

September 22, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-373
and 50-374

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Nuclear Licensing Manager
Commonwealth Edison Company-Suite 300
OPUS West III
1400 OPUS Place
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

Dear Mr. Kovach:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. M83798 AND M83799)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 87 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 71 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments are in response to your application dated June 17, 1992.

The amendment administratively changes the Technical Specifications by removing the list of primary containment conductor overcurrent protective devices and moving it to a controlled procedure. The limiting conditions for operation, action statements, and surveillance requirements of the overcurrent protective devices remain unchanged.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
Original signed by:
Byron L. Siegel, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 87 to NPF-11
2. Amendment No. 71 to NPF-18
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Commonwealth Edison Company

LaSalle County Station
Unit Nos. 1 and 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-373

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 87
License No. NPF-11

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated June 17, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 87, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective upon startup from L1R05 refuel outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard D. Barrett, Director
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 22, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 87

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11

DOCKET NO. 50-373

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
XXIII	XXIII
3/4 8-22	3/4 8-22
3/4 8-24	3/4 8-24
3/4 8-25	3/4 8-25
3/4 8-25a	-
B 3/4 8-3	B 3/4 8-3

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.2 Primary and backup primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices associated with each primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 volt) electrical penetration circuit shall be OPERABLE. The scope of these protective devices excludes those circuits for which credible fault currents would not exceed the electrical penetration design rating.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices inoperable, restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out, or removed, at least once per 7 days thereafter. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their circuit breakers tripped, racked out, or removed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 Each of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 18 months:
 1. By verifying that the 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers and performing:
 - a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, and
 - b) An integrated system functional test of the breakers overcurrent protective trip circuit which includes simulated automatic actuation of the trip system to demonstrate that the overall penetration protection design remains within operable limits.
 - c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

BASES

A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

The battery load profile and battery charger specifications will be maintained and are located in Chapter 8, "Electrical Power", section of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, UFSAR.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 volt) electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either de-energizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance. A controlled list of the components applicable to Specification 3.8.3.2 is maintained as an Administrative Technical Requirement.

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers and fuses provides assurance of breaker and fuse reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturers brand of circuit breaker and/or fuse. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers and/or fuses are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers and/or fuses are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case circuit breakers and/or fuses, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers and/or fuses into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker or fuses for surveillance purposes.

The bypassing of the motor operated valves thermal overload protection continuously or during accident conditions by integral bypass devices ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the bypassing of the thermal overload protection continuously and during accident conditions are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves", Revision 1, March 1977.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-374

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 71
License No. NPF-18

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated June 17, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 71, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective upon startup from L1R05 refuel outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard J. Barrett, Director
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 22, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 71

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

DOCKET NO. 50-374

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change. Pages indicated with an asterisk are provided for convenience.

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
XXIII	XXIII
*3/4 8-21	*3/4 8-21
3/4 8-22	3/4 8-22
3/4 8-24	3/4 8-24
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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

A.C. CIRCUITS INSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.1 At least the following A.C. circuits inside primary containment shall be deenergized*:

- a. Installed welding grid systems 2A and 2B, and
- b. All drywell lighting circuits.
- c. All drywell hoists and cranes circuits.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With any of the above required circuits energized, trip the associated circuit breaker(s) in the specified panel(s) within 1 hour.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.1 Each of the above required A.C. circuits shall be determined to be de-energized at least once per 24 hours** by verifying that the associated circuit breakers are in the tripped condition.

*Except during entry into the drywell.

**Except at least once per 31 days if locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the tripped condition.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.2 Primary and backup primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices associated with each primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 volt) electrical penetration circuit shall be OPERABLE. The scope of these protective devices excludes those circuits for which credible fault currents would not exceed the electrical penetration design rating.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices inoperable, restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out, or removed, at least once per 7 days thereafter. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to over-current devices in circuits which have their circuit breakers tripped, racked out, or removed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 Each of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 18 months:
 1. By verifying that the 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers and performing:
 - a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, and
 - b) An integrated system functional test of the breakers overcurrent protective trip circuit which includes simulated automatic actuation of the trip system to demonstrate that the overall penetration protection design remains within operable limits.
 - c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.3 The thermal overload protection of each valve shown in Table 3.8.4.2-1 shall be bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE bypass device integral with the motor starter.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

- a. With the thermal overload protection for one or more of the above required valves not bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device, take administrative action to continuously bypass the thermal overload within 8 hours or declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION statement(s) for the affected system(s).
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.3.1 The thermal overload protection for the above required valves shall be verified to be bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry for those thermal overloads which are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions and by verifying that the thermal overload protection is bypassed for those thermal overloads which are continuously bypassed and temporarily placed in force only when the valve motors are undergoing periodic or maintenance testing:

- a. At least once per 18 months, and
- b. Following maintenance on the motor starter.

4.8.3.3.2 The thermal overload protection for the above required valves which are continuously bypassed shall be verified to be bypassed following testing during which the thermal overload protection was temporarily placed in force.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

BASES

A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

The battery load profile and battery charger specifications will be maintained and are located in Chapter 8, "Electrical Power", section of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, UFSAR.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 volt) electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either de-energizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance. A controlled list of the components applicable to Specification 3.8.3.2 is maintained as an Administrative Technical Requirement.

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers and fuses provides assurance of breaker and fuse reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturers brand of circuit breaker and/or fuse. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers and/or fuses are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers and/or fuses are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case circuit breakers and/or fuses, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers and/or fuses into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker or fuses for surveillance purposes.

The bypassing of the motor operated valves thermal overload protection continuously or during accident conditions by integral bypass devices ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the bypassing of the thermal overload protection continuously and during accident conditions are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves", Revision 1, March 1977.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 87 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 AND
AMENDMENT NO. 71 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 17, 1992, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo, the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. The proposed amendment would remove the technical specification (TS) table that lists components referenced in specification 3.8.3.2. In addition, the TS requirements have been modified such that all references to these tables have been removed and to state requirements in general terms that include the components listed in the tables removed from the TS. Guidance on the proposed TS change was provided by Generic Letter (GL) 91-08, dated May 1, 1991.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has proposed the removal of Table 3.8.3.2-1, "Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices" that is referenced in TS 3/4.8.3.2. With the removal of this table, the licensee has proposed to include the following statement for the LCO under TS 3.8.3.2:

Primary and backup primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices associated with each primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV, and 480 volt) electrical penetration circuit shall be OPERABLE. The scope of these protective devices excludes those circuits for which credible fault currents would not exceed the electrical penetration design rating.

In addition, the licensee has proposed to revise TS 4.8.3.2 to remove the reference to Table 3.8.3.2-1. The surveillance requirement has been revised to state the following:

Each of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

On the basis of its review of this matter, the staff finds that the proposed changes to the TS for LaSalle Units 1 and 2 are primarily administrative and

do not alter the requirements set forth in the existing TS. Overall, these changes will allow licensee to make corrections and updates to the list of components for which these TS requirements apply, under the provisions that control changes to plant procedures are specified in the Administrative Controls Section of the TS. Therefore, the staff finds that the proposed TS changes are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 34581). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: C. Phillips

Dated: September 22, 1992