



Duke Energy

Oconee Nuclear Station
7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672

(864) 885-3107 OFFICE

(864) 885-3564 FAX

W. R. McCollum, Jr.
Vice President

March 20, 2002

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Site
Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287
Commitment Change Annual Report

Attached are descriptions of Oconee commitment changes made between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2001. These changes were made per the guidance defined in NEI 99-04. The changes to these commitments have no adverse effect on compliance with NRC rules and regulations.

If there are any questions, please contact Larry Nicholson at (864) 885-3292.

Very truly yours,

W. R. McCollum, Jr., Site Vice President
Oconee Nuclear Site

Attachment

A001

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xc: Mr. L. A. Reyes
Regional Administrator, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303

Mr. M. C. Shannon
Senior NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Site

Mr. L. N. Olshan
Senior Project Manager
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SUMMARY of COMMITMENT CHANGES

NRC Notification Required	Number	Commitment Description
Yes	2001-O-001	The change is to the commitment to GL 83-28 dated 11/4/83. The Appendix A checklist is removed from the Quality Standards Manual, NSD 307 and added to the Design Basis document for QA Condition 1.
Yes	2001-O-002	3/9/95 letter re: CCW pump flange seals will be tested on a 7 year frequency rather than six month frequency. Tests showed that all 12 seals had zero leakage, with the median time in service eight years and two seals were in service for > 10 years.
Yes	2001-O-003	NRC letters 3/7/97, 1/27/97, 4/16/98 concerning Video Badge Network Encryption. Changes to the commitment match minor modifications implemented at all three DPC nuclear sites.
Yes	2001-O-004 Rev 0 and 1	The original commitment was made in 1997 because of Unit 2 HPI injection line leak. The revised commitment states the ISI Program inspection of welds in HPI normal injection pipe can be inspected by alternate means, such as full RT and partial UT, which can still detect fine cracks caused by thermal fatigue. During the next refueling outage, the single boundary valve was replaced with two valves. The valves were placed back to back and the UT examinations cannot be performed. For the 3EOC19 outage only, the RT does not meet code geometric sharpness. All subsequent radiographs will meet the code requirements.
Yes	2001-O-005	NRC Commitment Deletion - These commitments consist of one-time corrective actions that are historical and these historical corrective actions are no longer commitments as defined in NEI 99-04. The deletion of these historical commitments has no adverse effect on compliance with NRC rules and regulations.
Yes	2001-O-006	The revised commitment states, "Dependent upon plant conditions, either the RB Emergency Sump or the Fuel Transfer Canal is capable of receiving the contents of the Borated Water Storage Tank should the tank develop a leak." The 9/6/73 correspondence dealt with the ability to prevent an uncontrolled release of refueling water which implied that the unit would be aligned for refueling. However, the original ONS commitment provided no direct reference to refueling and thus implied that the BWST can be transferred to the FTC during all modes of operation. The commitment is being revised to describe the means readily available to transfer the contents of the BWST to other locations in the event of a tank leak during any plant mode.
Yes	2001-O-007	The change allows the storage of multiple Reactor Building Emergency Sump (RBES) flanges on Unit 2 and Unit 3. This would allow for installing both flanges during NO MODE when no RBES flow path is required and simultaneously test and perform maintenance on the RBES flow paths. The basis of the commitment was that if only one flange was maintained in the Reactor Building then there would be no chance of installing both flanges during MODE 4, MODE 5 or MODE 6 which would violate Tec Specs, however the evolution is controlled by procedure.
Yes	2001-O-008	The revised commitment is that it is no longer required to manually strip non-essential loads within 30 minutes following a Station Blackout event. Calculation OSC-667 shows that room temperatures are within allowable limits without manually stripping loads.
Yes	2001-O-009	The commitment was to obtain pump runout information from the vendor. Written information will not be obtained from the vendor, however, there is information from the vendor that justifies 5 minute operation at runout conditions. Additionally, modification will install alternate isolation of the pumps which eliminates the need for the operator action to secure the pumps for runout conditions.
Yes	2001-O-010	The revised commitment states that the LPSW pumps may operate for short periods of time with inadequate NPSH. LPSW pump NPSH testing concluded that the pump can operate for approximately 2 - 4 hours with less than required NPSH.