### FINAL SUBMITTAL

OCONEE EXAM 50-269, 270, 287/2002-301

February 11 - 15, 2002

# FINAL SIMULATOR SCENARIOS AND OUTLINES

## OCONEE

02/11/2002

# OPERATING EXAM (SIMULATOR)

Facility: Oconee	Scenario No.:	1 fnl	Op-Test No.:
Examiners:		Operato	rs: <u>I -SRO (1-3)</u>
			R-OATC (1-3)
			U-BOP (1-3)

#### **Initial Conditions:**

75% Reactor Power EOL, per dispatcher request (IC-42)

#### Turnover:

- Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair oil leak, expected returned this shift
- SASS in manual for I&E testing
- AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing NI-9 OOS, to be replaced next outage "A" MSLB circuit OOS

- Keowee Unit 2 OOS for unplanned reasons
- Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground, operability test complete PT/1/A/0600/15 (Control Rod Movement) to be performed after turnover

Event No.	Malfunction No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
0a	Pre-Insert MSS330		TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start	
0b	Pre-Insert Updater		SASS in manual	
0с	Pre-Insert Updater		AMSAC/DSS bypassed	
0d	Pre-Insert MEL180		Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout	
0e	Pre-Insert MNI082		NI-9 OOS	
Of	Pre-Insert Override		"A" MSLB disabled	
1		N, (BOP), SRO	Perform Control Rod Movement	
2	MCR021 Override	C, OATC, SRO	Drop CR Group 2 Rod 6, (pip O-01-03316) (TS) Diamond blocked from AUTO operation	
3		R, OATC	Power Reduction	
4	MPS440 (40-80%)	C, (BOP), SRO	1A₁ RCP High Vibration	
5	MP1281	I, OATC, SRO	ΔT <sub>c</sub> fails HIGH when RCP secured	
6	MCR022	M, OATC, SRO	Second dropped control rod, requiring a manual reactor trip	
7	MEL090	C, ALL	ATWS CT-1 Lockout (Loss of Power)	
8	MEL180	M, ALL	Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout (blackout, PRA)	

<sup>\* (</sup>N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Op-Test No.: \_\_\_\_ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2

Event Description: Perform Control Rod Movement PT: (N, BOP/SRO)

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	BOP/SRO	Perform PT/1/A/0600/15, Control Rod Movement	
•		Conduct pre-job briefing	
		Review Limits and Precautions	
		Place SAFETY RODS OUT BYPASS Switch in Bypass.	
		Take manual control of reactor and feedwater	
		SG Master in Hand	
		Diamond in manual	
		Test CRD Group 1	
		Transfer CRD Group 1 to Aux power supply     OP/1105/009 (Control Rod Drive System)	
		Select group 1 on Group Select Switch	
		Select ALL on Single Select Switch	
		Depress selector for SEQ OVERRIDE	
		Depress selector for AUXILIARY	
		Select JOG on Speed Selector	
		> Depress selector for CLAMP	
		Depress selector for MANUAL TRANSFER switch until TRANSFER CONFIRM lamp comes on followed by CONTROL ON lamps on PI panel. All CONTROL ON lamps on group transferred should be on.	
		Depress selector for CLAMP RELEASE pushbutton.	
		Depress selector for GROUP.	
		IF desired, select RUN on Speed Selector. Group is now transferred to Auxiliary Power Supply.	
		<ul> <li>Insert CRD Group 1 ≈ 2.5% (≈ 6 seconds)</li> </ul>	
		Withdraw CRD Group 1 to OUT LIMIT	
		Transfer CRD Group 1 to DC Hold Power Supply	
		Select group 1 on Group Select Switch	
		> Select ALL on Single Select Switch	
		> Ensure SEQ OVERRIDE selected	
	:	> Depress selector for AUXILIARY	
		> Select JOG on Speed Selector	

On Toot	No. S	cenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2
•		cenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2  orm Control Rod Movement PT: (N, BOP/SRO)
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	BOP/SRO	Depress selector for CLAMP
		Depress selector for MANUAL TRANSFER switch until TRANSFER CONFIRM lamp AND all CONTROL ON lamps on PI panel go off.
		Depress selector for CLAMP RELEASE.
		Depress selector for GROUP.
		Depress selector for Sequence.
		Depress selector for TRANSFER RESET. Transfer is complete.
		IF desired, select RUN on Speed Selector. Group is now transferred to Normal Power Supply.
		Test CRD Group 2
		Transfer CRD Group 2 to Aux power supply per OP/1105/009 (Control Rod Drive System)
	i.	Select group 1 on Group Select Switch
		<ul> <li>Select ALL on Single Select Switch</li> </ul>
		> Depress selector for SEQ OVERRIDE
		Depress selector for AUXILIARY
		Select JOG on Speed Selector
		> Depress selector for CLAMP
;		Depress selector for MANUAL TRANSFER switch until TRANSFER CONFIRM lamp comes on followed by CONTROL ON lamps on PI panel. All CONTROL ON lamps on group transferred should be on.
		Depress selector for CLAMP RELEASE pushbutton.
		Depress selector for GROUP.
		IF desired, select RUN on Speed Selector. Group is now transferred to Auxiliary Power Supply.
,		<ul> <li>Insert CRD Group 2 ≈ 2.5% (≈ 6 seconds)</li> </ul>
		Withdraw CRD Group 2
		This event is completed when Group 2 Rod 6 drops into the core (during Group 2 withdrawal) or as directed by the lead evaluator.

Op-Test No.: \_\_\_\_\_ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3

Event Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATC/SRO) (TS)
When crew begins to withdraw CRD Group 2, rod #6 drops into the

	core.		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		Plant response: Statalarms  1SA-2/B-10, CRD Position Error  1SA-2/D-9, CRD Out Inhibit Position Indicating Panel  API indication of dropped rod on individual meter  In limit (zero %) green light on respective dropped rod.  Loss of respective dropped rod out limit (100%) red light.  Amber 7" asymmetric lights on the dropped rod and the entire group.  Diamond Panel indications  9" asymmetric lamp.  Out inhibit lamp if NI Flux is above 60%.  Group In Limit (green) lamp on respective group.	
	OATC	Crew will use "plant stabilization process" to stabilize the plant.  Acknowledge and verbalize to the SRO the most important Statalarm received for the failure.  Verbalize to the SRO reactor power level and direction of movement.	
	ВОР	Recognize that a valid runback should be occurring but is not because the ICS is in manual.	
	SRO	The SRO should use the OAC to monitor unit status.  Determine that the use of AP/1/A/1700/15, Dropped Control Rods is required.	

Page 2 of 3 Op-Test No.: \_\_\_\_ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2

Event Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATC/SRO) (TS)

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO	SRO will direct actions per AP/1/A/1700/15, Dropped Control Rods.
		Verify ≤ one dropped control rod.
	OATC	2. Verify ≤ one control rod misaligned > 9" (6%) from group average.
	OAIC	3. Verify Reactor is critical
		4. Verify runback to 55% FP in progress.
		OATC should determine that a runback is <b>not</b> in progress due to ICS in manual and initiate a manual runback.
	ВОР	<ol> <li>Initiate Enclosure 5.1 (Control of Plant Equipment During Shutdown)</li> </ol>
	SRO	6. Notify I&E (SPOC) to perform the following:
		Investigate cause of dropped rod
		Prepare to reduce RPS Flux/Flow-Imbalance and RPS High Flux setpoints.
		<ol> <li>Within 1 hour verify &gt; 1% SDM with the allowance for inoperable control rod(s) by performing PT/1/A/1103/15, Reactivity Balance Calculations.</li> </ol>
		8. Within 2 hours, ensure reactor power is less than 60% of the allowable power per the RCP combination.
		Note: The crew may elect to place the Diamond in Auto to let the unit runback. However going to Auto is blocked by a malfunction of the auto/manual pushbutton.
	BOP	9. Transfer CRD Group 2 to DC Hold Power Supply
		Select group 2 on Group Select Switch
		Select ALL on Single Select Switch
		Ensure SEQ OVERRIDE selected
:		Depress selector for AUXILIARY
		> Select JOG on Speed Selector
		Depress selector for CLAMP
		Depress selector for MANUAL TRANSFER switch until TRANSFER CONFIRM lamp AND all CONTROL ON lamps on PI panel go off.

Op-Tes	t No.:	Scenario No.: 1	Event No.: 2	Page 3 of 3		
Event D	escription: Dro	opped Control Rod	: (C, OATC/SRO) (TS)			
Time	Position		Applicant's Actions or	Behavior		
		➤ Depr	ess selector for CLAMP	RELEASE.		
		▶ Depr	ess selector for GROUP			
		➤ Depr	ess selector for Sequenc	ce.		
			<ul> <li>Depress selector for TRANSFER RESET. Transfer is complete.</li> </ul>			
		•	IF desired, select RUN on Speed Selector. Group is now transferred to Normal Power Supply.			
	OATC	10. Begin reduci manual.	10. Begin reducing reactor power to less than 60% with the ICS in manual.			
	SRO		11. Refer to TS 3.1.5 (Safety Rod Position Limits) and determine Condition "A" applies.			
		Verify SI	Verify SDM within COLR limit in 1 hour			
		Declare	Declare the rod inoperable in 1 hour.			
		When power is event is compl	being reduced with the eted.	e ICS in manual this		

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)

Op-Test No.: \_\_\_\_\_ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1

Event Description: Power Reduction: (R, OATC)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

OATC/SRO The OATC will reduce reactor power with the ICS in manual.

• Reduce FDW to reduce power

• Insert control rods to control Tave.

Note: The crew may elect to put FDW back in AUTO. If so, manually reducing FDW will not be required.

When power has been reduce by at least 5% or when directed by the lead evaluator this event is completed.

Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.: \_\_\_\_ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4

Event Description: 1A<sub>1</sub> RCP High Vibration: (C, BOP/SRO)

	<u> </u>	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ВОР	During the power reduction Statalarm 1SA-9/D-2, RC Pump Vibration High, will alarm.
		The BOP should refer to the ARG
		<ul> <li>Verify RCP vibration conditions by using RCP OAC Display Group RCP</li> </ul>
		Refer to AP/1/A/1700/16, Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.
		<ul> <li>Determine if RCP immediate trip criteria is met by referring to Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria).</li> </ul>
		An immediate trip condition based on vibration is one of the immediate trip criteria. Sustained actual Emergency High Vibration as verified by Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria).
		Since immediate trip criteria is not met then notify the OSM and request an evaluation of the RCP vibration condition by the RCP Component Engineer.
		Statalarm 1SA-9/E2 (RCP VIBRATION EMERG HIGH) will actuate.
	ВОР	The BOP should determine that the trip criteria are met based on Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria) and inform the SRO.
	SRO	The SRO should direct the BOP to trip the 1A1 RCP.
	ВОР	Trip the 1A1 RCP.
		When crew has tripped the RCP this event is completed.

Op-Test No.: \_\_\_\_ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 1

Event Description:  $\Delta T_c$  fails HIGH: (I, OATC/SRO)

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		When the 1A₁ RCP is secured ∆Tc fails HIGH
		Statalarm 1SA-02/B-5, RC Cold Leg Diff. Temperature High, will actuate.
		FDW flow will ratio based on the failure
		"A" FDW flow will increase causing "A" loop Tc to decrease.
		"B" FDW flow will decrease causing "B" loop Tc to increase.
		This will cause actual ΔTc to increase
	OATC	Diagnose the $\Delta T_c$ failure by observing the $\Delta T_c$ meter on 1UB1. It should return to zero but is staying a + 3.5 degrees.
		Take the Feedwater Masters to MANUAL and re-ratio feedwater using the loop Tc meters to return actual $\Delta T_c$ to near zero.
	SRO	May refer to AP/28 (ICS Instrument Failures)
		When the OATC has re-ratioed FDW and returned Tc to near zero or when directed by the lead examiner this event is completed.

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Op-Test	No.:	Scenario No.: 1	Event No.: 6	Page 1 of 1		
Event De	escription: <b>Se</b>	cond dropped Control F	ond dropped Control Rod (Manual Reactor Trip): (M, OATC/SRO)			
Time	Position	App	olicant's Actions or	Behavior		
		After the plant is stable second control rod wi		ed by the lead examiner a		
		Plant response:				
		Statalarm				
		• 1SA-2/D-10 (CRD	Continuous Boron	Dilute Permit) actuates		
		CRD PI Panel				
		API indication of d	API indication of dropped rod on individual meter			
		In limit (zero %) gr	<ul> <li>In limit (zero %) green light on respective dropped rod.</li> <li>Amber 7" asymmetric lights on the dropped rod and the entire group.</li> </ul>			
		<del>-</del>				
		Crew response:	Crew response:			
	OATC	dropped into the o	The OATC should determine that a second control rod has dropped into the core by observing the CRD PI Panel and MANUALLY TRIP THE REACTOR. OATC will attempt to trip the reactor by depressing the reactor trip pushbutton.			
		Note: The reactor w	ill not trip when th	e button is depressed.		
	SRO	SRO should ENS!	JRE that a manual	reactor trip is performed.		
		SRO enters IMAs				
	W	After the reactor pus	shbutton has beei	n depressed this event is		

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: 1	Event No.: 7	Page 1 of 4

Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)

When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will be tripped and CT-1 (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path and CT-4.

path and	101-4.		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	OATC	Recognize that the Reactor should have tripped and begin performing Immediate Manual Actions.  • Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton  • Verify reactor power < 5% FP and decreasing	
		The OATC should recognize that Power Range NIs are not < 5% FP and perform Rule 1. (CT-E.1, CT-E.2)	
		<ul> <li>Verify that at least one Power Range NI is ≥5% FP.</li> </ul>	
		Initiate manual control rod insertion to the IN LIMIT.	
		Open 1HP-24 & 1HP-25 (1A and 1B BWST Suction)	
		Ensure 1A or 1B HPIP is operating.	
		Start 1C HPIP.	
		Open 1HP-26 & 1HP-27 (1A and 1B HP Injection)	
		<ul> <li>Dispatch operators to the Cable Room and to the 600V Load Centers 1X9 and 2X1 to de-energize the CRD System.</li> </ul>	
		Notify the Procedure Director to GO TO UNPP tab.	
	ВОР	Adjust FDW to match reactor power and maintain Tave near setpoint.	

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: 1	Event No.: 7	Page 2 of 4

Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)

When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will be tripped and CT-1 (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground noth and CT-A

path and	1 C1-4.	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO	Transfer to the UNPP tab from IMAs and direct the following actions:
		Ensure Rule 1 is in progress or complete.
		Verify Main FDW available.
		<ul> <li>IAAT <u>all</u> power range NIs are &lt;5% FP, THEN ensure the turbine-generator is tripped.</li> </ul>
		➤ This action will result in a unit loss of power for ≈ 35 seconds due to CT-1 lockout. (refer to page 3 of event 7)
		<ul> <li>Verify <u>all</u> wide range NIs ≥1% FP.</li> </ul>
		Maximize letdown.
		Verify Main FDW available.
		<ul> <li>Adjust Main FDW flow as necessary to control RCS temperature.</li> </ul>
		Verify overcooling NOT in progress.
		<ul> <li>Ensure makeup to the LDST is secured.</li> </ul>
		WHEN <u>all</u> NIs are <1% FP, AND decreasing, THEN continue in this tab.

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: 1	Event No.: 7	Page 3 of 4

Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)

When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will trip and CT-1 (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path and CT-4.

and CT-	-4.			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	ВОР	Perform symptoms check and when asked report no other symptoms.		
		When power is regained on the Main Feeder Buses perform AP/11, Recovery from Loss of Power.		
		<ul> <li>IAAT Pzr level &gt; 80" [180" acc],</li> <li>THEN ensure Pzr heaters in AUTO</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Verify load shed is complete as indicated by LOAD SHED COMPLETE on any ES Module (Channel 1 or 2).</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.2 (Restoring Loads Outside the Control Room).</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.4 (Actions to Restore ESV System to Normal Operation).</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Verify condenser vacuum maintained.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Verify IA header pressures ≥ 90 psig:</li> </ul>		
	OATC	Determine the Main Feedwater Pumps have tripped as a result of the loss of power and perform RULE 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency FDW).		
		Ensure any EFDWP operating		
		<ul> <li>Initiate Enclosure 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation)</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Throttle Motor Driven EFDW as necessary to prevent overcooling.</li> </ul>		
i				

Op-Test No.: \_\_\_\_ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 4 of 4

Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)

When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will trip and CT-1 (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path and CT-4.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO	When the turbine is tripped and power is lost: Two possible paths
		GO TO the "Blackout" tab per parallel actions page
		<ul> <li>In the blackout tab, the crew will: verify power restored, initiate AP/11(Recovery from Loss of Power) and transfer to Subsequent Actions.</li> </ul>
		OR
		If power is restored prior to transferring to blackout tab, SRO will complete UNPP tab.
		<ul> <li>Determine that the reactor has tripped and power is ≤ 1% power.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Direct an RO to throttle HPI per Rule 6 and adjust Letdown if needed.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Determine that CC and HPI are lost and initiate AP/25 (SSF Emergency Operating Procedure)</li> </ul>
		3. When power is regained to the 4160-switchgear use a "Parallel Actions" transfer from the yellow page to initiate AP/11(Recovery from Loss of Power).
		4. Transfer to Subsequent Actions
		<ul> <li>Verify all control rods are inserted</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Verify all 4160V switchgear (1TC, 1TD, 1TE) energized.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Verify Main FDW is not operating and ensure SG level are approaching 240" XSUR.</li> </ul>
		This event is completed when power is regained to 4160V switchgear, reactor is shutdown, EOP Subsequent Actions are in progress, and when directed by the lead examiner.

Op-Test No.: \_\_\_\_ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 1

Event Description: Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout, Unit Blackout: (M, ALL)

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		When directed by the lead examiner Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout will occur.		
		Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout will result in a Unit Blackout.		
		Determine that CC and HPI are lost and initiate AP/25 (SSF Emergency Operating Procedure)		
		The SRO will make a "Parallel Actions" transfer to the Blackout tab.		
	SRO	<ul> <li>Close 1HP-31 (RCP Seal Flow Control) (CT) and 1HP-21 (RCP Seal Return).</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Determine SGs are not being feed and dispatch operators to the Atmospheric Dump Valves.</li> </ul>		
		Note: Since the TD EFDW Pump is OOS no source of FDW is available to the SGs until power is restored from CT- 5.		
		Notify SSF operators that feeding with SSF ASW is required.		
		<ul> <li>Initiate Enclosure 5.39 (Restoration of Power) (CT-A.8)</li> </ul>		
	ВОР	Perform Enclosure 5.39 (Restoration of Power)		
		Determine CT-1 has no voltage		
		Determine no Keowee Units operating		
		<ul> <li>Verify CT-5 indicates 4160 volts.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Place the following auto/manual transfer switches in manual:</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>MFB1 AUTO/MANUAL</li> <li>MFB2 AUTO/MANUAL</li> <li>STANDBY 1 AUTO/MANUAL</li> <li>STANDBY 2 AUTO/MANUAL</li> <li>CT4 Bus 1 AUTO/MANUAL</li> <li>CT4 Bus 2 AUTO/MANUAL</li> <li>CT5 Bus 1 AUTO/MANUAL</li> <li>CT5 Bus 2 AUTO/MANUAL</li> <li>CT5 Bus 2 AUTO/MANUAL</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Close SL1 and SL2 breakers</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Close S1 and S2 breakers</li> </ul>		
		Note: This will power the Main Feeder Buses.		
	OATC	Use RULE 3 to establish EFDW flow to SGs.		
		This event and the exam are complete when plant is in a safe configuration i.e. EFW is restored.		

Facility: <b>Oconee</b>	Scenario No.:	2 fni	Op-Test No.:
Examiners:		Operators:	U-SRO (1-4)
			J-OATC (1-3)
			R-BOP (1-3)

#### **Initial Conditions:**

• 25% Reactor Power, startup in progress (IC-45)

#### Turnover:

- Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair oil leak
- AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
- NI-9 OOS, to be replaced next outage
- "A" MSLB circuit OOS
- "A" Condensate Booster Pump OOS, breaker to be replaced
- Keowee Unit 2 OOS for unplanned reasons
- Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
- Operability test of Keowee Unit 1 is to be performed per PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro Operation) after turnover and before startup continues, ONS to perform remote Keowee start

Event No.	Malfunction No.	Event Type*	Event Description
0a	Pre-Insert MSS330		TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start
0b	Pre-Insert		AMSAC/DSS bypassed
0с	Pre-Insert MNI082		NI-9 OOS
Od	Pre-Insert AOR		"A" MSLB circuit disabled "B" MSLB circuit disabled
0e	Pre-Insert MEL180		Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout
Of	Pre-Insert		"A" CBP Breaker racked out
1	Override	N, BOP, SRO C, BOP, SRO	Operability test Keowee Unit 1 Keowee Unit 1 Gen Field Flashing Breaker fails to OPEN automatically
2	MPS090	C, OATC, SRO	1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails closed
3	MNI032	I, OATC, SRO	Controlling NI fails LOW
4	Override	C, BOP, SRO	Seismic event (PRA) 1A RBCU rupture (TS)
5	MPS020 5%-25%	C, ALL	1B SG Tube leak (ramp 10 – 100 gpm over 30 min) (TS)
6		R, OATC	Unit Shutdown
7	MSS360,50	M, ALL	1A Main Steam line break in RB

<sup>\* (</sup>N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: _	2	Event No.: _	1	Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Or	perability test K	eowee	Unit 1 (N, BO	P/SRO)	

	matically (C, BOP/SRO)
on	Applicant's Actions or Behavio

<b>T</b> :	Donition	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
Time	Position			
	SRO	Direct BOP to perform PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro Operation) to operability test unit 1 Keowee underground.		
	ВОР	Use OP/1106/019 (Keowee Hydro At Oconee) to perform an "Automatic Startup" of Keowee Unit 1		
		Initial Conditions		
		Verify applicable Statalarms and breaker positions		
		Notify Keowee operator to give Oconee control of Keowee # 1.		
		Review Limits and Precautions		
		Procedure		
		Place UNIT 1 LOCAL MASTER switch to "START" AND hold until Keowee Unit starts.		
		2. Verify the following:		
		GEN 1 FIELD BREAKER closes		
		GEN 1 SUPPLY BREAKER closes		
:		GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER closes		
		3. Ensure GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER trips.		
		<ul> <li>Candidate should diagnose that the breaker did not open automatically and should open the breaker manually and initiate a work request or contact SPOC.</li> </ul>		
	SRO	SRO should direct the BOP to continue with the startup.		
		Note: GEN FIELD FLASHING BREAKER automatically trips ≤ 45 seconds after receiving close signal. Failure of breaker to trip automatically does NOT make the KHU inoperable. Startup procedure may continue.		
	SRO	4. Determines KHU #1 is operable when test complete		
	BOD.	5. Verify ACB-1, Keowee 1 Generator Breaker, closed.		
	BOP	6. Verify Unit 1 EMER FDR ACB 3 closed		
		7. Verify ≈ 4.16 KV on CT4 Volts (2AB3)		
		8. Close SK1 and SK2 (CT4 STBY BUS 1/2 FEEDER)		
		9. Shutdown Keowee #1.		
		Event is complete when operability test is complete or when directed by the lead examiner.		

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: _	2	Event No.: _	2	Page 1 of 1	
Event Description: 11	IP-120 (RC Volu	me Coi	ntrol) Fails cl	osed (C. OA	TC/SRO)	

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	OATC	1HP-120 fails closed during Keowee #1 operability test. This will allow OATC diagnoses of failure.
		Diagnose 1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Failed closed:
:		RCS makeup flow goes to zero.
		PZR level begins to decrease.
		LDST level begins to increase.
		<ul> <li>Valve position <u>demand</u> for 1HP-120 begins to increase to the 100% demand value and valve position indication will indicate closed (green light).</li> </ul>
	SRO	Refer to AP/14 (Loss of Normal Makeup and/or RCP Seal Injection.
		Determine Seal Injection is not lost
		Determine loss of suction to HPI pumps has not occurred.
		<ul> <li>Verify any HPI pump operating.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Verify RCP seal injection flow exists.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Verify RCP RCP seal injection or HPI makeup line leak is not indicated.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Verify 1HP-120 has failed and GO TO Step 4.167.</li> </ul>
	:	<ul> <li>Perform the following as necessary to maintain Pzr level &gt; 200":</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Close 1HP-6 (Letdown Orifice Stop)</li> </ul>
1		<ul> <li>Throttle 1HP-7 (Letdown Control)</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Throttle 1HP-26 (1A HP Injection)</li> </ul>
		3. Contact SPOC to repair 1HP-120.
i.	!	Note: 1HP-120 will remain failed for the duration of the scenario.
	SRO	Directs and supervises AP/14 implementation
		When PZR level is being controlled manually or when directed by the lead examiner this event is completed.

Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: _2 Event No.: _3 Page 1 of 1					
Event De	escription: <b>Cont</b> <b>Whe</b> l	rolling NI fails LOW (I, OATC/SRO)  n directed by the lead examiner the controlling NI will fail low.			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		Plant response:			
		1SA-02/A-12, ICS Tracking, will actuate. Diamond will transfer to manual on NI flux < 1.5% and FDW will decrease due to reactor cross limit. RCS pressure and temperature will increase.			
		Crew response:			
		When the ICS TRACKING alarm is received, the candidates should utilize the "plant stabilization process" to stabilize the plant and recognize that the controlling NI has failed. RX will trip on high pressure with no operator action.			
ļ	OATC	2. Verify reactor power.			
		<ol> <li>Place the FDW Masters in manual and stabilize the plant.</li> <li>Adjust T<sub>ave</sub> using control rods and FDW and stabilize the plant</li> </ol>			
	SRO	The SRO should direct the NCOs to check OAC and the control board NI meters to determine the status of the NI signals that can be used in the ICS.			
		Refer to AP/28, ICS Instrument Failures			
		<ul> <li>SPOC should be contacted to repair NI-5.</li> </ul>			
		Note: The ICS will remain in manual for the remainder of the scenario.			
		When the plant is stable or when directed by the lead examiner this event is completed.			

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: 2	Event No.: 4	Page 1 of 1
Event Description:	Seismic event (PRA) 1A RBCU rupture (C,	BOP/SRO) (TS)	

1A RBCU rupture (C, BOP/SRO) (15)				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		1. 1SA-9/B-9, LPSW RBCU A Cooler Rupture will actuate and RB normal sump level will increase.		
	ВОР	The BOP should refer to ARG for 1SA-9/B-9		
	20.	<ul> <li>Verify alarm is valid by checking RBCU 1A Inlet Flow and RBCU 1A delta flow.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Verify 1LPSW-18 (RBCU 1A Oultlet) open</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Verify adequate LPSW flow is available; check LPSW pump operation</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Monitor RBNS Level for any unexplained increase (Notify Chemistry to sample RBNS for boron to determine if a cooler rupture has occurred.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Diagnose a Cooler Rupture is indicated and Isolate the 1A RBCU Cooler.</li> </ul>		
	SRO	<ol> <li>The SRO should determine that isolation of LPSW to a RBCU places the Unit in Tech Spec 3.0.3, which will require a unit shutdown.</li> </ol>		
		The control room will receive a phone call from security that indicates that a tremor has been felt but no damage has been noted.		
	SRO	3. The SRO should refer to AP/05, Earthquake.		
		Dispatch operators to perform plant inspections		
		Note: No damage will be reported.		
		<ul> <li>*Notify SPOC to develop the Strong Motion Accelerometer tape.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>*Verify NO fuel handling activities in progress.</li> </ul>		
		* These items may not be completed depending on how soon the next event is started.		
		Note: Team may decide at this time to begin a unit shutdown. Refer to event 6.		
		When the Earthquake AP has been initiated, the RBCU has been isolated, or at the direction of the Lead Examiner this event is completed.		

Op-Test	No.: S	Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2
Event De	escription: 1B S	GG Tube leak (ramp 10 – 100 gpm over 30 min) (C, ALL) (TS)
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		1B SG tube leak occurs following RBCU isolation and initiation of AP/5, Earthquake, or when directed by the lead evaluator.
		Plant response:
		<ul> <li>1. The following alarms actuate:</li> <li>1SA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH</li> </ul>
		1SA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
		PZR level will decrease and RC makeup flow will increase.
		Crew response:
		Diagnose and take actions for a Tube leak in the 1B SG:
	ALL	Refer to the ARG for the following alarms:
	ВОР	1SA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
:		1SA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
	SRO	3. Refer to AP/1/A/1700/31 (Primary to Secondary Leakage)
	BOP	Open and white Tag TB Sump pump breakers.
ļ	SRO	Monitor primary parameters; PZR Level and LDST level to determine that gross leakage exist and transfer to step 4.65.
	į	6. Determine OTSG tube leak size is initially less than 25 gpm. Greater than 25 will require entering the EOP.
	ВОР	7. Log RIA readings (a rough log is adequate)
	SRO	8. Initiate a Unit shutdown to met requirements of Encl. 5.1 (Unit Shutdown Requirements).
		Note: As the scenario develops the leak will increase to greater than 25 gpm and transfer to the EOP will be required.
i		I and the second

Op-Test No.: Scenario No.:2				
Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
SRO	<ul> <li>9. Primary inventory should be monitored and when the leak rate is determined to be &gt; 25 gpm transfer to the SGTR tab of the EOP.</li> <li>10. EOP SGTR tab will perform the following:</li> <li>Determine that the Reactor is not tripped.</li> </ul>			
	scription: 1B \$			

Appendix D

**BOP** 

**SRO** 

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: _	2	Event No.: _	6	Page 1 of 1
Front December 11	it Chutdaum /D	OATO			

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ВОР	The BOP will utilize Enclosure 5.19 (Control of Plant Equipment During Shutdown for SGTR).
		Note: With the unit at $\approx$ 25% power only applicable steps will be performed.
		Notify WCC SRO to make notifications
		Transfer electrical auxiliaries
		Place 1TA AUTO/MAN transfer switch in MAN
		Place 1TB AUTO/MAN transfer switch in MAN
		Close 1TA SU 6.9 KV FDR
		Close 1TB SU 6.9 KV FDR
		Place MFB1 AUTO/MAN transfer switches in MAN
		Place MFB2 AUTO/MAN transfer switches in MAN
		Close E1₁ MFB1 STARTUP FDR
		Close E2 <sub>1</sub> MFB2 STARTUP FDR
	OATC/SRO	The OATC will use the FDW Masters and the Diamond to reduce power while monitoring Reactor Power, Tave, and other plant parameters.
		If the reactor trips automatically the team must return to IMAs.
		Note: the team may manually trip the reactor if PZR level canno be maintained with full HPI. This may occur because of the tube leak and RCS cooldown.
		When a unit shutdown of > 5% has occurred or when directed by the lead examiner this event is concluded.
		If the reactor is manually tripped activate event 7.

Op-Test	No.: S	cenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2				
Event De	1A m	lain Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)  nain steam line break will occur following event 6 as directed by  ead examiner.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
	ALL	Plant response:				
		Statalarm 1SA-02/A-9, MS Press High/Low, actuates				
		"A" and "B" main steam (MS) pressure decreases				
		Reactor trips.				
		"B" MS line pressure stops decreasing				
		"A" MS line pressure continues to decrease				
		RCS may saturate				
	Crew response:					
		1. The Crew should respond to the MSLB in the "1A" SG				
	SRO	The SRO will "Parallel Action" to transfer to the Excessive Heat     Transfer (EHT) tab and direct the Crew's actions as follows:				
	OATC	<ul> <li>3. The OATC will perform IMAs.</li> <li>Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton</li> <li>Verify reactor power &lt; 5% FP and decreasing</li> <li>Depress TURBINE TRIP pushbutton</li> <li>Verify all turbine stop valves closed</li> <li>Verify RCP seal injection available</li> </ul>				
		The OATC will verify the performance of IMAs while the BOP performs a symptoms check.				
	OATC	5. If SCM = 0°F then the OATC will perform Rule #2 (Loss of SCM) after receiving concurrence from the SRO. (CT-A1, A2)				
		Trip ALL RCPs within 2 minutes				
		Ensure open 1HP-24 and 1HP-25				
		Ensure ALL HPI pumps operating				
	Ensure open 1HP-26 and 1HP-27					
		Verify required HPI flow per header				
		Verify TBVs available				

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: 2	Event No.:7	Page 2 of 2

Event Description: 1A Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ВОР	Feed all intact SGs
		<ul> <li>Control EFDW as required to raise level to intact SGs to proper setpoint per RULE 7 (SG Feed Control)</li> </ul>
		Trip both Main FDWPs
		<ul> <li>Place FDW block valve switches (1FDW-33, 31, 42, 40) in CLOSE:</li> </ul>
		Maintain SG pressure < RCS pressure
	ВОР	6. The BOP will perform Rule #5 (Main Steam Line Break) after receiving concurrence from the SRO. (CT-B.1.3)
		<ul> <li>Stop 1A MDEFDW Pump</li> <li>Initiate both trains of MSLB isolation</li> <li>Ensure both Main FDW pumps tripped</li> <li>Steam 1B SG to maintain CETCs constant</li> </ul>
		7. Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) will be performed.
	SRO	8. Excessive Heat Transfer (EHT) tab will:
		Verify excessive heat transfer stopped
	ВОР	<ul> <li>Throttle HPI to stabilize RCS pressure and maintain PZR level &gt; 80" (180" acc)</li> </ul>
		Verify letdown in service
		<ul> <li>Feed and steam all intact SGs to stabilize RCS P/T. (CT-B.1.1)</li> </ul>
	SRO	Minimize SCM using the following methods as necessary:     (CT-B.1.2)
		<ul> <li>De-energizing all PZR heaters</li> <li>Using PZR spray</li> <li>Throttling HPI</li> </ul>
		Initiate Enclose 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell △ T Control)
		GO TO Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) tab.
		When the SRO has transferred to the SGTR tab or when directed by the Lead Examiner the event and scenario is completed.

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1 (I	R8, S1

Facility: Oconee	Scenario No.:	2 fnl rev.1	Op-Test No.:
Examiners:		Operators:	U-SRO (1-4)
			I-OATC (1-3)
			R-BOP (1-3)

#### Initial Conditions:

• 35% Reactor Power, shutdown in progress (IC-45)

#### Turnover:

- Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair oil leak
- AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
- NI-9 OOS, to be replaced next outage
- "A" MSLB circuit OOS
- "A" Condensate Booster Pump OOS, breaker to be replaced
- Keowee Unit 2 OOS for unplanned reasons
- Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
- Operability test of Keowee Unit 1 is to be performed per PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro Operation) after turnover, ONS to perform remote Keowee start

Event No.	Malfunction No.	Event Type*	Event Description
0a	Pre-Insert MSS330		TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start
0b	Pre-Insert		AMSAC/DSS bypassed
0с	Pre-Insert MNI082		NI-9 OOS
0d	Pre-Insert		"A" MSLB circuit disabled
50	AOR		"B" MSLB circuit disabled
0e	Pre-Insert MEL180		Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout
Of	Pre-Insert		"A" CBP Breaker racked out
0*		R, OATC	Unit Shutdown
1	Override	N, BOP, SRO C, BOP, SRO	Operability test Keowee Unit 1 Keowee Unit 1 Gen Field Flashing Breaker fails to OPEN automatically
2	MPS090	C, OATC, SRO	1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails closed
3	MNI032	I, OATC, SRO	Controlling NI fails LOW
4	Override	C, BOP, SRO	Seismic event (PRA) 1A RBCU rupture (TS)
5	MPS020 5%-25%	C, ALL	1B SG Tube leak (ramp 10 – 100 gpm over 30 min) (TS)
6		R, OATC	Unit Shutdown
7	MSS360,50	M, ALL	1A Main Steam line break in RB

<sup>\* (</sup>N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
		,

Op-Test	No.: S	cenario No.: 2 Event No.: 0* Page 1 of 1			
Event D	escription: <b>Unit</b>	Shutdown (R, OATC)			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
	OATC/SRO	The OATC will use the FDW Masters and the Diamond to reduce power from 35% to ~28% while monitoring Reactor Power, Tave, and other plant parameters.			
	When a unit shutdown of > 5% has occurred or when directed by the lead examiner this event is concluded.				
	Note: the OATC will turnover duties to another RO once pow change requirement is satisfied as determined by the lead examiner.				

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: _	2	Event No.: _	1	Page 1 of 1
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Event Description: Operability test Keowee Unit 1 (N, BOP/SRO)

Keowee Unit 1 Gen Field Flashing Breaker fails to OPEN automatically (C, BOP/SRO)

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO	Direct BOP to perform PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro Operation) to operability test unit 1 Keowee underground.
	ВОР	Use OP/1106/019 (Keowee Hydro At Oconee) to perform an "Automatic Startup" of Keowee Unit 1
		Initial Conditions
		Verify applicable Statalarms and breaker positions
		2. Notify Keowee operator to give Oconee control of Keowee # 1.
		Review Limits and Precautions
		Procedure
		Place UNIT 1 LOCAL MASTER switch to "START" AND hold until Keowee Unit starts.
		Verify the following:
		GEN 1 FIELD BREAKER closes
		GEN 1 SUPPLY BREAKER closes
		GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER closes
		3. Ensure GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER trips.
		<ul> <li>Candidate should diagnose that the breaker did not open automatically and should open the breaker manually and initiate a work request or contact SPOC.</li> </ul>
	SRO	SRO should direct the BOP to continue with the startup.
		Note: GEN FIELD FLASHING BREAKER automatically trips ≤ 45 seconds after receiving close signal. Failure of breaker to trip automatically does NOT make the KHU inoperable. Startup procedure may continue.
i I	SRO	4. Determines KHU #1 is operable when test complete
	DOD	5. Verify ACB-1, Keowee 1 Generator Breaker, closed.
	ВОР	6. Verify Unit 1 EMER FDR ACB 3 closed
		7. Verify ≈ 4.16 KV on CT4 Volts (2AB3)
		8. Close SK1 and SK2 (CT4 STBY BUS 1/2 FEEDER)
		9. Shutdown Keowee #1.
		Event is complete when operability test is complete or when directed by the lead examiner.

Op-Test No.:	Scenario No.: _	2	Event No.: _	2	Page 1 of 1
Event Description: 11	IP-120 (RC Volu	me Co	ntrol) Fails cl	osed (C. OA)	rc/sro)

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	OATC	1HP-120 fails closed during Keowee #1 operability test. This will allow OATC diagnoses of failure.
		Diagnose 1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Failed closed:
		<ul><li>RCS makeup flow goes to zero.</li><li>PZR level begins to decrease.</li></ul>
		LDST level begins to increase.
		<ul> <li>Valve position <u>demand</u> for 1HP-120 begins to increase to the 100% demand value and valve position indication will indicate closed (green light).</li> </ul>
:	SRO	Refer to AP/14 (Loss of Normal Makeup and/or RCP Seal Injection.
		Determine Seal Injection is not lost
·		<ul> <li>Determine loss of suction to HPI pumps has not occurred.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Verify <u>any</u> HPI pump operating.</li> </ul>
		Verify RCP seal injection flow exists.
		<ul> <li>Verify RCP RCP seal injection or HPI makeup line leak is not indicated.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Verify 1HP-120 has failed and GO TO Step 4.167.</li> </ul>
•		<ul> <li>Perform the following as necessary to maintain Pzr level &gt; 200":</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Close 1HP-6 (Letdown Orifice Stop)</li> </ul>
·		<ul> <li>Throttle 1HP-7 (Letdown Control)</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Throttle 1HP-26 (1A HP Injection)</li> </ul>
		3. Contact SPOC to repair 1HP-120.
		Note: 1HP-120 will remain failed for the duration of the scenario.
	SRO	Directs and supervises AP/14 implementation
<u> </u>		When PZR level is being controlled manually or when directed by the lead examiner this event is completed.

Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: _2							
Event De	escription: <b>Cont</b> <b>Wher</b>	rolling NI fails LOW (I, OATC/SRO)  n directed by the lead examiner the controlling NI will fail low.					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior					
		Plant response:					
		SA-02/A-12, ICS Tracking, will actuate. Diamond will transfer to manual on NI flux < 1.5% and FDW will decrease due to reactor cross limit. RCS pressure and temperature will increase.					
Crew response:							
	<ol> <li>When the ICS TRACKING alarm is received, the candidates should utilize the "plant stabilization process" to stabilize the plant and recognize that the controlling NI has failed. RX will trip on high pressure with no operator action.</li> </ol>						
	OATC	2. Verify reactor power.					
:		<ol> <li>Place the FDW Masters in manual and stabilize the plant.</li> <li>Adjust T<sub>ave</sub> using control rods and FDW and stabilize the plant</li> </ol>					
	SRO	The SRO should direct the NCOs to check OAC and the control board NI meters to determine the status of the NI signals that can be used in the ICS.					
		Refer to AP/28, ICS Instrument Failures					
		<ul> <li>SPOC should be contacted to repair NI-5.</li> </ul>					
Note: The ICS will remain in manual for the remainder of the scenario.							
		When the plant is stable or when directed by the lead examiner this event is completed.					

Scenar		

Op-Test No.:		Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1	
Event Description:		Seismic event (PRA)  1A RBCU rupture (C, BOP/SRO) (TS)	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		1. 1SA-9/B-9, LPSW RBCU A Cooler Rupture will actuate and RB normal sump level will increase.	
	ВОР	The BOP should refer to ARG for 1SA-9/B-9	
ВОР	501	<ul> <li>Verify alarm is valid by checking RBCU 1A Inlet Flow and RBCU 1A delta flow.</li> </ul>	
		Verify 1LPSW-18 (RBCU 1A Oultlet) open	
		<ul> <li>Verify adequate LPSW flow is available; check LPSW pump operation</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Monitor RBNS Level for any unexplained increase (Notify Chemistry to sample RBNS for boron to determine if a cooler rupture has occurred.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Diagnose a Cooler Rupture is indicated and Isolate the 1A RBCU Cooler.</li> </ul>	
	SRO	<ol><li>The SRO should determine that isolation of LPSW to a RBCU places the Unit in Tech Spec 3.0.3, which will require a unit shutdown.</li></ol>	
		The control room will receive a phone call from security that indicates that a tremor has been felt but no damage has been noted.	
	SRO	3. The SRO should refer to AP/05, Earthquake.	
		Dispatch operators to perform plant inspections	
		Note: No damage will be reported.	
		<ul> <li>*Notify SPOC to develop the Strong Motion Accelerometer tape.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>*Verify NO fuel handling activities in progress.</li> </ul>	
		* These items may not be completed depending on how soon the next event is started.	
		Note: Team may decide at this time to begin a unit shutdown. Refer to event 6.	

When the Earthquake AP has been initiated, the RBCU has been isolated, or at the direction of the Lead Examiner this event is completed.

Op-Test	No.: S	scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2
Event De	escription: 1B S	G Tube leak (ramp 10 – 100 gpm over 30 min) (C, ALL) (TS)
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		1B SG tube leak occurs following RBCU isolation and initiation of AP/5, Earthquake, or when directed by the lead evaluator.  Plant response:  1. The following alarms actuate:
		1SA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
		1SA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
		PZR level will decrease and RC makeup flow will increase.
		Crew response:
	ALL	Diagnose and take actions for a Tube leak in the 1B SG:
	ВОР	Refer to the ARG for the following alarms:
		1SA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
		<ul> <li>1SA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH</li> </ul>
	SRO	3. Refer to AP/1/A/1700/31 (Primary to Secondary Leakage)
	ВОР	4. Open and white Tag TB Sump pump breakers.
	SRO	5. Monitor primary parameters; PZR Level and LDST level to determine that gross leakage exist and transfer to step 4.65.
		6. Determine OTSG tube leak size is initially less than 25 gpm. Greater than 25 will require entering the EOP.
	ВОР	7. Log RIA readings (a rough log is adequate)
	SRO	Initiate a Unit shutdown to met requirements of Encl. 5.1 (Unit Shutdown Requirements).
		Note: As the scenario develops the leak will increase to greater than 25 gpm and transfer to the EOP will be required.

Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: _2 Event No.: _5 Page 2 of 2  Event Description: 1B SG Tube leak (ramp 10 – 100 gpm over 30 min) (C, ALL) (TS)			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	SRO	9. Primary inventory should be monitored and when the leak rate is determined to be > 25 gpm transfer to the SGTR tab of the EOP.	
		10. EOP SGTR tab will perform the following:	
		Determine that the Reactor is not tripped.	
	ВОР	Maintain PZR level ≥ 220 inches using Enclosure 5.5 (Pzr and LDST Level Control). (CT-D.1)	
		Open HP-24 and 25 (1A and 1B BWST Suction)	
		➤ Close 1HP-5	
		Monitor RIA-16 ("A" MS Header) and 17 ("B" MS Header) to identify all SGs with tube ruptures.	
		Start the Outside Air Booster Fans on both Units 1 and 3.	
	SRO	11. The SRO should direct the OATC to begin a unit shutdown at a rate between 9.9% per hour and 20% per minute (MAXIMUM RUNBACK).	

Note: A shutdown with the ICS in manual is required.

scenario.

Note: This event will remain in progress for the remainder of the

Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: _2			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ВОР	The BOP will utilize Enclosure 5.19 (Control of Plant Equipment During Shutdown for SGTR).	
		Note: With the unit at $\approx$ 25% power only applicable steps will be performed.	
		Notify WCC SRO to make notifications	
		Transfer electrical auxiliaries	
		Place 1TA AUTO/MAN transfer switch in MAN	
		Place 1TB AUTO/MAN transfer switch in MAN	
		Close 1TA SU 6.9 KV FDR	
		Close 1TB SU 6.9 KV FDR	
		Place MFB1 AUTO/MAN transfer switches in MAN	
		<ul> <li>Place MFB2 AUTO/MAN transfer switches in MAN</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Close E1<sub>1</sub> MFB1 STARTUP FDR</li> </ul>	
		Close E2 <sub>1</sub> MFB2 STARTUP FDR	
	OATC/SRO	The OATC will use the FDW Masters and the Diamond to reduce power while monitoring Reactor Power, Tave, and other plant parameters.	
		If the reactor trips automatically the team must return to IMAs.	
		Note: the team may manually trip the reactor if PZR level cannot be maintained with full HPI. This may occur because of the tube leak and RCS cooldown.	
		When a unit shutdown of > 5% has occurred or when directed by the lead examiner this event is concluded.	
		If the reactor is manually tripped activate event 7.	

	otline)

Op-Test	No.: So	cenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2	
Event Description: 1A Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)  1A main steam line break will occur following event 6 as directed by the lead examiner.			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ALL	Plant response:	
		Statalarm 1SA-02/A-9, MS Press High/Low, actuates	
		"A" and "B" main steam (MS) pressure decreases	
		Reactor trips.	
		"B" MS line pressure stops decreasing	
	Ì	"A" MS line pressure continues to decrease	
		RCS may saturate	
		Crew response:	
		1. The Crew should respond to the MSLB in the "1A" SG	
	SRO	<ol><li>The SRO will "Parallel Action" to transfer to the Excessive Heat Transfer (EHT) tab and direct the Crew's actions as follows:</li></ol>	
	OATC	<ul> <li>3. The OATC will perform IMAs.</li> <li>Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton</li> <li>Verify reactor power &lt; 5% FP and decreasing</li> <li>Depress TURBINE TRIP pushbutton</li> <li>Verify all turbine stop valves closed</li> <li>Verify RCP seal injection available</li> </ul>	
		The OATC will verify the performance of IMAs while the BOP performs a symptoms check.	
	OATC	5. If SCM = 0°F then the OATC will perform Rule #2 (Loss of SCM) after receiving concurrence from the SRO. (CT-A1, A2)	
		Trip ALL RCPs within 2 minutes	
		Ensure open 1HP-24 and 1HP-25	
		Ensure ALL HPI pumps operating	
		Ensure open 1HP-26 and 1HP-27	
		Verify required HPI flow per header	
:		Verify TBVs available	

•		Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 2
Event De	escription: 1A N	Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ВОР	Feed all intact SGs
		<ul> <li>Control EFDW as required to raise level to intact SGs to proper setpoint per RULE 7 (SG Feed Control)</li> </ul>
		Trip both Main FDWPs
		Place FDW block valve switches (1FDW-33, 31, 42, 40) in CLOSE:
		Maintain SG pressure < RCS pressure
	ВОР	<ul> <li>6. The BOP will perform Rule #5 (Main Steam Line Break) after receiving concurrence from the SRO. (CT-B.1.3)</li> <li>Stop 1A MDEFDW Pump</li> <li>Initiate both trains of MSLB isolation</li> <li>Ensure both Main FDW pumps tripped</li> <li>Steam 1B SG to maintain CETCs constant</li> </ul>
		7. Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) will be performed.
	SRO	8. Excessive Heat Transfer (EHT) tab will:
		Verify excessive heat transfer stopped
	ВОР	Throttle HPI to stabilize RCS pressure and maintain PZR level > 80" (180" acc)
		Verify letdown in service
		<ul> <li>Feed and steam all intact SGs to stabilize RCS P/T. (CT-B.1.1)</li> </ul>
	SRO	<ul> <li>Minimize SCM using the following methods as necessary:         (CT-B.1.2)</li> <li>De-energizing all PZR heaters</li> </ul>

Using PZR sprayThrottling HPI

completed.

Initiate Enclose 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell  $\Delta$  T Control)

GO TO Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) tab.

When the SRO has transferred to the SGTR tab or when directed by the Lead Examiner the event and scenario is

### CREW TURNOVER (Revised)

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- 1. Unit 1: MODE 1, 35% Reactor Power
  - 430 EFPD
  - Shutdown in progress
- 2. Unit 2: MODE 1, 100% Reactor Power
- 3. Unit 3: MODE 1, 100% Reactor Power

#### **TURNOVER:**

- 1. Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair oil leak, expected returned this shift
  - TS 3.7.5, Condition "B", 72 hours completion time
- 2. AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
  - SLC 16.7.2, Condition "A" and "B", 7 day completion time
- 3. NI-9 OOS, to be replaced next outage
- 4. "A" MSLB circuit OOS
  - SLC 16.10.5
  - TS 3.3.13, Condition "A", 72 hour completion time
- 5. "A" Condensate Booster Pump OOS, breaker to be replaced
- 6. Keowee Unit 2 OOS for unplanned reasons
  - TS 3.8.1, Condition "C", 72 hours completion time
- 7. Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
- 8. To satisfy SR 3.8.1.3, the operability test of Keowee Unit 1 is to be performed per PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro Operation), ONS to perform remote Keowee start
- 9. Begin Enclosure 3.2 (Power Reduction) of OP/1/A/1102/004, Operation At Power, after turnover.