Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265

> Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. R. L. Bolger Assistant Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Gentlemen:

DISTRIBUTION Docket NRC PDR Local PDR ORB #2 REading KRGoller TJCarter RMDiggs DLZiemann WEConverse OELD 0I&E (3) BJones (8) BScharf (15) JMcGough OPA (Clafe Miles) VStello ACRS (16)

MAR 0 8 1976

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 24 and 23 to Facility License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes in the Technical Specifications and are in response to your request dated December 20, 1974.

The amendments consist of changes in the Technical Specifications that add interim surveillance requirements to assure the integrity of certain high energy lines outside containment. The requirements are intended to remain in effect only until modifications which would acceptably mitigate the effects of postulated high energy line breaks outside containment have been completed.

Our Safety Evaluation also discusses our findings with respect to your report submitted February 18, 1975, regarding the consequences of high energy line breaks outside containment and your letter of September 16, 1975, regarding proposed modifications to mitigate the consequences of postulated high energy line breaks outside containment.

Your proposed schedule for completion of the modifications as described in your letter of October 21, 1975 is acceptable.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice related to this action also are enclosed.

Sincerely.

Tahad Schurffor , Chief s Branch #2 Original signed by Bennis L. Ziemann

Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors

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1.	Amendment No. 24 to
	License DPR-29
2.	Amendment No. 23 to
	License DPR-30
3.	Safety Evaluation
4.	Federal Register Notice
cc	w/enclosures:
Mr.	Charles Whitmore
Pre	sident and Chairman
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Mr.	Robert W. Watts, Chairman
Roc	k Island County Board
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VIERDWERL TO EACLILITY OPERATING LICENSES

Amendment No. 24 Liconse No. DPR-29

License No. 23 License No. 23

. The Muclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

- A. The application for amendment by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated December 20, 1974, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CPR Chapter I;
- The facility will operate in comformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
- C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
- The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
- I. An environmental statement or negative declaration need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendaent.

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2. Accordingly, the licenses are amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.

3. These license amendments are offective as of their date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Original streed by: Karl R. Goller

Karl R. Goller, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors Division of Operating Reactors Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

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DOCKEL NOS' 20-224 VAD 20-265

Replace the fourth page of the Table of Contents of the Appendix A portion of the Technical Specifications with the attached revised page iv and add new pages 218a, 218b and 218c. The changed area on revised page iv is reflected by a marginal line.

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3.11 High Energy Piping Integrity (Outside Containment)

Applicability:

Applies to operating status of certain piping outside primary containment.

Objective:

To assure the integrity of sections of piping which is postulated to effect safe plant shutdown.

Specification:

1. The high energy piping sections identified in Table 4.11-1 shall be maintained free of visually observable through wall leaks.

- A. If a leak is detected by the surveillance program of 4.11, efforts to identify the source of the leaks shall be started immediately.
- B. If the source of leakage cannot be identified within 24 hours of detection or if the leak is found to be from a break in the piping sections identified in Table 4.11-1, the pressure within the section of piping shall be brought to atmospheric pressure within 48 hours.
- When the modifications identified in Commonwealth Edison's letter to the NRC dated September 16, 1975 (G. Abrell to D. Ziemann) have been completed, Technical Specifications 3.11 and 4.11 will no longer be required.

4.11 High Energy Piping Integrity

Applicability:

Applies to the periodic examination requirements for certain piping outside primary containment.

Objective:

To determine the condition of the sections of piping.

Specification:

The inspections listed in Table 4.11-1 shall be performed as specified.

218a

TABLE 4.11-1

Surveillance Requirements for High Energy Piping Outside Containment

Piping	Surveillance Area	Surveillance Technique	Frequ cy
Main Steam	from primary containment penetration to secondary containment penetration	Visual(1)	30 days
Reactor Feedwater Piping	from primary containment penetration to secondary containment penetration and "A"(2) Reactor Feed Pump discharg to the 24-inch Diameter Feedwater Header	Visual(1) e	30 days
HPCI Steam Piping	from the primary containment pene- tration to the reactor building penetration	Visual(1)	30 days
RCIC Steam Piping	from primary containment penetration to the RCIC turbine.	Visual(1)	30 days

- (1) Visual observation of piping insulation and area for evidence of wetness or any physical damage resulting from a leak. Surveillance to be performed using normal access without scaffolding or any other access aids.
- (2) "A" Reactor Feed Pump for Unit 1
 "C" Reactor Feed Pump for Unit 2

218b

High Energy Piping Integrity (Outside Containment) .

Bases:

Intensive analysis and review has shown that there are specific postulated high energy piping system failures which have the potential to inhibit safe cold shutdown of the reactor. This conclusion is based on utilizing the basic NRC high energy line break criteria. To reduce the probability of such failures, certain plant modifications are necessary. Until these modifications are complete, additional surveillance will be performed during plant operation to enhance the detection of piping system defects. The inservice examination and the frequency of inspection will provide a means for timely detection of such piping defects.

218c



UNITED STATES WUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 24 AND 23 TO

FACILITY LICENSE NOS. DPR-29 AND DPR-30

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

QUAD CITIES UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 50-265

ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH ENERGY PIPING FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

INTRODUCTION

On December 18, 1972, and January 16, 1973, the Atomic Energy Commission's Regulatory staff sent letters to Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo) requesting a detailed design evaluation to substantiate that the design of Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 is adequate to withstand the effects of a postulated rupture in any high energy fluid piping system outside the primary containment, including the double-ended rupture of the largest line in the main steam and feedwater system. It was further requested that if the results of the evaluation indicated that changes in the designs were necessary to assure safe plant shutdown, information on these design changes and plant modifications would be required. Criteria for conducting this evaluation were included in the letters. In response to our letters, Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 - Special Report No. 12^{-/}, "Analysis of Effects of Pipe Break Outside Primary Containment," was filed by CECo on April 22, 1974. This report was supplemented by information supplied by letter^{-/} dated July 1, 1974. By letter dated February 18, 1975, CECo

Quad Cities Station - Special Report No. 12, "Analysis of Effects of Pipe Break Outside the Primary Containment," dated April 8, 1974, for CECo by Sargent & Lundy, cover letter dated April 22, 1974.

Quad Cities Station - Special Report No. 12, Supplement No. 1, "Analysis of Effects of Pipe Break Outside the Primary Containment," for CECo by Sargent & Lundy, cover letter dated July 1, 1974. filed Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 - Special Report No. 12, Revision $1^{3'}$ of the same title as the original report. The revision replaced the previous report in its entirety. A surveillance program for certain high energy line piping outside of containment was proposed by the licensee by letter dated December 20, 1974. This surveillance involved inspection of high energy piping identified in reference 3 as areas of concern in the event of a pipe break. Specific modification plans for the areas of concern for Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 were filed by letter dated September 16, 1975.

EVALUATION

Criteria

A summary of the criteria and requirements included in our letter of December 18, 1972, is set forth below:

- a. Protection of equipment and structures necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming a concurrent and unrelated single active failure of protected equipment, should be provided from all effects resulting from ruptures in pipes carrying high energy fluid, where the temperature and pressure conditions of the fluid exceed 200°F and 275 psig, respectively, up to and including a double-ended rupture of such pipes. Breaks should be assumed to occur in those locations specified in the "pipe whip criteria." The rupture effects to be considered include pipe whip, structural (including the effects of jet impingement), and environmental.
- b. In addition, protection of equipment and structures necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming a concurrent and unrelated single active failure of protected equipment, should be provided from the environmental and structural effects (including the effects of jet impingement) resulting from a single open crack at the most adverse location in pipes carrying fluid routed in the vicinity of this equipment. The size of the cracks should be assumed to be 1/2 the pipe diameter in length and 1/2 the wall thickness in width (defined as "critical crack size").
 - 3/ Quad Cities Station - Special Report No. 12, Revision 1, "Analysis of Effects of Pipe Break Outside the Primary Containment," February, 1975, for CECo by Sargent & Lundy, cover letter dated February 18, 1975.
 - Letter, B. Lee, Jr. to E. G. Case, Docket Nos. 50-254/265, December 20, 1974.

5/ Letter, G. A. Abrell to D. L. Ziemann, Docket Nos. 50-254/265, September 16, 1975.

High Energy Systems

Our evaluation included the following piping systems containing high energy fluids:

Main Steam System (MS) Extraction and Auxiliary Steam Systems Feedwater System (FW) Condensate System Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Reactor Water Cleanup System (RW)

Areas or Systems Affected by High Energy Pipe Breaks

An evaluation was conducted of the effects of high energy pipe breaks on the following systems, components, and structures which would be necessary (in various combinations, depending on the effects of the break) to safely shutdown, cooldown, and maintain cold shutdown conditions:

- a. General
 - 1. Control and Instrument Cables and Tunnels
 - 2. Electrical Distribution System
 - 3. Emergency dc Power Supply (batteries)
 - 4. Emergency ac Power Supply (diesels)
 - 5. Heating and Ventilation Systems (needed for long-term occupancy
 to maintain the reactor in safe shutdown condition)

12

- b. Reactor Control Systems and associated instrumentation
- c. Cooling and Service Water Systems
- d. ECCS components
- e. Structures
 - 1. Containment
 - 2. Main Steam Tunnel
 - 3. Control Room

- 4. Vital Electric Load Centers and Switchgear Rooms
- 5. Diesel Generator Room
- 6. Ventilation Equipment Rooms

Specific Areas of Concern

The licensee has provided the results of his examination of all postulated safety related high energy line break locations and evaluated the break consequences. We have reviewed all of this information, including the following specific areas of concern where the potential consequences might be severe or where specific corrective action would further assure safe cold shutdown of the plant. Unless otherwise stated, the below discussion applies to both Units 1 and 2.

a. Compartment Pressurization

Large pipe breaks, including the double-ended rupture of the largest pipes in a system, and pipe cracks up to the critical size defined above have been considered for pipes in the main steam tunnel, the reactor building (outside of containment) and the turbine building. The licensee's compartment pressurization calculations include pressure plus impingement forces.

Each of the facility's steam tunnels is divided into two compartments by a slab fitted with blowout panels which function to equalize pressure when a 2 psi differential pressure exists between the compartments. For each steam tunnel, the licensee has assumed a simultaneous rupture of one MS line and two adjacent FW lines. MS isolation valve closure was assumed to occur 5.5 seconds after the rupture. For this case, the maximum steam tunnel pressure calculated was 20.9 psia. The tunnel walls can easily withstand this transient. For Unit 1, the forces generated in such a transient could damage the blowout panels which could cause subsequent damage to cable trays located in the upper tunnel compartment. These cable trays carry safety related cabling. The main steam line circumferential and longitudinal break points identified in Table 12 of Ref. 3 are those which could produce such damage. For Unit 1 only, the licensee will provide improved support for the blowout panels by:

 Installing an additional W36 x 135 beam on top of the existing W24 on the east-west wall of the tunnel, 11 feet south of column row "G";

- 2. Replacing the existing 6B x 12 north-south beams supporting the panels with five W21 x 55 beams; and
- 3. Upgrading the chains restraining the blowout panels.

For Unit 2, the blowout panels are somewhat removed from the areas of potential pipe ruptures. The pressure transient resulting from the above calculation will not lead to damage to the safety related cabling (as in Unit 1); thus, no modification is proposed.

In the reactor building, the consequences of high energy line breaks and cracks in the HPCI, RW, and RCIC systems were evaluated. Damage to the torus, a steel-walled steam supression chamber used as a heat sink in several modes of operation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), could occur as a result of certain HPCI and RCIC pipe longitudinal breaks identified in Table 13 and 15, respectively, of Ref. 3. The licensee will provide pipe restraints at the critical break points to reduce the impingement loads. These restraints will consist of U-shaped plates covering the break points and anchored to the nearest structure.

Pressure calculations for the turbine building produced no areas of concern with respect to safety related equipment.

b. Pipe Whip

The effects of pipe whip on structure walls and safety related components have been calculated by the licensee for MS and FW system pipe breaks in the steam tunnel, for HPCI, RW, and RCIC system pipe breaks in the reactor building, and for MS and FW system pipe breaks in the turbine building. Break points were chosen in accordance with the guidelines set forth in our December 18, 1972 and January 16, 1973 letters. Pipe whip calculations include pressure and impingement forces.

In the steam tunnel, whipping MS pipes could cause damage to the blowout panels similar to that caused by pressure and impingement forces alone (see Section a). Damage to safety cabling could occur as a result of circumferential breaks in the MS system pipes indicated in Table 16, Ref. 3. For Unit 1, the modifications proposed to mitigate the consequences of the pressure transient will also serve to mitigate the consequences of the pipe whip transient. For Unit 2, the licensee will add an additional north-south beam (east of the main steam lines) approximately 15 feet west of column row "H" to protect against pipe whip. In the reactor building, whipping HCPI or RCIC piping, resulting from circumferential pipe breaks indicated in Table 17 and 19, respectively, Ref. 3, could damage the torus (described above). Other whipping HPCI piping, identified in Table 17 of Ref. 3, could damage the Core Spray valve, MO-1-1402-4A, and other smaller HPCI piping. The U-shaped restraints (described in Section a) installed at the critical break points will serve to mitigate the consequences of the pipe whip transient.

1

Postulated pipe whip calculations for high energy lines in the turbine buildings produced no areas of concern with respect to safety related equipment.

c. Compartment Flooding

The licensee has determined the effects of flooding for steam or feedwater line breaks in the steam tunnel, the reactor building, and the turbine building. Although the main steam isolation valves could be short circuited, should the steam tunnel fill with water, these valves will fail in the shut position and safe shutdown will not be impaired. No other safety related equipment or wiring is endangered by potential flooding caused by MS, FW, HPCI, RW, or RCIC system pipe breaks.

d. Environmental Effects

Components and equipment were checked for possible adverse environmental effects which could be caused by the rupture of a high energy line. Adverse temperature, pressure, and humidity were the parameters which were used in the evaluation of safety related equipment.

We have reviewed the licensee's assessment of the consequences of environmental effects on safety related equipment. We find that safety related equipment has been designed to limits in excess of postulated conditions which could arise from the rupture of a high energy line.

e. Control Room Habitability

The main control room is physically located away from and isolated from all high energy lines. Neither the control room equipment nor its ventilation system would be affected by environmental effects caused by a rupture of a high energy line. The control room will be habitable in the event of a high energy line break outside containment. Modifications to the existing facility will be required to assure that Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 can be safely shut down in the event of a high energy line break outside of containment. The modifications listed below have been described by the licensee and are necessary to assure cold shutdown of the reactor in the event of a high energy line break.

a. Unit 1 only:

Provide an improved support system for the tunnel blowout panels by adding an additional W36 x 135 beam to the existing W24 on the eastwest wall of the steam tunnel; replace the existing 6B x 12 northsouth beams supporting the panels with five W21 x 55 beams; and upgrade the blowout panel restraint chains and supports.

b. Unit 2 only:

Install an additional north-south beam in the main steam tunnel approximately 15 feet west of column row "H".

c. Units 1 and 2

Provide U-shaped pipe restraints at the critical break points HPCIL₁, HPCIL₄ through HPCIL₁₃, RCICL₇, RCICL₁₀ through RCICL₁₂, HPCIC₂, HPCIC₅ through HPCIC₁₄, RCIC₈, and RCIC₁₃. (licensee's' designation used in Ref. 3).

INTERIM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Commonwealth Edison has proposed to visually inspect the main steam, feedwater, HPCI and RCIC steam piping outside of containment monthly until the modifications described above are completed. We have reviewed the surveillance program and have determined that it will provide added assurance that abnormal degradation of these pipes will be detected promptly.

We have concluded that the proposed interim surveillance requirements provide reasonable assurance that high energy line failures will be detected before the occurrence of damage to safety related piping and equipment and are acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

We have determined that these amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of this review of the information submitted to us and on our discussion with representatives of the CECo, we have concluded that the licensee's assessment of the consequences of high energy line failures outside containment is acceptable. Some modifications to the facility are necessary. We have concluded that the potential consequences of postulated high energy pipe failures, following the modifications, will not prevent the capability of Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 to achieve safe cold shutdown conditions consistent with the single failure and redundancy requirements as described in our letter of December 18, 1972.

The licensee stated by letter $\frac{6}{}$ dated October 21, 1975, (regarding modification to the Dresden 1 Facility) that the above modifications for Quad Cities Unit 1 will be complete by the end of the Winter 1976 refueling outage and by the end of the Fall 1976 refueling outage for Quad Cities Unit 2. Because of the high energy line surveillance which the licensee will perform and the limited time required for completion of the modifications are complete is reduced. Based on these considerations, we have concluded that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: MAR 0 8 1976

6/ Letter, G. A. Abrell to D. L. Ziemann, Docket No. 50-10, October 21, 1975.

DOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 50-265
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
AND
IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACIDITY OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Muclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment Nos. 24 and 23 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 (respectively), issued to Commonwealth Edison Company (acting for itself and on behalf of the Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 (the facilities) located in Rock Island County, Illinois. The amendments are effective as of their date of issuance.

The amendments incorporate increased surveillance requirements in the Technical Specifications to provide additional assurance that high energy line failures outside of containment will not occur during the short period of time the facilities will be operated prior to completing certain modifications to assure that the facilities can withstand the consequences of postulated reptures in high energy piping outside of containment.

The application for these amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Pnergy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Cormission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Notice of the Proposed Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses in connection with this action was published in the FEDERAL RECISTER on October 30, 1974 (39 FR 38275). No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following notice of the proposed action.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of the amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for these amendments dated December 20, 1974 and related filings dated April 22, 1974, July 1, 1974, February 18, 1975, September 16, 1975, and October 21, 1975, (2) Amendment Nos. 24 and 25 to License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30, and (3) the Commission's concurrently issued related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Fublic Document Boom, 1717 H Street, M. H., Washington, D. C. and at the Moline Public Library, 504 - 17th Street, Foline, Illinois 60625.

20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors. .) .0 . Muclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. A single copy of items (2) and (5) any be obtained upon request

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FOR THE MUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION

m/S'V/ 0 Original Maned by

Division of Operating Reactors Operating Reactors Branch #2 Richard D. Silver, Acting Chief

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