



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV  
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

April 18, 2002

William A. Eaton, Vice President  
Operations - Grand Gulf Nuclear Station  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
P.O. Box 756  
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

SUBJECT: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-416/01-07

Dear Mr. Eaton:

On March 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 2, 2002, with Jerry Roberts and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

***Ken E. Brockman for***

William D. Johnson, Chief  
Project Branch A  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-416  
License: NPF-29

Entergy Operations, Inc.

-2-

Enclosure:  
NRC Inspection Report  
50-416/01-07

cc w/enclosure:  
Executive Vice President  
and Chief Operating Officer  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
P.O. Box 31995  
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995

Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway  
P.O. Box 651  
Jackson, Mississippi 39205

Winston & Strawn  
1400 L Street, N.W. - 12th Floor  
Washington, DC 20005-3502

Sam Mabry, Director  
Division of Solid Waste Management  
Mississippi Department of Natural  
Resources  
P.O. Box 10385  
Jackson, Mississippi 39209

President, District 1  
Claiborne County Board of Supervisors  
P.O. Box 339  
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

General Manager  
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
P.O. Box 756  
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

The Honorable Richard Ieyoub  
Attorney General  
Department of Justice  
State of Louisiana  
P.O. Box 94005  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005

Office of the Governor  
State of Mississippi  
Jackson, Mississippi 39201

Mike Moore, Attorney General  
Frank Spencer, Asst. Attorney General  
State of Mississippi  
P.O. Box 22947  
Jackson, Mississippi 39225

Dr. F. E. Thompson, Jr.  
State Health Officer  
State Board of Health  
P.O. Box 1700  
Jackson, Mississippi 39215

Robert W. Goff, Program Director  
Division of Radiological Health  
Mississippi Dept. of Health  
P.O. Box 1700  
Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1700

Vice President  
Operations Support  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
P.O. Box 31995  
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995

Director, Nuclear Safety  
and Regulatory Affairs  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
P.O. Box 756  
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:  
 Regional Administrator (**EWM**)  
 DRP Director (**KEB**)  
 DRS Director (**ATH**)  
 Senior Resident Inspector (**TLH4**)  
 Branch Chief, DRP/A (**WDJ**)  
 Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (**JMK**)  
 Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (**PHH**)  
 RITS Coordinator (**NBH**)  
 Scott Morris (**SAM1**)  
 GG Site Secretary (**MJS**)

R:\\_GG\2001\GG2001-07RP-TLH.wpd

RIV:RI:DRP/A	SRI:DRP/A	C:DRS/PSB	C:DRP/A	D:DRP
RWDeese	TLHoeg	GMGood	WDJohnson	KEBrockman
<b>CJPaulk for</b>	<b>CJPaulk for</b>	<b>/RA/</b>	<b>CJPaulk for</b>	<b>/RA/</b>
04/17/02	04/17/02	04/16/02	04/17/02	04/18/02

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

T=Telephone

E=E-mail

F=Fax

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

Docket: 50-416  
License: NPF-29  
Report No: 50-416/01-07  
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.  
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station  
Location: Waterloo Road  
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150  
Dates: December 30, 2001 through March 30, 2002  
Inspectors: T. L. Hoeg, Senior Resident Inspector  
R. W. Deese, Resident Inspector  
P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector  
R. E. Lantz, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector  
J. B. Nicholas, Senior Health Physicist  
Approved By: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch A  
Division of Reactor Projects  
ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000416-01-07, on 12/30/01- 03/30/02; Entergy Operations, Inc., Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Integrated resident & regional inspection report; ALARA Planning and Controls; Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and regional reactor inspectors. The inspectors identified no findings. The significance of any findings are indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significant Determination Process does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

## Report Details

Summary of Plant Status: During this inspection period, the plant operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power except for periodic planned power reductions for monthly control rod exercising and periodic rod pattern adjustments.

### 1. **REACTOR SAFETY**

#### **Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness**

#### 1R04 Equipment Alignment

##### .1 Quarterly Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdown inspections and reviews of systems important to reactor safety in order to verify the operability of the systems. The inspectors reviewed system operating instructions, system valve and breaker lineups, operator logs, system control room indications. The inspectors also verified valves, breakers, and control circuits were in their required positions for operability. The following systems were inspected:

- Control rod drive system Train A
- Residual heat removal system Train A
- Standby service water system Train B

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

##### .2 Semi-Annual Equipment Alignment (71111.04S)

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the engineered safety feature Division I AC and DC Electrical system to determine if there were any discrepancies between the actual equipment lineups versus what was procedurally required. During the walkdown, System Operating Instructions 04-1-01-L11-1, "Plant DC System," Revision 114, and 04-1-01-R21-15, "ESF Bus 15AA," Revision 12, applicable annunciator response procedures, and Drawings E-1023, "One Line Meter and Relay Diagram - 125V DC Buses 11DA, 11DB, and 11DC," Revision 31 and E-1008, "One Line Meter and Relay Diagram - 4.16 KV ESF System Buses 15AA and 16AB, Unit 1," Revision 12, were used by the inspectors to verify major system components were correctly labeled, cooled, and ventilated. The inspectors also reviewed open condition reports on the system for any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system to perform its design function. Documentation associated with control room deficiencies, temporary modifications, operator workarounds, and items tracked by plant engineering were also reviewed to assess their collective impact on system operation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Quarterly Fire Protection Area Walkdowns (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed area fire plans and performed walkdowns of plant areas to assess the material condition and operational status of fire detection, suppression systems and equipment; the material condition of fire barriers; and control of transient combustibles. Specific risk-significant plant areas included:

- Division I switchgear room, 1C202
- Division I battery room, 1C207
- Division I switchgear room, 1A219
- Division II switchgear room, 1A221
- Residual heat removal Room A, 1A203
- Standby gas treatment Room A, 1A323
- Standby gas treatment Room B, 1A326
- 119' Auxiliary building perimeter hallway, 1A202

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

On March 26, 2002, the inspectors observed operator requalification training activities in the simulator to assess the licensee's effectiveness in evaluating the requalification program and to ensure that licensed individuals received the appropriate level of training required to maintain their licenses. The observed training consisted of a simulated loss of feedwater flow followed by the loss of the reactor core isolation cooling pump in accordance with Grand Gulf Nuclear Station's licensed operator training scenario Procedure GSMS-LOR-00198, Revision 0, "Loss of Feedwater Flow."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.



1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, or components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the Maintenance Rule program. Reviews focused on: (1) proper Maintenance Rule scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; and, (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2), and goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed the most recent system health reports and system functional failures for the last 2 years. The following SSCs were reviewed:

- Engineered safety features switchgear ventilation system
- Containment isolation system
- Condensate system
- Diesel generator building ventilation system
- Nuclear boiler system controls
- Atmospheric dump system

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed weekly and daily work schedules to determine when risk-significant activities were scheduled. The inspectors discussed selected activities with operations and work control personnel regarding risk evaluations and overall plant configuration control. The inspectors discussed emergent work issues with work control center personnel and reviewed the prioritization of scheduled activities. The inspectors verified the performance of plant risk assessments related to planned and emergent maintenance activities as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and plant Procedure 01-S-18-6, "Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities," Revision 1.

Specific maintenance items reviewed during this period included:

- MAI 306105, Train B control rod drive hydraulic system
- MAI 302446, Train B suppression pool makeup system
- MAI 292655, Train B standby service water
- MAI 301285, Low pressure core spray system
- MAI 309712, Train A standby liquid control system
- MAI 276151, Train A control room ventilation system

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected operability evaluations affecting risk-significant mitigating systems to assess: (1) technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were appropriately addressed with respect to their collective impact on continued safe plant operation; and (4) where compensatory measures were involved, whether the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled. The following evaluations were reviewed:

- CR-GGN-2002-0056, Standby liquid control Pump A discharge check valve
- CR-GGN-2001-1623, Emergency switchgear and battery room ventilation
- CR-GGN-2001-0066, High pressure core spray electrical transformer
- CR-GGN-2002-0313, Control room fire door

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated an operator workaround associated with the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station's main generator dc powered hydrogen seal oil pump. The licensee previously determined that on a loss of offsite power, the seal oil pump would not provide proper flow to the hydrogen seals on the main generator to prevent hydrogen leakage resulting in a fire hazard. As a result, operations personnel would have to isolate the hydrogen supply to the main generator and purge excess hydrogen from the generator following a loss of offsite power. The inspectors also evaluated the effect of this operator workaround on the operators' abilities to implement applicable abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Engineering Request No. ER-2001-285, "Channel A End of

Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip Bypass Time Delay and Logic Modification," Revision 0. The inspectors verified that: (1) the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the component had not been degraded as a result of the modification; (2) the modification did not place the reactor plant in any unsafe conditions; and, (3) adequate postinstallation testing was performed to verify the modification functioned as expected.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed postmaintenance test procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria was clear and would adequately demonstrate operational readiness, consistent with design and licensing-basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, ranges, and accuracy for the application; (5) tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and, (6) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The following activities were reviewed:

- MAI 308880, Division II hydrogen igniters
- MAI 309293, Standby service water, Train B
- MAI 310586, Standby liquid control system, Train A
- MAI 303899, Containment temperature transmitter, Train A
- MAI 276151, Control room ventilation, Train A
- MAI 310110, 1P41FO61, Drywell purge compressor cooler relief valve

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance test procedures and reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether the SSCs satisfied the Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the Technical Requirements Manual, and licensee procedural requirements; and, to determine if the testing appropriately demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. The following tests were inspected:

- 06-OP-1C11-R-013, "Control Rod Drive Hydraulics Valve Test," Revision 101
- 06-OP-1P81-M-002, "High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator 13 Functional Test," Revision 113
- 06-OP-1P41-Q-005, "Standby Service Water Loop B Valve and Pump Operability Test," Revision 114
- 06-IC-1M71-R-004, "Containment Temperature Transmitter Calibration," Revision 3
- 06-OP-1P81-R-001, "High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator 18 Month Functional Test," Revision 108
- 06-CH-1P81-1P81-Q-057, "Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank A001 Sampling and Chemical Testing," Revision 103

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the temporary alterations listed below to assess the following attributes: (1) the adequacy of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation; (2) the consistency of the installation with the modification documentation; (3) the updating of drawings and procedures, as applicable; and, (4) the adequacy of the postinstallation testing.

- No. 2002-001, Bypassed plant service water flow control circuit
- No. 2001-0025, Temporary installation of vibration monitoring instrumentation on the recirculation flow control valves

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP1 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the 2002 exercise to determine if the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the emergency plan. This exercise had been postponed from September 2001 because of the events of September 11, 2001. The scenario included equipment and electrical power failures, an unisolable steam leak direct to atmosphere, core damage, and a radiological release to

demonstrate the licensee's capabilities to implement the emergency plan.

The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk-significant activities of classification, notification, protective action recommendations, and assessment of offsite dose consequences in the following emergency response facilities:

- Simulator control room
- Technical support center
- Operations support center
- Emergency operations facility

The inspectors also assessed personnel recognition of abnormal plant conditions, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, protection of emergency workers, emergency repair capabilities, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.54(q) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

The inspectors attended the postexercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the initial licensee self-assessment of exercise performance. The inspectors also attended a subsequent presentation of critique items to plant management.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Observation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

On February 6, 2002, the inspectors observed a planned licensee emergency preparedness quarterly drill. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario to determine if it reflected realistic plant configurations. The inspectors observed licensee personnel at various locations during the exercise including the control room simulator, the technical support center, the emergency operations facility, and the emergency news and media center. The inspectors primarily focused on the ability of the emergency response organization to properly classify the simulated emergency through recognition of emergency action levels, their ability to activate the station emergency plan and procedures, and their ability to make proper and timely notifications as appropriate.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 2. RADIATION SAFETY

### Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

#### 2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspector interviewed radiation workers and radiation protection personnel throughout the controlled access area and conducted independent radiation surveys of selected work areas. The inspector attended the prejob as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) briefing and observed the potentially high exposure job which involved the transfer of a high integrity container filled with radioactive resin to a shielded transport shipping cask during the inspection. The following items were reviewed and compared with regulatory requirements to determine whether the licensee had an adequate program to maintain occupational exposures ALARA:

- ALARA program procedures
- Three radiation protection department self-assessments (dosimetry program performed June 25-28, 2001; hot spot tracking program performed November 1-15, 2001; and ALARA planning and controls performed January 9-18, 2002)
- Processes used to estimate and track exposures
- Plant collective exposure history for the past 3 years, current exposure trends, and 3-year rolling average dose information
- Five radiation work permit (RWP) packages for work activities which resulted in some of the highest personnel collective exposures during the inspection period and Refueling Outage RF11 (RWP 2001-1082, "Repair of Valve 1N11F052A"; RWP 2001-1501, "MSRV Work"; RWP 2001-1514, "LLRT, Pressure Test, and Drywell Bypass Test Work"; RWP 2001-1517, "Flow Control Valve B33F060A/B Work"; and RWP 2001 1613"; G33F039 Valve Replacement"
- Individual exposures of selected work groups (health physics, operations, mechanical maintenance, and instruments and controls)
- Hot spot tracking and reduction program
- Radiological work planning
- ALARA Committee meeting minutes (6/21/01, 6/22/01, 6/28/01, 7/9/01, 7/18/01, 7/30/01, 8/16/01, 8/23/01, 8/24/01, 8/28/01, 9/26/01, 10/02/01, 11/26/01, 11/29/01, 11/30/01, 12/12/01, and 12/13/01)
- A summary of radiological worker performance and ALARA related condition reports

written since June 1, 2001, was reviewed (10 of these documents were reviewed in detail: CR-GGN-2001-1141, -1219, -1237, -1274, -1340, -1433, -1499, -1518, -1982, and -1988)

- Job site inspection and ALARA controls. Prejob briefing and work activities for the transfer of a high integrity container filled with radioactive resin to a shielded transport shipping cask which was controlled by RWP 2002-1006, Task 1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)**

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Reactor Safety Cornerstone Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy and completeness of the data used to calculate and report performance indicator information from the second calendar quarter 2000 through the fourth calendar quarter 2001. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 1, as guidance and interviewed licensee personnel responsible for compiling the information.

The inspectors verified the licensee's reported results for the emergency preparedness drill and exercise performance indicator by reviewing a sample of records for exercises, actual declared emergencies, drills, and simulator training scenarios. The inspectors verified the licensee's reported results for the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator by reviewing drill participation attendance records for a sample of 10 key emergency responders. The inspectors verified the licensee's reported results for the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator by reviewing a sample of offsite siren test results. The following performance indicators were reviewed:

- Unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours
- Scrams with a loss of normal heat removal
- Reactor coolant system leakage
- Emergency response organization drill/exercise performance
- Emergency response organization drill participation
- Alert and notification system reliability

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-416/01-004, "Violation of Operating License Condition 2.C (1) Maximum Power Level," Revision 0 and Revision 1

On October 3, 2001, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station received new information relating to moisture carryover calculation methodology from General Electric and determined that their existing calorimetric calculations may be in error. The licensee had been previously using a General Electric generic value of 0.1 percent for the moisture carryover fraction when General Electric most recently recommended a value of 0.0 percent to be used for the type of steam dryers used at Grand Gulf. Grand Gulf discovered that changing the carry over fraction in their core thermal power calculation from 0.1 percent to 0.0 percent resulted in a 3.1 megawatt increase which exceeded their maximum allowed power level of 3833 megawatts during past operating history. In December of 2001, the licensee through discussions with General Electric determined that the enthalpy values used in their calorimetric calculations had been less conservative as a result of using older steam table data vice newer data. Using the newer enthalpy data resulted in an increase of 5.5 megawatts at full power. This conservatism addressed in LER 2001-004, Revision 1, combined with the moisture carryover error, produced a total thermal power increase of 8.6 megawatts or 0.224 percent. As a result, the licensee violated their operating License Condition 2.F. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program by initiating Condition Reports CR-GGN-2001-1645 and CR-GGN-2001-1899.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's apparent cause, corrective actions, safety assessment, and reporting requirements associated with these LERs and found no findings of significance. These licensee event reports are closed.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-416/01-005-00, "Loose-Parts Report as Required By NRC Regulatory Guide 1.133, Revision 1 and Jet Pump Nozzle Flow Restriction"

On November 27, 2001, during the performance of the daily jet pump surveillance, the licensee noted indications of reduced flow through reactor recirculation system jet Pump 13. The licensee assessed available indications and concluded that an unknown particle was restricting flow through the jet pump. In accordance with their Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Table 4.4-11, Item 6 addressing their position on Section C.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light Water Cooled Reactors," Revision 1, the licensee submitted Licensee Event Report 2001-05 to notify the NRC of a loose part in their reactor coolant system. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program by initiating Condition Report CR-GGN-2001-1871.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's apparent cause, corrective actions, safety assessment, and reporting requirements associated with this licensee event report and identified no findings of significance. This licensee event report is closed.



.3 (Open) Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) from Technical Specification 3.8.1 Required Action B.4 for Division II Emergency Diesel Generator

On March 26, 2002, at 4:02 a.m., the licensee entered a 72-hour required action statement per Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," for a planned Division II emergency diesel generator maintenance outage. The outage time was scheduled to last approximately 36 hours under the licensee's Limiting Condition of Operation Number 02-0208. Following the maintenance, the licensee experienced several equipment failures associated with newly installed pressure and temperature switches during postmaintenance testing which required extensive troubleshooting and retesting. The licensee determined that the apparent cause for the failure of the switches was due to venting, and subsequent repressurization, of the system resulting in air leaks rendering the pneumatic engine control circuit inoperable. Due to the amount of time spent resolving postmaintenance test problems, the licensee was likely to exceed their allowed outage time and initiated discussions with the NRC. At 12:00 a.m., on March 29, 2002, the licensee requested and received 72 hours of enforcement discretion from the NRC while in violation of their operating license, specifically Technical Specification 3.8.1 required Action B.4. On March 29, 2002, at 1:36 p.m., the licensee declared the Division II emergency diesel generator operable and exited the limiting condition of operation after 81.52 hours. The licensee initiated Condition Report 2002-0555 to document their noncompliance with their operating license. At the close of this inspection period the inspectors had not yet completed all inspection activities associated with this NOED and considered this item as an unresolved item (URI) (URI 05000416/2001-007-01).

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

On April 2, 2002, the resident inspectors presented their inspection results to Mr. J. Roberts, Director of Nuclear Safety and Assurance, and his staff.

The results of the ALARA Planning and Controls inspection were presented on January 24, 2002, to Mr. J. Roberts, Director of Nuclear Safety Assurance, and other members of licensee management.

The results of the emergency preparedness inspection were presented on March 8, 2002, to Mr. W. Eaton, Vice President of Operations, and other members of licensee management.

The inspectors also asked if any materials examined during the inspections should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified by the licensee.

## ATTACHMENT

### PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

#### Licensee

D. Barfield, Manager, Design Engineering  
R. Barnes, Manager, Training and Development  
R. Benson, Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
C. Bottemiller, Manager, Plant Licensing  
K. Christian, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance  
G. Coker, Quality Assurance Specialist  
D. Cotton, Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
W. Deck, Security Superintendent  
L. Eaton, Maintenance Rule Coordinator  
W. Eaton, Vice President, Operations  
N. Edney, Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
J. Edwards, General Manager, Plant Operations  
C. Ellsaesser, Manager, Corrective Action and Assessment  
A. Goel, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety Assurance  
G. Green, Senior Emergency Planner  
M. Guynn, Manager, Emergency Preparedness  
C. Hayes, Emergency Preparedness Project Manager, Nuclear Support  
C. Holifield, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety Assurance  
R. Jackson, Senior Licensing Specialist, Nuclear Safety Assurance  
C. Lambert, Director, Engineering  
M. Larson, Senior Licensing Specialist, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs  
R. Moomaw, Manager, Outage Planning and Scheduling  
M. Renfroe, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components  
J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance  
J. Robertson, Manager, Quality Assurance  
F. Rosser, Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
G. Sparks, Manager, Operations  
R. Sumrall, Emergency Planner  
D. Townsend, Senior Emergency Planner  
W. Trichell, Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
R. VanDenAkker, Senior Emergency Planner  
D. Wiles, Acting Director, Engineering  
R. Wilson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection  
E. Wright, Specialist, Radiation Protection  
H. Yeldell, Manager, System Engineering

#### NRC

W. Johnson, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects  
G. Good, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Safety  
T. Pruett, Senior Risk Analyst  
P. Sekerak, Project Manager, NRR

Other

R. Fuller, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, Arkansas Nuclear One  
J. Lewis, Emergency Planning Manager, Waterford - 3  
F. Puleo, Plant Protection Coordinator, South Texas Project

**ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED**

Opened

05000416/2001-007-01	URI	Notice of Enforcement Discretion from Technical Specification 3.8.1 Required Action B.4 (Section 4OA3.3)
----------------------	-----	--

Closed

50-416/01-004-00 and 50-416/01-004-01	LER	Violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(1) Maximum Power Level (Section 4OA3.1)
50-416/01-005-00	LER	Loose-Parts Report as Required By NRC Regulatory Guide 1.133, Revision 1 and Jet Pump Nozzle Flow Restriction (Section 4OA3.2)

**LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

Procedures:

10-S-01-1	Activation of Emergency Plan (EPP-1)	Revision 108
10-S-01-6	Notification of Offsite Agencies and Plant On-Call Emergency Personnel (EPP-6)	Revision 36
10-S-01-11	Evacuation of Onsite Personnel (EPP-11)	Revision 16
10-S-01-12	Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations (EPP-12)	Revision 29
10-S-01-29	Operations Support Center (OSC) Operations (EPP-29)	Revision 17
10-S-01-30	Technical Support Center (TSC) Operations (EPP-30)	Revision 11
10-S-01-33	Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Operation (EPP-33)	Revision 11
01-S-10-4	Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises	Revision 9
01-S-10-6	Emergency Response Organization	Revision 15

10-S-04-4	Performance Indicators	Revision 2
06-CH-1P75-Q-0056	Fuel Oil Tank A003B Sampling Surveillance Test	Revision 103
06-CH-1P75-Q-0055	Fuel Oil Tank A003A Sampling Surveillance Test	Revision 103

Condition Reports:

2000-0358	2002-0480	2002-0486	2002-0496	2002-0500
2001-1052	2002-0482	2002-0487	2002-0497	2002-0505
2002-0473	2002-0483	2002-0489	2002-0498	2002-0367
2002-0476	2002-0484	2002-0490	2002-0499	2002-0376
2002-0479	2002-0485	2002-0493	2002-0499	

Maintenance Action Items:

284093	313246	313304	313309	313315	313520
302347	313276	313307	313310	313318	313526
312115	313277	313308	313314	313322	312731

Other Miscellaneous Documents:

Engineering Request 2001-285-000, Revision 0  
Control Room Standing Order 00-004  
Miscellaneous Drill and Exercise Reports from April 2000 through February 2001  
Grand Gulf Emergency Plan, Revision 46  
GG-1-SMS-LOR-00178, Revision 4, "EOP Execution Practice Scenarios"