

PDR

December 22, 1993

Docket No. 50-316

Mr. E. E. Fitzpatrick, Vice President  
Indiana Michigan Power Company  
c/o American Electric Power Service Corporation  
1 Riverside Plaza  
Columbus, Ohio 43216

Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick:

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT  
RE: EXTENSION OF CERTAIN 18-MONTH SURVEILLANCES (TAC NO. M86340)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 158 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in partial response to your application dated April 16, 1993, and supplemented September 28, and December 3, 1993.

The amendment revises TS to allow certain tests normally designated as 18-month surveillances to be delayed until the next refueling outage scheduled to begin August 6, 1994. The current cycle for Unit 2 will be lengthened by approximately 5 months due to a planned power reduction in order to separate the refueling outages between Unit 1 and Unit 2. This amendment addresses only 4 of the 16 groups of surveillances that you requested because the limiting due dates for surveillances in these groups expire in early to mid-January 1994. The remaining changes requested by your application dated April 16, 1993, will be the subject of future Commission action.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

John B. Hickman, Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 158 to DPR-58
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

|        |           |             |          |          |            |            |
|--------|-----------|-------------|----------|----------|------------|------------|
| OFFICE | LA: PD31  | PE: PD31    | PM: PD31 | HIC      | OGC        | (A)D: PD31 |
| NAME   | CJamerson | BWetzel:jkd | JHickman | JWermiel | R Bashmann | RBlough    |
| DATE   | 12/17/93  | 12/17/93    | 12/17/93 | 12/13/93 | 12/16/93   | 12/18/93   |

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**Mr. E. E. Fitzpatrick**  
**Indiana Michigan Power Company**

**Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant**

**cc:**

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**December 1993**



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-316

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 158  
License No. DPR-74

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated April 16, 1993, as supplemented September 28, and December 3, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 158, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



A. Randolph Blough, Acting Director  
Project Directorate III-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 22, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 158

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74

DOCKET NO. 50-316

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

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3/4 3-1  
3/4 3-11  
3/4 3-14  
3/4 3-30  
3/4 4-33  
3/4 5-2  
3/4 5-5  
3/4 6-10  
3/4 6-12  
3/4 6-14  
3/4 7-6  
3/4 7-12  
3/4 7-13  
3/4 7-16a  
3/4 7-19

INSERT

3/4 0-4  
3/4 3-1  
3/4 3-11  
3/4 3-14  
3/4 3-30  
3/4 4-33  
3/4 5-2  
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3/4 6-14  
3/4 7-6  
3/4 7-12  
3/4 7-13  
3/4 7-16a  
3/4 7-19

### 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.0.8 By specific reference to this section, those surveillances which must be performed on or before August 13, 1994, and are designated as 18-month or 36-month surveillances (or required as outage-related surveillances under the provisions of Specification 4.0.5) may be delayed until the end of the cycle 9-10 refueling outage. For these specific surveillances under this section, the specified time intervals required by Specification 4.0.2 will be determined with the new initiation date established by the surveillance date during the Unit 2 1994 refueling outage.

### 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

##### ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.†

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

TABLE 4.3-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

| <u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>  | <u>CHANNEL CHECK</u> | <u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>   | <u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u> | <u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u> |
|---|----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| 1. Manual Reactor Trip<br>A. Shunt Trip Function<br>B. Undervoltage Trip Function | N.A.<br>N.A.         | N.A.<br>N.A.                 | S/U(1)(10)<br>S/U(1)(10)       | 1, 2, 3*, 4, 5*<br>1, 2, 3*, 4, 5*          |
| 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux  | S                    | D(2,8), M(3,8)<br>and Q(6,8) | M and S/U(1)                   | 1, 2 and *                                  |
| 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux,<br>High Positive Rate                               | N.A.                 | R(6)                         | M                              | 1, 2  |
| 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux,<br>High Negative Rate                               | N.A.                 | R(6)                         | M                              | 1, 2  |
| 5. Intermediate Range,<br>Neutron Flux  | S                    | R(6,8)                       | S/U(1)                         | 1, 2 and *                                  |
| 6. Source Range, Neutron Flux   | S                    | R(6,14)                      | H(14) and S/U(1)               | 2(7), 3(7),<br>4 and 5                      |
| 7. Overtemperature AT   | S                    | R(9)†                        | M                              | 1, 2  |
| 8. Overpower AT   | S                    | R(9)                         | M                              | 1, 2  |
| 9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low  | S                    | R†                           | M                              | 1, 2  |
| 10. Pressurizer Pressure--High  | S                    | R†                           | M                              | 1, 2  |
| 11. Pressurizer Water Level--High   | S                    | R†                           | M                              | 1, 2  |
| 12. Loss of Flow - Single Loop  | S                    | R(8)                         | M                              | 1   |

† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-5.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.†

4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.†

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

**TABLE 4.3-2**  
**ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURED ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION**  
**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

| <u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>  | <u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>              | <u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u> | <u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u> | <u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u> | <u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u> |
|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---|---|
| <b>1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP, FEEDWATER ISOLATION, AND MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS</b> |                                   |                            |                                |   |   |
| a. Manual Initiation  | ----- See Functional Unit 9 ----- |                            |                                |   |   |
| b. Automatic Actuation Logic  | N.A.                              | N.A.                       | M(2)                           | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3, 4                                  |
| c. Containment Pressure-High  | S                                 | R                          | M(3)                           | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3                                     |
| d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low   | S                                 | R†                         | M                              | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3                                     |
| e. Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines--High  | S                                 | R                          | M                              | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3                                     |
| f. Steam Line Pressure--Low   | S                                 | R                          | M                              | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3                                     |
| <b>2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY</b>   |                                   |                            |                                |   |   |
| a. Manual Initiation  | ----- See Functional Unit 9 ----- |                            |                                |   |   |
| b. Automatic Actuation Logic  | N.A.                              | N.A.                       | M(2)                           | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3, 4                                  |
| c. Containment Pressure-High-High   | S                                 | R                          | M(3)                           | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3                                     |
| <b>3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION</b>   |                                   |                            |                                |   |   |
| <b>a. Phase "A" Isolation</b>   |                                   |                            |                                |   |   |
| 1) Manual   | ----- See Functional Unit 9 ----- |                            |                                |   |   |
| 2) From Safety Injection Automatic Actuation Logic  | N.A.                              | N.A.                       | M(2)                           | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3, 4                                  |
| <b>b. Phase "B" Isolation</b>   |                                   |                            |                                |   |   |
| 1) Manual   | ----- See Functional Unit 9 ----- |                            |                                |   |   |
| 2) Automatic Actuation Logic  | N.A.                              | N.A.                       | M(2)                           | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3, 4                                  |
| 3) Containment Pressure-High-High   | S                                 | R                          | M(3)                           | N.A.  | 1, 2, 3                                     |

† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

2. With two or more block valves inoperable,

Within 1 hour either (1) restore a total of at least two block valves to OPERABLE status, or (2) close the block valves and remove power from the block valves, or (3) close the associated PORVs and remove power from their associated solenoid valves; and apply the portions of ACTION a.2 or a.3 above for inoperable PORVs, relating to OPERATIONAL MODE, as appropriate.

- c. With PORVs and block valves not in the same line inoperable,\*

within 1 hour either (1) restore the valves to OPERABLE status or (2) close and de-energize the other valve in each line. Apply the portions of ACTION a.2 or a.3 above, relating to OPERATIONAL MODE, as appropriate for two or three lines unavailable.

- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.4.11.1 Each of the three PORVs shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, excluding valve operation, and
- b. At least once per 18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.†

4.4.11.2 Each of the three block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel. The block valve(s) do not have to be tested when ACTION 3.4.11.a or 3.4.11.c is applied.

4.4.11.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel while the emergency buses are energized by the onsite diesel generators and onsite plant batteries. This testing can be performed in conjunction with the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.2.e and 4.8.2.3.2.d.

\*PORVs isolated to limit RCS leakage through their seats and the block valves shut to isolate this leakage are not considered inoperable.

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution.
  - c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected by removal of the breaker from the circuit.
  - d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.†
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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- d. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is above 600 psig.
  2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
- e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:†
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection test signal.
  2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection test signal:
    - a) Centrifugal charging pump
    - b) Safety injection pump
    - c) Residual heat removal pump
- f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated discharge pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
- |                               |                                    |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Centrifugal charging pump  | Greater than or equal to 2405 psig |
| 2. Safety Injection pump      | Greater than or equal to 1409 psig |
| 3. Residual heat removal pump | Greater than or equal to 190 psig  |
- g. By verifying the correct position of each mechanical stop for the following Emergency Core Cooling System throttle valves:
1. Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS sub-systems are required to be OPERABLE.

† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

#### CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 Two independent containment spray systems shall be OPERABLE with each spray system capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

##### ACTION:

With one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 255 psig at a flow of greater than or equal to 700 gpm, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
- c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:†
  1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment Pressure--High-High test signal.
  2. Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a Containment Pressure--High-High test signal.
- d. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment Pressure--High-High test signal.†
- d. At least once per 5 years by verifying a water flow rate of at least 20 gpm (greater than or equal to 20 gpm) but not to exceed 50 gpm (less than or equal to 50 gpm) from the spray additive tank test line to each containment spray system with the spray pump operating on recirculation with a pump discharge pressure greater than or equal to 255 psig.

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:†

- a. Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal, each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
- b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test signal, each Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
- c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation signal, each Purge and Exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.1.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.7.1.2 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 by:
- a. Verifying that each motor driven pump develops an equivalent discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1240 psig at 60°F in recirculation flow.
  - b. Verifying that the steam turbine driven pump develops an equivalent discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1180 psig at 60°F and at a flow of greater than or equal to 700 gpm when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 310 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
  - c. Verifying that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position.
  - d. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path is in the fully open position whenever the auxiliary feedwater system is placed in automatic control or when above 10% RATED THERMAL POWER. This requirement is not applicable for those portions of the auxiliary feedwater system being used intermittently to maintain steam generator level.
  - e. Verifying at least once per 18 months during shutdown that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position upon receipt of the appropriate engineered safety features actuation test signal required by Specification 3/4.3.2.†
  - f. Verifying at least once per 18 months during shutdown that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically upon receipt of the appropriate engineered safety features actuation test signal required by Specification 3/4.3.2.†
  - g. Verifying at least once per 18 months during shutdown that the unit cross-tie valves can cycle full travel. Following cycling, the valves will be verified to be in their closed positions.

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.3.1

- a. At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.
- b. At least one component cooling water flow path in support of Unit 1 shutdown functions shall be available.

APPLICABILITY: Specification 3.7.3.1.a. - MODES 1, 2, 3, 4.  
Specification 3.7.3.1.b. - At all times when Unit 1 is in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

ACTION:

When Specification 3.7.3.1.a is applicable:

With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

When Specification 3.7.3.1.b is applicable:

With no flowpath in Unit 1 available, return at least one flowpath to available status within 7 days, or provide equivalent shutdown capability in Unit 1 and return at least one flow path to available status within the next 60 days, or have Unit 1 in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. The requirements of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.3.1 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection test signal.†

4.7.3.2 At least once per 18 months during shutdown, verify that the unit cross-tie valves can cycle full travel. Following cycling, the valves will be verified to be in their closed positions.

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

### 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

##### 3.7.4.1

- a. At least two independent essential service water loops shall be OPERABLE.
- b. At least one essential service water flowpath associated with support of Unit 1 shutdown functions shall be available.

**APPLICABILITY:** Specification 3.7.4.1.a. - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.  
Specification 3.7.4.1.b. - At all times when Unit 1 is in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

#### ACTION:

When Specification 3.7.4.1.a is applicable:

With only one essential service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

When Specification 3.7.4.1.b is applicable:

With no essential service water flow path available in support of Unit 1 shutdown functions, return at least one flow path to available status within 7 days or provide equivalent shutdown capability in Unit 1 and return the equipment to service within the next 60 days, or have Unit 1 in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. The requirements of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.7.4.1 At least two essential service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
  - b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection test signal.†

† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- e. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 6000 cfm plus or minus 10%.
  2. Verifying that on a Safety Injection Signal from either Unit 1 or Unit 2, or on a containment phase A isolation signal, the system automatically diverts its inlet flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber bank and that either fan can then be manually started in the re-circulation mode.†
  3. Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/16 inch W. G. relative to the outside atmosphere at a system flow rate of 6000 cfm plus or minus 10%.
- f. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99% of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 6000 cfm plus or minus 10%.
- g. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 6000 cfm plus or minus 10%.

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b) Emptying a longitudinal sample from an adsorber tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly, and obtaining samples at least two inches in diameter and with a length equal to the thickness of the bed.

Subsequent to reinstalling the adsorber tray used for obtaining the carbon sample, the system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by also verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 25,000 cfm plus or minus 10%.

- d. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 25,000 cfm plus or minus 10%.
  2. Deleted.
  3. Verifying that the standby fan starts automatically on a Containment Pressure--High-High Signal and directs its exhaust flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks on a Containment Pressure--High-High Signal.†
- e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99% of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 25,000 cfm plus or minus 10%.
- f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 25,000 cfm plus or minus 10%.

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† The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 158 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY  
DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-316

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 16, 1993, as supplemented September 28, and December 3, 1993, the Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2. The licensee's supplemental letters provided clarifying information and did not change the staff's initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination published in the Federal Register (58 FR 41505). The proposed amendment would extend specific TS surveillances which have various due dates, the first of which is January 2, 1994. The surveillances would be extended to the Unit 2 refueling outage, which is currently scheduled to begin August 6, 1994. All of the requested surveillance extensions are associated with surveillances normally performed during refueling outages. The current cycle will be lengthened approximately 5 months due to a planned power reduction in order to separate the current dual unit outages. The licensee classified the affected TS into 16 groups. This amendment pertains only to the following four groups of TS surveillances:

| <u>Group</u> | <u>TSs Affected</u>   | <u>Description of Change</u>  |
|--------------|---|---|
| (1)          | 4.3.1.1.3<br>4.3.2.1.3  | Delay time-response testing for reactor trip and engineered safety features instrumentation |
| (2)          | 4.5.1.d<br>4.5.2.e<br>4.6.2.1.c<br>4.6.2.2.c<br>4.6.3.1.2<br>4.7.1.2.e<br>4.7.1.2.f<br>4.7.3.1.b<br>4.7.4.1.b<br>4.7.5.1.e.2<br>4.7.6.1.d.3 | Delay testing for equipment response to ESF signals   |

| <u>Group</u> | <u>TSs Affected</u>   | <u>Description of Change</u>   |
|--------------|---|--|
| (6)          | Table 4.3-1<br>Items 7,9,10 & 11<br>Table 4.3-2, Item 1.d<br>4.3.2.1.2 (P-11)<br>4.4.11.1.b | Delay pressurizer pressure & level calibrations, interlock function testing, and PORV calibrations |
| (11)         | Table 4.3-1, Item 5<br>4.3.1.1.2 (P-6)  | Delay intermediate range calibration and interlock functional testing                              |

The due dates specified in the licensee's submittal for each TS affected are the most limiting due dates, in that for multiple TSs the date when the first surveillance is due is listed. Also, the due dates given in the submittal include the 25% maximum allowable extension beyond the surveillance interval allowed by TS 4.0.2.

This amendment addresses only the above four groups of TS surveillances because their limiting due dates expire in early to mid-January 1994. Group 2 has a limiting due date of April 15, 1994, but was also evaluated in this amendment because it is closely related to Group 1 surveillances. The remaining 12 extension requests will be evaluated by the staff at a later date under a separate cover.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

Generic Letter (GL) 91-04, "Changes in Technical Specifications Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle," was published April 2, 1991. The purpose of the GL was to provide guidance to licensees wishing to take advantage of improvements in reactor fuels to increase the duration of the fuel cycle for their facilities. Although the licensee is not requesting a permanent change to a 24-month fuel cycle, it is requesting a one-time surveillance extension, in which some of the guidance of GL 91-04 will apply.

The staff included in its guidance in GL 91-04 the following statement:

The NRC staff has reviewed a number of requests to extend 18-month surveillances to the end of a fuel cycle and a few requests for changes in surveillance intervals to accommodate a 24-month fuel cycle. The staff has found that the effect on safety is small because safety systems use redundant electrical and mechanical components and because licensees perform other surveillances during plant operation that confirm that these systems and components can perform their safety functions. Nevertheless, licensees should evaluate the effect on safety of an increase in 18-month surveillance intervals to accommodate a 24-month fuel cycle. This evaluation should support a conclusion that the effect on safety is small. Licensees should confirm that historical plant maintenance and surveillance data support this conclusion.

The licensee's request for surveillance extension is very similar to extensions granted previously, one for Unit 1 approved by the NRC on April 17,

1987, and two for Unit 2 approved by the NRC on December 28, 1987, and February 29, 1988. The reasons for the extension and the equipment included in this request are similar. The specific TS changes are addressed below.

Groups (1) and (2) Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Response Testing

The proposed amendment requests a 5-month (most limiting due date) extension for the time-response testing required by TSs 4.3.1.1.3 for the reactor trip and ESF instrumentation in TS Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-3. The amendment also requests an extension of surveillances for equipment that actuates on an ESF signal covered by TSs 4.5.1.d, 4.5.2.e, 4.6.2.1.c, 4.6.2.2.c, 4.6.3.1.2, 4.7.1.2.e. and f, 4.7.3.1.b, 4.7.4.1.b, 4.7.5.1.e.2 and 4.7.6.1.d.3.

The TSs include the automatic initiation of valves, pumps, and ventilation as detailed in the licensee's submittal. The equipment is actuated by ESF signals: safety injection (SI), phase isolation, containment purge, exhaust isolation, and containment pressure high-high. Testing of these instrument loops either requires plant shutdown or removal of an entire train of safety equipment from operation. The licensee does not consider it prudent to perform this testing at power. All required channel checks and functional checks of the ESF and reactor protection system will continue as scheduled. The licensee has reviewed the surveillance history of these ESF systems and has determined that the equipment should be able to meet the TS requirements during the extension period. The licensee received a similar extension for these components in 1987 and performed a review of all the as-found data from the extended surveillance period. No degradation was noted; all of the as-found responses were within the acceptance criteria. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's request for one-time surveillance extension for Groups (1) and (2) acceptable.

Group (6) Pressurizer Pressure & Level Calibrations and PORV Calibrations

The proposed amendment requests a 6½ month extension (most limiting date) for some of the pressurizer channel calibrations, interlock testing involving pressurizer pressure instrumentation, and PORV calibrations required by TS 4.3.1.1.1 Table 4.3-1 Items 7,9,10 and 11, TS 4.3.2.1.1 Table 4.3-2, Item 1.d, TS 4.3.2.1.2 (P-11) and TS 4.4.11.1.b. Calibration of the PORVs at power is not permitted by TSs because the calibration renders all three PORVs inoperable at the same time. Calibration of certain pressurizer level and pressure instruments at power is not considered prudent because the configuration of the instrumentation calibration could result in a reactor trip. Two of the pressurizer pressure instruments share a common sensing line with one of the pressurizer level instruments.

Calibrations can and will be performed on two of the three pressurizer level channels and on two of the four pressurizer pressure channels per TSs. Also, the instrument channels on which the licensee is requesting surveillance extensions on will be subject to channel functional testing and/or channel checks. The testing that will be performed would be expected to provide indication of the operability of the systems.

The licensee performed a drift analysis using as-found instrument errors from previous instrument calibrations to project the amount of drift the instruments will have during the extension period. Details of the licensee's analysis were submitted in a letter dated December 3, 1993. In its submittal the licensee provided the results of the analysis and concluded that, based on these results, the drift data clearly indicated that instrument drift will be within acceptable limits while operating in the requested surveillance extension period. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's request for one-time surveillance extension for Group (6) acceptable.

#### **Group (11) Intermediate Range Calibration and Interlock Functional Testing**

In a letter dated December 3, 1993, the licensee withdrew its request for extensions of surveillances pertaining to intermediate range calibration and interlock functional testing because these surveillances were performed during a forced outage on August 10, 1993. These extensions are no longer needed.

#### **3.0 STATE CONSULTATION**

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

#### **4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION**

The amendment changes surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 41505). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

#### **5.0 CONCLUSION**

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

**Principal Contributor: Beth A. Wetzel**

**Date: December 22, 1993**