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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-265

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 62  
License No. DPR-30

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated March 29, 1979, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:

3.B Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 62, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #2  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 20, 1981

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 62

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30

DOCKET NO. 50-265

Revise the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications as follows:

Remove

Replace

3.7/4.7-4

3.7/4.7-4

3.7/4.7-16

3.7/4.7-16

**QUAD-CITIES  
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tion valves which shall be tested at a pressure of 25 psig, each operating cycle. Bolted double-gasketed seals shall be tested whenever the seal is closed after being opened and at least at each operating cycle.

- 2) Personnel air lock door seals shall be tested at a pressure of 10 psig each operating cycle.

**i. Acceptance Criteria and Corrective Action for LLRT**

If the total leakage rates listed below are exceeded, repairs and retests shall be performed to correct the condition.

- 1) Double-gasketed seals  $10\%L_{10}$  (48)
- 2) a) Testable penetrations and isolation valves  $30\%L_{10}$  (48)  
b) Any one penetration or isolation valve except main steamline isolation valves  $5\%L_{10}$  (48)  
c) Any one main steamline isolation valve 11.5 scf/hr at 25 psig.

**3. Pressure Suppression Chamber-Reactor Building Vacuum Breakers**

- a. Except as specified in Specification 3.7.A.3.b below, two pressure sup-

**3. Pressure Suppression Chamber-Reactor Building Vacuum Breakers**

- a. The pressure suppression chamber-reactor building vacuum

3.7/4.7-4

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multiplying the maximum allowable leak rate by 0.75, thereby providing a 25% margin to allow for leakage deterioration which may occur during the period between leak rate tests.

The primary containment leak rate test frequency is based on maintaining adequate assurance that the leak rate remains within the specification. Allowing the test intervals to be extended up to 8 months permits some flexibility needed to have the tests coincide with scheduled or unscheduled shutdown periods.

The data reduction methods of ANSI N45.4-1972 will be applied for integrated leak rate tests.

The penetration and air purge piping leakage test frequency, along with the containment leak rate tests, is adequate to allow detection of leakage trends. Whenever a double-gasketed penetration (primary containment head equipment hatches and the suppression chamber access hatch) is broken and remade, the space between the gaskets is pressurized to determine that the seals are performing properly. The test pressure of 48 psig is consistent with the accident analyses and the maximum preoperational leak rate test pressure. It is expected that the majority of the leakage from valves, penetrations, and seals would be into the reactor building. However, it is possible that leakage into other parts of the facility could occur. Such leakage paths that may affect significantly the consequences of accidents are to be minimized. The personnel air lock is tested at 10 psig because the inboard door is not designed to shut in the opposite direction.

The results of the loss-of-coolant accident analysis referenced in Section 5.2.4.3 of the SAR indicate that fission products would not be released directly to the environs because of leakage from the main steamline isolation valves due to holdup in the steam system complex. Although this effect would indicate that an adequate margin exists with regard to the release of fission products, a program will be undertaken to further reduce the potential for such leakage to bypass the standby gas treatment system.

Surveillance of the reactor building-pressure suppression chamber vacuum breakers consists of operability checks and leakage tests (conducted as part of the containment leaktightness tests). These vacuum breakers are normally in the closed position and open only during tests or an accident condition. As a result, a testing frequency of 3 months for operability is considered justified for this equipment. Inspections and calibrations are performed during refueling outages, this frequency being based on experience and judgment.

Pressure suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers monthly operability tests are performed to check the capability of the disks to open and close and to verify that the position indication and alarm circuits function properly. The disks must open during accident conditions and during transient additions of energy through relief valves. This periodic operation of the disks and the quality of equipment justify the frequency of operability tests of this equipment.

Following each quarterly operability test, a differential pressure decay rate test is performed to verify that leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber is within specified limits.

Measurement of force to open, calibration of position switches, inspection of equipment, and functional testing are performed during each refueling outage. This frequency is based on equipment quality, experience, and judgment. Also, a more stringent differential pressure decay rate test is performed during refueling outages than is performed monthly. This test is performed to verify that total leakage paths between the drywell and suppression chamber are not in excess of the equivalent to a 1-inch orifice.

This small leakage path is only a small fraction of the allowable, thus integrity of the containment system is assured prior to startup following each refueling outage (Reference 1).



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
AMENDMENT NO. 68 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29, AND  
AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY  
AND  
IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 265

Introduction

By letter of March 29, 1979, Commonwealth Edison Company (licensee) proposed to eliminate a provision in the Appendix A Technical Specifications for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 that requires continuous monitoring of the primary containment inerting system makeup as a means for detecting gross containment leakage.

Discussion and Evaluation

The current Technical Specifications provide that, when the containment is inerted, it should be continuously monitored for gross leakage "by review of the inerting system makeup requirements." Since this monitoring requirement was initiated, a pumpback system has been installed to maintain a minimum of 1.2 psi differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber. This differential pressure is monitored continuously and provides a more sensitive and reliable method for indicating gross containment leakage than does monitoring of the inerting system makeup. Therefore, the requirement to continuously monitor the inerting system makeup is unnecessary, and the proposal to eliminate this requirement is acceptable.

Environmental Considerations

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: April 20, 1981

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 50-265COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANYANDIOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO  
OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 68 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-29, and Amendment No. 62 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-30, issued to Commonwealth Edison Company and Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company, which revised the Technical Specifications for operation of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located in Rock Island County, Illinois. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendments revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications to eliminate the requirement for continuous monitoring of the primary containment inerting system makeup as a means of monitoring the containment for gross leakage.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated March 29, 1979, (2) Amendment No. 68 to License No. DPR-29 and Amendment No. 62 to License No. DPR-30, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D. C., and at the Moline Public Library, 304-17th Street, Moline, Illinois. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, April 20, 1981.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Thomas K. Ippolito, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #2  
Division of Licensing