

February 10, 1988

Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Mr. L. D. Butterfield, Jr.
Nuclear Licensing Manager
Commonwealth Edison Company
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Dear Mr. Butterfield:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 53 AND 35 TO FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSES NPF-11 AND NO. NPF-18 - LA SALLE COUNTY STATION,
UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. 66119 AND 66120)

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 53 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 35 to Facility Operating License NPF-18 for the La Salle County Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letters dated September 4, 1987 and supplemented December 4, 1987.

The amendments revise the La Salle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications to permit the use of the remaining channels of the Traversing Incore Probe System when one or more channels are inoperable.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation supporting Amendment No. 53 to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 35 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Paul Shemanski, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III
IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 53 to License No. NPF-11
2. Amendment No. 35 to License No. NPF-18
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

P.S.

PDIII-2:PM	PDIII-2:LA	PDIII-2:PD
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Mr. L. D. Butterfield, Jr.
Commonwealth Edison Company

LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station
Units 1 and 2

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-373

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 53
License No. NPF-11

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The applications for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated September 4, 1987 and supplemented December 4, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 53, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective 45 days after the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Daniel R. Muller".

Daniel R. Muller, Director
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosure:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 10, 1988

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 53

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11

DOCKET NO. 50-373

Replace the following page of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed page. The revised page is identified by Amendment number and contains a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 3-8

3/4 3-73

B 3/4 3-5

INSERT

3/4 3-8

3/4 3-73

B 3/4 3-5

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

LA SALLE - UNIT 1

3/4 3-8

Amendment No. 53

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High	NA	M	R	1, 2, 5
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure	NA	M	R	1
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Valve Trip System Oil Pressure - Low	NA	M	R*	1
11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position	NA	R	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
12. Manual Scram	NA	M	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
13. Control Rod Drive				
a. Charging Water Header Pressure - Low	NA	M	R	2, 5
b. Delay Timer	NA	M	R	2, 5

- (a) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- (b) The IRM, and SRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1/2 decades during each startup and the IRM and APRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1/2 decades during each controlled shutdown, if not performed within the previous 7 days.
- (c) Within 24 hours prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days.
- (d) This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM channel to conform to the power levels calculated by a heat balance during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 when THERMAL POWER \geq 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The APRM Gain Adjustment Factor (GAF) for any channel shall be equal to the power value determined by the heat balance divided by the APRM reading for that channel.

Within 2 hours, adjust any APRM channel with a GAF $>$ 1.02. In addition, adjust any APRM channel within 12 hours, (1) if power is greater than or equal to 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the APRM channel GAF is $<$ 0.98, or (2) if power is less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the APRM reading exceeds the power value determined by the heat balance by more than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Until any required APRM adjustment has been accomplished, notification shall be posted on the reactor control panel.

- (e) This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM flow biased channel to conform to a calibrated flow signal.
- (f) The LPRMs shall be calibrated at least once per 1000 effective full power hours (EFPH).
- (g) Measure and compare core flow to rated core flow.
- (h) This calibration shall consist of verifying the 6 ± 1 second simulated thermal power time constant.

*The specified 18-month interval may be waived for Cycle 1 provided the surveillance is performed during Refuel 1, which is to commence no later than October 27, 1985.

INSTRUMENTATION

TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.3.7.7. The traversing in-core probe (TIP) system shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. Movable detectors, drives and readout equipment to map the core in the required measurement locations and
 - b. Indexing equipment to allow all required detectors to be calibrated in a common location.

APPLICABILITY: When the traversing in-core probe is used for:

- *a. Recalibration of the LPRM detectors, and
- *b. Monitoring the APLHGR, LHGR, MCPR, or MFLPD.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more TIP measurement locations inoperable, required measurements may be performed as described in 1 and 2 below, provided the reactor core is operating in an octant symmetric control rod pattern, and the total core TIP uncertainty for the present cycle has been measured to be less than 8.7 percent.
 1. TIP data for an inoperable measurement location may be replaced by data obtained from that string's redundant (symmetric) counterpart if the substitute TIP data was obtained from an operable measurement location.
 2. TIP data for an inoperable measurement location may be replaced by data obtained from a 3-dimensional BWR core simulator code normalized with available operating measurements, provided the total number of simulated channels (measurement locations) does not exceed:
 - a) All channels of a single TIP machine, or
 - b) A total of five channels if more than one TIP machine is involved.
- b. Otherwise, with the TIP system inoperable, suspend use of the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.
- c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.7.7 The traversing in-core probe system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by normalizing each of the above required detector outputs within 72 hours prior to use for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.

*Only the detector(s) in the required measurement location(s) are required to be OPERABLE.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS

The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions should not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the intermediate range monitors are on scale adequate information is available without the SRMs and they can be retracted.

3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe (TIP) system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.

The specification allows use of substituted TIP data from symmetric channels if the control rod pattern is symmetric since the TIP data is adjusted by the plant computer to remove machine dependent and power level dependent bias. The source of data for the substitution may also be a 3-dimensional BWR core simulator calculated data set which is normalized to available real data. Since uncertainty could be introduced by the simulation and normalization process, an evaluation of the specific control rod pattern and core operating state must be performed to ensure that adequate margin to core operating limits is maintained.

3/4.3.7.8 AMMONIA DETECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the ammonia detection system ensures that an accidental ammonia release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated to provide protection for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of ammonia, the control room emergency ventilation system will automatically be placed in the recirculation mode of operation to provide the required protection. The detection systems required by this specification are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.78 "Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release."

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-374

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 35
License No. NPF-18

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated September 4, 1987 and supplemented December 4, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 35, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective 45 days after the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Daniel R. Muller, Director
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosure:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 10, 1988

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 35

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

DOCKET NO. 50-374

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REMOVE

3/4 3-8

3/4 3-73

B 3/4 3-5

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FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High	NA	M	R	1, 2, 5
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure	NA	M	R	1
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Valve Trip System Oil Pressure - Low	NA	M	R	1
11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position	NA	R	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
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- b. Otherwise, with the TIP system inoperable, suspend use of the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.
- c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.7.7 The traversing in-core probe system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by normalizing each of the above required detector outputs within 72 hours prior to use for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.

*Only the detector(s) in the required measurement location(s) are required to be OPERABLE.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations".

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The specification allows use of substituted TIP data from symmetric channels if the control rod pattern is symmetric since the TIP data is adjusted by the plant computer to remove machine dependent and power level dependent bias. The source of data for the substitution may also be a 3-dimensional BWR core simulator calculated data set which is normalized to available real data. Since uncertainty could be introduced by the simulation and normalization process, an evaluation of the specific control rod pattern and core operating state must be performed to ensure that adequate margin to core operating limits is maintained.

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OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 53 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 AND
AMENDMENT NO. 35 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letters dated September 4, 1987, and December 4, 1987, Commonwealth Edison proposed to amend Facility Operating License NPF-11 and NPF-18 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. The proposed amendment will permit the use of functioning channels of the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system when one or more of the TIP measurement locations are inaccessible or inoperable.

2.0 EVALUATION

The current Technical Specification 3.3.7.7. requires that all five TIP units be operable and capable of being intercalibrated in a common location in order to use the system for recalibration of any low power range monitor (LPRM) detector or for monitoring thermal limits. The proposed amendment would permit continued use of the system if no more than one TIP machine is inoperable or no more than five channels are inoperable if more than one TIP machine is involved. Data from symmetric channels would be substituted in the inaccessible channels which do not have a symmetric counterpart (e.g., those on an axis of symmetry). TIP data would be generated by computer modeling using a 3-dimensional core simulator. Computer modeling may also be used to generate constants for other inaccessible channels.

The licensee concludes that the use of symmetric channel data is acceptable if the total core TIP uncertainty has been measured to be less than 8.7% for the cycle. Revised Specification 3.3.7.7. requires such measurement. The use of calculated TIP data is also acceptable under the same conditions. The analysis supports the application of the substitutions for all channels of a single TIP machine or up to five channels if more than one TIP machine is involved.

The staff has reviewed the proposed Technical Specification changes and concludes that they are consistent with the analyses described above and are acceptable. The restriction of the permissible substitutions to one TIP machine or to five channels if more than one machine is involved assures that the ability of the computer to accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core is not compromised.

We conclude that the proposed Unit 1 and Unit 2 license amendments are acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve changes in the installation and use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (52 FR 46542) on December 8, 1987, and consulted with the state of Illinois. No public comments were received, and the state of Illinois did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

REFERENCE

Letter from C. Allen, Commonwealth Edison to USNRC dated September 4, 1987, and December 4, 1987.

Principal Contributor: Walter Brooks, NRR/SRXB
Paul Shemanski, NRR/PDIII-2

Dated: February 10, 1988