December 18, 1981

Docket Nos. 50-265
and 50-254



Mr. L. DelGeorge
Director of Nuclear Licensing
Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. DelGeorge:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 75 and 68 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 for Quad Cities Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letter dated December 3, 1981, supplemented by letter dated December 14, 1981. The amendments change the Technical Specifications relating to the containment cooling mode of the RHR system for each unit.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Roby B. Bevan, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 75 to DPR-29
2. Amendment No. 68 to DPR-30
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice

cc w/enclosures
See next page

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Mr. L. DelGeorge
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
AND
IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-254

QUAD CITIES STATION UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.75
License No. DPR-29

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated December 3, 1981, as supplemented December 14, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-29 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   B. Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 75, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 18, 1981

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 75

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29

DOCKET NO. 50-254

Revise the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications as follows:

Remove	Replace
3.5/4.5-3	3.5/4.5-3
3.5/4.5-12	3.5/4.5-12

continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during such 7 days all active components of both core spray subsystems, the containment cooling mode of the RHR (including two RHR pumps), and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be operable.

6. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated, and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System

1.a. Both loops of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system, as defined in the bases for Specification 3.5.B, shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition.

1.b. From the effective date of this amendment until June 1, 1982, the "A" loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system for each reactor may share the Unit 2 "A" and "B" RHR service water pumps using cross tie line 1/2-10124-16"-D. Consequently, the requirements of Specifications 3.5.B.2 and 3.5.B.3 will impose the corresponding surveillance testing of equipment associated with both reactors if the shared RHR service water pump or pumps, or the cross tie line, are made or found to be inoperable.

2. From and after the date that one of the RHR service water pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 30 days unless such pump is sooner made operable, provided that during such 30 days all other active components of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system are operable.

containment cooling mode of the RHR, and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System

Surveillance of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system shall be performed as follows:

1. RHR service water subsystem testing:

	Item	*Frequency*
a.	Pump and valve operability	Once/3 months
b.	Flow rate test - each RHR service water pump shall deliver at least 3500 gpm against a pressure of 198 psig	After pump maintenance and every 3 months
c.	A logic system functional test	Each refueling outage

2. When it is determined that one RHR service water pump is inoperable, the remaining components of that loop and the other containment cooling loop of the RHR system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

Should the loss of one RHR pump occur, a nearly full complement of core and containment cooling equipment is available. Three RHR pumps in conjunction with the core spray subsystem will perform the core cooling function. Because of the availability of the majority of the core cooling equipment, which will be demonstrated to be operable, a 30-day repair period is justified. If the LPCI mode of the RHR system is not available, at least two RHR pumps must be available to fulfill the containment cooling function. The 7-day repair period is set on this basis.

B. RHR Service Water

The containment cooling mode of the RHR system is provided to remove heat energy from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. For the flow specified, the containment long-term pressure is limited to less than 8 psig and is therefore more than ample to provide the required heat-removal capability (reference SAR Section 5.2.3.2).

The Containment Cooling mode of the RHR System consists of two loops. Each loop consists of 1 Heat Exchanger, 2 RHR Pumps, and the associated valves, piping, electrical equipment, and instrumentation. The "B" loop on each unit contains 2 RHR Service Water Pumps. During the period from November 24, 1981, to June 1, 1982, the "A" loop on each unit may utilize the "A" and "B" RHR Service Water Pumps from Unit 2 via a cross-tie line. After June 1, 1982, each "A" loop will contain 2 RHR Service Water Pumps. Either set of equipment is capable of performing the containment cooling function. Loss of one RHR service water pump does not seriously jeopardize the containment cooling capability, as any one of the remaining three pumps can satisfy the cooling requirements. Since there is some redundancy left, a 30-day repair period is adequate. Loss of one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system leaves one remaining system to perform the containment cooling function. The operable system is demonstrated to be operable each day when the above condition occurs. Based on the fact that when one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system becomes inoperable, only one system remains, which is tested daily, a 7-day repair period was specified.

C. High-Pressure Coolant Injection

The high-pressure coolant injection subsystem is provided to adequately cool the core for all pipe breaks smaller than those for which the LPCI mode of the RHR system or core spray subsystems can protect the core.

The HPCI meets this requirement without the use of offsite electrical power. For the pipe breaks for which the HPCI is intended to function, the core never uncovers and is continuously cooled, thus no cladding damage occurs (reference SAR Section 6.2.5.3). The repair times for the limiting conditions of operation were set considering the use of the HPCI as part of the isolation cooling system.

D. Automatic Pressure Relief

The relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem are a backup to the HPCI subsystem. They enable the core spray subsystem or LPCI mode of the RHR system to provide protection against the small pipe break in the event of HPCI failure by depressurizing the reactor vessel rapidly enough to actuate the core spray subsystems or LPCI mode of the RHR system. The core spray subsystem and/or the LPCI mode of the RHR system provide sufficient flow of coolant to limit fuel cladding temperatures to less than 2200°F, to assure that core geometry remains intact, to limit the core wide clad metal-water reaction to less than 1%, and to limit the calculated local metal-water reaction to less than 17%.

Loss of 1 of the relief valves affects the pressure relieving capability and, therefore, a 7 day repair period is specified. Loss of more than one relief valve significantly reduces the pressure relief capability, thus a 24-hour repair period is specified based on the HPCI system availability during this period.

E. RCIC

The RCIC system is provided to supply continuous makeup water to the reactor core when the reactor is isolated from the turbine and when the feedwater system is not available. Under these conditions the pumping capacity of the RCIC system is sufficient to maintain the water level above the core without any other water system in operation. If the water level in the reactor vessel decreases to the RCIC initiation level, the system automatically starts. The system may also be manually initiated at any time.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
AND
IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-265

QUAD CITIES STATION UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 68
License No. DPR-30

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Commonwalth Edison Company (the licensee) dated December 3, 1981, as supplemented December 14, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   B. Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 68, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 18, 1981

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.68

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30

DOCKET NO. 50-265

Revise the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications as follows:

Remove	Replace
3.5/4.5-3	3.5/4.5-3
3.5/4.5-11	3.5/4.5-11

continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during such 7 days all active components of both core spray subsystems, the containment cooling mode of the RHR (including two RHR pumps), and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be operable.

6. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated, and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System

1.a. Both loops of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system, as defined in the bases for Specification 3.5.B, shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition.

1.b. From the effective date of this amendment until June 1, 1982, the "A" loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system for each reactor may share the Unit 2 "A" and "B" RHR service water pumps using cross tie line 1/2-10124-16"-D. Consequently, the requirements of Specifications 3.5.B.2 and 3.5.B.3 will impose the corresponding surveillance testing of equipment associated with both reactors if the shared RHR service water pump or pumps, or the cross tie line, are made or found to be inoperable.

2. From and after the date that one of the RHR service water pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 30 days unless such pump is sooner made operable, provided that during such 30 days all other active components of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system are operable.

containment cooling mode of the RHR, and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System

Surveillance of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system shall be performed as follows:

1. RHR service water subsystem testing:

	Item	*Frequency*
a.	Pump and valve operability	Once/3 months
b.	Flow rate test - each RHR service water pump shall deliver at least 3500 gpm against a pressure of 198 psig	After pump maintenance and every 3 months
c.	A logic system functional test	Each refueling outage

2. When it is determined that one RHR service water pump is inoperable, the remaining components of that loop and the other containment cooling loop of the RHR system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

3.5 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION BASES

A. Core Spray and LPCI Mode of the RHR System

This specification assures that adequate emergency cooling capability is available.

Based on the loss-of-coolant analyses included in References 1 and 2 and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K, core cooling systems provide sufficient cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss-of-coolant accident, to limit the calculated peak cladding temperature to less than 2200° F, to assure that core geometry remains intact, to limit the corewide cladding metal-water reaction to less than 1%, and to limit the calculated local metal-water reaction to less than 17%.

The allowable repair times are established so that the average risk rate for repair would be no greater than the basic risk rate. The method and concept are described in Reference 3. Using the results developed in this reference, the repair period is found to be less than half the test interval. This assumes that the core spray subsystems and LPCI constitute a one-out-of-two system; however, the combined effect of the two systems to limit excessive cladding temperature must also be considered. The test interval specified in Specification 4.5 was 3 months. Therefore, an allowable repair period which maintains the basic risk considering single failures should be less than 30 days, and this specification is within this period. For multiple failures, a shorter interval is specified; to improve the assurance that the remaining systems will function, a daily test is called for. Although it is recognized that the information given in Reference 3 provides a quantitative method to estimate allowable repair times, the lack of operating data to support the analytical approach prevents complete acceptance of this method at this time. Therefore, the times stated in the specific items were established with due regard to judgment.

Should one core spray subsystem become inoperable, the remaining core spray subsystem and the entire LPCI mode of the RHR system are available should the need for core cooling arise. To assure that the remaining core spray, the LPCI mode of the RHR system, and the diesel generators are available, they are demonstrated to be operable immediately. This demonstration includes a manual initiation of the pumps and associated valves and diesel generators. Based on judgments of the reliability of the remaining systems, i.e., the core spray and LPCI, a 7-day repair period was obtained.

Should the loss of one RHR pump occur, a nearly full complement of core and containment cooling equipment is available. Three RHR pumps in conjunction with the core spray subsystem will perform the core cooling function. Because of the availability of the majority of the core cooling equipment, which will be demonstrated to be operable, a 30-day repair period is justified. If the LPCI mode of the RHR system is not available, at least two RHR pumps must be available to fulfill the containment cooling function. The 7-day repair period is set on this basis.

B. RHR Service Water

The containment cooling mode of the RHR system is provided to remove heat energy from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. For the flow specified, the containment long-term pressure is limited to less than 8 psig and is therefore more than ample to provide the required heat-removal capability (reference SAR Section 5.2.3.2).

The Containment Cooling mode of the RHR System consists of two loops. Each loop consists of 1 Heat Exchanger, 2 RHR Pumps, and the associated valves, piping, electrical equipment, and instrumentation. The "B" loop on each unit contains 2 RHR Service Water Pumps. During the period from November 24, 1981, to June 1, 1982, the "A" loop on each unit may utilize the "A" and "B" RHR Service Water Pumps from Unit 2 via a cross-tie line. After June 1, 1982, each "A" loop will contain 2 RHR Service Water Pumps. Either set of equipment is capable of performing the containment cooling function. Loss of one RHR service water pump does not seriously jeopardize the containment cooling capability, as any one of the remaining three pumps can satisfy the cooling requirements. Since there is some redundancy left, a 30-day repair period is adequate. Loss of one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system leaves one remaining system to perform the containment cooling function. The operable system is demonstrated to be operable each day when the above condition occurs.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 75 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29

AMENDMENT NO. 68 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

QUAD CITIES STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 50-265

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 3, 1981 Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) proposed a temporary change to Appendix A, Technical Specifications, to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30 for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2, respectively.

On November 21, 1981 a leak was discovered in the underground portion of the Unit 1 RHR loop "A" Service Water Line. Unit 1 was in an outage at the time and could not restart because of failure to meet a Technical Specification (T/S) requirement for two operable RHR containment cooling loops. In order to meet the T/S requirement, the RHR Service Water Pumps "A" and "B" from Unit 2 were made available to Unit 1 by utilizing a cross-tie line (see Figure 1). Unit 2 was in a refueling outage at the time and this equipment (RHR SW pumps A & B) was not required to be operable for Unit 2. However, the T/S precludes any refueling work that has the potential for draining the vessel unless the low-pressure core cooling and containment cooling systems are operable.

EVALUATION

The licensee proposes a temporary T/S modification that allows the RHR containment cooling loop "A" for Unit 2 to be defined as operable for Unit 2 while the cross-tie line is connected to Unit 1. The T/S amendment will allow the use of the cross-tie until June 1, 1982, at which time the repair of the Unit 1 RHR loop "A" service water line will be completed.

The containment cooling mode of the RHR system for each unit consists of two loops as shown in Figure 1. Each loop consists of one heat exchanger, two RHR pumps, associated valves, piping, electrical equipment and instrumentation. The "B" loop on each unit contains two RHR service water pumps. Normally the "A" loop on each unit also contains two RHR service water pumps. However, during the time interval from November 24, 1981 to June 1, 1982 the "A" loop on each unit may utilize the "A" and "B" RHR service water pumps from Unit 2. Service water from Unit 2 to Unit 1 will be delivered via the cross-tie line. Loss of one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system leaves the remaining loop to perform the containment cooling function. Either loop of the RHR system can satisfy the containment cooling function.

As stated in the Quad Cities FSAR, only one RHR and one RHR service water pump are required to provide containment cooling following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) on one unit. One RHR and one RHR service water pump are also adequate to place and maintain the other unit in the cold shutdown condition. Adequate containment cooling is therefore available in the event of a design basis LOCA concurrent with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and the worst single failure, if one RHR and one RHR service water pump are available. If the Unit 1/2 (swing) D/G or Unit 2 D/G is postulated as the single failure, along with a Loss of Offsite Power, the modification results in no change to existing procedures or to the existing design basis. If the Unit 1 D/G is postulated to fail, the original design basis is met with the proposed changes since procedure changes and electrical modifications have been proposed to assure that adequate power is allocated to the necessary equipment during a Loss of Offsite Power.

A procedure will be implemented which will allow Buses 13-1 and 23-1 to be energized by D/G 1/2 at the same time (see Figure 2). This will permit one Unit 2 RHR service water pump and one Unit 1 RHR pump to be powered by the D/G 1/2. This procedure would require that the ECCS pumps on Bus 23-1 be pulled-to-lock (prevented from auto starting) prior to closing two locally mounted control switches (as described below) which permit both buses to be energized by the 1/2 diesel.

To permit 1/2 D/G to supply Bus 13-1 on Unit 1 and Bus 23-1 on Unit 2 at the same time, a breaker position interlock in the closing circuit of either one of the two 1/2 DG output breakers must be bypassed when the redundant breaker is already closed. This action is accomplished in either 1/2 DG output breaker by means of a control switch which is physically and electrically independent of its redundant counterpart. Once the breaker position interlock is bypassed in the 1/2 DG output breaker that is open, the operator will then be able to close this output breaker from the control room.

To minimize the probability of operator errors that will leave the bypass control switches in the wrong position, after their function was accomplished, the licensee was advised that we will require that the bypass condition in each breaker closing circuit be automatically removed when the associated 1/2 DG output breaker is opened. The licensee has elected to implement this requirement by providing bypass control switches that are spring-return-to-open. This in essence, automatically removes the bypass as soon as the operator releases the switch from the bypass position. We find this to be an acceptable way to implement our requirement in this regard. The licensee has also stated that the bypass control switches will be of the same type as those previously qualified and presently used in existing safety related circuits in the plant.

The licensee stated that the modification will be fully tested to assure that the 1/2 diesel can energize Bus 23-1 when it is already energizing Bus 13-1, or energize Bus 13-1 when it is already energizing Bus 23-1. It will also be demonstrated that the closing circuits will revert to the original condition when the bypasses are removed.

Prior to this modification implementation, the licensee has committed to write procedures and train operators in the use of this new installation.

We find this temporary modification acceptable because the licensee states and we concur based upon information elicited from the licensee that: (1) there is ample time, and there will be appropriate procedures and operator training to manually actuate the local switches to initiate the containment cooling function after an event; (2) the RHR containment cooling mode was always designed as a manual action; (3) no originally designed automatic protective features will be adversely affected; and (4) there will be no compromises to core cooling by this temporary modification.

Environmental Considerations

We have determined that these amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that these amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: December 18, 1981



FIGURE 1 - CROSSTIE OF RHR SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS



FIGURE 2 SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM
EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 50-265

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

AND

IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO

OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment Nos. 75 and 68 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30, issued to Commonwealth Edison Company and Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company, which revised the Technical Specifications for operation of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located in Rock Island County, Illinois. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendments change the Technical Specifications relating to the containment cooling mode of the Residual Heat Removal system for each unit, to provide for shared service water cooling loops by means of an interconnection of the two loops.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of the amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated December 3, 1981, as suppplemented December 14, 1981, (2) Amendment No. 75 to License No. DPR-29 and Amendment No. 68 to License No. DPR-30, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the Moline Public Library, 504 - 17th Street, Moline, Illinois. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 18th day of December 1981.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing