

March 21, 1991

Docket Nos. 50-373
and 50-374

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Nuclear Licensing Manager
Commonwealth Edison Company-Suite 300
OPUS West III
1400 OPUS Place
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

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Dear Mr. Kovach:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NOS. 74370 AND 74371)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 77 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 61 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated July 26, 1989, as supplemented on July 9, 1990, December 5, 1990, January 2, 1991, and January 18, 1991. Your previous application dated July 10, 1987, was superseded by your July 26, 1989 submittal and is considered to be withdrawn.

The amendments revise the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications Table 3.3.2-1 (Isolation Actuation Instrumentation) Item A.1.d (Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High) and Item A.1.e (Main Steam Line Tunnel Delta Temperature - High) to allow both channels of each trip system to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 4 hours for reactor building ventilation maintenance, filter changes, damper cycling, and surveillance testing and 12 hours for the secondary containment leak rate test without placing the trip system in the tripped condition. Additionally, the associated bases were modified to reflect these changes.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice. The Notice of Withdrawal has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:

John B. Hickman, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 77 to NPF-11
2. Amendment No. 61 to NPF-18
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice of Withdrawal

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

DOCUMENT NAME: [AMENDMENT 74370/77] 732

Office: LA/PDIII-2

Surname: CMoore

Date: 3/1/91

PM/PDIII-2

JHickman:ta

3/5/91

PD/PDIII-2

RBarrett

3/2/91

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ETHELIER

3/10/91

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Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Commonwealth Edison Company

LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station
Units Nos. 1 and 2

cc:

Phillip P. Steptoe, Esquire
Sidley and Austin
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Robert Cushing
Chief, Public Utilities Division
Illinois Attorney General's Office
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Assistant Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street
Suite 12
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Michael I. Miller, Esq.
Sidley and Austin
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Resident Inspector/LaSalle, NPS
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Rural Route No. 1
P. O. Box 224
Marseilles, Illinois 61341

Chairman
LaSalle County Board of Supervisors
LaSalle County Courthouse
Ottawa, Illinois 61350

Attorney General
500 South 2nd Street
Springfield, Illinois 62701

Chairman
Illinois Commerce Commission
Leland Building
527 East Capitol Avenue
Springfield, Illinois 62706

Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Facility Safety
1035 Outer Park Drive
Springfield, Illinois 62704

Regional Administrator, Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road, Bldg. #4
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Robert Neumann
Office of Public Counsel
State of Illinois Center
100 W. Randolph
Suite 11-300
Chicago, Illinois 60601



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-373

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 77
License No. NPF-11


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated July 26, 1989, as supplemented on July 9, 1990, December 5, 1990, January 2, 1991, and January 18, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 77 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective upon date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard J. Barrett, Director
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 21, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 77

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11

DOCKET NO. 50-373

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 3-11

3/4 3-14(a)

B 3/4 3-2

INSERT

3/4 3-11

3/4 3-14(a)

B 3/4 3-2

TABLE 3.3.2-1

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>VALVE GROUPS OPERATED BY SIGNAL (a)</u>	<u>MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM (b)</u>	<u>APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
A. <u>AUTOMATIC INITIATION</u>				
1. <u>PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION</u>				
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level				
(1) Low, Level 3	7	2	1, 2, 3	20
(2) Low Low, Level 2	2, 3	2	1, 2, 3	20
(3) Low Low Low, Level 1	1, 10	2	1, 2, 3	20
b. Drywell Pressure - High	2, 7, 10	2	1, 2, 3	20
c. Main Steam Line				
1) Radiation - High	1	2	1, 2, 3	21
	3	2	1, 2, 3	22
2) Pressure - Low	1	2	1	23
3) Flow - High	1	2/line ^(d)	1, 2, 3	21
d. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High	1	2	1 ^{(i)(j)} , 2 ^{(i)(j)} , 3 ^{(i)(j)}	21
e. Main Steam Line Tunnel ΔTemperature - High	1	2	1 ^{(i)(j)} , 2 ^{(i)(j)} , 3 ^{(i)(j)}	21
f. Condenser Vacuum - Low	1	2	1, 2*, 3*	21
2. <u>SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION</u>				
a. Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation - High	4(c)(e)	2	1, 2, 3 and **	24
b. Drywell Pressure - High	4(c)(e)	2	1, 2, 3	24
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	4(c)(e)	2	1, 2, 3, and #	24
d. Fuel Pool Vent Exhaust Radiation - High	4(c)(e)	2	1, 2, 3, and **	24

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

NOTES (Continued)

- (g) Requires RCIC steam supply pressure-low coincident with drywell pressure-high.
- (h) Manual initiation isolates 1E51-F008 only and only with a coincident reactor vessel water level-low, level 2, signal.
- (i) Both channels of each trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 4 hours for required reactor building ventilation system corrective maintenance, filter changes, damper cycling and surveillance tests, other than Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.1.c, without placing the trip system in the tripped condition.
- (j) Both channels of each trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 12 hours for performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.1.c without placing the trip system in the tripped condition.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

This specification ensures the effectiveness of the instrumentation used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by prescribing the OPERABILITY trip setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems. When necessary, one channel may be inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance. Both channels of each trip system for the main steam tunnel ambient temperature and ventilation system differential temperature may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 4 hours for required reactor building ventilation system maintenance and testing and 12 hours for the required secondary containment Leak Rate test without placing the trip system in the tripped condition. This will allow for maintaining the reliability of the ventilation system and secondary containment. Some of the trip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting have a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.

Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected. For D.C. operated valves, a 3 second delay is assumed before the valve starts to move. For A.C. operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C. power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency diesel generators. In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve starts to move. In addition to the pipe break, the failure of the D.C. operated valve is assumed; thus the signal delay is concurrent with the 13 second diesel startup. The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss in each case which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunction with the 13 second delay. It follows that checking the valve speeds and the 13 second time for emergency power establishment will establish the response time for the isolation functions. However, to enhance overall system reliability and to monitor instrument channel response time trends, the isolation actuation instrumentation response time shall be measured and recorded as a part of the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection. Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to more than one system at the same time.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-374

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 61
License No. NPF-18

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated July 26, 1989, as supplemented on July 9, 1990, December 5, 1990, January 2, 1991, and January 18, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 61, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective upon date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard J. Barrett, Director
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 21, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 61

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

DOCKET NO. 50-374

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 3-11

3/4 3-14

3/4 3-14(a)

B 3/4 3-2

INSERT

3/4 3-11

3/4 3-14

3/4 3-14(a)

B 3/4 3-2

TABLE 3.3.2-1

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>VALVE GROUPS OPERATED BY SIGNAL (a)</u>	<u>MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM (b)</u>	<u>APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
A. <u>AUTOMATIC INITIATION</u>				
1. <u>PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION</u>				
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level				
(1) Low, Level 3	7	2	1, 2, 3	20
(2) Low Low, Level 2	2, 3	2	1, 2, 3	20
(3) Low Low Low, Level 1	1, 10	2	1, 2, 3	20
b. Drywell Pressure - High	2, 7, 10	2	1, 2, 3	20
c. Main Steam Line				
1) Radiation - High	1	2	1, 2, 3	21
	3	2	1, 2, 3	22
2) Pressure - Low	1	2	1	23
3) Flow - High	1	2/line ^(d)	1, 2, 3	21
d. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High	1	2	1 ^{(i)(j)} , 2 ^{(i)(j)} , 3 ^{(i)(j)}	21
e. Main Steam Line Tunnel ΔTemperature - High	1	2	1 ^{(i)(j)} , 2 ^{(i)(j)} , 3 ^{(i)(j)}	21
f. Condenser Vacuum - Low	1	2	1, 2*, 3*	21
2. <u>SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION</u>				
a. Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation - High	4(c)(e)	2	1, 2, 3 and **	24
b. Drywell Pressure - High	4(c)(e)	2	1, 2, 3	24
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	4(c)(e)	2	1, 2, 3, and #	24
d. Fuel Pool Vent Exhaust Radiation - High	4(c)(e)	2	1, 2, 3, and **	24

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 20 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- ACTION 21 - Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- ACTION 22 - Close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour and declare the affected system inoperable.
- ACTION 23 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours.
- ACTION 24 - Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatment system operating within 1 hour.
- ACTION 25 - Lock the affected system isolation valves closed within 1 hour and declare the affected system inoperable.
- ACTION 26 - Provided that the manual initiation function is OPERABLE for each other group valve, inboard or outboard, as applicable, in each line, restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 24 hours; otherwise, restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours; otherwise:
 - a. Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours, or
 - b. Close the affected system isolation valves within the next hour and declare the affected system in operable.

TABLE NOTATIONS

- * May be bypassed with reactor steam pressure < 1043 psig and all turbine stop valves closed.
- ** When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- # DURING CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
 - (a) See Specification 3.6.3, Table 3.6.3-1 for valves in each valve group.
 - (b) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the channel in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter. In addition for those trip systems with a design providing only one channel per trip system, the channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 8 hours for required surveillance testing without placing the channel in the tripped condition provided that the redundant isolation valve, inboard or outboard, as applicable, in each line is operable and all required actuation instrumentation for that redundant valve is OPERABLE, or place the trip system in the tripped condition.
 - (c) Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.
 - (d) A channel is OPERABLE if 2 of 4 instruments in that channel are OPERABLE.
 - (e) Also actuates secondary containment ventilation isolation dampers per Table 3.6.5.2-1.
 - (f) Closes only RWCU system inlet outboard valve.

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

NOTES (Continued)

- (g) Requires RCIC steam supply pressure-low coincident with drywell pressure-high.
- (h) Manual initiation isolates 2E51-F008 only and only with a coincident reactor vessel water level-low, level 2, signal.
- (i) Both channels of each trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 4 hours for required reactor building ventilation system corrective maintenance, filter changes, damper cycling and surveillance tests, other than Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.1.c, without placing the trip system in the tripped condition.
- (j) Both channels of each trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 12 hours for performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.1.c without placing the trip system in the tripped condition.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

This specification ensures the effectiveness of the instrumentation used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by prescribing the OPERABILITY trip setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems. When necessary, one channel may be inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance. Both channels of each trip system for the main steam tunnel ambient temperature and ventilation system differential temperature may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 4 hours for required reactor building ventilation system maintenance and testing and 12 hours for the required secondary containment Leak Rate test without placing the trip system in the tripped condition. This will allow for maintaining the reliability of the ventilation system and secondary containment. Some of the trip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting have a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.

Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected. For D.C. operated valves, a 3 second delay is assumed before the valve starts to move. For A.C. operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C. power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency diesel generators. In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve starts to move. In addition to the pipe break, the failure of the D.C. operated valve is assumed; thus the signal delay is concurrent with the 13 second diesel startup. The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss in each case which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunction with the 13 second delay. It follows that checking the valve speeds and the 13 second time for emergency power establishment will establish the response time for the isolation functions. However, to enhance overall system reliability and to monitor instrument channel response time trends, the isolation actuation instrumentation response time shall be measured and recorded as a part of the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection. Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to more than one system at the same time.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 77 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 AND
AMENDMENT NO. 61 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 26, 1989, Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) proposed a technical specification (TS) amendment for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, to allow continued plant operation for a period of 12 hours with the main steam tunnel (MST) high ambient temperature and high ventilation system differential temperature trips bypassed. The licensee provided additional information that did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination in letters dated July 9, 1990, December 5, 1990, January 2, 1991, and January 18, 1991. Specifically, the licensee proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.2-1 and the associated Bases 3/4.3.2 to allow bypassing of MST temperature trips for a period of up to 4 hours for reactor building ventilation system maintenance, filter changes, damper cycling and surveillance tests and for a period of up to 12 hours for secondary containment leak rate tests. The licensee indicated that this change is required to prevent a two unit outage and unnecessary Group I isolation (main steam valves) during containment leak rate testing and ventilation system surveillance and maintenance activities due to common reactor building ventilation system at LaSalle Station.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee indicated that the MST ambient air temperature and ventilation system differential temperature sensors are used for the detection of small leaks in the MST. The temperature sensors for these parameters are set to annunciate in the control room whenever an air temperature increase corresponding to a 5 gpm leak is detected and to cause a Group I primary containment isolation (PCI) trip when a 25 gpm leak is detected. Approximately 90 percent of the reactor building ventilation system air flow passes through the Units 1 and 2 main steam tunnels and therefore detection of small leak rates requires the trip setpoints to be set very close to normal operating temperatures. At LaSalle, the secondary containment buildings for Unit 1 and 2 are joined, making it necessary to perform the containment leak rate test on both units simultaneously. During the performance of the test, the reactor building ventilation system for both units must be shut down to demonstrate that the standby gas treatment system is capable of maintaining a negative

pressure in the secondary containment. Operation of the units is limited during the test by the MST temperatures. With either unit operating and the ventilation system shutdown, the MST temperature increases rapidly and will cause a Group I isolation (MSIV closure) on each operating unit. As a result, this test is scheduled during a two unit outage.

The licensee indicated that the containment leak rate test to demonstrate that both the inner and outer doors of the reactor building trackway are leak tight requires 6 to 8 hours. The requested bypass temperature trips for 12 hours will provide enough time for unanticipated difficulties.

The licensee also indicated that bypass of both temperature trips for up to 4 hours is needed for preventive maintenance of reactor building ventilation system, filter changes, damper cycling and surveillance testing. The present TS allows that one trip system (high differential temperature) can be bypassed up to 4 hours during above activities. The licensee indicated that this is not very useful as the MST temperature rises quickly during shutdown of the ventilation system causing unnecessary challenges to reactor safety systems.

The licensee indicated that other trips will be available which can detect main steam leakage outside of the primary containment and cause automatic Group I isolation. These are (a) low main steam line pressure (operating condition 1 only), (b) high main steam line flow rate, and (c) low reactor water level.

The licensee proposed to revise the station operating procedures as a compensatory measure to establish special logs to monitor indications of MST steam leakage and abnormal temperatures. These logs will be initiated 4 hours prior to the tests and will monitor every one-half hour: (a) floor drain sumps which collect leakage of systems in the MST, (b) main condenser normal makeup flow rate for leakage, and (c) MST ambient temperature to ensure that the temperature limit for environmentally qualified equipment is not exceeded. The shift operating and maintenance personnel will be briefed about the test procedures, trip bypass and the purpose of special logs.

The licensee also indicated that it has performed a risk based evaluation to determine the effects on plant safety of removing the MST ambient and differential temperature trips. The analysis indicates that the reliability of the MSIVs to close in response to a steam line break outside the containment will not be significantly compromised by removal of MST temperature trip sensors as part of trip logic. The small increase in risk to plant safety due to small line breaks which quickly propagate to large breaks will be offset by the reduction in risk to plant safety posed by the challenges to safety systems caused by spurious MSIV closures.

The licensee also indicated that the bypassing of the temperature trips will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The safety evaluation in Section 15.6.4 of the UFSAR does not include an analysis of small steam leaks. The only analysis is for a catastrophic failure of a main steam line which represents the envelope evaluation of steam line failures outside of the containment.

The staff has reviewed the licensee submittals as discussed above and concurs that the MST temperature trips are not the only primary means of protection against a major leak in the MST. The MST temperature detectors provide a means for early detection of small steam breaks from the pressure boundary. Based on the unique common design of the LaSalle Station reactor building ventilation system, the effects of spurious isolation on the safety systems, and the proposed compensatory measures provided, the staff concludes that the requested bypassing of the MST temperature trips for containment leak rate testing and maintenance of reactor building ventilation system will not significantly reduce the margin of safety or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated and therefore is acceptable.

Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the proposed technical specification changes to TS Table 3.3.2-1 to allow continued plant operation with the MST ambient and high ventilation systems differential temperature trips for a period of up to 12 hours during containment leak rate testing and for a period up to 4 hours during reactor building ventilation system maintenance, filter changes, damper cycling and surveillance testing are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (54 FR 40926). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such

activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Goel

Date: March 21, 1991

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENTS TO
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has received a request from Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo, the licensee) to withdraw CECo's application for proposed amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-11 and DPR-18, issued to the licensee for operation of the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively, located in LaSalle County, Illinois. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity for Hearing was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on November 30, 1987 (52 FR 45515).

The proposed amendments would make a change to the Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature and Delta Temperature containment isolation trips.

By letter dated July 26, 1989, CECo superseded their July 10, 1987 application. Therefore, the July 10, 1987 submittal is considered withdrawn.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated July 10, 1987, and (2) the staff's letter dated March 21, 1991.

These documents are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. and at the local public document room located at the Public Library of Illinois Valley Community College, Rural Route No. 1, Ogelsby, Illinois 61348.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 21st day of March, 1991.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John B. Hickman, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation