

*Docket File*



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555  
September 1, 1989

Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach  
Nuclear Licensing Manager  
Commonwealth Edison Company  
Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. Kovach:

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT RELATED TO SHARING OF THE UNIT 1 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM C AND D SERVICE WATER PUMPS (TAC NOS. 74529 AND 74530) - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 119 and 115 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The amendments are in response to your application dated August 28, 1989.

The amendments will permit the "B" loop of the RHR heat exchangers on each unit to be fed from the RHR "C" and "D" service water pumps on Unit 1 via the cross-tie line until November 1, 1989.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notices.

Sincerely,

*Thierry M. Ross for*

Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III,  
IV, V, and Special Projects

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 119 to License No. DPR-29
2. Amendment No. 115 to License No. DPR-30
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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September 1, 1989

Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach  
Nuclear Licensing Manager  
Commonwealth Edison Company  
Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

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Dear Mr. Kovach:

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The amendments will permit the "B" loop of the RHR heat exchangers on each unit to be fed from the RHR "C" and "D" service water pumps on Unit 1 via the cross-tie line until November 1, 1989.

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Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager  
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1. Amendment No. 119 to License No. DPR-29
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cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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PDIII-2 P.S.  
PShemanski  
8/31/89

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach  
Commonwealth Edison Company

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station  
Units 1 and 2

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555



COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-254

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 119  
License No. DPR-29

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated August 28, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-29 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 119, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Paul C. Shemanski, Acting Director  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III,  
IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 1, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 119

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29

DOCKET NO. 50-254

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3.5/4.5-4

3.5/4.5-7

INSERT

3.5/4.5-4

3.5/4.5-7

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

1. b. From the effective date of this amendment until November 1, 1989, the "B" loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system for each reactor may share the Unit 1 "C" and "D" RHR service water pumps using cross tie line 1/2-10509-16"-D. Consequently, the requirements of Specifications 3.5.B.2 and 3.5.B.3 will impose the corresponding surveillance testing of equipment associated with both reactors if the shared RHR service water pump or pumps, or the cross tie line, are made or found to be inoperable.
2. From and after the date that one of the RHR service water pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 30 days unless such pump is sooner made operable, provided that during such 30 days all other active components of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system are operable.
3. From and after the date that one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless such subsystem is sooner made operable, provided that all active components of the other loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system, both core spray subsystems, and both diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available, shall be operable.
- b. Flow rate test - After pump maintenance and every 3 months each RHR service water pump shall deliver at least 3500 gpm against a pressure of 198 psig
- c. A logic system functional test Each refueling outage
2. When it is determined that one RHR service water pump is inoperable, the remaining components of that loop and the other containment cooling loop of the RHR system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.
3. When one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system becomes inoperable, the operable loop shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately, and daily thereafter.

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

The Containment Cooling mode of the RHR System consists of two loops. Each loop consists of 1 Heat Exchanger, 2 RHR Pumps, and the associated valves, piping, electrical equipment, and instrumentation. The "A" loop on each unit contains 2 RHR Service Water Pumps. Until November 1, 1989, the "B" loop on each unit may utilize the "C" and "D" RHR Service Water Pumps from Unit 1 via a cross-tie line. After November 1, 1989, each "B" loop will contain 2 RHR Service Water Pumps. Either set of equipment is capable of performing the containment cooling function. Loss of one RHR service water pump does not seriously jeopardize the containment cooling capability, as any one of the remaining three pumps can satisfy the cooling requirements. Since there is some redundancy left, a 30-day repair period is adequate. Loss of one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system leaves one remaining system to perform the containment cooling function. The operable system is demonstrated to be operable each day when the above condition occurs. Based on the fact that when one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system becomes inoperable, only one system remains, which is tested daily, a 7-day repair period was specified.

C. High-Pressure Coolant Injection

The high-pressure coolant injection subsystem is provided to adequately cool the core for all pipe breaks smaller than those for which the LPCI mode of the RHR system or core spray subsystems can protect the core.

The HPCI meets this requirement without the use of offsite electrical power. For the pipe breaks for which the HPCI is intended to function, the core never uncovers and is continuously cooled, thus no cladding damage occurs (reference SAR Section 6.2.5.3). The repair times for the limiting conditions of operation were set considering the use of the HPCI as part of the isolation cooling system.

D. Automatic Pressure Relief

The relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem are a backup to the HPCI subsystem. They enable the core spray subsystem and LPCI mode of the RHR system to provide protection against the small pipe break in the event of HPCI failure by depressurizing the reactor vessel rapidly enough to actuate the core spray subsystem and LPCI mode of the RHR system. The core spray subsystem and the LPCI mode of the RHR system provide sufficient flow of coolant to limit fuel cladding temperatures to less than 2200°F, to assure that core geometry remains intact, to limit the core wide clad metal-water reaction to less than 1%, and to limit the calculated local metal-water reaction to less than 17%.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-265

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 115  
License No. DPR-30


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated August 28, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 115, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Paul C. Shemanski, Acting Director  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III,  
IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 1, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 115

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30

DOCKET NO. 50-265

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3.5/4.5-3

3.5/4.5-11

INSERT

3.5/4.5-3

3.5/4.5-11

continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during such 7 days all active components of both core spray subsystems, the containment cooling mode of the RHR (including two RHR pumps), and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be operable.

containment cooling mode of the RHR shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

6. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated, and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System

B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System

Surveillance of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system shall be performed as follows:

1. a. Both loops of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system, as defined in the bases for Specification 3.5.B, shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition.

1. RHR service water subsystem testing:

Item	Frequency
a. Pump and valve operability	Once/3 months

1. b. From the effective date of this amendment until November 1, 1989 the "B" loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system for each reactor may share the Unit 1 "C" and "D" RHR service water pumps using cross tie line 1/2-10509-16"-D. Consequently, the requirements of Specifications 3.5.B.2 and 3.5.B.3 will impose the corresponding surveillance testing of equipment associated with both reactors if the shared RHR service water pump or pumps, or the cross tie line, are made or found to be inoperable.

b. Flow rate test - each RHR service water pump shall deliver at least 3500 gpm against a pressure of 198 psig	After pump maintenance and every 3 months
c. A logic system functional test	Each refueling outage

2. From and after the date that one of the RHR service water pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 30 days unless such pump is sooner made operable, provided that during such 30 days all other active components of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system are operable.

2. When it is determined that one RHR service water pump is inoperable, the remaining components of that loop and the other containment cooling loop of the RHR system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

3.5 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION BASES

A. Core Spray and LPCI Mode of the RHR System

This specification assures that adequate emergency cooling capability is available.

Based on the loss-of-coolant analyses included in References 1 and 2 and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K, core cooling systems provide sufficient cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss-of-coolant accident, to limit the calculated fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200°F, to assure that core geometry remains intact to limit the corewide cladding metal-water reaction to less than 1% and to limit the calculated local metal-water reaction to less than 17%.

The allowable repair times are established so that the average risk rate for repair would be no greater than the basic risk rate. The method and concept are described in Reference 3. Using the results developed in this reference, the repair period is found to be less than half the test interval. This assumes that the core spray subsystems and LPCI constitute a one-out-of-two system; however, the combined effect of the two systems to limit excessive cladding temperature must also be considered. The test interval specified in Specification 4.5 was 3 months. Therefore, an allowable repair period which maintains the basic risk considering single failures should be less than 30 days, and this specification is within this period. For multiple failures, a shorter interval is specified; to improve the assurance that the remaining systems will function, a daily test is called for. Although it is recognized that the information given in Reference 3 provides a quantitative method to estimate allowable repair times, the lack of operating data to support the analytical approach prevents complete acceptance of this method at this time. Therefore, the times stated in the specific items were established with due regard to judgment.

Should one core spray subsystem become inoperable, the remaining core spray subsystem and the entire LPCI mode of the RHR system are available should the need for core cooling arise. To assure that the remaining core spray and the LPCI mode of the RHR system are available, they are demonstrated to be operable immediately. This demonstration includes a manual initiation of the pumps and associated valves. Based on judgments of the reliability of the remaining systems, i.e., the core spray and LPCI, a 7-day repair period was obtained.

Should the loss of one RHR pump occur, a nearly full complement of core and containment cooling equipment is available. Three RHR pumps in conjunction with the core spray subsystem will perform the core cooling function. Because of the availability of the majority of the core cooling equipment, which will be demonstrated to be operable, a 30-day repair period is justified. If the LPCI mode of the RHR system is not available, at least two RHR pumps must be available to fulfill the containment cooling function. The 7-day repair period is set on this basis.

B. RHR Service Water

The containment cooling mode of the RHR system is provided to remove heat energy from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. For the flow specified, the containment long-term pressure is limited to less than 8 psig and is therefore more than ample to provide the required heat-removal capability (reference SAR Section 5.2.3.2).

The Containment Cooling mode of the RHR System consists of two loops. Each loop consists of 1 Heat Exchanger, 2 RHR Pumps, and the associated valves, piping, electrical equipment, and instrumentation. The "A" loop on each unit contains 2 RHR Service Water Pumps. Until November 1, 1989, the "B" loop on each unit may utilize the "C" and "D" RHR Service Water Pumps from Unit 1 via a cross-tie line. After November 1, 1989, each "B" loop will contain 2 RHR Service Water Pumps. Either set of equipment is capable of performing the containment cooling function. Loss of one RHR service water pump does not seriously jeopardize the containment cooling capability, as any one of the remaining three pumps can satisfy the cooling requirements. Since there is some redundancy left, a 30-day repair period is adequate. Loss of one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system leaves one remaining system to perform the containment cooling function. The operable system is demonstrated to be operable each day when the above condition occurs.

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555



SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 119 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 115 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 265

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On Friday, March 10, 1989, excessive ground water leakage was observed in the tunnel which accesses the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) rooms. An investigation was conducted and determined that the leakage was due to a crack in the Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water System "B" loop piping, which is located underground.

Weekly surveillances have been performed on the "B" loop of RHR Service Water System since March 13, 1989. The weekly surveillance of the Unit 2 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps demonstrated the flows required by Technical Specifications and these values were trended with no further deterioration noted.

On August 25, 1989, Unit 2 was shutdown to perform various maintenance activities including maintenance performed on the Unit 2 "C" RHR Service Water pump, which required post maintenance testing. On August 27, 1989, the "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps were operated simultaneously for approximately 5 seconds and the "D" pump was secured. The "C" RHR Service Water pump flow did not meet the required Technical Specification acceptance criteria for operability. The "D" RHR Service Water pump was subsequently tested resulting in performance similar to the "C" RHR Service Water pump. The "B" loop was subsequently declared inoperable. Technical Specifications preclude startup of Unit 2 with the "B" loop inoperable.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee proposed a temporary Technical Specification (TS) change to allow declaring the Unit 2 RHR containment cooling loop "B" as operable when the cross-tie line is connected to Unit 1. The TS amendment will allow the use of the cross-tie until November 1, 1989, at which time the repair of the Unit 2 RHR loop "B" service water line will be completed.

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The containment cooling mode of the RHR system for each unit consists of two loops. Each loop consists of one heat exchanger, two RHR pumps, associated valves, piping, electrical equipment and instrumentation. Normally, the "B" loop on each unit contains two RHR service water pumps, and the "A" loop on each unit also contains two RHR service water pumps. However, during the time interval from August 28, 1989, to November 1, 1989, the "B" loop on each unit may utilize the "C" and "D" RHR service water pumps from Unit 1. Service water from Unit 1 to Unit 2 will be delivered via the cross-tie line. Loss of any one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system will leave the remaining loop to perform the containment cooling function. Either loop of the RHR system can satisfy the containment cooling function.

As stated in the Quad Cities FSAR, only one RHR and one RHR service water pump are required to provide containment cooling following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) at a unit. One RHR and one RHR service water pump are also adequate to place and maintain the other unit in the cold shutdown condition. In the cross-tied condition, the boundary design basis accident scenario involves a LOCA on Unit 1, loss of off-site power, and failure of the 1/2 Diesel Generator. After core cooling is restored by the ECCS on Unit 1, the required loads to provide RHR Service Water to both units and maintain core cooling on the accident unit are within the capability of the Unit 1 Diesel Generator. These conditions result in the minimum operability of two RHR Service Water pumps, one per unit as analyzed in the SAR.

In the event of a loss of offsite power and the failure of the Unit 1 Diesel Generator, the Unit 1 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water Pumps can be cross-tied to the Unit 2 Diesel Generator in adequate time to prevent containment overheating.

CECo has stated this modification will be tested prior to startup of Unit 2. To assure that the minimum Technical Specification flow requirements for the "B" containment cooling loops for each unit in the cross-tie configuration are maintained with only the Unit 1 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps operable a preoperational test will be performed by the licensee. Each loop has a flow element (FE) between the cross-tie and RHR heat exchangers to measure flow. The motor operated valves downstream of the RHR heat exchangers can be throttled to balance the flow. CECO has stated that during the preoperational tests the following flow combinations will be tested to assure the minimum Technical Specifications flow requirements are attained: 1C RHR pump to 2B heat exchanger, 1D RHR pump to 2B heat exchanger, and 1C and 1D pump to the 1B and 2B heat exchangers.

Prior to the implementation of this modification, CECO has committed to revise or develop procedures as necessary to address surveillance requirements, outage report requirements, and operability of Unit 1 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps, and Unit 1 Diesel Generator during this interim period. In addition, controls will be implemented to assure the operators are aware that a loss of Unit 1 "C" or "D" RHR Service Water pump will render one containment cooling loop inoperable.

The staff has reviewed the temporary modification and finds it acceptable for the following reasons: the minimum cooling requirements for RHR containment cooling are maintained for the worst case scenario identified in the FSAR; CECO will perform adequate preoperational testing to assure that minimum Technical Specification flow requirements are satisfied; and adequate administrative controls will be in place to assure that both units can be safely operated under all conditions associated with the modified containment cooling configuration.

### 3.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

NRC staff reviewed the licensee's amendment application and determined, in accordance with the criteria of 50.92(c), that operation of Quad Cities according to the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because, as described in Section 6 of the Quad Cities Safety Analysis Report (SAR), one RHR pump and one RHR Service Water pump will provide adequate containment cooling following a loss of coolant accident. A similar combination of equipment is adequate on the non-accident unit to place and maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. This minimum combination of equipment is only experienced in the degraded conditions of loss of offsite power, loss of coolant accident on one unit, and failure of one diesel generator to start. Cross-tied RHR Service Water systems do not reduce the minimum required system availability as described in the SAR, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because a cross-tied configuration shares two RHR Service Water pumps between Units 1 and 2 in the same manner that emergency power supplies are shared between the two units. Shared safety-related systems are an integral characteristic of the Quad Cities design and, (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because cross-tied configuration of the RHR service water systems do not result in plant conditions outside the bounds of minimum system operability assumed in SAR analysis for design basis accident scenarios.

Accordingly, the Commission finds that this request does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The State of Illinois was informed by telephone on August 31, 1989, of the staff's final no significant hazards consideration determination. The State contact had no comment on the determination.

### 4.0 FINDINGS OF EMERGENCY WARRANTING AN AMENDMENT WITHOUT NOTICE

The licensee's application for the TS change was timely, and provided a summary of the events leading to the necessity for an emergency amendment request. The NRC staff concurs that the sudden complete failure of the Unit 2 "B" Loop RHR Service Water train to meet TS flow requirements could not have been predicted. Furthermore, the staff finds that failure to grant the proposed changes in a timely manner would increase the outage time of Quad Cities Unit 2 by delaying restart. We also find that the licensee could not have reasonably avoided this situation, that the licensee responded in a timely manner, and did not delay its application to take advantage of the

Emergency License Amendments provisions of 10 CFR 50.91. Accordingly, the staff concludes that the licensee has satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), and that a valid emergency exists.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission made a final determination that these amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: the amendment does not (a) significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (b) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated or (c) significantly reduce a safety margin and, therefore, the amendment does not involve significant hazards consideration; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (4) the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security, nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Byron Siegel and Thierry Ross, NRR/DRSP

Dated: September 1, 1989

Document Name:  
QUAD SHOLLY 74529/30

Requestor's ID:  
MALONE

Author's Name:  
TROSS

Document Comments:  
Permit the "B" loop of the RHR heat exchanger

September 1, 1989

Sholly Coordinator

- 2 -

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NRC Acting Project Directorate: Paul C. Shemanski

Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager  
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

September 1, 1989



MEMORANDUM FOR: Sholly Coordinator

FROM: Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III,  
IV, V, and Special Projects

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION IN BIWEEKLY FR NOTICE - NOTICE OF  
CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING  
LICENSE AND FINAL DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS  
CONSIDERATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING (EXIGENT OR  
EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES)

Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad Cities Nuclear  
Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois

Date of application for amendments: August 28, 1989

Description of amendments request: These amendments will permit the "B" Loop  
of the RHR heat exchanger on each unit to be fed from the RHR "C" and "D"  
service water pumps from Unit 1 via the cross-tie line until November 1, 1989.

Date of issuance: September 1, 1989

Effective date: September 1, 1989

Amendment No.: 119, 115

Facility Operating License No. DPR-29 and DPR-30: Amendments revised the  
Technical Specifications.

Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration: No

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of  
emergency circumstances, final determination of no significant hazards  
consideration are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 1, 1989.

Attorney for licensee: Michael Miller, Esq., Sidley and Austin, One First  
National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois 60603.

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Sholly Coordinator

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Local Public Document Room location: Dixon Public Library, 221 Hennepin Avenue, Dixon Illinois 61021.

NRC Acting Project Directorate: Paul C. Shemanski

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Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager  
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