

March 11, 1996

Mr. D. L. Farrar
Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Services
Commonwealth Edison Company
Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place, Suite 500
Downers Grove, IL 60515

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 10 CFR
PART 50, APPENDIX J, OPTION B (TAC NOS. M94063 AND M94064)

Dear Mr. Farrar:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 110 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 95 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments are in response to your application dated November 14, 1995, as supplemented January 4, 1996, and February 29, 1996.

The amendments revise the Technical Specifications (TSs) to incorporate 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors," Option B.

That portion of your proposed revisions to the LaSalle TS which would add a footnote to the surveillance requirements in TS Section 4.6.1.3 has not been included in the subject TS revisions in accordance with the request in your letter dated February 29, 1996.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

M. David Lynch, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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PDR ADOCK 05000373
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Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374
Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 110 to NPF-11
2. Amendment No. 95 to NPF-18
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl: see next page

Distribution: Docket File PUBLIC PDIII-2 r/f
J. Roe, JWR R. Capra C. Moore M. Lynch
OGC, 015B18 G. Hill (4), T5C3 C. Grimes, 011E22 ACRS, T2E26
B. Clayton, RIII J. Hickman, 013D18 R. Lobel

DOCUMENT NAME: LA94063.AMD

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D. L. Farrar
Commonwealth Edison Company

LaSalle County Station
Unit Nos. 1 and 2

cc:

Phillip P. Steptoe, Esquire
Sidley and Austin
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Robert Cushing
Chief, Public Utilities Division
Illinois Attorney General's Office
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Assistant Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street
Suite 12
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Michael I. Miller, Esquire
Sidley and Austin
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60603

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Resident Inspectors Office LaSalle Station
2605 N. 21st Road
Marseilles, Illinois 61341-9756

Document Control Desk-Licensing
Commonwealth Edison Company
1400 Opus Place, Suite 400
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

Chairman
LaSalle County Board of Supervisors
LaSalle County Courthouse
Ottawa, Illinois 61350

Attorney General
500 South Second Street
Springfield, Illinois 62701

Chairman
Illinois Commerce Commission
Leland Building
527 East Capitol Avenue
Springfield, Illinois 62706

Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Facility Safety
1035 Outer Park Drive
Springfield, Illinois 62704

Regional Administrator
U.S. NRC, Region III
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351

LaSalle Station Manager
LaSalle County Station
Rural Route 1
P.O. Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-373

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 110
License No. NPF-11

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated November 14, 1995, as supplemented January 4, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 110, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective upon the date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than June 30, 1996.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



M. David Lynch, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 11, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 110

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11

DOCKET NO. 50-373

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

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3/4 6-1
3/4 6-5
3/4 6-6
3/4 6-23
B 3/4 6-1
B 3/4 6-1a
B 3/4 6-4a
6-20a

INSERT

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B 3/4 6-4a
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-374

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 95
License No. NPF-18

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated November 14, 1995, as supplemented January 4, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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DEFINITIONS

1.20 DELETED

LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN

1.21 A LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN shall be a pattern which results in the core being on a thermal hydraulic limit, i.e., operating on a limiting value for APLHGR, LHGR, or MCPR.

LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

1.22 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) shall be the heat generation per unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST

1.23 A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test of all logic components, i.e, all relays and contacts, all trip units, solid state logic elements, etc. of a logic circuit, from sensor through and including the actuated device to verify OPERABILITY. THE LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total system steps such that the entire logic system is tested.

MAXIMUM FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY

1.24 The MAXIMUM FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY (MFLPD) shall be the highest value of the FLPD which exists in the core.

MEMBERS(S) OF THE PUBLIC

1.25 MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC shall include all persons who are not occupationally associated with the plant. This category does not include employees of the licensee, its contractors, or vendors. Also excluded from this category are persons who enter the site to service equipment or to make deliveries. This category does include persons who use portions of the site for recreational, occupational, or other purposes not associated with the plant.

MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

1.26 The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) shall be the smallest CPR which exists in the core.

OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL

1.27 The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) shall contain the methodology and parameters used in the calculation of offsite doses resulting from radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, in the calculation of gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring Alarm/Trip Setpoints, and in the conduct of the Environmental Radiological Monitoring Program. The ODCM shall also contain (1) the Radioactive Effluent Controls and Radiological Environmental Monitoring Programs required by Technical Specification Section 6.2.F.4 and (2) descriptions of the information that should be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating and Semi-Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports required by Technical Specification Sections 6.6.A.3 and 6.6.A.4.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2,* and 3.

ACTION:

Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations** not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- b. Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing except for primary containment air lock testing and main steam lines through the isolation valves, in accordance with and at the frequency specified by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

**Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment, and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed when the primary containment has not been deinerted since the last verification or more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Each primary containment air lock shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2*, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one primary containment air lock door inoperable:
 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.
 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
 4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the primary containment air lock inoperable, except as a result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.6.1.3 Each primary containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. By performing required primary containment air lock leakage testing in accordance with and at the frequency specified by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, .
 - b. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.**

*Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to Specification 4.6.1.1.b.

**Only required to be performed upon entry into primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 Each primary containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each primary containment automatic isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING at least once per 18 months by verifying that on a containment isolation test signal each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each primary containment power operated or automatic isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.3.4 Each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that the valve checks flow.

4.6.3.5 Each traversing in-core probe system explosive isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying the continuity of the explosive charge.
- b. At least once per 18 months by removing the explosive squib from at least one explosive valve such that the explosive squib in each explosive valve will be tested at least once per 90 months, and initiating the explosive squib. The replacement charge for the exploded squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having at least one of that batch successfully fired. No explosive squib shall remain in use beyond the expiration of its shelf-life and operating-life.

4.6.3.6 At the frequency specified by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program:

- a. Verify leakage rate through all four main steam lines through the isolation valves is ≤ 100 scfh when tested at ≥ 25.0 psig.
- b. Verify combined leakage rate through hydrostatically tested lines that penetrate the primary containment is within limits.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

The structural integrity of the primary containment is ensured by the successful completion of the Inservice Inspection Program for Post Tensioning Tendons and by associated visual inspections of the steel liner and penetrations for evidence of deterioration or breach of integrity. This ensures that the structural integrity of the primary containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Primary Containment Tendon Surveillance Program. Testing and Frequency are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3, except that the Unit 1 and 2 primary containments shall be treated as twin containments even though the Initial Structural Integrity Tests were not within 2 years of each other.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is maintained by limiting leakage to $\leq 1.0 L_a$ except prior to the first startup after performing a required leakage test. At this time, Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage limits must be met. Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_a) is 0.635% by weight of the containment atmosphere per day at the design basis LOCA maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 39.6 psig.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock, main steam lines through the isolation valves, and valves in hydrostatically tested lines are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.3, and Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.b maintains PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY by requiring compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (4.6.1.3) or main steam isolation valve leakage (4.6.3.6.a) does not necessarily result in a failure of this Surveillance Requirement, 4.6.1.1.b. The impact of the failure to meet these Surveillance Requirements 4.6.1.3 and 4.6.1.1.b must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The leakage limits for main steam lines through the isolation valves and leakage test results of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.a are not included in the total sum of Type B and C tests (approved exemption). As-left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required leakage test is required to be $< 0.60 L_a$ for combined Type B and C leakage, and $< 0.75 L_a$ for overall Type A leakage. At all other times

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (Continued)

between required Type A tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of $\leq 1.0 L_a$. At $\leq 1.0 L_a$, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis.

The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6.1.2 DELETED

3/4.6.1.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitation on closure and leak rate for the primary containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and the primary containment leakage rate given in Specification 3/4.6.1.1. The specification makes allowances for the fact that there may be long periods of time when the air locks will be in a closed and secured position during reactor operation. Only one closed door in each air lock is required to maintain the integrity of the containment.

Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The surveillance requirements reflect the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established during initial air lock and primary containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Additional annotation is provided to require the results of air lock leakage tests being evaluated against the acceptance criteria applicable to the surveillance requirements. This ensures that the air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determined the combined Type B and Type C primary containment leakage.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude assess to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the primary containment.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.a verifies leakage through all four main steam lines is ≤ 100 scfh when tested at $\geq P_t$ (25.0 psig). The transient and accident analyses are based on leakage at the specified leakage rate. The leakage rate for main steam lines through the isolation valves must be verified to be in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. A Note has been added to this Surveillance Requirement requiring the results to be excluded from the total of Type B and Type C tests. This ensures that leakage rate for main steam lines through the isolation valves is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.b test of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the assumptions of UFSAR Section 6.2 are met. The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test at a frequency in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF

Vacuum relief breakers are provided to equalize the pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell. This system will maintain the structural integrity of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures.

The vacuum breakers between the suppression chamber and the drywell must not be inoperable in the open position since this would allow bypassing of the suppression pool in case of an accident. There are four valves to provide redundancy so that operation may continue for up to 72 hours with one vacuum breaker inoperable provided that the manual isolation valves on each side are in the closed position.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

6.2.F.7 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Testing Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a , is 39.6 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , at P_a , is 0.635% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

- a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60 L_a$ for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for Type A tests.
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
 - 1) Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_a$ when tested at $\geq P_a$.
 - 2) For each door, the seal leakage rate is ≤ 5 scf per hour when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to ≥ 10 psig.

The provisions of specification 4.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of specification 4.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

6.3 ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF A REPORTABLE EVENT IN PLANT OPERATION

The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

- a. The Commission shall be notified and a Licensee Event Report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and
- b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function.

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 95, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective upon the date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than June 30, 1996.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



M. David Lynch, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 11, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 95

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

DOCKET NO. 50-374

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

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1-3
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3/4 6-5
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3/4 6-26
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B 3/4 6-4a
6-20a

INSERT

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DEFINITIONS

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1.0 DEFINITIONS

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DEFINITIONS

FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY

1.14 The FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY (FLPD) shall be the LHGR existing at a given location divided by the specified LHGR limit for that bundle type.

FRACTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER

1.15 The FRACTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER (FRTP) shall be the measured THERMAL POWER divided by the RATED THERMAL POWER.

FREQUENCY NOTATION

1.16 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM

1.17 A GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting primary coolant system offgases from the primary system and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment.

IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.18 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

- a. Leakage into collection systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or
- b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of the leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

1.19 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.

1.20 DELETED

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2,* and 3.

ACTION:

Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations** not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- b. Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing except for primary containment air lock testing and main steam lines through the isolation valves, in accordance with and at the frequency specified by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

**Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment, and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed when the primary containment has not been deinerted since the last verification or more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Each primary containment air lock shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2*, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one primary containment air lock door inoperable:
 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.
 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
 4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the primary containment air lock inoperable, except as a result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

4.6.1.3 Each primary containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. By performing required primary containment air lock leakage testing in accordance with and at the frequency specified by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, .
- b. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

*Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to Specification 4.6.1.1.b.

**Only required to be performed upon entry into primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted.

CONTAINMENT SYST

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 Each primary containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each primary containment automatic isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING at least once per 18 months by verifying that on a containment isolation test signal each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each primary containment power operated or automatic isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.3.4 Each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that the valve checks flow.

4.6.3.5 Each traversing in-core probe system explosive isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying the continuity of the explosive charge.
- b. At least once per 18 months by removing the explosive squib from at least one explosive valve such that the explosive squib in each explosive valve will be tested at least once per 90 months, and initiating the explosive squib. The replacement charge for the exploded squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having at least one of that batch successfully fired. No explosive squib shall remain in use beyond the expiration of its shelf-life and operating-life.

4.6.3.6 At the frequency specified by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program:

- a. Verify leakage rate through all four main steam lines through the isolation valves is ≤ 100 scfh when tested at ≥ 25.0 psig.
- b. Verify combined leakage rate through hydrostatically tested lines that penetrate the primary containment is within limits.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

The structural integrity of the primary containment is ensured by the successful completion of the Inservice Inspection Program for Post Tensioning Tendons and by associated visual inspections of the steel liner and penetrations for evidence of deterioration or breach of integrity. This ensures that the structural integrity of the primary containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Primary Containment Tendon Surveillance Program. Testing and Frequency are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3, except that the Unit 1 and 2 primary containments shall be treated as twin containments even though the Initial Structural Integrity Tests were not within 2 years of each other.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is maintained by limiting leakage to $\leq 1.0 L_a$ except prior to the first startup after performing a required leakage test. At this time, Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage limits must be met. Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_a) is 0.635% by weight of the containment atmosphere per day at the design basis LOCA maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 39.6 psig.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock, main steam lines through the isolation valves, and valves in hydrostatically tested lines are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.3, and Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.b maintains PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY by requiring compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (4.6.1.3) or main steam isolation valve leakage (4.6.3.6.a) does not necessarily result in a failure of this Surveillance Requirement, 4.6.1.1.b. The impact of the failure to meet these Surveillance Requirements 4.6.1.3 and 4.6.1.1.b must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The leakage limits for main steam lines through the isolation valves and leakage test results of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.a are not included in the total sum of Type B and C tests (approved exemption). As-left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required leakage test is required to be $< 0.60 L_a$ for combined Type B and C leakage, and $< 0.75 L_a$ for overall Type A leakage. At all other times

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (Continued)

between required Type A tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of $\leq 1.0 L_0$. At $\leq 1.0 L_0$, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis.

The Frequency is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions. Thus, 4.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.b.

3/4.6.1.2 DELETED

3/4.6.1.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitation on closure and leak rate for the primary containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and the primary containment leakage rate given in Specification 3/4.6.1.1. The specification makes allowances for the fact that there may be long periods of time when the air locks will be in a closed and secured position during reactor operation. Only one closed door in each air lock is required to maintain the integrity of the containment.

Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The surveillance requirements reflect the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established during initial air lock and primary containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Additional annotation is provided to require the results of air lock leakage tests being evaluated against the acceptance criteria applicable to the surveillance requirements. This ensures that the air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determined the combined Type B and Type C primary containment leakage.

3/4.6.1.4 MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM

Calculated doses resulting from the maximum leakage allowance for the main steamline isolation valves in the postulated LOCA situations would be a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guidelines provided the main steam line system from the isolation valves up to and including the turbine condenser remains intact. Operating experience has indicated that degradation has

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

This specification provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to control leakage from the primary containment during accidents.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude assess to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the primary containment.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.a verifies leakage through all four main steam lines is ≤ 100 scfh when tested at $\geq P_t$ (25.0 psig). The transient and accident analyses are based on leakage at the specified leakage rate. The leakage rate for main steam lines through the isolation valves must be verified to be in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. A Note has been added to this Surveillance Requirement requiring the results to be excluded from the total of Type B and Type C tests. This ensures that leakage rate for main steam lines through the isolation valves is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.b test of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the assumptions of UFSAR Section 6.2 are met. The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test at a frequency in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF

Vacuum relief breakers are provided to equalize the pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell. This system will maintain the structural integrity of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures.

The vacuum breakers between the suppression chamber and the drywell must not be inoperable in the open position since this would allow bypassing of the suppression pool in case of an accident. There are four valves to provide redundancy so that operation may continue for up to 72 hours with one vacuum breaker inoperable provided that the manual isolation valves on each side are in the closed position.

PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

the Initial Structural Integrity Tests were not within 2 years of each other.

The Onsite Review and Investigative Function shall be responsible for reviewing and approving changes to the Inservice Inspection Program for Post Tensioning Tendons.

The provisions of 4.0.2 and 4.0.3 are applicable to the Tendon Surveillance Program inspection frequencies.

6.2.F.7 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Testing Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a , is 39.6 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , at P_a , is 0.635% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

- a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60 L_a$ for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for Type A tests.
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
 - 1) Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_a$ when tested at $\geq P_a$.
 - 2) For each door, the seal leakage rate is ≤ 5 scf per hour when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to ≥ 10 psig.

The provisions of specification 4.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of specification 4.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

6.3 ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF A REPORTABLE EVENT IN PLANT OPERATION

The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

- a. The Commission shall be notified and a Licensee Event Report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and
- b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed pursuant to Specification 6.1.G.2.c(1).



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 110 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 AND
AMENDMENT NO. 95 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letters dated November 14, 1995, and January 4, 1996, Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd, the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would revise the TS to reflect the approval for ComEd to use 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, for the LaSalle County Stations containment leakage rate test programs. The January 4, 1996, supplement only requested a change in the implementation schedule for the amendment. This information was within the scope of the original application and did not change the staff's initial proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration determination. The November 14, 1995, and January 4, 1996, letters also requested similar changes for the Dresden and Quad Cities Stations. Those requested changes were approved on January 11, 1996.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Compliance with Appendix J provides assurance that the primary containment, including those systems and components which penetrate the primary containment, do not exceed the allowable leakage rate values specified in the TS and bases. The allowable leakage rate is determined so that the leakage assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

On February 4, 1992, the NRC published a notice in the Federal Register (57 FR 4166) discussing a planned initiative to begin eliminating requirements marginal to safety which impose a significant regulatory burden. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, "Primary Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors," was considered for this initiative and the staff undertook a study of possible changes to this regulation. The study examined the previous performance history of domestic containments and examined the effect on risk of a revision to the requirements of Appendix J. The results of this study are reported in NUREG-1493, "Performance-Based Leak-Test Program."

Based on the results of this study, the staff developed a performance-based approach to containment leakage rate testing. On September 12, 1995, the NRC approved issuance of this revision to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, which was

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subsequently published in the Federal Register on September 26, 1995, and became effective on October 26, 1995. The revision added Option B "Performance-Based Requirements" to Appendix J to allow licensees to voluntarily replace the prescriptive testing requirements of Appendix J with testing requirements based on both overall and individual component leakage rate performance.

Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, "Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program," was developed as a method acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing Option B. This regulatory guide states that the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," provides methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with Option B with four exceptions which are described therein.

Option B requires that the regulatory guide or other implementation document used by a licensee to develop a performance-based leakage testing program must be included, by general reference, in the plant TS.

Regulatory Guide 1.163 specifies an extension in Type A test frequency to at least one test in 10 years based upon two consecutive successful tests. Type B tests may be extended up to a maximum of 10 years based upon completion of two consecutive successful tests and Type C tests may be extended up to 5 years based on two consecutive successful tests.

By letter dated October 20, 1995, NEI proposed TS for implementing Option B. After some discussion, the staff and NEI agreed on a set of model TS which were transmitted to NEI in a letter dated November 2, 1995. These TS are to serve as a model for licensees to develop plant-specific TS in preparing amendment requests to implement Option B.

In order for a licensee to determine the performance of each component, a licensee must establish factors that are indicative of performance such as an administrative leakage limit. The administrative limit is selected to be indicative of the potential onset of component degradation. Although these limits are subject to NRC inspection to assure that they are selected in a reasonable manner, they are not TS requirements. Failure to meet an administrative limit requires the licensee to return to the minimum value of the test interval.

Option B requires that the licensee maintain records to show that the criteria for Type A, B, and C tests have been met. In addition, the licensee must maintain comparisons of the performance of the overall containment system and the individual components to show that the test intervals are adequate. These records are subject to NRC inspection.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee's November 14, 1995, letter to the NRC proposes to establish a "Primary Containment Leakage Rate Program" and proposes to add this program to the TS. The program references Regulatory Guide 1.163 which specifies methods

acceptable to the NRC for complying with Option B. This requires a change to existing TS 1.20, 4.6.1.1.b., 3.6.1.3, 4.6.1.3 and 4.6.3.6, and the addition of the program to Section 6.2.F.7 of the TS.

Option B permits a licensee to choose Type A; or Type B and C; or Type A, B, and C testing to be done on a performance basis. The licensee has elected to perform Type A, B, and C testing on a performance basis. The licensee has proposed to add a Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, to the TS. TS consistent with those transmitted to NEI in a letter dated November 2, 1995, except as noted below, were also proposed.

The TS changes proposed by the licensee differ with the model TS developed by the NRC staff in cooperation with NEI on one item. The generic surveillance for secondary containment integrity requires verifying that the leakage rate for all secondary containment bypass leakage meets certain criteria at a frequency in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The licensee, however, has chosen to retain its existing surveillance which requires verifying once per 24 hours that the pressure within the secondary containment is ≥ 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge, verifying once per 31 days that appropriate doors and penetrations are closed, and verifying once per 18 months that each standby gas treatment train can produce adequate secondary containment vacuum at a specified flow rate. The current specifications provide adequate assurance of secondary containment, were previously approved by the staff, and are acceptable. Based on the above, the licensee's proposed changes implementing Option B of Appendix J are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 62896). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: R. Lobel
J. Hickman

Date: March 8, 1996