

August 5, 1994

Docket Nos. STN 50-454
and STN 50-455

Mr. D. L. Farrar
Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Services
Commonwealth Edison Company
Executive Towers West III, Suite 500
1400 OPUS Place
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

Dear Mr. Farrar:

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SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. M90015 AND M90016)

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 63 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-37 and Amendment No. 63 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-66 for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments are in response to your application dated August 2, 1994.

The amendments change the Technical Specifications by adding a footnote in Table 3.3-9 that recognizes that through the end of cycle 6, Reactor Coolant System Temperature Wide Range Hot Leg indication for Unit 1, loop B is not required to be operable at the remote shutdown panel unless an unscheduled shutdown and entry into Mode 4 takes place.

Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd) requested that this amendment be processed on an emergency basis. The emergency exists in that failure of the Commission to act in a timely way would result in shutdown of Unit 1. ComEd's investigation of past surveillance testing of the degraded instrumentation showed no indication of problems prior to the erratic readings nor have there been any shutdowns of Unit 1 since the first indications of a problem in April 1994. Therefore, this emergency situation occurred without any prior indication of a problem and could not have been avoided.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance and final determination of no significant hazards consideration and opportunity for a hearing will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by Clyde Y. Shiraki for:
George F. Dick, Jr., Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 63 to NPF-37
2. Amendment No. 63 to NPF-66
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

LA:PDIII-2*	PM:PDIII-2	D:PDIII-2*	HICB*	SRXB*	RIII*	OGC*	ADRIII*
CMOORE	CSHIRAKI	RCAPRA	JWERMIEL	RJONESTc	EGREENMAN	RBACHMAN	JZWOLINSKI
08/04/94	8/16/94	08/05/94	08/04/94	08/04/94	08/04/94	08/04/94	08/05/94
YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO

*See previous concurrence

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P PDR

0500002

NRC FILE CENTER COPY

Handwritten initials/signature

Handwritten mark

Mr. D. L. Farrar
Commonwealth Edison Company

Byron Station
Unit Nos. 1 and 2

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. STN 50-454

BYRON STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 63
License No. NPF-37

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated August 2, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-37 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 63 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John A. Zwolinski, Assistant Director
for Region III Reactors
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 5, 1994



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. STN 50-455

BYRON STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 63
License No. NPF-66


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated August 2, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A (NUREG-1113), as revised through Amendment No. 63 and revised by Attachment 2 to NPF-66, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which were attached to License No. NPF-37, dated February 14, 1985, are hereby incorporated into this license. Attachment 2 contains a revision to Appendix A which is hereby incorporated into this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John A. Zwolinski, Assistant Director
for Region III Reactors
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 5, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 63 AND 63

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-37 AND NPF-66

DOCKET NOS. STN 50-454 AND STN 50-455

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the page identified below and inserting the attached page. The revised page is identified by the captioned amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3/4 3-51

Insert Pages

3/4 3-51

TABLE 3.3-9

REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>READOUT LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
1. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux	PL06J	2	1
2. Source Range Neutron Flux	PL06J	2	1
3. Reactor Coolant Temperature - Wide Range			
a. Hot Leg	PL05J	1/loop*	1/loop*
b. Cold Leg	PL05J	1/loop	1/loop
4. Pressurizer Pressure	PL06J	1	1
5. Pressurizer Level	PL06J	2	1
6. Steam Generator Pressure	PL04J/PL05J	1/stm gen	1/stm gen
7. Steam Generator Level	PL04J	1/stm gen	1/stm gen
8. RHR Temperature	LOCAL	2	1
9. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	PL04J/PL05J	2/stm gen	1/stm gen

*None required for Unit 1 loop B through the end of cycle 6 (i.e., prior to entry into Mode 3 for cycle 7) or until any unscheduled Unit 1 shutdown (entry into Mode 3 on the return to power operation) prior to the end of cycle 6.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 63 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-37
AND AMENDMENT NO. 63 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-66
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
BYRON STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. STN 50-454 AND STN 50-455

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In a letter dated July 29, 1994, Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd or the licensee) informed the staff that on August 1, 1994, at 0920 CDT, Byron, Unit 1, would not be in compliance with the Table 3.3-9 requirement to have one remote reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature wide range hot leg instrument per loop operable. In its letter, the licensee requested that the staff exercise its discretion not to enforce compliance with the required actions in Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.5. During the surveillance test of the reactor containment fan coolers (RCFCs) in April and May 1994, it had been noted that the 1B hot leg resistance temperature detector (RTD) indication in both the control room and at the remote shutdown panel (RSDP), was erratic. The licensee thought it had corrected the problem by replacing the RTD amplifier card. In the June surveillance test, there were again some minor effects of the RCFCs on the indication, but not extreme enough to cause the licensee to consider the instrument inoperable. However, during the July 1994 surveillance test, the indication was again erratic during the operation of the RCFCs. Consequently, on July 25, 1994, at 0920 CDT, the 1B hot leg RTD was declared inoperable for RSDP and control room indication. Based on tests of the instrument loop and prior experience with the narrow range RTD instrumentation, the licensee believes that the root cause of the problem is in a cable splice located inside containment. The licensee has concluded that repair of the RTD should not be performed at power due to the radiation dose that would be received and that at this point in core life, shutting down to perform the repairs and then starting back up could induce Xenon and Delta I transients in the core.

In accordance with the TS, the required number of instrumentation channels had to be restored to operable status within 7 days or the reactor placed in hot standby within the next 6 hours and hot shutdown within the following 6 hours. To avoid placing the unit through an unnecessary thermal transient and in an unnecessary shutdown condition, in its letter dated July 29, 1994, the licensee requested a six week extension of the allowed outage time for the affected channel or until approval of an emergency TS amendment request. In a letter dated August 1, 1994, the staff agreed to exercise its discretion not to enforce compliance with the required actions in TS 3.3.3.5 for the period

from August 1, 1994, 0920 CDT, until the staff could take action on an emergency TS amendment request, or the unit was shut down prior to the scheduled outage date, in which event the staff expected the malfunctioning RTD to be repaired.

In a letter dated August 2, 1994, the licensee requested an emergency TS amendment to add a note to Table 3.3-9 to recognize that through cycle 6, or until any unscheduled Unit 1 shutdown prior to the end of cycle 6, Unit 1 would not be required to have a loop B wide range hot leg indication operable at the remote shutdown panel. The indication is currently within the allowable specifications, but its indication has been erratic under certain reactor containment cooling fan configurations.

2.0 EVALUATION

The RSDP instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of hot standby of the reactor from locations outside the control room. This capability is required so that in the event control room habitability is lost, the operators can establish control at the RSDP and place and maintain the unit in Mode 3. Due to the malfunction, the 1B wide range hot leg indications in the control room and at the RSDP are degraded. Indication of hot leg temperature is available and fully operable at the fire hazards panel. This indication is not safety-related although it is powered from a safety-related bus. An amendment is not required for the inoperable control room indication because per the accident monitoring instrumentation requirements of Table 3.3-10, only two channels are required to be operable in the control room, and the minimum number of channels required to be operable is one. Although with Unit 1 in normal Mode 1 operation the 1B wide range hot leg indication at the RSDP operates within the allowable specifications, the licensee declared the degraded RSDP indication inoperable because surveillance testing has shown it to be unreliable when operating the RCFCs and if the environmental conditions in the containment during an accident required the operation of the RCFCs, the 1B wide range hot leg indication may not be available. In the event of an accident requiring the use of wide range indication in the control room or RSDP, the other three loops' hot leg indications and all four cold leg indications are operable and available. In addition, the preferred instrumentation in the control room for measuring RCS temperature indications is the core exit thermocouples (CETCs) which are also operable.

The remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channels given in Table 3.3-9 are required to be operable with readouts displayed external to the control room. With the number of operable remote shutdown monitoring channels less than the minimum number of channels required, the inoperable channel is to be restored to operable status within 7 days, or the unit placed in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours. Unit 1 is currently in a coastdown to refueling and is scheduled to shut down on September 9, 1994. To avoid placing the reactor in an unnecessary shutdown condition from its current coastdown operations and cycling it through an unnecessary thermal transient, the licensee requested an

emergency TS amendment to allow it to continue to operate with an inoperable 1B wide range hot leg indication at the RSDP.

During the coastdown period leading up to the scheduled September 9, 1994, shutdown, the licensee has put in place compensatory actions that include: 1) as much as is practicable, no large intentional power changes; 2) operations personnel will be made aware of the degraded condition of the 1B wide range hot leg indication and a special operating order will be written to monitor the redundant instrumentation available at the fire hazards panel if evacuation of the control room and use of the RSDP is required; 3) correction of the erratic operation of the 1B wide range hot leg indication has been added to the pending action work schedule and will be accomplished if an unscheduled outage occurs; and 4) repairs as far as they are practical have been completed by replacing the RTD amplifier card, and the indication is currently within the acceptance criteria. The probability of an event occurring that requires use of the RSDP indication is very low and, if required, plant procedures direct the operating personnel to use other available instrumentation.

Performing the repairs prior to the scheduled shutdown could be accomplished either at power or by shutting down the unit and then restarting it. If performed at power, a three person crew would work in a radiation field of 4 to 7 rem/hour for 2 to 3 man hours, for a total dose expenditure of 24 to 63 rem. This is compared to performing the repair during the scheduled refueling outage in which the radiation field would be about 50 millirem/hour for a total dose of about 450 millirem. Performing the repair at power, therefore, would not be consistent with maintaining doses as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Alternatively, the reactor could be shut down, the repairs accomplished and the reactor started back up. However, at this point in core life, the core is sensitive to reactivity effects seen with large changes in reactor power, control rod movement, and RCS temperature. The core responds to reactivity changes with Xenon and Delta I transients that can sometimes be difficult to stabilize. These core sensitivities are attributed to fuel depletion in the center region of the core and the decoupling between the top and bottom regions of the core. A startup from the shutdown condition would also present challenges. To minimize Xenon and Delta I transients, startup should begin with the core Xenon free. But, even in the Xenon free condition, the startup would experience Xenon build-in and Delta I effects from power increases, control rod movement, RCS temperature changes, and RCS dilution, due to the separate behavior of the top and bottom of the core. The Xenon build-in distribution effects may also impact quadrant power tilt ratio. For the reasons stated above, it is not practical to perform the repair at power or to shut down the reactor specifically to make the repair and then start it up again.

The licensee has evaluated the probability of events occurring that would be affected by the inoperability of the 1B wide range hot leg indication at the RSDP. The probability of a fire in a dual unit control has been calculated as $9.5 \text{ E-}03$ per reactor year using EPRI FIVE methodology. The probability of a fire in the dual unit control room, requiring use of the RSDP during the time

the 1B wide range hot leg indication is inoperable, is decreased to $2.08 \text{ E-}03$. This does not take credit for any mitigation, such as the control room being continuously manned and the ability of the operators to combat the fire. During the period that the 1B wide range hot leg indication at the RSDP is inoperable, the probability of a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occurring on unit 1 is $6.7 \text{ E-}04$. The normal probability of core damage from the LOCA is $7.64 \text{ E-}08$ per reactor year. This probability decreases to $8.37 \text{ E-}08$ for the period during which the 1B wide range hot leg indication at the RSDP is inoperable. Therefore, the probability of a fire in the control room or core damage due to a small break LOCA is not increased by allowing Unit 1 to operate until the end of the cycle with the 1B wide range hot leg indication inoperable.

The staff has evaluated the licensee's proposed change. The indication in the control room and at the remote shutdown panel of the 1B wide range hot leg is within the allowable specifications during normal at-power operations. The licensee has committed to maintaining Unit 1 at stable power conditions with no load following or other optional activities that would perturbate power level. In the unlikely event of an accident occurring that requires use of the remote shutdown panel, indications are available from the other three loops as well as at the fire hazards panel. Plant procedures direct operators to utilize alternate indications and a special operating order is in place to amplify this instruction. For the reasons stated above, the staff finds that allowing Unit 1 to operate with the 1B wide range hot leg indication inoperable until the end of the present cycle is acceptable.

3.D EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

In April 1994, and again in May 1994, it was noted that the 1B wide range hot leg indication in the control room and at the remote shutdown panel became erratic during the performance of TS monthly surveillance requirement 4.6.3.2.a of the RCFCs. The RTD amplifier card was removed and replaced with a qualified spare after the May occurrence. The indication of the 1B wide range hot leg returned to normal and remained that way for the next month. During the RCFC surveillance test in June, the indication was again erratic. Although the problem was logged, the indication was normal after the surveillance test, and the channel was not declared inoperable. During the July 25, 1994, RCFC surveillance test, the 1B wide range hot leg indication was erratic again and it was declared inoperable, causing entry into a 7 day limiting condition for operation. The RTD amplifier card was replaced and operation of RCFCs in different combinations replicated the erratic indication. Although the deviations were minor and within allowable tolerances, they indicate that the indication is still degraded and that the problem is probably caused by a cable splice inside the containment.

The licensee has requested that this amendment be processed on an emergency basis. The emergency exists in that failure of the Commission to act in a timely way would result in shutdown of the unit. The licensee's investigation of past surveillance testing of the degraded instrumentation showed no indication of problems prior to the erratic readings nor have there been any

shutdowns of the unit since the first indications of a problem in April 1994. Therefore, this emergency situation occurred without any prior indication of a problem and could not have been avoided.

4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed TS change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The availability of wide range hot leg temperature instrumentation is not considered a precursor for any of the accidents evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, providing an extension to the allowed outage time to permit the unit to operate with an inoperable 1B wide range hot leg instrument for an additional six weeks will not result in a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

The operability of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available to permit plant shutdown and provide the capability to maintain the plant in hot standby from locations outside the control room in case control room habitability is lost. The assumptions made in performing the safe shutdown analysis for a control room fire assume that a control room fire does not occur simultaneously with other accidents, events, or phenomena, except for a single unit loss of offsite power. For a fire in the control room, it is assumed that the operators will evacuate the control room and establish reactor control from the RSDP to place and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. At the RSDP, plant procedures direct the use of indications at the fire hazards panel if indications are not available at the RSDP. Among the indications available at the fire hazards panel are redundant indications for wide range temperature for each loop's hot and cold legs. Although the wide range hot leg temperature indications are not safety-related, the fire hazards panel is powered from a safety related power source. The erratic 1B wide range hot leg temperature indications appear to result from localized temperatures or vibration. Since the event resulting in control room inaccessibility is unlikely to create the environment that would induce the erratic behavior, the wide range temperature indications are expected to be available to the RSDP operator.

Although procedures for natural circulation and small break LOCA direct use of wide range indication, the availability of wide range indication from the other three loops, backup indication of cold leg temperatures, and the availability of other indication methods such as core exit thermocouples,

provides sufficient information that the operators' ability to perform the necessary actions would not be impeded.

Therefore, since the subject instrumentation does not contribute to the probability of occurrence of an accident and backup indication is available and identified to an operator in the event of an accident, this request for an emergency TS amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed TS change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed extension of the allowed outage time for the RSDP 1B wide range hot leg indication does not result in plant operations or configurations that could create a new or different type of accident. The compensatory measures which have been implemented have been evaluated to ensure they do not result in any component or system being placed in an unanalyzed configuration.

Therefore, the inoperability of the 1B RTD will not increase the consequences or possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed extended time for which the unit would be allowed to operate with the 1B wide range hot leg indication inoperable is acceptable based on the availability of redundant indication on the fire hazards panel and on the small probability of a failure of the remaining indications concurrent with an event requiring the use of the RSDP. The exposure of the unit to the small probability of an event requiring use of the RSDP during the increased time period is insignificant and offset by the benefit of avoiding an unnecessary plant transient. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, the Commission has made a final determination that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for

categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: C. Shiraki

Date: August 5, 1994