

November 8, 1994

Mr. E. E. Fitzpatrick, Vice President  
Indiana Michigan Power Company  
c/o American Electric Power Service Corporation  
1 Riverside Plaza  
Columbus, OH 43215

Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick:

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT RE: STEAM GENERATOR STOP VALVES (TAC NOS. M88510 AND  
M88511)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 185 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 and Amendment No. 170 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated December 22, 1993.

The amendments modify the action statements for both units and the surveillance requirements for Unit 2 in TS 3.7.1.5 to provide greater operational flexibility and consistency with the new standard TS. The Bases are also revised as appropriate.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed signed by

John B. Hickman, Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV

Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 185 to DPR-58  
2. Amendment No. 170 to DPR-74  
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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See next page

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NAME	LLessler	JHickman:g11	R Jones TCollins		LBMARSH
DATE	09/7/94	09/7/94	09/12/94	09/11/94	09/3/94

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Mr. E. E. Fitzpatrick  
Indiana Michigan Power Company

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant

cc:

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December 1993

DATED: November 8, 1994

AMENDMENT NO. 185 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58-D. C. COOK  
AMENDMENT NO. 170 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74-D. C. COOK

**Docket File**

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cc: Plant Service list

140015



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-315

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 185  
License No. DPR-58

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated December 22, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 185, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John N. Hannon, Director  
Project Directorate III-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 8, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 185  
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58  
DOCKET NO. 50-315

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 7-10  
B 3/4 7-3  
-

INSERT

3/4 7-10  
B 3/4 7-3  
B 3/4 7-3a

PLANT SYSTEMS

STEAM GENERATOR STOP VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each steam generator stop valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

MODE 1 - With one steam generator stop valve inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours; otherwise, reduce power to less than or equal to 5 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

MODES 2 - With one or more steam generator stop valves inoperable, close the and 3 inoperable valve(s) within 8 hours and verify the inoperable valves are closed at least once per 7 days. Otherwise, be in at least MODE 4 within 12 hours, with the unit in at least MODE 3 within the first 6 hours.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5.1 Each steam generator stop valve that is open shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 8 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.7.1.5.2 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

4.7.1.5.3 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 when performing PHYSICS TESTS at the beginning of a cycle provided the steam generator stop valves are maintained closed.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 9 hours with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss of off-site power.

#### 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY

The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 gpm primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.7.1.5 STEAM GENERATOR STOP VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the steam generator stop valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the steam generator stop valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

With one steam generator stop valve inoperable in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hours. Some repairs to the valves can be made with the unit hot. The 8 hour completion time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the steam generator stop valves. If the steam generator stop valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours and the MODES 2 and 3 action statement entered. The completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the steam generator stop valves in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

Since the steam generator stop valves are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable valves may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the valves are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. The 8 hour completion time is consistent

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.7.1.5 STEAM GENERATOR STOP VALVES (continued)

with the MODE 1 action statement requirement. For inoperable steam generator stop valves that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified completion time, but are closed, the inoperable valves must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day completion time is reasonable, based on engineering judgement, in view of steam generator stop valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position.

If in MODES 2 or 3 the steam generator stop valves cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated completion time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-316

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 170  
License No. DPR-74

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated December 22, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 170, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John N. Hannon, Director  
Project Directorate III-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 8, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 170

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74

DOCKET NO. 50-316

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 7-10  
B 3/4 7-3  
-

INSERT

3/4 7-10  
B 3/4 7-3  
B 3/4 7-3a

PLANT SYSTEMS

STEAM GENERATOR STOP VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each steam generator stop valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

MODE 1 - With one steam generator stop valve inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours; otherwise, reduce power to less than or equal to 5 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

MODES 2 and 3 - With one or more steam generator stop valves inoperable, close the inoperable valve(s) within 8 hours and verify the inoperable valves are closed at least once per 7 days. Otherwise, be in at least MODE 4 within 12 hours, with the unit in at least MODE 3 within the first 6 hours.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5.1 Each steam generator stop valve that is open shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 8 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.7.1.5.2 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

4.7.1.5.3 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 when performing PHYSICS TESTS at the beginning of a cycle provided the steam generator stop valves are maintained closed.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 9 hours with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss of off-site power. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

#### 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY

The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 gpm primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.7.1.5 STEAM GENERATOR STOP VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the steam generator stop valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the steam generator stop valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

With one steam generator stop valve inoperable in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hours. Some repairs to the valves can be made with the unit hot. The 8 hour completion time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the steam generator stop valves. If the steam generator stop valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours and the MODES 2 and 3 action statement entered. The completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the steam generator stop valves in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.7.1.5 STEAM GENERATOR STOP VALVES (continued)

Since the steam generator stop valves are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable valves may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the valves are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. The 8 hour completion time is consistent with the MODE 1 action statement requirement. For inoperable steam generator stop valves that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified completion time, but are closed, the inoperable valves must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day completion time is reasonable, based on engineering judgement, in view of steam generator stop valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position.

If in MODES 2 or 3 the steam generator stop valves cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated completion time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 185 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 170 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-315 AND 50-316

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 22, 1993, the Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74 for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed amendments would revise the action statement in TS 3.7.1.5, Steam Generator Stop Valves, to be more consistent with NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants." The proposed changes will allow both greater time for compensatory action as well as operation in Modes 2 and 3 with valves inoperable but closed. In addition, a Unit 2 action requirement would be revised to be consistent with Unit 1 and fulfill a Licensee Event Report commitment.

2.0 EVALUATION

The steam generator stop valves (SGSVs), also referred to as main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), isolate steam flow from the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break. SGSV closure terminates flow from the unaffected (intact) steam generators. One SGSV is located in each main line outside, but close to, containment. The SGSVs are downstream from the main steam safety valves (MSSV) and auxiliary feedwater pump turbine (AFW) steam supply, to prevent MSSV and AFW isolation from the steam generators by SGSV closure. Closing the SGSVs isolates the turbine, steam bypass system, and other auxiliary steam supplies from the steam generators. The SGSVs close on a main steam isolation signal generated by either low steam generator pressure or high containment pressure. The SGSVs fail closed on loss of control or actuation power. The SGSVs may also be manually actuated.

The design basis of the SGSVs is established by the containment analysis for the large steam line break inside containment. The design precludes the blowdown of more than one steam generator, assuming a single active component failure (e.g., the failure of one SGSV to close on demand). The SGSVs serve only a safety function and remain open during power operation. These valves operate under the following situations:

- a. A high energy line break inside containment which assumes that the SGSV on the affected steam generator remains open to maximize the mass and energy release into containment. Steam is discharged from all steam generators until the remaining SGSVs close. After SGSV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator and from the residual steam in the main steam header downstream of the closed SGSVs in the unaffected loops. Closure of the SGSVs isolates the break from the unaffected steam generators.
- b. A break outside of containment and upstream from the SGSVs which is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of more than one steam generator must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled reactor coolant system cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the SGSVs isolates the break and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.
- c. A break downstream of the SGSVs will be isolated by the closure of the SGSVs.
- d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the SGSVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generators. In addition to minimizing radiological releases, this enables the operator to maintain the pressure of the steam generator with the ruptured tube below the SGSV setpoints, a necessary step toward isolating the flow through the rupture.
- e. The SGSVs are also utilized during other events such as a feedwater line break.

The Cook SGSV design incorporates a piston which is attached to the valve's stem. The steam above and below the piston is normally at line pressure. The cylinder volume above the piston is piped through a three-way valve into a pair of redundant, air-operated dump valves. Upon receipt of a signal to close, the dump valves open and vent the steam from the cylinder. The steam pressure in the valve's body below the piston forces the piston to move rapidly and close the valve. The valve therefore is not dependent on an external power source for emergency closure. Each valve closes within 5 seconds after receipt of the requisite safety signal. Speed of closing is controlled by the setting of a needle restrictor within the hydraulic opening and closing system.

The Cook Steam Generator Stop Valves TS requires each steam generator stop valve to be operable. In Mode 1, when a valve is inoperable but open, the required action is to restore the valve within 4 hours, otherwise reduce power to less than 5% within the next 2 hours. The licensee has proposed to change the action times to 8 hours and 6 hours, respectively. In Modes 2 and 3, the current required action is to maintain an inoperable stop valve closed, or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. The licensee has proposed to change the action to direct closure of one or more inoperable valves within 8 hours and to verify closure once per 7 days. Alternatively, be in Mode 4 within 12 hours and Mode 3 within the first 6. The licensee has also proposed to change the Unit 2 surveillance requirement such that a timed closure to demonstrate operability is required only for valves which are open.

The proposed change to the Mode 1 action statement is consistent with the "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants" (WSTS), NUREG-1431, September 1992. In support of the action requirements in the WSTS, the staff stated:

"The 8 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the MSIVs. The 8 hour Completion Time is greater than that normally allowed for containment isolation valves because the MSIVs are valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides an additional means for containment isolation.

If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours, at which point the action statement for MODES 2 and 3, discussed below, would be entered. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems."

Based on the above, the proposed changes to the Mode 1 action statements are acceptable.

The new proposed action statement for Modes 2 and 3 is consistent with the "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants" (WSTS), NUREG-1431, September 1992. In support of the action requirements in the WSTS the staff stated:

"Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. The 8 hour Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Condition A (corresponding to the Mode 1 action statement). For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable MSIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgement, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position."

Based on the above, the proposed changes to the Modes 2 and 3 action statements are acceptable.

Appropriate changes are also proposed for the Bases to provide the rationale behind the revised action statements. These changes are acceptable.

The proposed change to the Unit 2 surveillance requirement, to specifically state that a timed closure to demonstrate operability is required only for valves which are open, is intended to clarify the surveillance requirement and

make it consistent with the Unit 1 TS. Surveillance requirement (SR) 4.7.1.5.1 currently states: "Each steam generator stop valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 8 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5." SR 4.0.5 states in part:

"Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be applicable as follows:

- a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i)."

ASME Code IWV-3416 states: "For a valve in a system declared inoperable or not required to be operable, the exercising test schedule need not be followed. Within 30 days prior to return of the system to operable status, the valves shall be exercised and the schedule resumed in accordance with requirements of this article."

In the Cook TS, the limiting condition for operation for the SGSVs in Mode 1 only requires action if an SGSV is inoperable but open and in Modes 2 and 3 allows continued operation if the SGSV is maintained closed. As a result, a closed SGSV is not considered operable and therefore, would not need to be exercised.

However, in November 1992, due to the wording of SR 4.7.1.5.1 which states "Each steam generator stop valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE ..." without regard for whether the SGSV is open or not, operations personnel at Cook concluded that a surveillance was overdue on a SGSV which was closed. After a review of the ASME Code, both the licensee and NRC staff concluded that no surveillance was required on a valve which is closed. Therefore, the licensee has proposed to modify the surveillance that the operability demonstration is only required on SGSVs *that are open*. Based on the above, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change the requirements with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation

exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 4939). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

#### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: John B. Hickman, NRR

Date: November 8, 1994