DISTRIBUTION
Docket
NRC PDR
Local PDR
ORB #2 Reading
KRGoller
TJCarter
RPSnaider
PWO'Connor
OELD Slewis
OI&E (5)
BJones (4)
BScharf (10)
JMcGough
ACRS (16)
OPA (CMiles)
VSTello
DRoss
TBAbernathy
JRBuchanan

Docket No. 50-263

SEP 27 1976

Northern States Power Company
ATTN: Mr. L. O. Mayer, Manager
Nuclear Support Services
414 Nicollet Mall - 8th Floor
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

Gentlemen:

In response to a portion of your request dated April 1, 1975, the Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 23 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-22 for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications to incorporate revised operability and testing requirements for the standby gas treatment system. During our review, we discussed with your staff various modifications to the changes proposed in your April 1, 1975 submittal. Your staff has agreed to these modifications, which have been incorporated.

The remainder of your April 1, 1975 request, which dealt with revisions to the Administrative Controls section of the Technical Specifications, was resolved by the issuance of License Amendment No. 17 dated March 16, 1976.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by:
Dennis L. Ziemann
Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 23 to License No. DPR-22
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

OFFICE ➤	DOR:ORB #2	DOR:ORB #2	DSE:ETSB	OELD	DOR:ORB #2	
SURNAME ➤	RPSnaider:ah	RMDiggs	JCollins	SLewis	DLZiemann	
DATE ➤	9/13/76	9/14/76	9/17/76	9/17/76	9/27/76	

Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974-526-166

cc w/enclosures:
Gerald Charnoff, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge
1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Arthur Renquist, Esquire
Vice President - Law
Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

Howard J. Vogel, Esquire
Legal Counsel
2750 Dean Parkway
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55416

Mr. Steve J. Gadler
2120 Carter Avenue
St. Paul, Minnesota 55108

Daniel L. Ficker, Esquire
Assistant City Attorney
Criminal Division
638 City Hall
St. Paul, Minnesota 55102

Mr. Kenneth Dzugan
Environmental Planning Consultant
Office of City Planner
Grace Building
421 Wabasha Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55102

Sandra S. Gardebring, Esquire
Special Assistant Attorney General
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
1935 W. County Road B2
Roseville, Minnesota 55113

Anthony Z. Roisman, Esquire
Roisman, Kessler and Cashdan
1025 15th Street, N. W., 5th Floor
Washington, D. C. 20005

The Environmental Conservation Library
Minneapolis Public Library
300 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

Mr. D. S. Douglas, Auditor
Wright County Board of Commissioners
Buffalo, Minnesota 55313

State Department of Health
ATTN: Secretary and Executive Officer
University Campus
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-263

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 23
License No. DPR-22

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated April 1, 1975, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

OFFICE ➔						
SURNAME ➔						
DATE ➔						

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Original Signed by:
Dennis L. Ziemann

Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: SEP 27 1976

OFFICE ➤						
SURNAME ➤						
DATE ➤						

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 23

PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22

DOCKET NO. 50-263

Replace existing pages listed below of the Technical Specifications with attached revised and additional pages. Changes on these pages are denoted by marginal lines.

148
149
Add Page 149a
159
160
165
166

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
6. If the specifications of 3.7.A cannot be met, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.	
B. Standby Gas Treatment System	B. Standby Gas Treatment System
1. Two separate and independent standby gas treatment system circuits shall be operable at all times when secondary containment integrity is required, except as specified in sections 3.7.B.1.(a) and (b).	1. At least once per month, initiate from the control room 3500 cfm (±10%) flow through both circuits of the standby gas treatment system. In addition:
a. After one of the standby gas treatment system circuits is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation and fuel handling is permissible only during the succeeding seven days, provided that all active components in the other standby gas treatment system shall be demonstrated to be operable within 2 hours and daily thereafter. Within 36 hours following the 7 days, the reactor shall be placed in a condition for which the standby gas treatment system is not required in accordance with Specification 3.7.C.1.(a) through (d).	a. Within 2 hours from the time that one standby gas treatment system circuit is made or found to be inoperable for any reason and daily thereafter for the next succeeding seven days, initiate from the control room 3500 cfm (±10%) flow through the operable circuit of the standby gas treatment system.

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
b. If both standby gas treatment system circuits are not operable, within 36 hours the reactor shall be placed in a condition for which the standby gas treatment system is not required in accordance with Specification 3.7.C.1.(a) through (d).	b. If both standby gas treatment system circuits are not operable within 7 days, within 36 hours verify that the conditions of Specification 3.7.C.1.(a) through (d) are satisfied.
2. Performance Requirement	2. Performance Requirement Tests
a. Periodic Requirements	a. At least once per 720 hours of system operation; or once per operating cycle, but not to exceed 18 months, whichever occurs first; or following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system while the system is operating that could contaminate the HEPA filters or charcoal adsorbers, perform the following:
(1) The results of the in-place DOP tests at 3500 cfm (±10%) on HEPA filters shall show ≤1% DOP penetration.	(1) In-place DOP test the HEPA filter banks.
(2) The results of in-place halogenated hydrocarbon tests at 3500 cfm (±10%) on charcoal banks shall show ≤1% penetration.	(2) In-place test the charcoal adsorber banks with halogenated hydrocarbon tracer.
(3) The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show ≥90% methyl iodine removal efficiency when tested at 130°C, 95% R.H.	(3) Remove one carbon test canister from the charcoal adsorber. Subject this sample to a laboratory analysis to verify methyl iodide removal efficiency.

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
b. The system shall be shown to be operable with: (1) Combined filter pressure drop $\leq$ 6 inches water. (2) Inlet heater power output $\geq$ 15kW. (3) Automatic initiation upon receipt of following inputs: (a) High drywell pressure, or (b) Reactor building ventilation plenum high radiation, or (c) Refueling floor high radiation.	b. At least once per operating cycle, but not to exceed 18 months, the following conditions shall be demonstrated for each standby gas treatment system: (1) Pressure drop across the combined filters of each standby gas treatment system circuit shall be measured at 3500 cfm ($\pm$10%) flow rate. (2) Operability of inlet heater at nominal rated power shall be verified. (3) Automatic initiation of each standby gas treatment system circuit.
3. Post Maintenance Requirements a. After any maintenance or testing that could affect the HEPA filter or HEPA filter mounting frame leak tight integrity, the results of the in-place DOP tests at 3500 cfm ($\pm$10%) on HEPA filters shall show $\leq$1% DOP penetration. b. After any maintenance or testing that could affect the charcoal adsorber leak tight integrity, the results of in-place halogenated hydrocarbon tests at 3500 cfm ($\pm$10%) on charcoal adsorber banks shall show $\leq$1% penetration.	3. Post Maintenance Testing a. After any maintenance or testing that could affect the leak tight integrity of the HEPA filters, perform in-place DOP tests on the HEPA filters. b. After any maintenance or testing that could affect the leak tight integrity of the charcoal adsorber banks, perform halogenated hydrocarbon tests on the charcoal adsorbers.

Bases Continued:

3.7 A. Primary Containment

system, leak inspections are scheduled during startup periods, when the primary system is at or near rated operating temperature and pressure. The 24-hour period to provide inerting is judged to be sufficient to perform the leak inspection and establish the required oxygen concentration. The primary containment is normally slightly pressurized during periods of reactor operation. Nitrogen used for inerting could leak out of the containment but air could not leak in to increase oxygen concentration. Once the containment is filled with nitrogen to the required concentration, no monitoring of oxygen concentration is necessary. However, at least once a week the oxygen concentration will be determined as added assurance.

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and C. Secondary Containment

The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during reactor operation, when the drywell is sealed and in service; the reactor building provides primary containment when the reactor is shutdown and the drywell is open, as during refueling. Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete containment system, secondary containment is required at all times that primary containment is required except, however, for initial fuel loading prior to initial power testing.

The standby gas treatment system is designed to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the chimney during secondary containment isolation conditions, with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the environs. One standby gas treatment system circuit is designed to automatically start upon containment isolation and to maintain the reactor building pressure at the design negative pressure so that all leakage should be in-leakage. Should one circuit fail to start, the redundant alternate standby gas treatment circuit is designed to start automatically. Each of the two circuits has 100% capacity. Only one of the two standby gas treatment system circuits is needed to cleanup the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation. If one system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance. Therefore, reactor operation or refueling operation may continue while repairs are being made. If neither circuit is operable, the plant is placed in a condition that does not require a standby gas treatment system.

Bases Continued:

3.7 B. Standby Gas Treatment System, and C. Secondary Containment

While only a small amount of particulates are released from the primary containment as a result of the loss of coolant accident, high-efficiency particulate filters before and after the charcoal filters are specified to minimize potential particulate release to the environment and to prevent clogging of the charcoal adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine to the environment. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1% bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers using halogenated hydrocarbon and a HEPA filter efficiency of at least 99% removal of DOP particulates. Laboratory carbon sample test results indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency for expected accident conditions. Operation of the standby gas treatment circuits significantly different from the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. If the performance requirements are met as specified, the calculated doses would be less than the guidelines stated in 10 CFR 100 for the accidents analyzed.

D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves

Double isolation valves are provided on lines penetrating the primary containment. Closure of one of the valves in each line would be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the pressure suppression system. Automatic initiation is required to minimize the potential leakage paths from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. Details of the isolation valves are discussed in Sections 5.2 and 7.2 of the FSAR.

---

(3) "Nuclear Safety Program Annual Progress Report for Period Ending December 31, 1966, ORNL-4071."

Bases Continued:

4.7 B. Standby Gas Treatment System, and C. Secondary Containment

Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain the design negative pressure within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the reactor building isolation valves and the standby gas treatment system. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system operational capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Standby gas treatment system inplace testing procedures will be established utilizing applicable sections of ANSI N510-1975 standard as a procedural guideline only. Redundant heaters in the standby gas treatment system room prevent moisture buildup on the adsorbent. If painting, fire, or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals, or foreign materials, the same tests and sample analysis should be performed as required for operational use. Replacement adsorbent should be qualified according to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 1 (June 1976). The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures will allow for the removal of one representative sample cartridge. The sample will be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed. If the iodine removal efficiency test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system will be replaced. High efficiency particulate filters are installed before and after the charcoal filters to prevent clogging of the carbon adsorbers and to minimize potential release of particulates to the environment. An efficiency of 99% is adequate to retain particulates that may be released to the reactor building following an accident. This will be demonstrated by inplace testing with DOP as the testing medium. Any HEPA filters found defective will be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to regulatory guide position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 1 (June 1976). Once per operating cycle demonstration of HEPA filter pressure drop, operability of inlet heaters at rated power, automatic initiation of each standby gas treatment system circuit, and leakage tests after maintenance or testing which could affect leakage, is necessary to assure system performance capability.

Bases Continued:

D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves

Those large pipes comprising a portion of the reactor coolant system whose failure could result in uncovering the reactor core are supplied with automatic isolation valves (except those lines needed for emergency core cooling system operation or containment cooling). The closure times specified herein are adequate to prevent loss of more coolant from the circumferential rupture of any of these lines outside the containment than from a steam line rupture. Therefore, this isolation valve closure time is sufficient to prevent uncovering the core.

In order to assure that the doses that may result from a steam line break do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel rod perforation resulting from the accident occur prior to closure of the main steam line isolation valves. Analyses suggest that fuel rod cladding perforations would be avoided for main steam valve closure times, including instrument delay, as long as 10.5 seconds. However, for added margin the Technical Specifications require a valve closure time of not greater than 5 seconds.

The primary containment isolation valves are highly reliable, have low service requirement, and most are normally closed. The initiating sensors and associated trip channels are also checked to demonstrate the capability for automatic isolation. Reference Section 5.2.2.4.3 and Table 5-2-3 FSAR. The test interval of once per operating cycle for automatic initiation results in a failure probability of 1.1×10^{-7} that a line will not isolate. More frequent testing for valve operability results in a more reliable system.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 23 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-263

INTRODUCTION

By a portion of a letter dated April 1, 1975, Northern States Power Company requested a change to the Technical Specifications appended to Provisional Operating License DPR-22 for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The proposed change involves:

1. Changes to the testing requirements for the standby gas treatment system (SGTS), HEPA and charcoal filters.

2. Increased testing requirements to verify performance capability of system fans.

3. Establishment of test and analysis frequency as each operating cycle (not to exceed 18 months) or after 720 hours of system operation.

4. Changes to Bases to reflect the changes of 1, 2 and 3 above and to provide further guidance on recommended filter replacement quality levels.

These proposed changes were in response to our letter dated January 7, 1975, to Northern States Power Company in which we provided guidelines for assuring high confidence that the SGTS would function reliably, when needed, at a degree of efficiency equal to or better than that assumed in the accident analysis.

EVALUATION

During our review of the proposed changes, we determined that modification of the submittal was necessary in order to fully meet the objectives discussed above. Our evaluation of the changes proposed by the licensee and modified by the staff with agreement of the licensee is as follows:

1. Specification 3.7.B.1 - This specification was changed to establish time limits for testing of the operable SGTS (should one circuit be made, or found to be, inoperable). Additionally, a time limit for single circuit operation has been added which would require the reactor to be shutdown within 36 hours should both circuits not be operable after seven days.

2. Specification 3.7.b.2.a.(3) - One major aspect of this specification is that laboratory samples are now specifically required. This clarification is necessary to reflect the fact that field testing utilizing methyl iodide analysis is not deemed satisfactory. Additionally, the requirements for testing in accordance with RDTM16-IT temperature and humidity requirements (130°C, 95% RH) are incorporated. The relative humidity (R.H.) has been increased from 70 percent to 95 percent. If the results from the carbon sample analysis under the prescribed test conditions show a methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent, we can assume that the charcoal adsorber in the SGTS from which the sample was taken would remove at least 90 percent of both inorganic and organic iodides contained in the air being filtered by the system under postulated accident conditions. The use of radioactive methyl iodide (organic iodine) as the test media assures that the capability of the charcoal to remove elemental (inorganic) iodine under postulated accident conditions will be equal to or greater than the efficiency measured under test conditions. The use of 95 percent humidity during the test will assure that the removal of organic iodine under the accident conditions will be equal to or greater than the efficiency measured under test conditions. The reduction of the relative humidity to 70 percent under accident conditions is assured by heaters in the SGTS. These removal efficiency values for the SGTS would maintain the combined thyroid dose from the postulated LOCA and post LOCA secondary containment purging within 10 CFR Part 100 guideline doses.

3. Specification 3.7.B.2.a. - An acceptable air flow rate has been specified as a range within 10 percent of design flow rate. The addition of this range places an upper as well as a lower performance limit on system flow to define a range of normal system operation. Flow rate determined to be outside of this range would indicate an abnormality which requires investigation.

4. Specification 3.7.B.3 has been added to delineate that testing which will be necessary following any maintenance which could affect the HEPA filter or HEPA filter mounting frame integrity or the charcoal adsorber leak tight integrity.

5. Specifications 4.7.B.1.a and 4.7.B.1.b delineate the requirements for testing of the single operable circuit, should one circuit be found or made to be inoperable. They also establish the requirements for shutdown of the reactor should both circuits not be fully operable within 7 days.

6. Specification 4.7.B.2 - A limitation of 18 months has been placed on the allowable time between the performance of the DOP tests for the HEPA filters, the halogenated hydrocarbon tests for the charcoal adsorbers and laboratory charcoal methyl iodide analysis. This 18 month limitation stands regardless of the length of the operating cycle. The normal operating cycle is up to 15 months but conditions could exist in which actual calendar time between refuelings could be greater. The change assures that the demonstration tests will be performed within a given period of time.

   The requirement has been added for testing after 720 hours of system operation or following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the operating Standby Gas Treatment System. The 720 hour limitation will provide for a minimum of 2 tests prior to the estimated exhaustion point of the charcoal inservice. Manufacturers' literature has estimated service life to be approximately 2000 hours. We believe the more stringent testing frequency to be warranted because of lack of conclusive data regarding service life in the Standby Gas Treatment System environment and because of the need to assure the readiness of the system at all times.

7. Specification 4.7.B.2.b - The same limitation of 18 months has been placed upon the specified demonstrations of system performance. The addition of ±10% to the system design flow rate in 4.7.B.2.b.(1) has been explained in 3. above. Specification 4.7.B.2.b.(2) has been changed to require operability of the inlet heater and Specification 4.7.B.2.b.(3) requires demonstration of the automatic initiation capability of each Standby Gas Treatment System circuit.

8. Specification 4.7.B.3 addresses the specific post-maintenance surveillance requirements for the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Adherence to the post-maintenance testing specifications will assure that the integrity of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks has not been violated.

9. Bases to 4.7.b - The bases were amended to reflect the changes mentioned in 1. through 8. above. In addition, guidance was provided to the licensee on recommended replacement of defective HEPA filters or unacceptable charcoal adsorbers in accordance with the regulatory recommendations stated in Regulatory Guide 1.52. These recommendations have been included in the bases associated with the testing specifications of the Standby Gas Treatment System.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: September 27, 1976

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-263

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 23 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-22, issued to the Northern States Power Company (the licensee), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (the facility) located in Wright County, Minnesota. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment incorporated revised operability and testing requirements for the standby gas treatment system.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated April 1, 1975, (2) Amendment No. 23 to License No. DPR-22, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Environmental Conservation Library, Minneapolis Public Library, 300 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this SEP 27 1976

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Original Signed by:
Dennis L. Ziemann

Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Operating Reactors

OFFICE ➤						
SURNAME ➤						
DATE ➤						

DETERMINATION OF PROPOSED LICENSING AMENDMENT

Licensee: Northern States Power Company (Monticello)

Request for: Changes to Appendix A of POL to incorporate revised more stringent LCO's and SR's for standby gas treatment system and to incorporate recent organizational changes in the NSP corporate structure.

Request Date: April 1, 1975

Proposed Noticing Action:
( ) Pre-notice Recommended
(X) Post-notice Recommended
( ) Determination delayed pending completion of Safety Evaluation

Basis for Decision: Meets none of the criteria of RLOP-601, Enclosure 1a, which would require pre-notice.

Proposed NEPA Action:
( ) EIS Required
( ) Negative Declaration (ND) and Environmental Impact Appraisal (EIA) Required
(X) No EIS, ND or EIA Required
( ) Determination delayed pending completion of EIA

Basis for Decision: Does not involve either a major action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment or a change in type or quantity of effluents.

Noticing Concurrences:

Date:

1. R. P. Snaider 2/6/76
2. D. L. Ziemann 2/6/76
3. for K. R. Goller 2/9/76
4. OELD S H Lewis 2/11/76