November 5, 1993

Docket No. 50-461

Mr. Richard F. Phares
Director - Licensing
Clinton Power Station
P. O. Box 678
Mail Code V920
Clinton, Illinois 61727

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Dear Mr. Phares:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M85232)

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 85 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 for the Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit No. 1. The amendment is in response to your application dated December 15, 1992 (U-602070).

The amendment increases the allowed outage time for differential temperature instruments associated with the containment and reactor vessel isolation control system (CRVICS) as described in CPS Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, CRVICS INSTRUMENTATION.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Douglas V. Pickett, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 85 to NPF-62
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
see next page

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cc:

Mr. J. S. Perry
Senior Vice President
Clinton Power Station
Post Office Box 678
Clinton, Illinois 61727

Mr. J. A. Miller
Manager Nuclear Station
Engineering Department
Clinton Power Station
Post Office Box 678
Clinton, Illinois 61727

Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
RR#3, Box 229 A
Clinton, Illinois 61727

Mr. R. T. Hill
Licensing Services Manager
General Electric Company
175 Curtner Avenue, M/C 481
San Jose, California 95125

Regional Administrator, Region III
799 Roosevelt Road, Building 4
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Chairman of DeWitt County
c/o County Clerk's Office
DeWitt County Courthouse
Clinton, Illinois 61727

Mr. Robert Neumann
Office of Public Counsel
State of Illinois Center
100 W. Randolph, Suite 11-300
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Mr. J. W. Blattner
Project Manager
Sargent & Lundy Engineers
55 East Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Illinois Department
of Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Facility Safety
1035 Outer Park Drive
Springfield, Illinois 62704

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-461

CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 85
License No. NPF-62

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Illinois Power Company* (IP), and Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc. (the licensees) dated December 15, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 is hereby amended to read as follows:

*Illinois Power Company is authorized to act as agent for Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc. and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 85, are hereby incorporated into this license. Illinois Power Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Douglas V Pickett for

James E. Dyer, Director
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 5, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 85

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-62

DOCKET NO. 50-461

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages, indicated by an asterisk, are provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 3-11	3/4,3-11
3/4 3-12*	3/4 3-12*
3/4 3-19	3/4 3-19
3/4 3-20*	3/4 3-20*

3/4.3.2 CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR VESSEL ISOLATION CONTROL SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2 The containment and reactor vessel isolation control system (CRVICS) channels shown in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE* with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2 and with ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.2-3.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.2-1.

ACTION:

a. With a CRVICS channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. For CRVICS Main Steam Line Isolation Trip Functions:

   1. With one of the four channels required for any Trip Function inoperable, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 48 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

   2. With two of the four channels required for any Trip Function inoperable, place one channel in the tripped condition within six hours provided no tripped channel for that Trip Function already exists. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

   3. With three or four channels required for any Trip Function inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.

c. For other CRVICS Isolation Trip Functions:

   1. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel(s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condition** within 24 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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*For CRVICS Main Steam Line Isolation Trip Function, a channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance provided at least two OPERABLE channels are monitoring that parameter.

For other CRVICS Isolation Trip Function, a channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance provided the requirements of Table 3.3.2-1 are fulfilled.

**An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

3.3.2 ACTION (Continued):

2. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system* in the tripped condition within 1 hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1 Each CRVICS channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.1-1.

4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS shall be performed at least once per 18 months. CRVICS main steam line isolation divisional logic and portions of the channel coincident logic shall be manually tested independent of the SELF TEST SYSTEM during each refueling outage. Each of the two trip systems or divisions of the CRVICS trip system logic shall be alternately and manually tested independent of the SELF TEST SYSTEM during every other refueling outage. All manual testing shall be completed such that all trip functions are tested at least once every four fuel cycles.

4.3.2.3 The CRVICS RESPONSE TIME of each CRVICS trip function shown in Table 3.3.2-3 shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train tested at least once per 36 months, and one channel per trip function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months, where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific CRVICS trip function.

*The trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition if this would cause the Trip Function to occur. When a trip system can be placed in the tripped condition without causing the Trip Function to occur, place the trip system with the most inoperable channels in the tripped condition; if both systems have the same number of inoperable channels, place either trip system in the tripped condition.

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

CRVICS INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION

ACTION 20 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

ACTION 21 - Deleted.

ACTION 22 - With one channel in either trip system inoperable restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

ACTION 23 - Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours* or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours* and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

ACTION 24 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours.

ACTION 25 - CORE ALTERATIONS, operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, and handling irradiated fuel in the primary or secondary containment may continue provided that SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established with the standby gas treatment system operating within 1 hour.

ACTION 26 - Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

ACTION 27 - Close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour** and declare the affected system inoperable.

ACTION 28 - Lock the affected system isolation valves closed within 1 hour** and declare the affected system inoperable.

ACTION 29 - Operations may continue provided that the affected CRVICS isolation valve(s) are closed within 1 hour and, as appropriate, declare the affected system or component inoperable and follow any ACTIONS appropriate to Specifications of the affected system. Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

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*For inoperable Main Steam Line Tunnel ΔTemp.-High Trip Functions, this time limit may be increased to 24 hours provided at least two Main Steam Line Tunnel Temp.-High channels remain OPERABLE.

**For inoperable ΔTemp.-High Trip Functions, this time limit may be increased to 24 hours provided the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for the Ambient Temperature-High Trip Function for the associated area is met for both Trip Systems.

TABLE 3.3.2-2

CRVICS INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

TRIP FUNCTION	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	$\geq$ -45.5 in.*	$\geq$ -47.7 in.
b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 (ECCS Div. I and II)	$\geq$ -45.5 in.*	$\geq$ -47.7 in.
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 (ECCS Div. III)	$\geq$ -45.5 in.*	$\geq$ -47.7 in.
d. Drywell Pressure - High	$\leq$ 1.68 psig	$\leq$ 1.88 psig
e. Drywell Pressure - High (ECCS Div. I and II)	$\leq$ 1.68 psig	$\leq$ 1.88 psig
f. Drywell Pressure - High (ECCS Div.III)	$\leq$ 1.68 psig	$\leq$ 1.88 psig
g. Containment Building Fuel Transfer Pool Ventilation Plenum Radiation - High	$\leq$ 100 mR/hr	$\leq$ 500 mR/hr
h. Containment Building Exhaust Radiation - High	$\leq$ 100 mR/hr	$\leq$ 400 mR/hr
i. Containment Building Continuous Containment Purge (CCP) Exhaust Radiation - High	$\leq$ 100 mR/hr	$\leq$ 400 mR/hr
j. Reactor Vessel Water Level Low Low Low-Level 1	$\geq$-145.5 in.*	$\geq$-147.7 in.

Amendment No. 47
SEP 2 5 1990

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 85 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-62

ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-461

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 15, 1992, the Illinois Power Company (IP, the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62, to change the technical specifications (TS) for the Clinton Power Station (CPS). The proposed change would increase the allowed outage time for differential temperature instruments associated with the containment and reactor vessel isolation control system (CRVICS) as described in the TS Table 3.3.2-1, CRVICS INSTRUMENTATION.

2.0 EVALUATION

The purpose of the differential temperature instruments associated with CRVICS is to monitor leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary and initiate alarms and/or an isolation function before predetermined limits are exceeded. Pursuant to this purpose, this instrumentation is designed to detect and effect an automatic isolation in response to a 25-gallon-per minute (gpm) equivalent steam leak in the particular area being monitored. The differential temperature is measured by comparing the area air handling unit's cooling water supply line temperature to the cooling water return line temperature.

The proposed change was prompted by a loss of 'B' (East) reactor water cleanup (RWCU) heat exchanger room air handling unit, which occurred at CPS on December 12, 1991. During this event the Shift Supervisor (SS) noted an increasing ambient temperature trend in the 'B' RWCU heat exchanger room, as indicated by the equipment area ambient temperature recorder. The SS immediately checked the differential temperature indication for the associated heat exchanger room, and it was indicating zero. In response to this indication, the status of the air handling unit fan was checked locally, and was determined to have failed. By analyzing the area differential temperature recorder, it was determined that the air handling unit had been failed for approximately 2 hours and 25 minutes. The existing TS requires the affected system isolation valves be closed within 2 hours. Therefore, this event resulted in operation prohibited by the plant's TS, and was documented in CPS Licensee Event Report (LER) 91-007.

In response to this event, IP proposed to increase the allowed outage time for the CRVICS differential temperature isolation instrumentation to allow sufficient time to identify and correct inoperable air handling units that support the operation of these instruments. The proposed change would be applicable to those instruments that isolate one or more of the following systems: (1) main steam lines, (2) RWCU, (3) reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), and (4) residual heat removal (RHR). The CPS TS currently require a CHANNEL CHECK to be performed on these instruments at least once every 12 hours. In addition, the TS currently require the main steam system to be isolated within 6 hours for a failure of 3 of the 4 differential temperature channels. Furthermore, it requires the RWCU, RCIC, and RHR systems to be isolated and the associated system declared inoperable within 1 hour for a failure of both differential temperature channels for each of the respective systems. Therefore, IP proposes an increase in the allowed outage time to 24 hours, to provide a reasonable period of time to detect and correct inoperabilities of these instruments caused by air handling unit failures.

Main Steam Line Isolation

The main steam line break leak detection subsystem consists of three types of monitoring circuits:

(1) ambient and differential area temperature is monitored and an alarm and main steam line isolation valve logic are initiated when the monitored temperature rises above a preset maximum,

(2) volumetric flow rate through the main steam lines provide comparative information to initiate an alarm and main steam line isolation closure when the monitored flow rate exceeds a preset maximum, and

(3) low water level in the reactor vessel is detected and a trip signal is sent to the isolation logic when the level decreases below a preselected set point.

Other main steam isolations are accomplished by main steam line high pressure, main steam line area high radiation, and low condenser vacuum. In addition, there is a manual isolation initiation capability.

For the main steam line and main steam line drain isolation valve control, four instrument channels are provided for each measured variable. The instrument channel trips are combined into a 2-out-of-4 logic using isolation modules to assure that no single failure in a channel can prevent the safety action by disenabling another channel nor can a single failure of one division logic prevent isolation by the remainder of the system. This is accomplished by combining the output trip signals of the logic divisions in a 2-out-of-2 logic. Divisions 1 and 4 or divisions 2 and 3 are required to transmit a signal to the CRVICS. The purpose of this 2-out-of-2 logic is to ensure that a failure of any one division does not result in inadvertent action. In response to this signal, the CRVICS initiates the closure of all main steam

line isolation valves and drain valves, the RWCU system isolation valves, and the RCIC system suction and steam supply line isolation valves.

The existing TS require the plant be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours or be in at least hot shutdown within 12 hours and cold shutdown within the next 24 hours for a condition with three of the four main steam line tunnel differential temperature channels inoperable. The proposed TS will require the plant be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 24 hours or be in at least hot shutdown within 24 hours and cold shutdown within the next 24 hours for a condition with 3 or 4 main steam line tunnel differential temperature channels inoperable, provided at least 2 main steam line tunnel ambient temperature channels remain operable.

Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation

The RWCU leak detection subsystem consists of the following two types of monitoring circuits:

(1) comparison of RWCU system water inlet and outlet flow rate, and

(2) ambient and differential temperature monitoring.

Ten ambient temperature and ten differential temperature instrument channels monitor the RWCU system area temperatures. Five area and five differential temperature switches are associated with each logic channel. Two ambient temperature elements are located in each of the following locations: Pump Room 1, Pump Room 2, Pump Room 3, Heat Exchanger Room East, and Heat Exchanger Room West. Two pairs of differential temperature elements are located in the ventilation chilled water inlets and exhausts of the above locations. Additionally, one ambient or differential temperature monitoring circuit in each of two divisions, monitoring main steam line tunnel temperature, will cause an isolation of the RWCU system. These monitors are the same units that effect isolation of the main steam lines. A trip of any one of these temperature switches will result in the activation of an annunciator and an automatic isolation of the RWCU system.

For a failure of both differential temperature channels associated with the RWCU system isolation trip function, the existing TS requires that the affected system isolation valves be closed within 1 hour and the affected system declared inoperable. The proposed TS would allow this time limit to be increased to 24 hours provided that the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system requirement for the ambient temperature-high trip function for the associated area is met for both trip systems.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation

The RCIC leak detection subsystem consists of the following two types of monitoring and control circuits:

(1) steam flow rate in RCIC steamlines, and

(2) ambient and differential temperature monitoring.

Additionally, leak detection is provided by alarm circuits that monitor the RCIC equipment area's sump level, sump pump run time, and sump pump running frequency.

Two ambient temperature elements are located in the RCIC equipment room. Also, two pairs of differential temperature elements are located in the RCIC equipment room's ventilation chilled water inlet and exhaust. Additionally, one ambient or differential temperature monitoring circuit in each of two divisions, monitoring main steam line tunnel temperature, will cause an isolation of the RCIC system. A trip of any one of these temperature switches will result in the activation of an annunciator and an automatic closure of the RCIC pump suction line. Furthermore, this signal will also trip the RCIC turbine. It should be noted, however, that there is a time delay associated with the RCIC system isolation signal from main steam line tunnel temperatures. The purpose of this time delay is to allow main steam and RWCU to be isolated before RCIC, thereby preserving the operation of the RCIC system for reactor vessel water makeup and core cooling.

For a failure of both differential temperature channels associated with the RCIC system isolation trip function, the existing TS requires that the affected system isolation valves be closed within 1 hour and the affected system declared inoperable. The proposed TS would allow this time limit to be increased to 24 hours provided that the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system requirement for the ambient temperature-high trip function for the associated area is met for both trip systems.

Residual Heat Removal System Isolation

The RHR leak detection subsystem consists of the following two types of monitoring and control circuits:

(1) steam flow rate in common RCIC/RHR steamlines, and

(2) ambient and differential temperature monitoring.

Additionally, leak detection is provided by alarm circuits that monitor the RHR areas' sump level, sump pump run time, and sump pump running frequency.

Two ambient temperature elements are located in each of the RHR heat exchanger rooms. Also, each RHR heat exchanger room's ventilation chilled water inlet and exhaust contains two pairs of differential temperature elements. A trip of any one of these temperature switches will result in the activation of an annunciator and an automatic closure of the RCIC suction and steam supply containment isolation valves, and the RHR return-to-feedwater, shutdown cooling suction, fuel pool cooling assist, and reactor vessel head spray line containment isolation valves.

For a failure of both differential temperature channels associated with the RHR system isolation trip function, the existing TS requires that the affected system isolation valves be locked closed within 1 hour and the affected system declared inoperable. The proposed TS would allow this time limit to be increased to 24 hours provided that the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system requirement for the ambient temperature-high trip function for the associated area is met for both trip systems.

3.0 SUMMARY

For all the above systems, there are two or more leakage detection systems available for each system or area that is a potential source of leakage. In addition, accessible areas are inspected periodically, and the temperature and flow indications are monitored regularly. Any abnormal instrument indication is investigated.

The setpoints for the ambient temperature instruments were calculated assuming the air handling units were in service during winter conditions. As a result, an isolation signal will be generated in response to high ambient temperature indication in the event of a 25-gpm equivalent steam leak under all cooling conditions. In addition, because redundant ambient temperature switches are required to be operable for each of the affected areas during the extended out of service period, the isolation signal would be generated even in the event of a single failure. Furthermore, with the associated air handling unit out of service, the ambient temperature would increase at a faster rate and, therefore, isolation would occur sooner than assumed in the ambient temperature setpoint calculation.

The CPS design requires the operation of the air handling units associated with the main steam tunnel, the RWCU heat exchanger and pump rooms, the RCIC equipment room, and the RHR pump rooms to support the operation of the CRVICS differential temperature instruments provided to detect leakage from these systems. The staff verified that the differential temperature isolation functions for the main steam system, RWCU system, RCIC system, and the RHR system associated with containment and reactor vessel isolation control system are adequately backed-up by the ambient temperature trip functions, and other diverse functions to justify an increase in the allowed outage time in order to repair an inoperable air handling unit. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS changes acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 6999). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Richard A. Skokowski

Date: November 5, 1993