



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 17, 1996

Mr. Roger O. Anderson, Director  
Licensing and Management Issues  
Northern States Power Company  
414 Nicollet Mall  
Minneapolis, MN 55401

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:  
IMPLEMENTATION OF BOILING WATER REACTOR OWNERS GROUP OPTION I-D  
CORE STABILITY SOLUTION (TAC NO. M92947)

Dear Mr. Anderson:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 97 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated June 22, 1995, as supplemented August 10, 1995, and March 26, 1996.

The amendment modifies the requirements for avoidance and protection from thermal hydraulic instabilities to be consistent with the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group long-term solution Option I-D described in the Licensing Topical Report NEDO-31960, "BWR Owners Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," June 1991, and NEDO-31960, Supplement 1, dated March 1992. NEDO-31960 and Supplement 1 to NEDO-31960 were endorsed by the NRC staff in a letter to L.A. England (BWR Owners Group) dated July 12, 1993. The amendment also adds the fuel cycle dependent stability power and flow limits in the Core Operating Limits Report.

As requested in your letter dated March 26, 1996, the enclosed amendment shall allow 60 days from the date of this letter for full implementation of the amendment to provide time for training and implementation of the changes.

The NRC staff is planning an inspection of the design record files for the calculations reported in the Table 4.1 of the Licensing Topical Report GENE-A00-04021-02 which was enclosed in your letter dated March 26, 1996. We will notify you of the date(s) of the inspection as the inspection schedule becomes available.

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R.O. Anderson

- 2 -

September 17, 1996

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Tae Kim, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-263

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 97 to DPR-22  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl: See next page

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DATE	9/13/96		9/13/96		8/29/96 <i>for</i>	9/13/96	9/17/96

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Mr. Roger O. Anderson, Director  
Northern States Power Company

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

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January 1995

DATED: September 17, 1996

AMENDMENT NO. 97 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22-MONTICELLO

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-263

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 97  
License No. DPR-22

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated June 22, 1995, as supplemented August 10, 1995, and March 26, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 97, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, with full implementation within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Tae Kim, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 17, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 97

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22

DOCKET NO. 50-263

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE

15  
107  
108  
109  
114  
211  
249b

INSERT

15  
107  
108  
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114  
211  
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### Bases Continued:

For analyses of the thermal consequences of the transients, the Operating MCPR Limit (T.S.3.11.C) is conservatively assumed to exist prior to initiation of the transients.

This choice of using conservative values of controlling parameters and initiating transients at the design power level, produces more pessimistic answers than would result by using expected values of control parameters and analyzing at higher power levels.

Deviations from as-left settings of setpoints are expected due to inherent instrument error, operator setting error, drift of the setpoint, etc. Allowable deviations are assigned to the limiting safety system settings for this reason. The effect of settings being at their allowable deviation extreme is minimal with respect to that of the conservatisms discussed above. Although the operator will set the setpoints within the trip settings specified, the actual values of the various setpoints can vary from the specified trip setting by the allowable deviation.

A violation of this specification is assumed to occur only when a device is knowingly set outside of the limiting trip setting or when a sufficient number of devices have been affected by any means such that the automatic function is incapable of preventing a safety limit from being exceeded while in a reactor mode in which the specified function must be operable. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 list the reactor modes in which the functions listed above are required.

- A. Neutron Flux Scram The average power range monitoring (APRM) system, which is calibrated using heat balance data taken during steady state conditions, reads in percent of rated thermal power (1670 MWt). Because fission chambers provide the basic input signals, the APRM system responds directly to average neutron flux. During transients, the instantaneous rate of heat transfer from the fuel (reactor thermal power) is less than the instantaneous neutron flux due to the time constant of the fuel. Therefore, during abnormal operational transients, the thermal power of the fuel will be less than that indicated by the neutron flux at the scram setting. Analyses demonstrate that, with a 120% scram trip setting, none of the abnormal operational transients analyzed violate the fuel Safety Limit and there is a substantial margin from fuel damage. Also, the flow biased neutron flux scram (specification 2.3.A.1) provides protection to the fuel safety limit in the unlikely event of a thermal-hydraulic instability.

3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

F. Recirculation System

1. Intentional entry into the stability exclusion region of the power-flow map defined in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) is prohibited. If entry into the stability exclusion region does occur, immediately perform one or more of the following until the stability exclusion region has been exited:
  - a. Insert control rods,
  - b. Increase the speed of an operating recirculation pump.
  
2. Entry into the stability buffer region of the power-flow map as defined in the COLR is prohibited unless the power distribution controls as defined in the COLR are in effect. If the power distribution controls are not in effect and entry into the stability buffer region does occur, immediately perform one or more of the following until the stability buffer region has been exited:
  - a. Insert control rods,
  - b. Increase the speed of an operating recirculation pump.

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

F. Recirculation system

1. See Specification 4.6.G

3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

F. Recirculation System

3. The reactor may be started and operated, or operation may continue with only one recirculation loop in operation provided that:
  - a. The following changes to setpoints and safety limit settings will be made within 24 hours after initiating operation with only one recirculation loop in operation.
    1. The Operating Limit MCPR (MCPR) will be changed per Specification 3.11.C.
    2. The Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR) will be changed per Specification 3.11.A.
    3. The APRM Neutron Flux Scram and APRM Rod Block setpoints will be changed as noted in Specification 2.3.A and Table 3.2.3.
  - b. Technical Specifications 3.5.F.1 and 3.5.F.2 are met.
4. With no reactor coolant system recirculation loops in operation:
  - a. Comply with Technical Specifications 3.5.F.1 and 3.5.F.2 by inserting control rods and then comply with specifications 3.6.A.2 and 3.5.F.3 for operation with only one recirculation loop in operation,  
  
OR
  - b. The reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown within 12 hours.

3.5/4.5

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Bases 3.5/4.5 continued:

#### F. Recirculation System

The reactor is designed such that thermal hydraulic oscillations are prevented or can be readily detected and suppressed without exceeding specified fuel design limits. To minimize the likelihood of a thermal-hydraulic instability, a power-flow exclusion region, to be avoided during normal operation, is calculated using the approved methodology as stated in specification 6.7.A.7. Since the exclusion region may change each fuel cycle the limits are contained in the Core Operating Limits Report. Specific directions are provided to avoid operation in this region and to immediately exit upon an entry. Entries into the exclusion region are not part of normal operation. An entry may occur as the result of an abnormal event such as a single recirculation pump trip. In these events, operation in the exclusion region may be needed to prevent equipment damage, but actual time spent inside the exclusion region is minimized. Though operator action can prevent the occurrence and protect the reactor from an instability, the APRM flow biased scram function will suppress oscillations prior to exceeding the fuel safety limit.

Power distribution controls are established to ensure the reactor is operated within the bounds of the stability analysis. With these controls in place, there is confidence that an oscillation will not occur outside of the stability exclusion region. Without these controls, it is theoretically possible to operate the reactor in such a manner as to cause an oscillation outside of the exclusion region. A nominal 5% power-flow buffer region outside of the exclusion region is provided to establish a stability margin to the analytically defined exclusion region. The buffer region may be entered only when the power distribution controls are in place.

Continuous operation with one recirculation loop was analyzed and the adjustments specified in specification 3.5.F.2 were determined by NEDO-24271, June 1980, "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Single Loop Operation". Specification 3.6.A.2 governs the restart of the pump in an idle recirculation loop. Adherence to this specification limits the probability of excessive flux transients and/or thermal stresses.

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24, 47, 70, 97

### 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

#### 3.11 REACTOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES

##### Applicability

The Limiting Conditions for Operation associated with the fuel rods apply to those parameters which monitor the fuel rod operating conditions.

##### Objective

The objective of the Limiting Conditions for Operation is to assure the performance of the fuel rods.

##### Specifications

##### A. Average Planar Linear Heat Generating Ratio (APLHGR)

During two recirculation loop power operation, the APLHGR for each type of fuel as a function of average planar exposure shall not exceed the applicable limiting values specified in the Core Operating Limits Report. When hand calculations are required, the APLHGR for each type of fuel as a function of average planar exposure shall not exceed the limiting value for the most limiting lattice (excluding natural uranium) provided in the Core Operating Limits Report.

During one recirculation loop power operation, the APLHGR limiting condition for operation for each type of fuel shall not exceed the most limiting of:

- a. The above values multiplied by 0.85, or
- b. The above values multiplied by the appropriate flow and power dependent correction factors provided in the Core Operating Limits Report.

If at any time during power operation, it is determined that the APLHGR limiting condition for operation is being exceeded, action shall be initiated within 15 minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. Surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation is within the prescribed limits. If the APLHGR is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two hours, reduce thermal power to less than 25% within the next four hours.

3.11/4.11

### 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

#### 4.11 REACTOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES

##### Applicability

The Surveillance Requirements apply to the parameters which monitor the fuel rod operating conditions.

##### Objective

The objective of the Surveillance Requirements is to specify the type and frequency of surveillance to be applied to the fuel rods.

##### Specifications

##### A. Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR)

The APLHGR for each type of fuel as a function of average planar exposure shall be determined daily during reactor operation at  $\geq 25\%$  rated thermal power.

Amendment No.  
34, 70, 88, 97

211

7. Core Operating Limits Report

- a. Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the Core Operating Limits Report before each reload cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

Rod Block Monitor Operability Requirements (Specification 3.2.C.2a)  
Rod Block Monitor Upscale Trip Settings (Table 3.2.3, Item 4.a)  
Recirculation System Power to Flow Map Stability Regions (Specification 3.5.F)  
Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate Limits (Specification 3.11.A)  
Linear Heat Generation Ratio Limits (Specification 3.11.B)  
Minimum Critical Power Ratio Limits (Specification 3.11.C)  
Power to Flow Map (Bases 2.3.A)

- b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, specifically those described in the following documents:

NEDE-24011-P-A, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel" (the approved version at the time the reload analyses are performed)

NSPNAD-8608-A, "Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant" (the approved version at the time the reload analyses are performed)

NSPNAD-8609-A, "Qualification of Reactor Physics Methods for Application to Monticello" (the approved version at the time the reload analyses are performed)

ANF-91-048(P)(A), "Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors-EXEM BWR Evaluation Model," Siemens Power Corporation (the approved version at the time the reload analyses are performed)

NEDO-31960, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," June 1991 (the approved version at the time the reload analyses are performed)

NEDO-31960, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," March 1992 (the approved version at the time the reload analyses are performed)

- c. The core operating limits shall be determined such that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, transient analysis limits and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.
- d. The Core Operating Limits Report, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements, shall be supplied upon issuance, for each reload cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 97 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22  
NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY  
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT  
DOCKET NO. 50-263

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 22, 1995, as supplemented August 10, 1995, and March 26, 1996, the Northern States Power Company (the licensee) requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The amendment would modify the requirements for avoidance and protection from thermal hydraulic instabilities to be consistent with the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) long-term solution Option I-D described in the Licensing Topical Report NEDO-31960, "BWR Owners Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," June 1991, and NEDO-31960, Supplement 1, dated March 1992. NEDO-31960 and Supplement 1 to NEDO-31960 were endorsed by the NRC staff in a letter to L.A. England (BWROG) dated July 12, 1993. The proposed amendment also adds the fuel cycle dependent stability power and flow limits in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) and corrects a typographical error in TS 6.7.A.7.b

The licensee's amendment request satisfied a prior commitment to the NRC. The licensee had committed to submit a plant-specific topical report demonstrating applicability of solution Option I-D as well as an implementation schedule for solution Option I-D in its response to NRC Generic Letter 94-02, "Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendation for Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactors."

The August 10, 1995, and March 26, 1996, letters provided a nonproprietary version of the topical report GENE-637-043-0295 and clarifying information, respectively. This information was within the scope of the original application and did not change the staff's initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. Therefore, renoticing was not warranted.

2.0 EVALUATION

The proposed changes include modifying the requirements for avoidance and protection from thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be consistent with the BWROG long-term solution Option I-D, and adding an exclusion region and its approved supporting methodologies to the COLR. The following describes the proposed changes.

(1) Bases 2.3.A - Neutron Flux Scram

Current basis states that the Average Power Range Monitoring (APRM) system 120% scram trip limiting safety setting specified in TS 2.3.A.1 protects against fuel damage for the analyzed abnormal operational transient, and that the use of a flow-referenced scram trip provides additional margin. The proposed change involves modifying a sentence to reflect that the flow-biased neutron flux scram (Specification 2.3.A.1) provides protection to the fuel safety limit in the unlikely event of a thermal-hydraulic instability. This change is consistent with the application of the previously approved BWROG long-term solution Option I-D, and therefore, it is acceptable.

(2) TS 3.5.F - Recirculation System

- a. TS 3.5.F.1.b, c, d, and e and Figure 3.5-1 are deleted to remove limiting condition for operation requirements for monitoring thermal-hydraulic instability during a single-loop operation and to remove the single-loop operation surveillance power/flow curve.
- b. TS 3.5.F.1.a.2 is modified to specify that the MAPLHGR [maximum average planar linear heat generation rate] limit is modified per TS 3.11.A and is renumbered TS 3.5.F.3.a.2.
- c. The existing TS 3.5.F.1 is renumbered as TS 3.5.F.3.
- d. TS 3.5.F.1 and 3.5.F.2 are added to exclude normal plant operation in the analytically defined exclusion region to be specified in the COLR. TS 3.5.F.4 is also added to account for the condition with no reactor coolant system recirculation loops in operation. The proposed addition to the TS requires that the exclusion region is to be avoided and will be immediately exited should inadvertent entry occur, in order to avoid challenges to the safety limit on minimum critical power ratio.

These changes are consistent with the application of the BWROG long-term solution Option I-D, and therefore, they are acceptable.

- (3) Surveillance Requirements 4.5.F.2 and 4.5.F.3 are deleted to remove the requirements to obtain baseline neutron flux noise data for single loop operation. These changes are consistent with the application of the BWROG long-term solution Option I-D, and therefore, they are acceptable.

(4) Bases 3.5/4.5.F - Recirculation System

The Bases have been revised to reflect the current approach for avoiding and protecting the fuel from thermal-hydraulic instabilities. These changes are consistent with the application of the BWROG long-term solution Option I-D, and therefore, they are acceptable.

## (5) TS 3.11.A - Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Ratio (APLHGR)

This TS has been revised to clarify the use of the APLHGR correction factors applied during single-loop operation. The current TS only uses one correction factor of 0.85 and the proposed change will also include the appropriate flow- and power-dependent correction factors specified in the COLR. This change is consistent with the approved topical report NEDC-30492, "Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Monitor and Technical Specification Improvement Program for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - April 1984," and therefore, it is acceptable.

In addition, the first sentence of TS 3.11.A has been corrected to read "During two recirculation loop 'power' operation,...." Although requested in the licensee's application dated January 4, 1994, the word "power" was inadvertently omitted from TS page 211 issued with Amendment No. 88 on June 30, 1994.

## (6) TS 6.7.A.7 - Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)

- a. The proposed change in TS 6.7.A.7.b includes a correction of a typographical error for Siemens Power Corporation report ANF-91-048(P)(A) as ANF-91-0481(P)(A) and an addition of an approved topical report NEDO-31960 and NEDO-31960, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology." These proposed changes are acceptable since they involve appropriate and approved methodologies to be used.
- b. Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (Act) requires that applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses state TS and that the TS be included as a part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TS are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories including: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. The regulation also states that the Commission may include such additional TS as it finds appropriate. TS limiting conditions for operation must be established for each item meeting one or more of the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The licensee has requested that the cycle-specific power/flow exclusion region be relocated from TS Figure 3.5-1 to the COLR. The staff has reviewed the proposed change and has determined that the cycle-specific power/flow exclusion region may be modified by the licensee, without affecting nuclear safety, provided that such changes are determined using the NRC-approved methodologies specified in TS 6.7.A.7. NRC approval and a license amendment would be required prior to using a methodology other than one approved and specified in TS 6.7.A.7. Because plant operation will continue to be limited in accordance with the values of the

cycle-specific power/flow exclusion region established using NRC-approved methodologies, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable and consistent with NRC guidance contained in Generic Letter 88-16 on modifying cycle-specific parameters. The requirement to avoid operations in the exclusion region will be maintained in the revised TS 3.5.F.1, 3.5.F.2, and 3.5.F.4.

The staff has concluded, therefore, that the relocation of the power/flow exclusion region to the COLR is acceptable because its inclusion in technical specifications is not required by 10 CFR 50.36 or other regulations, and it is adequately controlled by existing TS and its inclusion in the TS is not required to avert an immediate threat to public health and safety.

Based on its review, the staff concludes that the proposed changes, including the application of the BWROG long-term solution Option I-D to the Monticello plant, relocation of the power/flow exclusion region to the COLR, and addition of the approved topical report relating to the I-D methodologies, are consistent with the previously approved generic methodology, and are therefore acceptable.

The staff is planning to perform an inspection of the implementation of these changes. This inspection will focus on the design record files for the calculations reported in the Table 4.1 of GENE-A00-04021-02 to perform an independent review.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Minnesota State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 45181). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

## 5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: T. Huang

Date: September 17, 1996