From:

To:

Steven Long, MRA-PDO, SDW1 POREMENT & Werrak Made RES

Date:

1/2/01 2:04PM

Subject:

Fwd: Risk Assessment of IP2 SGTR & Loss of Bus 6A

From:

James Trapp

To:

Brian Holian; Peter Wilson; Richard Barrett; Steven Long

Date:

12/26/00 7:07AM

Subject:

Risk Assessment of IP2 SGTR & Loss of Bus 6A

Per Steve's requested I've attached the risk evaluation completed to address this condition. I will add that since we completed this evaluation, the ASP folks have analyzed the Aug. 99 loss of bus 6A event and have significantly reduce the CCDP for this event over previous estimates by Region I and the licensee. The reason for the reduction is better estimates for recovery actions and methods which weren't included in the previous evaluations. Sunil would be your contact for the latest information regarding this analysis. To my understanding, the attached evaluation is the only attempt to assess the risk of a SGTR and the loss of bus 6A. Hope this helps! If not please give me a call 610-337-5186. Thanks

# Risk Assessment for Indian Point Unit 2 A Hypothetical Case Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

# Background:

# February 15, 2000 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture

The Indian Point Unit 2 facility experienced a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) on February 14, 2000 when a flaw in the U-bend of tube R2C5 in steam generator 24 failed. This flaw had not been detected during the last nondestructive examination of steam generator tubes because of programmatic problems. During the recovery process following the SGTR, there were no failures in equipment or operator actions that were needed to mitigate the consequences of the event.

The conditional core damage probability (CCDP) associated with this event was calculated by ConEd using their risk model as 7.7E-05. This is comparable to the CCDP of 3.3E-04 calculated using the NRC's Rev. 2-QA Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model (SPAR) for Indian Point Unit 2. Additional analysis was performed by NRR to quantify the increase in core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) that resulted from operation with the flawed steam generator tubes<sup>1</sup>. An incremental increase in CDF was calculated as 1.0E-04 per reactor year for the second year of operation. In accordance with the guidance from MC0609, Appendix H, the LERF frequency equals the CDF for a SGTR, therefor the LERF frequency for this condition is also 1.0E-04<sup>2</sup>. Risk was dominated by the probability of human error in identifying and isolating the faulted steam generator and depressurizing the reactor coolant system to below the steam generator safety valve pressure.

### August 31, 1999 - Reactor Trip and Loss of Safeguards Electrical Power

The Indian Point Unit 2 facility also experienced a reactor trip prior to the SGTR on August 31, 1999. This trip was complicated by the loss of the 6A 480 volt ac safeguards electrical bus and the subsequent loss of the 24 battery. The loss of the 6A bus resulted in the loss of some emergency core cooling equipment including: one of the two motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) trains, one of three high pressure injection trains, one of two high pressure recirculation trains, one of two residual heat removal trains and loss of power to one of the two normally closed PORV block valves.

The CCDP associated with this event was calculated as 2.0E-04 by the NRR Operations support team (OST). Risk was dominated by the failure probabilities of the one remaining motor driven AFW pump, the turbine driven AFW pump and the probability for non-recovery of main feedwater. Had auxiliary feedwater failed, core damage could normally be prevented through use of primary bleed and feed. The success for reactor coolant system bleed and feed requires

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Subsequent examination determined that other tubes had not been detected during the examination preformed prior to the SGTR event.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Reference: memorandum Barrett to Blough, dated May 4, 2000

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

flow through both power operated relief valves (PORVs). However, flow through one of the PORVs was prevented because its normally closed block valve receives power from electrical bus 6A.

The CDF calculated using the NRC's Rev. 2-QA Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model (SPAR) for Indian Point Unit 2 was somewhat less than that calculated by the OST. The Rev 2-QA SPAR³ model calculated a CCDP for this event of 4.9E-05. The difference being that the SPAR model uses industry average basic event equipment failure data where the OST used data from the IP-2 individual plant evaluation (IPE) without including credit for equipment recovery.

# **Risk Analysis of Concurrent Events:**

This analysis constructed a hypothetical event, a SGTR, for which the recovery was complicated by failures in the electrical distribution system similar to those experienced during the August 31 event. Risk would increase because of the loss of safety related equipment and also because of the additional challenges to the operators. The August 31 event proved difficult for the ConEd organization to analyze and react to in a timely manner.

The August 31st event was initiated following a normal reactor trip that was complicated by actuation of safeguards bus undervoltage protective devices. A switchyard transformer tap changer was in its manual mode for an extended period. The event would have been a routine reactor trip had the tap changer been in automatic mode. Following the loss of self generation, safeguards 480 volt ac bus voltage sagged because of plant distribution system impedance. Protective instrumentation started all three emergency diesel generators (EDGs). When the diesel generators were ready to load, their output breakers were closed onto the three safeguards electrical buses. However, the generator output breaker to bus 6A tripped open on overload. Subsequent investigation found issues with the overcurrent trip device calibration process, including the type of equipment used for this activity. Although the process deficiencies may have resulted in a common cause failure of all three EDG output breakers, only one of the breakers' overcurrent trip point was set low enough to cause an overcurrent trip. The above referenced risk analysis for this event did not include recovery of the EDG, recovery of offsite power or activation of the station blackout cross-connection from Unit 1. Recovery was not considered because it is a complex process and the licensee's organization performed poorly during follow-up to the event as evidenced by their allowing a station battery to discharge to the point of cell reversal.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The IP-2 Rev 2-QA SPAR model was corrected to reflect the normally CLOSED position of the PORV block valves and was revised to credit operator recovery of the RHR suction path MOVs for shutdown cooling. The SPAR model human error recovery process was used to calculate the HRA for this recovery action as 2.0E-03 after consultation with RI operator licensing personnel.

# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

In reviewing the circumstances of these two events, it is clear that the causes for the August 31<sup>st</sup> event may not have revealed themselves until the SGTR event had there not been the earlier reactor trip. If that were the case, the SGTR recovery would have become complicated by the loss of power to important emergency safeguards equipment. A SGTR is a significant challenge to operators who would then have to cope with additional degraded plant equipment.

A risk assessment was performed of this hypothetical event, this assessment imposed the bus 6A electrical failures on to the SGTR event analysis. The CCDP was calculated using the NRC's Rev. 2-QA SPAR as 3.8E-04. The probability for core damage was dominated by the failure to identify and isolate the faulted steam generator and the failure to depressurize the RCS. This assessment did not calculate new human error probabilities for actions needed to recover from a SGTR. The loss of the 6A 480 volt electrical bus is expected to increase these failure probabilities because it complicates the recovery and causes additional stress to the operators. A copy of this analysis is Attachment 1.

# Effect of Concurrent Events on Human Reliability Analysis

Additional stress may have affected the Indian Point Unit 2 plant operators performance if bus 6A had failed during the SGTR. This increase stress level was accounted for in an additional risk analysis that used recalculated human error probabilities for four of the five operator tasks associated with the SGTR top events:

RCS-SG Depressurize RCS to below SG RV setpoint
DEP-REC Operator depressurizes the RCS after SG RV lift

SGISOL Ruptured SG isolated

THROTTLE Throttle HPI to reduce pressure RCS-DEP Depressurize RCS to RHR entry

The human error values for these five tasks were originally derived for the Rev. 2-QA SPAR models from sources such as the Surry facility NUREG 1150 study<sup>4</sup>, plant IPE's and the NRC Daily Events Manual. These values were recalculated using the Rev. 3i SPAR Model Human Error Worksheets. For each case, the "Stress" shaping factor associated with task diagnosis or action was set to "Extreme". The following summarizes these changes:

Event Name	Task Description	Original Value	Re-Calculated Value
HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	Operator fails to throttle HPI flow to reduce RCS pressure	1.0E-02 Surry 1150	5.0E-03
MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	Operator fails to isolate faulted steam generator	1.0E-03 San Onfre IPE	5.0E-03

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Analysis of Core Damage frequency: Surry Unit 1, Internal Events, NUREG/CR-4550

# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL	Operator fails to initiate RCS cooldown below SDC	1.0E-03 Daily Events Manual	no change
RCS-XHE-DIAG	Operator fails to diagnose SGTR and start procedures	6.8E-03 Surry 1150	2.1E-02
RCS-XHE-RECOVER	Operator fails to depressurize RCS below SG SRV given SG RV opens	3.5E-03 Surry 1150	5.0E-03
RCS-XHE-XM-SG	Operator fails to initiate RCS depressurization	2.1E-02 Surry 1150	5.0E-03

The CCDP for a SGTR with a loss of the 6A 480 volt electrical bus and re-calculated human error failure probabilities is 4.6E-04. A copy of this risk assessment is Attachment 2. Again, the probability for core damage was dominated by the failure to identify and isolate the faulted steam generator and the failure to depressurize the RCS. The table below lists the human error tasks and the contribution to the CDF from cut sets that the tasks are included.

Event Name	Task Description	Contributi	on to CDF
RCS-XHE-RECOVER	Operator fails to depressurize RCS below SG SRV given SG RV opens	1.6E-04	33.6%
RCS-XHE-DIAG	Operator fails to diagnose SGTR and start procedures	1.1E-04	23.8%
MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	Operator fails to isolate faulted steam generator	7.8E-05	16.9%
RCS-XHE-XM-SG	Operator fails to initiate RCS depressurization	2.6E-05	5.7%
HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL Operator fails to throttle HPI flow to reduce RCS pressure		5.7%
PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL Operator fails to initiate RCS cooldow below SDC		1.5E-05	3.4%

Completed by: Tom Shedlosky

Reviewed by: Jim Trapp Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident Office Seems 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

#### INITIATING EVENT ASSESSMENT

Code Ver : 6:68

Fam : IPT2 2QA

Model Ver : 1998/04/14 Init Event: IE-SGTR

User :

Ev ID: SGTR W/BUS 6A OOS

Total CCDP: 3.8E-004

Desc : Initiating Event Assessment

#### BASIC EVENT CHANGES

Event Name Type	Description	Base Prob	Curr Prob	
ACP-BAC-LP-6A	DIVISION 6A AC POWER 480V BU	9.0E-005	1.0E+000	TRUE
IE-LOOP	LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIA	3.1E-005	+0.0E+000	
IE-SGTR	STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE	1.6E-006	1.0E+000	
IE-SLOCA	SMALL LOCA INITIATING EVENT	2.3E-006	+0.0E+000	
IE-TRANS	TRANSIENT INITIATING EVENT	2.7E-004	+0.0E+000	

### SEQUENCE PROBABILITIES

Truncation: Cummulative: 100.0% Individual: 1.0%

Event Tree Name %Cont	Sequence Name	CCDP
w		
SGTR	11	1.3E-004
34.2		
SGTR	03	1.2E-004
31.6		
SGTR	43	5.7E-005
15.0		
SGTR	04	4.4E-005
11.6		
SGTR	05	1.0E-005
2.6		
SGTR	44	5.5E-006
1.5		
SGTR	08	4.6E-006
1.2		

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#### SEQUENCE LOGIC

Event Tree Sequence Name Logic

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6Atrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

						<del>-</del>
SGTR		11	/RT /HPI DEP-REC	/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG		
SGTR		03	/RT /HPI /SG-DEP /RCS-DEP	/AFW-SGTR /RCS-SG SGISOL RHR		
SGTR		43	/RT MFW-NT	AFW-SGTR F&B		
SGTR		04	/RT /HPI /SG-DEP	/AFW-SGTR /RCS-SG SGISOL		
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Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

SGTR	05	/RT /HPI SG-DEP	/AFW-SGTR /RCS-SG
SGTR	44	RT	
SGTR	08	/RT /HPI /DEP-REC SGISOL1 RHR	/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG /SG-DEP /RCS-DEP
Fault Tree Na	me 	Description	
AFW-SGTR DEP-REC SR F&B HPI MFW-NT TRANS RCS-DEP RCS-SG SETP RHR RT SG-DEP SETPO SGISOL SGISOL1		NO OR INSUFFICIENT AFW FLOW OPERATOR FAILS TO DEPRESSURI FAILURE TO PROVIDE FEED AND NO OR INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM FAILURE OF THE MAIN FEEDWATE FAILURE TO COOLDOWN RCS TO < OPERATOR FAILS TO LOWER RCS NO OR INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM REACTOR FAILS TO TRIP DURING HARDWARE FAILS TO LOWER RCS FAILURE TO ISOLATE RUPTURED FAILURE TO DEPRESSURIZE RCS	ZE RCS GIVEN SG ADV OR  BLEED COOLING THE HPI SYSTEM R SYSTEM DURING NON- RHR PRESSURE PRESSURE TO < SG RV THE RHR SYSTEM TRANSIENT PRESSURE TO < SG RV  SG BEFORE RWST DEPLETION

RCS-DEP

# SEQUENCE CUT SETS

Truncation: Cummulative: 100.0% Individual: 1.0%

Event Tree: SGTR

CCDP: 1.3E-004

Sequence: 11

CCDP % Cut Set Events

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Generator Tube Rupture			Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2	Attachment 1
7.4E-005	55.6	RCS-XHE-RECOVER SGTR-11-NREC	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
3.5E-005	26.5	RCS-XHE-RECOVER SGTR-11-NREC	HPI-XHE-XM-THRT	L
2.4E-005	18.0	RCS-XHE-RECOVER SGTR-11-NREC	RCS-XHE-DIAG	

# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Seem Seem Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2

Attachment 1

Event Tree: SGTR Sequence: 03

CCDP: 1.2E-004

CCDP	% Cut Set		Set	Events
3.8E-005	31.7	RHR-MDP-FC-2B		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
		SGTR-03-NREC		
3.0E-005	25.0	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
		SGTR-03-NREC		
2.0E-005	16.7	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		RHR-XHE-SUCTION
		SGTR-03-NREC		
1.0E-005	8.3	RHR-XHE-XM		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
		SGTR-03-NREC		
5.6E-006	4.7	RHR-MDP-CF-ALL		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
		SGTR-03-NREC		
3.8E-006	3.2	RHR-MDP-FC-2B		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR
		SGTR-03-NREC		
3.0E-006	2.5	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR
		SGTR-03-NREC		
2.6E-006	2.2	RHR-MOV-CF-DIS		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
		SGTR-03-NREC		
2.0E-006	1.7	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		RHR-XHE-SUCTION
		SGTR-03-NREC		
1.4E-006	1.2	RHR-MOV-OC-VLV		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
		SGTR-03-NREC		
Event	Tree: SGTR			CCDP: 5.7E-005
Sequen	ice: 43			
	% Cut Set		 	Events
- 2.8E-005	49.0	AFW-MDP-FC-21		AFW-TDP-FC-22
2.00 003	15.0	SGTR-43-NREC		111 131 10 22
1.2E-005	21.3	AFW-PMP-CF-ALL		SGTR-43-NREC
7.9E-006	13.8	AFW-TDP-FC-22		AFW-AOV-CC-MSG21
		SGTR-43-NREC		
4.0E-006	7.0	AFW-AOV-CF-SGS		SGTR-43-NREC
1.5E-006	2.6	AFW-MDP-CF-AB		AFW-TDP-FC-22
		SGTR-43-NREC		
7.2E-007	1.3	AFW-TDP-FC-22		AFW-CKV-CC-SG21
		SGTR-43-NREC		

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A trickal Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

6.5E-007	1.1	AFW-TDP-FC-22	ACP-BAC-LP-2-3A
		SGTR-43-NREC	
5.9E-007	1.0	AFW-CKV-CF-SUCT	SGTR-43-NREC
5.9E-007	1.0	AFW-CKV-CF-SGS-S	SGTR-43-NREC
5.9E-007	1.0	AFW-CKV-CF-PMPS	SGTR-43-NREC

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# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6Atrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Schere Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

	ree: SGTR e: 04				CCDP: 4.4E-005
CCDP	% Cut Set				Events
_					
3.0E-005	68.2	PCS-VCF-HW SGTR-04-NREC			MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
1.0E-005	22.7	PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL SGTR-04-NREC			MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
3.0E-006	6.8	PCS-VCF-HW SGTR-04-NREC			MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR
1.0E-006	2.3	PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL SGTR-04-NREC			MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR
	ree: SGTR ee: 05				CCDP: 1.0E-005
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut	Set	Events
1.0E-005	100.0	PCS-PSF-HW			SGTR-05-NREC
	Tree: SGTR ce: 44				CCDP: 5.5E-006
CCDP	% Cut Set				Events
_					
4.3E-006	77.8	RPS-XHE-XM-SCRAM SGTR-44-NREC			RPS-VCF-FO-ELEC
1.1E-006	20.6	RPS-BKR-FC-FTO SGTR-44-NREC			RPS-XHE-ERROR
8.9E-008	1.6	RPS-VCF-FO-MECH			SGTR-44-NREC
	Tree: SGTR				CCDP: 4.6E-006
Sequenc	ce: 08				
	% Cut Set			Set	Events
- 8.0E-007	17.4	RHR-MDP-FC-2B MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL			RCS-XHE-XM-SG SGTR-08-NREC

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6.3E-007	13.7	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
4.2E-007	9.2	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	
		RHR-XHE-SUCTION	SGTR-08-NREC	
3.8E-007	8.3	RHR-MDP-FC-2B	HPI-XHE-XM-THRT	L
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
3.0E-007	6.5	RHR-MOV-00-RWST	HPI-XHE-XM-THRT	L
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
2.6E-007	5.6	RHR-MDP-FC-2B	RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
2.1E-007	4.6	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	RHR-XHE-XM	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
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2.0E-007	4.5	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
2.0E-007	4.4	HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	
		RHR-XHE-SUCTION	SGTR-08-NREC	
1.4E-007	3.0	RCS-XHE-DIAG	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	
		RHR-XHE-SUCTION	SGTR-08-NREC	
1.2E-007	2.6	RHR-MDP-CF-ALL	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
1.0E-007	2.2	HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	RHR-XHE-XM	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
8.0E-008	1.7	RHR-MDP-FC-2B	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	SGTR-08-NREC	
6.8E-008	1.5	RCS-XHE-DIAG	RHR-XHE-XM	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
6.3E-008	1.4	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	SGTR-08-NREC	
5.6E-008	1.2	RHR-MDP-CF-ALL	HPI-XHE-XM-THRTI	1
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
5.5E-008	1.2	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	RHR-MOV-CF-DIS	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	

# BASIC EVENTS (Cut Sets Only)

Event Name Prob	Description	Curr
ACP-BAC-LP-2-3A	DIVISION 2A/3A AC POWER 480V BUS FAILS	9.0E-
AFW-AOV-CC-MSG21 003	SG-21 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 406A FAILS	1.1E-
AFW-AOV-CF-SGS 005	CCF OF STEAM GENERATOR INLET AOVS (FCVS)	1.9E-
AFW-CKV-CC-SG21 004	STEAM GENERATOR 21 INLET CHECK VALVE FAILS	1.0E-
AFW-CKV-CF-PMPS	CCF OF AFW PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES	2.7E-
AFW-CKV-CF-SGS-S 006	CCF OF SG INLET CHECK VALVES - SGTR	2.7E-
AFW-CKV-CF-SUCT	CCF OF AFW PUMP SUCTION CHECK VALVES	2.7E-
AFW-MDP-CF-AB	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF MOTOR DRIVEN PUMPS	2.1E-
AFW-MDP-FC-21	AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP 21 FAILS	3.9E-
AFW-PMP-CF-ALL	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF AFW PUMPS	5.6E-

# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A triceal Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Scheme Electric RipBus 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

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Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

005		
AFW-TDP-FC-22 002	AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP 22 FAILS	3.3E-
HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE HPI TO REDUCE PRES	1.0E-
MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION FAILURES	1.0E-
MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	OPERATOR FAILS TO ISOLATE FAULTED STEAM GENER	1.0E-
PCS-PSF-HW	HARDWARE FAILURES CAUSING FAILURE TO DEPRESSU	1.0E-
PCS-VCF-HW	TBVS/COND/CIR FAILURES	3.0E-
PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE RCS COOLDOWN BELOW	1.0E-
RCS-XHE-DIAG	OPERATOR FAILS TO DIAGNOSE SGTR TO START PROC	6.8E-
RCS-XHE-RECOVER	OPERATOR FAILS TO DEPRESSURIZE RCS BELOW SG S	3.5E-
RCS-XHE-XM-SG	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE RCS DEPRESSURIZATI	2.1E-
RHR-MDP-CF-ALL	RHR PUMP COMMON CAUSE FAILURES	5.6E-
RHR-MDP-FC-2B	RHR TRAIN B FAILS	3.8E-
RHR-MOV-CF-DIS	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RHR DISCHARGE MOVS	2.6E-
RHR-MOV-OC-VLV	RHR DISCHARGE VALVE FAILS	1.4E-
004 RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	RHR/RWST ISOLATION MOV FAILS	3.0E-
003 RHR-XHE-SUCTION 003	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER RHR SUCTION PATH	2.0E-

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1.0E+000

Attachment 1

# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Sense Electrical Bus 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Event Name Prob	Description	Curr
<b></b>		
RHR-XHE-XM	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE RHR SYSTEM	1.0E-
003		
RPS-BKR-FC-FTO	RPS BREAKERS FAIL TO OPEN	5.7E-
006		
RPS-VCF-FO-ELEC	CONTROL ROD DRIVES REMAIN ENERGIZED	4.3E-
004		
RPS-VCF-FO-MECH	CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLIES FAIL TO INSERT	8.9E-
008		
RPS-XHE-ERROR	OPERATOR FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE MG SETS	2.0E-
001		
RPS-XHE-XM-SCRAM	OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY TRIP THE REACTOR	1.0E-
002		
SGTR-03-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 03 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
1.0E+000		
SGTR-04-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 04 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
1.0E+000		
SGTR-05-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 05 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
1.0E+000		
SGTR-08-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 08 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
1.0E+000		
SGTR-11-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 11 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
1.0E+000		
SGTR-43-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 43 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	2.2E-
001		
SGTR-44-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 44 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2

Attachment 1

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# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident Office State of State Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

#### INITIATING EVENT ASSESSMENT

Code Ver : 6:68

Fam : IPT2\_2QA

Model Ver : 1998/04/14 Init Event: IE-SGTR

User :

Ev ID: SGTR W/BUS 6A OOS

Total CCDP: 4.6E-004

Desc : Initiating Event Assessment

#### BASIC EVENT CHANGES

Event Name Type	Description	Base Prob	Curr Prob
ACP-BAC-LP-6A	DIVISION 6A AC POWER 480V BU	9.0E-005	1.0E+000 TRUE
HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE H	1.0E-002	5.0E-003
IE-LOOP	LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIA	3.1E-005	+0.0E+000
IE-SGTR	STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE	1.6E-006	1.0E+000
IE-SLOCA	SMALL LOCA INITIATING EVENT	2.3E-006	+0.0E+000
IE-TRANS	TRANSIENT INITIATING EVENT	2.7E-004	+0.0E+000
MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	OPERATOR FAILS TO ISOLATE FA	1.0E-003	5.0E-003
RCS-XHE-DIAG	OPERATOR FAILS TO DIAGNOSE S	6.8E-003	2.1E-002
RCS-XHE-RECOVER	OPERATOR FAILS TO DEPRESSURI	3.5E-003	5.0E-003
RCS-XHE-XM-SG	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE R	2.1E-002	5.0E-003

#### SEQUENCE PROBABILITIES

Truncation : Cummulative :	100.0%	Individual	:	0.0%
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Event Tree Name %Cont	Sequence Name	CCDP
	,	
SGTR	03	1.6E-004
34.8		
SGTR	11	1.6E-004
34.8		
SGTR	04	6.0E-005
13.0		
SGTR	43	5.7E-005
12.4		

Risk Assessment - Loss of Safeguards Electrical Coincident With a Seath Sent Coincident with a S	Indian Point 2 Bus 6A SELPATrical Bus 6A Steam Generator Tube Rupture	Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1
SGTR	0.5	1.0E-005
2.2		
SGTR 1.2	44	5.5E-006
SGTR	08	5.1E-006
1.1		
SGTR	13	3.4E-006
0.7 SGTR	09	1.9E-006
0.4		1.51 000
SGTR	10	3.1E-007
0.1 SGTR	1.0	0.00.000
0.0	16	8.8E-008
SGTR	18	2.9E-008
0.0		
SGTR 0.0	14	2.2E-009
SGTR	17	5.8E-011
0.0		
SEQUENCE	E LOGIC	
	quence Name	Logic
 aamp 0.3	/pm	/ARW COMP
SGTR 03	/RT /HPI	/AFW-SGTR /RCS-SG
	/RFI /SG-DEP	SGISOL
	/ 5G-DEF	201201
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Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2
Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincides Whit a stephil sells and Principal Bus 6A
Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Comordent with a Otean Cenerator Tube Napture

KISK	Assessment - Indian Point 2	Attachment 1

		/RCS-DEP	RHR
SGTR	11	/RT /HPI DEP-REC	/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG
SGTR	04	/RT /HPI /SG-DEP RCS-DEP	/AFW-SGTR /RCS-SG SGISOL
SGTR	43	/RT MFW-NT	AFW-SGTR F&B
SGTR	05	/RT /HPI SG-DEP	/AFW-SGTR /RCS-SG
SGTR	44	RT	
SGTR	08	/RT /HPI /DEP-REC SGISOL1 RHR	/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG /SG-DEP /RCS-DEP
SGTR	13	/RT HPI /SG-DEP	/AFW-SGTR /RCS-SG1 SGISOL
SGTR	09	/RT /HPI /DEP-REC SGISOL1	/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG /SG-DEP RCS-DEP
SGTR	10	/RT /HPI /DEP-REC	/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG SG-DEP
SGTR	16	/RT HPI /DEP-REC SGISOL1	/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG1 /SG-DEP
SGTR	18	/RT HPI DEP-REC	/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG1

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A trickal Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

SGTR

14

/RT

HPI SG-DEP /AFW-SGTR

/RCS-SG1

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page

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Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident Ohn Asternia and Principal Bus 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

SGTR

17

/RT

/AFW-SGTR RCS-SG1

HPI /DEP-REC

SG-DEP

Fault Tree Name

Description

AFW-SGTR NO OR INSUFFICIENT AFW FLOW DURING SGTR

DEP-REC OPERATOR FAILS TO DEPRESSURIZE RCS GIVEN SG ADV OR

SR F&B

FAILURE TO PROVIDE FEED AND BLEED COOLING NO OR INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM THE HPI SYSTEM HPI

MFW-NT FAILURE OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM DURING NON-

TRANS

FAILURE TO COOLDOWN RCS TO < RHR PRESSURE RCS-DEP

OPERATOR FAILS TO LOWER RCS PRESSURE TO < SG RV RCS-SG

SETP

OPERATOR FAILS TO LOWER RCS PRESSURE TO < SG RV RCS-SG1

SETPO

RHR NO OR INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM THE RHR SYSTEM

RT REACTOR FAILS TO TRIP DURING TRANSIENT

HARDWARE FAILS TO LOWER RCS PRESSURE TO < SG RV SG-DEP

SETPO

SGISOL FAILURE TO ISOLATE RUPTURED SG BEFORE RWST DEPLETION

SGISOL1 FAILURE TO DEPRESSURIZE RCS TO ISOLATE SG

#### SEQUENCE CUT SETS

Truncation: Cummulative: 100.0% Individual: 1.0%

Event Tree: SGTR

CCDP: 1.6E-004

Sequence: 03

CCDP	% Cut Set	Cu	ut Set Events
3.8E-005	23.3	RHR-MDP-FC-2B	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
		SGTR-03-NREC	
3.0E-005	18.4	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
		SGTR-03-NREC	

Risk Assessm Loss of Safeguards Elect Coincident With a Steam Coincident wit	ent - Indian P ctrical Bus 6A 13 GB FUP FIFE h a Steam Ge	oint 2 ap Bus 6A enerator Tube Rupture	Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2	Attachment 1
2.0E-005	12.2	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL SGTR-03-NREC	RHR-XHE-SUCTION	
1.9E-005	11.6	RHR-MDP-FC-2B SGTR-03-NREC	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	
1.5E-005	9.2	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	
1.0E-005	6.1	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR SGTR-03-NREC	RHR-XHE-SUCTION	
1.0E-005	6.1	RHR-XHE-XM SGTR-03-NREC	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	
5.6E-006	3.4	RHR-MDP-CF-ALL SGTR-03-NREC	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	
5.0E-006	3.1	RHR-XHE-XM SGTR-03-NREC	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	
2.8E-006	1.7	RHR-MDP-CF-ALL SGTR-03-NREC	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	
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Attachment 1

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2

Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coinchiem With a secul sens attended to the Coinchiem With a secul sens attended to the Coinchiem C Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.6E-006 1.6 RHR-MOV-CF-DIS MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL SGTR-03-NREC CCDP: 1.6E-004 Event Tree: SGTR Sequence: 11 % Cut Set Cut Set Events CCDP 67.7 RCS-XHE-RECOVER RCS-XHE-DIAG 1.1E-004 SGTR-11-NREC RCS-XHE-XM-SG 2.5E-005 16.1 RCS-XHE-RECOVER SGTR-11-NREC HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL 2.5E-005 16.1 RCS-XHE-RECOVER SGTR-11-NREC CCDP: 6.0E-005 Event Tree: SGTR Sequence: 04 CCDP % Cut Set Cut Set Events 3.0E-005 50.0 PCS-VCF-HW MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL SGTR-04-NREC 25.0 MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR PCS-VCF-HW 1.5E-005 SGTR-04-NREC MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL 1.0E-005 16.7 PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL SGTR-04-NREC PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR 5.0E-006 8.3 SGTR-04-NREC Event Tree: SGTR CCDP: 5.7E-005 Sequence: 43 Cut Set Events CCDP % Cut Set 2.8E-005 49.0 AFW-MDP-FC-21 AFW-TDP-FC-22 SGTR-43-NREC 1.2E-005 21.3 AFW-PMP-CF-ALL SGTR-43-NREC 7.9E-006 13.8 AFW-TDP-FC-22 AFW-AOV-CC-MSG21 SGTR-43-NREC 7.0 SGTR-43-NREC 4.0E-006 AFW-AOV-CF-SGS AFW-MDP-CF-AB AFW-TDP-FC-22 1.5E-006 2.6

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Senerator Tube Rupture Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture		Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1		
		SGTR-43-NREC		
7.2E-007	1.3	AFW-TDP-FC-22	AFW-CKV-CC-SG21	
		SGTR-43-NREC		
6.5E-007	1.1	AFW-TDP-FC-22	ACP-BAC-LP-2-3A	
		SGTR-43-NREC		
5.9E-007	1.0	AFW-CKV-CF-SUCT	SGTR-43-NREC	
5.9E-007	1.0	AFW-CKV-CF-SGS-S	SGTR-43-NREC	
5.9E-007	1.0	AFW-CKV-CF-PMPS	SGTR-43-NREC	
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# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Connection Tube Rupture Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

	Tree: SGTR ce: 05				CCDP: 1.0E-005
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut	Set	Events
- 1.0E-005	100.0	PCS-PSF-HW			SGTR-05-NREC
	Tree: SGTR ce: 44				CCDP: 5.5E-006
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut	Set	Events
- 4.3E-006	77.8	RPS-XHE-XM-SCRAM SGTR-44-NREC			RPS-VCF-FO-ELEC
1.1E-006	20.6	RPS-BKR-FC-FTO SGTR-44-NREC			RPS-XHE-ERROR
8.9E-008	1.6	RPS-VCF-FO-MECH			SGTR-44-NREC
	Tree: SGTR ce: 08				CCDP: 5.1E-006
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut	Set	Events
8.0E-007	15.6	RHR-MDP-FC-2B MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL			RCS-XHE-DIAG SGTR-08-NREC
6.3E-007	12.3	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL			RCS-XHE-DIAG SGTR-08-NREC
4.2E-007	8.2	RCS-XHE-DIAG RHR-XHE-SUCTION			MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL SGTR-08-NREC
4.0E-007	7.8	RHR-MDP-FC-2B MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR			RCS-XHE-DIAG SGTR-08-NREC
3.2E-007	6.2	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST			RCS-XHE-DIAG
2.1E-007	4.1	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR RCS-XHE-DIAG MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL			SGTR-08-NREC RHR-XHE-XM SGTR-08-NREC
2.1E-007	4.1	RCS-XHE-DIAG RHR-XHE-SUCTION			MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR SGTR-08-NREC
1.9E-007	3.7	RHR-MDP-FC-2B			HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL
1.9E-007	3.7	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL RHR-MDP-FC-2B			SGTR-08-NREC RCS-XHE-XM-SG

Risk Assessm Loss of Safeguards Ele Coincident With 25ted Coincident wit	ient - Indian F ctrical Bus 6A Horisal Pfikie th a Steam Ge	Point 2 Բարեյլե 6A enerator Tube Rupture	Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2	Attachment 1
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
1.5E-007	2.9	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	i
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
1.5E-007	2.9	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
1.2E-007	2.3	RHR-MDP-CF-ALL	RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-08-NREC	
1.1E-007	2.1	RCS-XHE-DIAG	RHR-XHE-XM	
		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	SGTR-08-NREC	
1.0E-007	2.0	HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	
		RHR-XHE-SUCTION	SGTR-08-NREC	
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Loss of Safeguards Ele Coincident With a Stewn	Havenstatopfikega		Risk Asse	essment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1
1.0E-007	2.0	RCS-XHE-XM-SG RHR-XHE-SUCTION		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL SGTR-08-NREC
9.5E-008	1.9	RHR-MDP-FC-2B MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL SGTR-08-NREC
9.5E-008	1.9	RHR-MDP-FC-2B MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		RCS-XHE-XM-SG SGTR-08-NREC
7.5E-008	1.5	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL SGTR-08-NREC
7.5E-008	1.5	RHR-MOV-OO-RWST MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		RCS-XHE-XM-SG SGTR-08-NREC
5.9E-008	1.2	RHR-MDP-CF-ALL MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		RCS-XHE-DIAG SGTR-08-NREC
5.5E-008	1.1	RCS-XHE-DIAG MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		RHR-MOV-CF-DIS SGTR-08-NREC
Event Tr Sequence				CCDP: 3.4E-006
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut Set	Events
_				
1.2E-006	35.1	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT SGTR-13-NREC		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
7.6E-007	22.8	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL SGTR-13-NREC		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL
5.9E-007	17.5	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT SGTR-13-NREC		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR
3.8E-007	11.4	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL SGTR-13-NREC	٠	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR
1.2E-007	3.7	HPI-MDP-FC-2A MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		HPI-MDP-FC-2B SGTR-13-NREC
9.2E-008	2.8	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL SGTR-13-NREC		HPI-CKV-CF-CLINJ
6.2E-008	1.9	HPI-MDP-FC-2A MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		HPI-MDP-FC-2B SGTR-13-NREC
4.6E-008	1.4	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR SGTR-13-NREC		HPI-CKV-CF-CLINJ
Event Tr Sequence				CCDP: 1.9E-006
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut Set	Events

Loss of Sa Coinciden	Assessmen afeguards Electric t Whit as Egul W Icident with a	al Bus éatrica	int 2 Լ <u>Բ</u> ԱՏ 6A erator Tube Rupture	Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2	Attachment 1
6.3E	-007	33.6	PCS-VCF-HW	RCS-XHE-DIAG	
			MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-09-NREC	
3.2E	-007	16.8	PCS-VCF-HW	RCS-XHE-DIAG	
			MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	SGTR-09-NREC	
2.1E	-007	11.2	PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL	RCS-XHE-DIAG	
			MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-09-NREC	
1.5E	-007	8.0	PCS-VCF-HW	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
			MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-09-NREC	
1.5E	-007	8.0	PCS-VCF-HW	HPI-XHE-XM-THRT	L
			MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-09-NREC	
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Loss of Safeguards E Coincident With a Sie	angas tipetkica		Risk Asse	essment - Indian Point 2	Attachment 1
Conficialit w	illi a Steaili Geil	erator rube Nupture			
1.1E-007	5.6	PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL		RCS-XHE-DIAG	
1.15 007	5.0	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		SGTR-09-NREC	
7.5E-008	4.0	PCS-VCF-HW		HPI-XHE-XM-THRT	<b>т</b> .
7.56-000	4.0	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		SGTR-09-NREC	1
7.5E-008	4.0	PCS-VCF-HW		RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
7.5E-008	4.0			SGTR-09-NREC	
F 0F 000	2 7	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL			
5.0E-008	2.7	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		RCS-XHE-XM-SG SGTR-09-NREC	
E 0E 000	2.7	PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL		HPI-XHE-XM-THRT	ıT
5.0E-008	2.7	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		SGTR-09-NREC	ь
0 FE 000	1 3				ıT
2.5E-008	1.3	PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		HPI-XHE-XM-THRT SGTR-09-NREC	ш
2 FB 000	1 3				
2.5E-008	1.3	PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL		RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		SGTR-09-NREC	
Event T	ree: SGTR			CCDP: 3.1E	-007
Sequenc	e: 10				
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut Set	Events	
-					
2.1E-007	67.7	RCS-XHE-DIAG SGTR-10-NREC		PCS-PSF-HW	
5.0E-008	16.1	RCS-XHE-XM-SG SGTR-10-NREC		PCS-PSF-HW	
5.0E-008	16.1	HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL SGTR-10-NREC		PCS-PSF-HW	
Event 1	Tree: SGTR			CCDP: 8.8E	!-008
Sequenc				CCDI. C.OL	
•					
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut Set	Events	
-					
2.5E-008	28.1	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT		RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		SGTR-16-NREC	
1.6E-008	18.3	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL		RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		SGTR-16-NREC	
1.2E-008	14.1	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT		RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		SGTR-16-NREC	
8.0E-009	9.1	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL		RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR		SGTR-16-NREC	
5.9E-009	6.7	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT		RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		SGTR-16-NREC	

Loss of Sa Coincident	Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 oss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A coincides With a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture			Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2	Attachment ·	
3.8E	-009	4.4	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL	RCS-XHE-XM-SG		
			MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	SGTR-16-NREC		
2.9E	-009	3.3	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT	RCS-XHE-XM-SG		
			MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	SGTR-16-NREC		
2.6E	-009	3.0	HPI-MDP-FC-2A	HPI-MDP-FC-2B		
			RCS-XHE-DIAG	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		
			SGTR-16-NREC			
1.9E	-009	2.2	RCS-XHE-DIAG	MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL		
			HPI-CKV-CF-CLINJ	SGTR-16-NREC		
1.9E	-009	2.2	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL	RCS-XHE-XM-SG		
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Loss of Safeguards I	ment - Indian Poi Electrical Bus 6A CHILLIAN IN FAIRIGE With a Steam Gen	int 2 Ļஇபூs 6A erator Tube Rupture	Risk Asse	ssment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1
1.3E-009	1.5	MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR HPI-MDP-FC-2A RCS-XHE-DIAG SGTR-16-NREC		SGTR-16-NREC HPI-MDP-FC-2B MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR
9.7E-010	1.1	RCS-XHE-DIAG HPI-CKV-CF-CLINJ		MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR SGTR-16-NREC
Event '	Tree: SGTR			CCDP: 2.9E-008
Sequen	ce: 18			
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut Set	Events
1.2E-008	42.5	RCS-XHE-RECOVER RCS-XHE-DIAG		HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT SGTR-18-NREC
8.0E-009	27.6	RCS-XHE-RECOVER RCS-XHE-DIAG		HPI-MDP-CF-ALL SGTR-18-NREC
2.9E-009	10.1	RCS-XHE-RECOVER RCS-XHE-XM-SG		HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT SGTR-18-NREC
1.9E-009	6.6	RCS-XHE-RECOVER RCS-XHE-XM-SG		HPI-MDP-CF-ALL SGTR-18-NREC
1.3E-009	4.5	RCS-XHE-RECOVER HPI-MDP-FC-2B SGTR-18-NREC		HPI-MDP-FC-2A RCS-XHE-DIAG
9.7E-010	3.3	RCS-XHE-RECOVER HPI-CKV-CF-CLINJ		RCS-XHE-DIAG SGTR-18-NREC
3.1E-010	1.1	RCS-XHE-RECOVER HPI-MDP-FC-2B SGTR-18-NREC		HPI-MDP-FC-2A RCS-XHE-XM-SG
	Tree: SGTR ce: 14			CCDP: 2.2E-009
CCDP	% Cut Set		Cut Set	Events
-				
1.2E-009	52.6	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT SGTR-14-NREC		PCS-PSF-HW
7.6E-010	34.2	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL SGTR-14-NREC		PCS-PSF-HW
1.2E-010	5.6	HPI-MDP-FC-2A PCS-PSF-HW		HPI-MDP-FC-2B SGTR-14-NREC
9.2E-011	4.1	PCS-PSF-HW SGTR-14-NREC		HPI-CKV-CF-CLINJ

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident Office as 64 Principal Bus 6A Coincident with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

2.3E-011

1.0

HPI-TNK-VF-RWST

PCS-PSF-HW

2.3E-011 1.0

SGTR-14-NREC PCS-PSF-HW

HPI-CKV-CF-PMPS

SGTR-14-NREC

Event Tree: SGTR

Sequence: 17

CCDP: 5.8E-011

CCDP

% Cut Set

Cut Set Events

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Coincident With a Stee	nent - Indian Po ectrical Bus 6A HI SHE AND FILIS th a Steam Ge	oint 2 紀유명( Septimental Septi	Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2	Attachment 1
2.5E-011	42.5	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT	RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		PCS-PSF-HW	SGTR-17-NREC	
1.6E-011	27.6	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL	RCS-XHE-DIAG	
		PCS-PSF-HW	SGTR-17-NREC	
5.9E-012	10.1	HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		PCS-PSF-HW	SGTR-17-NREC	
3.8E-012	6.6	HPI-MDP-CF-ALL	RCS-XHE-XM-SG	
		PCS-PSF-HW	SGTR-17-NREC	
2.6E-012	4.5	HPI-MDP-FC-2A	HPI-MDP-FC-2B	
		RCS-XHE-DIAG	PCS-PSF-HW	
		SGTR-17-NREC		
1.9E-012	3.3	RCS-XHE-DIAG	PCS-PSF-HW	
		HPI-CKV-CF-CLINJ	SGTR-17-NREC	
6.2E-013	1.1	HPI-MDP-FC-2A	HPI-MDP-FC-2B	
		RCS-XHE-XM-SG	PCS-PSF-HW	
		SGTR-17-NREC		

# BASIC EVENTS (Cut Sets Only)

Event Name Prob	Description	Curr
ACP-BAC-LP-2-3A	DIVISION 2A/3A AC POWER 480V BUS FAILS	9.0E-
005		
AFW-AOV-CC-MSG21	SG-21 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 406A FAILS	1.1E-
003		
AFW-AOV-CF-SGS	CCF OF STEAM GENERATOR INLET AOVS (FCVS)	1.9E-
005		
AFW-CKV-CC-SG21	STEAM GENERATOR 21 INLET CHECK VALVE FAILS	1.0E-
004		
AFW-CKV-CF-PMPS	CCF OF AFW PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES	2.7E-
006		
AFW-CKV-CF-SGS-S	CCF OF SG INLET CHECK VALVES - SGTR	2.7E-
006		
AFW-CKV-CF-SUCT	CCF OF AFW PUMP SUCTION CHECK VALVES	2.7E-
006		
AFW-MDP-CF-AB	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF MOTOR DRIVEN PUMPS	2.1E-
004		
AFW-MDP-FC-21	AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP 21 FAILS	3.9E-
003		
AFW-PMP-CF-ALL	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF AFW PUMPS	5.6E-
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Risk Assessment - Indian Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A. Coincident With A Steam Coincident with a Steam G	cal Bus 6A	Attachment 1
005		
AFW-TDP-FC-22	AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP 22 FAILS	3.3E-
002		<b>4.52</b>
HPI-CKV-CF-CLINJ	CCF OF COLD LEG INLET CHECK VALVES	1.1E-
005		
HPI-CKV-CF-PMPS	CCF OF HPI PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES	2.7E-
006		
HPI-MDP-CF-ALL	HPI PUMP COMMON CAUSE FAILURES	9.1E-
005 HPI-MDP-FC-2A	IIDI MDATNI A DATI C	3 05
003	HPI TRAIN A FAILS	3.9E-
HPI-MDP-FC-2B	HPI TRAIN B FAILS	3.8E-
003		
HPI-MOV-OC-SUCT	HPI SUCTION VALVES FAIL	1.4E-
004		
HPI-TNK-VF-RWST	RWST NOT AVAILABLE	2.7E-
006	OPERATOR DATE OF THE MURCHINE UPL TO REPUGE REC	
HPI-XHE-XM-THRTL	OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE HPI TO REDUCE PRE	S 5.0E-
MSS-VCF-HW-ISOL	RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION FAILURES	1.0E-
002		_,,_
MSS-XHE-XM-ERROR	OPERATOR FAILS TO ISOLATE FAULTED STEAM GENE	R 5.0E-
003		
PCS-PSF-HW	HARDWARE FAILURES CAUSING FAILURE TO DEPRESS	U 1.0E-
005	MDUG /GOND /GTD DATINDEG	2 0 11
PCS-VCF-HW 003	TBVS/COND/CIR FAILURES	3.0E-
PCS-XHE-XM-RCOOL	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE RCS COOLDOWN BELC	W 1.0E-
003	0120X 125 10 11112 NOC 000220 2220	
RCS-XHE-DIAG	OPERATOR FAILS TO DIAGNOSE SGTR TO START PRO	C 2.1E-
002		
RCS-XHE-RECOVER	OPERATOR FAILS TO DEPRESSURIZE RCS BELOW SG	S 5.0E-
003	ODDDAMOD DATED MO INTMIAME DOG DEDDEGGIDIGA	'I 5.0E-
RCS-XHE-XM-SG 003	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE RCS DEPRESSURIZAT	1 5.UE-
RHR-MDP-CF-ALL	RHR PUMP COMMON CAUSE FAILURES	5.6E-
004	1011 00111011 011002 111201120	
RHR-MDP-FC-2B	RHR TRAIN B FAILS	3.8E-
003		
RHR-MOV-CF-DIS	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RHR DISCHARGE MOVS	2.6E-
001		
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# Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A Coincident With a Steam Seem Seem Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2 Attachment 1

Event Name	Description	Curr
Prob		
RHR-MOV-OO-RWST	RHR/RWST ISOLATION MOV FAILS	3.0E-
RHR-XHE-SUCTION 003	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER RHR SUCTION PATH	2.0E-
RHR-XHE-XM 003	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE RHR SYSTEM	1.0E-
RPS-BKR-FC-FTO	RPS BREAKERS FAIL TO OPEN	5.7E-
RPS-VCF-FO-ELEC	CONTROL ROD DRIVES REMAIN ENERGIZED	4.3E-
RPS-VCF-FO-MECH 008	CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLIES FAIL TO INSERT	8.9E-
RPS-XHE-ERROR	OPERATOR FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE MG SETS	2.0E-
RPS-XHE-XM-SCRAM	OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY TRIP THE REACTOR	1.0E-
SGTR-03-NREC 1.0E+000	SGTR SEQUENCE 03 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
SGTR-04-NREC 1.0E+000	SGTR SEQUENCE 04 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
SGTR-05-NREC 1.0E+000	SGTR SEQUENCE 05 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
SGTR-08-NREC 1.0E+000	SGTR SEQUENCE 08 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
SGTR-09-NREC 1.0E+000	SGTR SEQUENCE 09 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
SGTR-10-NREC 1.0E+000	SGTR SEQUENCE 10 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
SGTR-11-NREC 1.0E+000	SGTR SEQUENCE 11 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	
SGTR-13-NREC 001	SGTR SEQUENCE 13 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	8.4E-
SGTR-14-NREC 001	SGTR SEQUENCE 14 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	8.4E-
SGTR-16-NREC 001	SGTR SEQUENCE 16 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	8.4E-
SGTR-17-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 17 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	8.4E-
SGTR-18-NREC	SGTR SEQUENCE 18 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY	8.4E-

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2
Loss of Safeguards Electrical Bus 6A
Coincident With a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Risk Assessment - Indian Point 2

Attachment 1

SGTR-43-NREC

SGTR SEQUENCE 43 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY

2.2E-

001

SGTR-44-NREC

SGTR SEQUENCE 44 NONRECOVERY PROBABILITY

1.0E+000

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