6 - Initiate a reduction in THERMAL POWER within 15 minutes and reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 2 hours.
- ACTION 7 - Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted within 1 hour.
- ACTION 8 - Lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within 1 hour.
- ACTION 9 - Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS,* and insert all insertable control rods and lock the reactor mode switch in the SHUTDOWN position within 1 hour.

*Except movement of IRM, SRM, or special movable detectors, or replacement of LPRM strings provided SRM instrumentation is OPERABLE per Specification 3.9.2.

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

TABLE NOTATIONS

- (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the channel in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
- (b) The "shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn* and during shutdown margin demonstrations performed per Specification 3.10.3.
- (c) An APRM channel is inoperable if there are less than 2 LPRM inputs per level or less than 14 LPRM inputs to an APRM channel.
- (d) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is unbolted or removed per Specification 3.10.1.
- (e) This function shall be automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is not in the Run position.
- (f) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required.
- (g) Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.
- (h) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
- (i) This function shall not be automatically bypassed when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- (j) Also actuates the EOC-RPT system.

*Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High	NA	Q	R	1, 2, 5
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure ⁽¹⁾	NA	Q	R	1
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Valve Trip System Oil Pressure - Low ⁽¹⁾	NA	Q	R	1
11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position	NA	R	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
12. Manual Scram	NA	W	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
13. Control Rod Drive				
a. Charging Water Header Pressure - Low	NA	M	R	2, 5
b. Delay Timer	NA	M	R	2, 5

(a) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(b) The IRM and SRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1/2 decades during each startup and the IRM and APRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1/2 decades during each controlled shutdown, if not performed within the previous 7 days.

(c) Within 24 hours prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days.

(d) This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM channel to conform to the power levels calculated by a heat balance during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 when THERMAL POWER $\geq$ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The APRM Gain Adjustment Factor (GAF) for any channel shall be equal to the power value determined by the heat balance divided by the APRM reading for that channel.

Within 2 hours, adjust any APRM channel with a GAF > 1.02 . In addition, adjust any APRM channel within 12 hours, if power is greater than or equal to 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the APRM channel GAF is < 0.98 . Until any required APRM adjustment has been accomplished, notification shall be posted on the reactor control panel.

(e) This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM flow biased channel to conform to a calibrated flow signal.

(f) The LPRMs shall be calibrated at least once per 1000 effective full power hours (EFPH).

(g) Measure and compare core flow to rated core flow.

(h) This calibration shall consist of verifying the 6 ± 1 second simulated thermal power time constant.

(i) At least once per 18 months, verify Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Valve Trip System Oil Pressure - Low Trip Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is $\geq$ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Specification 4.0.2 applies to this 18-month interval.

* The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for a period of 24 hours after entering OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 or 1 when shutting down from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

INSTRUMENTATION

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4.2 The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.4.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.4.2-2 and with the END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.4.2-3.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

- a. With an end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.4.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the channel setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one or both trip systems, place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement(s) for one trip system and:
 1. If the inoperable channels consist of one turbine control valve channel and one turbine stop valve channel, place both inoperable channels in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
 2. If the inoperable channels include two turbine control valve channels or two turbine stop valve channels, declare the trip system inoperable.
- d. With one trip system inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, otherwise, either:
 1. Increase the MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER (MCPR) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to the EOC-RPT inoperable value per Specification 3.2.3 within the next 1 hour, or
 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.
- e. With both trip systems inoperable, restore at least one trip system to OPERABLE status within 1 hour, otherwise, either:
 1. Increase the MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER (MCPR) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to the EOC-RPT inoperable value per Specification 3.2.3 within the next 1 hour, or
 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

TABLE 3.3.4.2-1

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM^(a)</u>
1. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	2(b)
2. Turbine Control Valve - Fast Closure	2(b)

- (a) A trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance provided that the other trip system is OPERABLE.
- (b) This function shall not be automatically bypassed when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

TABLE 3.3.4.2-3END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME (Milliseconds)</u>
1. Turbine Stop Valve-Closure	≤ 97
2. Turbine Control Valve - Fast Closure	≤ 97

TABLE 4.3.4.2.1-1

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Turbine Stop Valve Closure ^(a)	Q	R
2. Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure ^(a)	Q	R

(a) At least once per 18 months, verify Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and Turbine Control Valve - Fast Closure Trip Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is $\geq$ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Specification 4.0.2 applies to this 18-month interval.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30936P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (With Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)", Parts 1 and 2, December 1988, and RE-025 Revision 1, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2", April 1991. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required surveillances, entry into LCO and required ACTIONS may be delayed, provided the associated function maintains ECCS initiation capability.

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971 and NEDO-24222, dated December, 1979, and Appendix G of the FSAR.

The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a part of the Reactor Protection System and is an essential safety supplement to the reactor trip. The purpose of the EOC-RPT is to recover the loss of thermal margin which occurs at the end-of-cycle. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity to the reactor system at a faster rate than the control rods add negative scram reactivity. Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events. The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valves.

Analyses were performed to support continued operation with one or both trip systems of the EOC-RPT inoperable. The analyses provide MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) values which must be used if the EOC-RPT system is inoperable. These MCPR limits are included in the COLR and ensure that adequate margin to the MCPR safety limit exists with the EOC-RPT function inoperable. Application of these limits are discussed further in the bases for Specification 3.2.3.

A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system. Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one EOC-RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two stop valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system. For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stop valves. The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.

Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled. The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 130 TO FACILITY

OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 AND

AMENDMENT NO. 114 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 16, 1998, Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd, the licensee) requested changes to the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed changes affect TS Sections 3.3.1 (Reactor Protection System Instrumentation) and 3.3.4.2 (End-Of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation) by revising the setpoint below which the Turbine Control Valve (TCV) and Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) closure scram signals and the End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) signals are automatically bypassed. The setpoint is measured using turbine first stage pressure and is currently set at 140 psig which corresponds to 30 percent rated thermal power. The licensee proposes to reduce the setpoint to 25 percent rated thermal power and delete the reference to turbine first stage pressure from the TS. In addition, to ensure that the trips are enabled when they are needed, a requirement is proposed to be added to periodically verify that TCV and TSV scram trip functions and the EOC-RPT functions are not bypassed when at greater than or equal to 25 percent rated thermal power. The licensee stated that the reduction of the setpoint from 30 percent to 25 percent will reduce the complexity of reload analyses and increase operating flexibility at low power levels.

2.0 EVALUATION

Either a generator load rejection or turbine trip will initiate closure of the TSV and fast closure of the TCV to protect the turbine. Closure of the TSVs and fast closure of the TCVs results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients. To protect the reactor from overpressure due to positive reactivity, a reactor scram is initiated on TSV closure and TCV fast closure in anticipation of the transients that would result. In addition, the EOC-RPT instrumentation initiates a recirculation pump trip to reduce the peak reactor pressure and power resulting from a generator load rejection or turbine trip. The scram that results from the TSV closure or TCV fast closure reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the EOC-RPT system, ensures that the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) safety limit is not exceeded.

The TSV closure and TCV fast closure scram functions and EOC-RPT must be enabled during power operation. However, at low power levels, the scram and RPT may be bypassed because the severity of pressurization transients is reduced and because the majority of steam can bypass the turbine. LaSalle, Units 1 and 2, have approximately 30 percent bypass capability. Therefore, a scram on TCV or TSV closure is not needed unless power is greater than 30 percent as adequate steam bypass capacity is available. The current TS allow the TSV-Closure Scram, TCV-Fast Closure Scram, and EOC-RPT to be bypassed at less than 30 percent rated thermal power (P_{bypass}). ComEd proposes to reduce the current setpoint to 25 percent. This reduction from 30 percent to 25 percent provides a more conservative setting for the TSV closure and TCV fast closure scram bypass setpoints and EOC-RPT and will reduce the overpressure effects on scram actuation.

The reduction in P_{bypass} will impact the power dependent core thermal operating limits. LaSalle utilizes power and flow dependent thermal limits (ARTS). The licensee submitted a revised General Electric (GE) analysis of the ARTS Improvement Program for LaSalle that included an evaluation of the effects of the change in P_{bypass} . The analysis was performed to validate a linear extension of the generic thermal limits from 30 percent power down to 25 percent. New thermal limits were determined for LaSalle, Unit 1, Cycle 8, through the use of the NRC-approved ODYN reactor dynamic model for the limiting power dependent transients, Load Rejection Without Bypass and Feedwater Controller Failure events. With P_{bypass} at 25 percent power, the transient consequences for analyses between 25 percent and 30 percent power were much less severe than with P_{bypass} at 30 percent rated thermal power. This analysis is representative of limits that will be determined each cycle as part of the normal reload licensing process. For Unit 2 and future reloads, the licensee will evaluate these transients under 10 CFR 50.59 as part of the normal reload licensing process and submit the revised thermal limits in the Core Operating Limits Report in accordance with TS 6.6.A.6.d.

The current applicability and action statements for TCV and TSV closure and EOC-RPT trip instrumentation refer to turbine first stage pressure as a measurement of rated thermal power. While the P_{bypass} setpoint will continue to be measured by turbine first stage pressure, the reference will be deleted from the TS. Listing of the pressure is an unnecessary detail and its deletion is consistent with the format of this specification in NUREG-1434, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/6", Revision 1.

The licensee also proposes to revise the wording of TS Table 3.3.1-1, Note (i) and Table 3.3.4.2-1, Note (b). The revised notes will state that the scram signals shall not be automatically bypassed at greater than or equal to 25 percent of Rated Thermal Power, rather than stating that they shall be automatically bypassed below the P_{bypass} setpoint. This change ensures that the scram function and EOC-RPT function will be available and will not be automatically bypassed above 25 percent rated thermal power. The proposed wording is consistent with NUREG-1434.

The licensee also proposes to add a surveillance to ensure that these functions are not bypassed at greater than or equal to 25 percent rated thermal power. The proposed surveillance will require verification once per 18 months that the TSV-Closure and TCV-Fast Closure trip functions are not bypassed when thermal power is greater than or equal to 25 percent of rated thermal power. This addition is also consistent with NUREG-1434.

The reduction in P_{bypass} from 30 percent to 25 percent of rated thermal power will continue to ensure that the reactor is protected from overpressurization due to closure of the TSV or fast closure of the TCV during operation while still ensuring that unnecessary scrams and recirculation pump trips do not occur at low power levels. The changes to eliminate the reference to first stage turbine pressure and reword the applicability statement are administrative changes consistent with NUREG-1434. The addition of a surveillance to ensure that these functions are not bypassed at greater than or equal to 25 percent rated thermal power is conservative. Therefore, the proposed TS changes are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 64108). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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