

Brain Sheron's

Brain's second paragraph (as well as the first one) seems to imply he thinks:

RES concluded that if NRR had picked up on the crack growth rate issue, the tube (R2C5) issue would have been identified and failure prevented.

RES did not make nor imply such conclusion.

RES conclusions were that technical reviews were weak. Licensee's response and technical justifications were weak. NRR's technical review and conclusions were based on weak and questionable licensee's technical basis and as such were weak.

RES conclusions were not based on R2C5 failure.

Yes, had the licensee and the staff focused on and did well addressing crack growth rates and associated NDE uncertainties, we could have concluded that the probability of a tube leak or rupture was increased. And , the tube would have still failed!!

~~BUT~~ not for R2C5 case.

It was not identified, therefore growth rate was not applicable.

The data reflects it, therefore NDE uncertainty was not the issue.

R2C5 issues are:

Analyst did not identify crack from data.

(we agree with Brian) A crack indication in Row 2 (R2C67) did not drive Con Ed to do more

Conclusion:

Brian appears to be focusing on the tube failure and what could/should have been done to prevent it, and how that impacts the RES reviews and NRR's SE.

Answer: No direct impact. With a great licensee technical justification and a great NRR review, the failure would have still occurred. It's issue was not directly factored into the SE.

Is the task group required to address this answer?

*because . . .*

No, there are no such conclusions in the RES report to rebut.

Yes, the Team's charter could be taken to imply such.

Note: NDE technique could be taken to include data recognition and analysis.

EE/5