Docket Nos. 50-315
and 50-316

February 13, 1992

Mr. E. E. Fitzpatrick, Vice President
Indiana Michigan Power Company
c/o American Electric Power Service Corporation
1 Riverside Plaza
Columbus, Ohio 43216

Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NOS.162 AND146 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-58 AND DPR-74 (TAC NOS. M75243 AND M75244)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 162 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 and Amendment No.146 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The amendments revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications relating to controlled leakage. The changes are in response to your application dated October 17, 1989.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Timothy G. Colburn FOR
John F. Stang, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 162 to DPR-58
2. Amendment No. 146 to DPR-74
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

				OGC**
				1/27/91
LA/PD31**	PM/PD31**	PM/PD31**	BC/SPLB**	D/PD31
PShuttleworth	WLong	TColburn	RJones	LBMarsh
12/18/91	11/27/91	12/18/91	1/22/92	1/31/92

CP-1

DATED: February 13, 1992

AMENDMENT NO. 162 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58-D. C. COOK
AMENDMENT NO. 146 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DRP-74-D. C. COOK

Docket File
NRC & Local PDRs
PDIII-1 Reading
D.C. Cook Plant File
B. Boger
J. Zwolinski
L. Marsh
P. Shuttleworth
T. Colburn
J. Stang
W. Long
OGC-WF
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G. Hill (8), P-137
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cc: Plant Service list

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-315

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 162
License No. DPR-58

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated October 17, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 is hereby amended to read as follows:

> The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 162 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

L. B. Marsh, Director
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 13, 1992

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-316

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 146
License No. DPR-74

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated October 17, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:

> The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 146 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

L. B. Marsh, Director
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 13, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 162

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58

DOCKET NO. 50-315

Revise Appendix A Technical specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 4-16	3/4 4-16
3/4 4-17	3/4 4-17
3/4 4-17a	3/4 4-17a
B 3/4 4-3	B 3/4 4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

b. 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,

c. 1 GPM total primary-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators and 500 gallons per day through any one steam generator,

d. 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System,

e. Seal line resistance greater than or equal to 2.27 E-1 ft/gpm^2 and,

f. 1 GPM leakage from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4-0.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4**

ACTION:

a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve(s) leakage greater than the above limit, except when:

1. The leakage is less than or equal to 5.0 gpm, and

2. The most recent measured leakage does not exceed the previous measured leakage* by an amount that reduces the

*To satisfy ALARA requirements, measured leakage may be measured indirectly (as from the performance of pressure indicators) if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating valve compliance with the leakage criteria.

**Specification 3.4.6.2.e is applicable with average pressurizer pressure within 20 psi of the nominal full pressure value.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

margin between the most recent measured leakage and the maximum limit of 5.0 gpm by 50% or more,

declare the leaking valve inoperable and isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion by the use of a combination of at least two closed valves, one of which may be the OPERABLE check valve and the other a closed de-energized motor operated valve. Verify the isolated condition of the closed de-energized motor operated valve at least once per 24 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.6.2.1 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a. Monitoring the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor at least once per 12 hours.

b. Monitoring the containment sump inventory and discharge at least once per 12 hours.

c. Determining the seal line resistance at least once per 31 days when the average pressurizer pressure is within 20 psi of its nominal full pressure value. The seal line resistance measured during the surveillance must be greater than or equal to 2.27 E-1 ft/gpm^2. The seal line resistance, R_{SL}, is determined from the following expression:

$$R_{SL} = \frac{2.31\ (P_{CHP} - P_{SI})}{Q^2}$$

where: P_{CHP} = charging pump header pressure, psig

P_{SI} = 2112 psig (low pressure operation)

2262 psig (high pressure operation)

2.31 = conversion factor $(12\ in/ft)^2/(62.3\ lb/ft^3)$

Q = the total seal injection flow, gpm

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODES 3 and 4.

d. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours during steady state operation, and

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. Monitoring the reactor head flange leakoff system at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.6.2.2 Each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4-0 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit prior to entering MODE 3:

a. After each refueling outage;

b. Whenever the plant has been in COLD SHUTDOWN for 72 hours or more and if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months;

c. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve.

3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 gpm. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitations provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the leakage detection systems.

The limitation on seal line resistance ensures that the seal line resistance is greater than or equal to the resistance assumed in the minimum safeguards LOCA analysis. This analysis assumes that all of the flow that is diverted from the boron injection line to the seal injection line is unavailable for core cooling.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 146

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74

DOCKET NO. 50-316

Revise Appendix A Technical specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 4-15	3/4 4-15
3/4 4-16	3/4 4-16
3/4 4-16a	3/4 4-16a
B 3/4 4-4	B 3/4 4-4

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

b. 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,

c. 1 GPM total primary-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators and 500 gallons per day through any one steam generator,

d. 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System,

e. Seal line resistance greater than or equal to 2.27 E-1 ft/gpm^2, and

f. 1 GPM leakage from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4-0.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4**

ACTION:

a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve(s) leakage greater than the above limit, except when:

1. The leakage is less than or equal to 5.0 gpm, and

2. The most recent measured leakage does not exceed the previous measured leakage* by an amount that reduces the

*To satisfy ALARA requirements, measured leakage may be measured indirectly (as from the performance of pressure indicators) if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating valve compliance with the leakage criteria.

**Specification 3.4.6.2.e is applicable with average pressurizer pressure within 20 psi of the nominal full pressure value.

margin between the most recent measured leakage and the maximum limit of 5.0 gpm by 50% or more,

declare the leaking valve inoperable and isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion by the use of at least two closed valves, one of which may be the OPERABLE check valve and the other a closed de-energized motor operated valve. Verify the isolated condition of the closed de-energized motor operated valve at least once per 24 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.6.2.1 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a. Monitoring the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor at least once per 12 hours.

b. Monitoring the containment sump inventory and discharge at least once per 12 hours.

c. Determining the seal line resistance at least once per 31 days when the average pressurizer pressure is within 20 psi of its nominal full pressure value. The seal line resistance measured during the surveillance must be greater than or equal to 2.27 E-1 ft/gpm^2. The seal line resistance, R_{SL}, is determined from the following expression:

$$R_{SL} = \frac{2.31\ (P_{CHP} - P_{SI})}{Q^2}$$

where: P_{CHP} = charging pump header pressure, psig

P_{SI} = 2262 psig (high pressure operation)

2.31 = conversion factor $(12\ in/ft)^2/(62.3\ lb/ft^3)$

Q = the total seal injection flow, gpm

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODES 3 and 4.

d. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours during steady state operation, and

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. Monitoring the reactor head flange leakoff system at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.6.2.2 Each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4-0 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, except that in lieu of any leakage testing required by Specification 4.0.5, each valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit prior to entering MODE 3:

a. After each refueling outage;

b. Whenever the plant has been in COLD SHUTDOWN for 72 hours or more and if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months;

c. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve.

BASES

The limitation on seal line resistance ensures that the seal line resistance is greater than or equal to the resistance assumed in the minimum safeguards LOCA analysis. This analysis assumes that all of the flow that is diverted from the boron injection line to the seal injection line is unavailable for core cooling.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 GPM for all steam generators not isolated from the RCS ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of Part 100 limits in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 GPM limit is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents. The 500 gpd leakage limit per steam generator ensures that steam generator tube integrity is maintained in the event of a main steam line rupture or under LOCA conditions.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Should PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE occur through a component which can be isolated from the balance of the Reactor Coolant System, plant operation may continue provided the leaking component is promptly isolated from the Reactor Coolant System since isolation removes the source of potential failure.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS Pressure Isolation Valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS Pressure Isolation Valves is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.

3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady State Limits provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride, and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady State Limits.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 162 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58

AND AMENDMENT NO. 146 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-315 AND 50-316

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 17, 1989, the Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) requested amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74 for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (the facilities). The amendments would (a) revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TS) relating to controlled leakage, (b) delete a cross reference to previously removed reporting requirements for reactor coolant boundry isolation valve leakage, and (c) change the related Bases.

2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

"Controlled leakage" is the term applied to the cooled and filtered seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals by the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). The controlled leakage flow originates at a branch connection from the charging pump discharge header. The fluid is then discharged into the RCPs where part of it travels downward past the lower radial bearing and thermal barrier, and then joins the reactor coolant system (RCS). The remainder of the flow travels upward and enters the pump seal. From the pump seal, this portion of the controlled leakage flow is returned to the CVCS. Although all controlled leakage either enters the RCS directly or is returned to the RCS via the CVCS, a technical specification limit is placed on the maximum combined seal injection flow rate due to the fact that, in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), the charging pumps are realigned to provide safety injection and the controlled leakage flow is assumed to be unavailable for core cooling. Since the controlled leakage flow is assumed to be diverted from the safety injection flow, placing a limit on the maximum amount of controlled leakage is necessary to ensure conformance with the 10 CFR 50.46, Appendix K (LOCA) analysis.

The present TS impose a maximum flow rate limit of 52 gpm on controlled leakage. However, the Technical Specifications do not specify the RCS conditions for which this figure applies. The licensee has submitted calculations, based on the Darcy fluid flow equation, which indicate that, while for normal conditions the controlled leakage flow would be 40 gpm, at

the runout condition the flow would be 79 gpm. This is due to the higher pressure difference between the charging pump discharge header and the RCS that would exist under runout condition. Since the present TS permit a leakage rate of 52 gpm under all RCS conditions, with the surveillance measurement taken under normal conditions, the present TS are non-conservative for certain accident conditions. Upon discovery of this feature, the licensee acted to administratively limit controlled leakage to 40 gpm under normal conditions. This ensures that controlled leakage will not be excessive under accident conditions. As a permanent corrective measure, the licensee proposes to eliminate the "gpm" limit and replace it with a seal line resistance coefficient. The resistance coefficient proposed by the licensee is 2.27 E-1 ft/gpm^2. This would provide the benefit of specifying a leakage flow surveillance test acceptance criterion figure which is based on actual line resistance and is not affected by charging pump and RCS pressure conditions. The value of 2.27 E-1 ft/gpm^2 is consistent with the accident analysis and is acceptable on that basis. In the proposed formula for calculating the seal line resistance, the seal line resistance is a function of two variables: (a) the pressure difference between the charging pump discharge header and the seal injection point, and (b) the squared value of the seal injection flow. The charging pump header pressure and the seal injection flow are measured parameters and the seal injection pressure is an analytically derived value. The seal line resistance acceptance criterion specified in the proposed TS formula results in a value of approximately 40 gpm for seal injection flow at minimum charging pump discharge pressure and the analytically derived seal injection pressure.

The seal line flow resistance measurement will be performed after entry into Mode 3 or 4 with the facility at normal pressure following completion of seal flow needle valve position adjustments. This requires an exception to the requirements of TS 4.0.4 and is necessary to ensure an acceptable "as left" condition following completion of the surveillance. The proposed change would also provide an operational benefit by reducing the possibility of disturbing charging flow and pressurizer level during testing.

The proposed amendments would also delete a footnote reference to TS 6.9.1. The footnote to be deleted states that excessive pressure isolation valve leakage need not be reported as required by TS 6.9.1, unless the valve has been declared inoperable. However, TS 6.9.1 was previously amended, consistent with Generic Letter 83-43, to delete reporting requirements already covered by the LER Rule (10 CFR 50.73). The deletion of the reference to the reporting requirement from the TS is acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change the requirements with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or change to the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has

determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (55 FR 14509). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: W. Long

Date: February 13, 1992