

Docket No.: STN 50-454

AUG 05 1985

Mr. Dennis L. Farrar  
Director of Nuclear Licensing  
Commonwealth Edison Company  
Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. Farrar:

Subject: FEDERAL REGISTER NRC Bi-Weekly Notices of Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations Byron Station, Unit 1

Enclosed is a copy of the FEDERAL REGISTER NRC Bi-Weekly Notices of Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, dated July 31, 1985.

A notice concerning a revision to Technical Specification Section 6.12.2 to allow personnel to enter areas with radiation levels greater than 1000 mR/H during certain emergencies without an approved Radiation Work Permit may be found on Page 31067 of this publication.

Sincerely,  
Original signed by:  
B. J. Youngblood

B. J. Youngblood, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 1  
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:  
FEDERAL REGISTER Dated July 31, 1985

cc w/enclosure: See next page

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Mr. Dennis L. Farrar  
Director of Nuclear Licensing  
Commonwealth Edison Company  
Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

cc: Mr. William Kortier  
Atomic Power Distribution  
Westinghouse Electric Corporation  
Post Office Box 355  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

Michael Miller  
Isham, Lincoln & Beale  
One First National Plaza  
42nd Floor  
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Mrs. Phillip B. Johnson  
1907 Stratford Lane  
Rockford, Illinois 61107

Dr. Bruce von Zellen  
Department of Biological Sciences  
Northern Illinois University  
DeKalb, Illinois 61107

Mr. Edward R. Crass  
Nuclear Safeguards & Licensing  
Sargent & Lundy Engineers  
55 East Monroe Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Mr. Julian Hinds  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Byron/Resident Inspectors Offices  
4448 German Church Road  
Byron, Illinois 61010

Mr. Michael C. Parker, Chief  
Division of Engineering  
Illinois Department of  
Nuclear Safety  
1035 Outer Park Drive  
Springfield, Illinois 62704

Ms. Diane Chavez  
528 Gregory Street  
Rockford, Illinois 61108

Regional Administrator  
U. S. NRC Region III  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Joseph Gallo, Esq.  
Isham, Lincoln & Beale  
Suite 840  
1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Douglass Cassel, Esq.  
109 N. Dearborn Street  
Suite 1300  
Chicago, Illinois 60602

Ms. Pat Morrison  
5568 Thunderidge Drive  
Rockford, Illinois 61107

Ms. Lorraine Creek  
Rt. 1, Box 182  
Manteno, Illinois 60950

**Bi-Weekly Notice of Applications and Amendments To Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations**

**I. Background**

Pursuant to Pub. L. (Pub. L.) 97-415, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is publishing this regular bi-weekly notice. Pub. L. 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This bi-weekly notice includes all amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, since the date of publication of the last bi-weekly notice which was published on July 17, 1985 (50 FR 29006), through July 22, 1985.

**NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING AND LICENSE PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING**

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.

Comments should be addressed to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.

By August 30, 1985, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. A

petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceedings, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at (800) 325-6000 (in Missouri (800) 342-6700).

The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to (*Branch Chief*): petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this **Federal Register** notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to rule on the petition and/or request, that the petitioner has made a substantial showing of good cause for the granting of a late petition and/or request. That determination will be based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

**Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert County, Maryland**

*Date of application for amendments:* April 26, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would change the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to: (1) reflect a clarification of surveillance requirements of TS 4.6.1.6.2, "Containment Structural Integrity", concerning containment tendon end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces; (2) reflect an increase in the required diesel generator test load specified in TS 4.8.1.1.2.c.2, "A.C. Sources"; (3) delete TS 3/4 3.3.8, "Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation" and incorporate these requirements in TS Tables 3.3-6 and 4.3-3, "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation"; (4) provide simplification, additions and clarifications concerning the fire protection instrumentation in TS Table 3.3-11, "Fire Detection Instruments"; (5) revise limiting conditions and surveillance requirements for the hydrogen analyzers, TS 3/4.6.5, "Combustible Gas Control-Hydrogen

Analyzers"; and (6) revise limiting conditions and surveillance requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system (TS 3/4.7.1.2).

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The licensee has requested a change to TS 4.6.1.6.2 in order to provide clarification regarding inspection of containment tendon end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces. The wording of TS 4.6.1.6.2 would seem to indicate that all anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces should be inspected. The licensee's requested change would provide for an inspection of a random sample of end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces consistent with the sample of tendons selected for surveillance.

As indicated in the TS Bases for TS 4.6.1.6.2, the inspection of the containment post-tensioning system (tendon, anchors, and related equipment and structures) is based upon Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.35, "Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Structures," January 1976. A review of Section C.3 of the subject RG clearly indicates that a random sample of tendon end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces (corresponding to the random selection of tendons to be tested) should be selected for testing. Thus, the proposed TS change for selection of tendon end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces is consistent with the provisions of R.G. 1.35.

Finally, with regard to observation of concrete surfaces during the containment "Type A" test, TS 4.6.1.6.2 requires observation of crack patterns in concrete adjacent to the end anchorages. The licensee proposes to continue the use of a program developed in cooperation with the Architect/Engineer for Calvert Cliffs, Bechtel Power Corporation, as described in BG&E's letter dated June 19, 1985. The program involves the observation of 11 preselected areas for each containment during the Type A test; each area is 50 to 100 square feet in size. A total of over 50, representative, end anchorages per containment are thus observed. This program has been used at Calvert Cliffs to date. While the RG 1.35 program would incorporate a smaller, random, observation of concrete surfaces (approximately a 1% sample of all tendon-adjacent surfaces), the Calvert Cliffs program involves a larger, fixed, tendon sample (approximately 6% of all tendon-adjacent surfaces per Calvert Cliffs containment). Although the random system of observation might eventually result in a greater range of

observed concrete locations, the Calvert Cliffs program incorporates a sufficiently diverse sample to be representative of overall containment concrete conditions.

Based upon the above, the licensee's proposed changes to TS 406.1.6.2 and associated Bases, to establish the use of random inspection of tendon end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces and the observation of preselected areas during Type A tests, is in accordance with RG 1.35, January 1976.

On April 6, 1983, the NRC published guidance in the *Federal Register* (48 FR 14870) concerning examples of amendments that are not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration. One such example, (iv), involves "a change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan. . . ." The proposed changes in end anchorage and concrete surveillance are in accordance with RG 1.35 which is an acceptance criteria in Standard Review Plan 3.8.1, "Concrete Containment". Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed changes to TS 4.6.1.6.2 involve no significant hazards considerations.

The licensee has requested a change to TS 4.8.1.1.2c.2 to increase the diesel generator load rejection test load from 450 to 500 hp. The purpose of the load rejection test is to assure that the diesel generator will not trip, due to load rejection, in the event that the electrical load with the highest horse power rating should trip.

The existing test load specified in TS 4.8.1.1.2c.2 is 450 hp. Since completion of modifications to the auxiliary feedwater system which added one motor operated pump per unit, the new maximum load is 500 hp. Accordingly, the test load specified in TS 4.8.1.1.2c.2 should be increased to 500 hp to assure that the load rejection test is conducted with the limiting (largest) electrical load.

The proposed change would increase the size of the load that must be periodically rejected by the diesel generator by about 10%. This would provide greater assurance of the generator's capability to respond to the loss of the single largest load. Therefore, the probability or consequences of previously analyzed accidents would not be affected and the margin of safety would not be reduced. In addition, since no physical modification is associated

with this proposed change, increasing the size of the load to be periodically rejected by surveillance testing would not create the possibility of a new or different accident. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed change to TS 4.8.1.1.2c.2 involves no significant hazards considerations.

The licensee has proposed to delete TS 3/4.3.3.8 which contains limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation. The licensee has further proposed that the requirements of TS 3/4.3.3.8 be incorporated in TS Tables 3.3-6 and 4.3-3 where requirements for similar equipment are located.

The licensee's proposal to relocate the requirements of TS 3/4.3.3.8 is appropriate since locating requirements for similar equipment in common areas within the TS will facilitate compliance. Since the proposed changes do not affect plant design, operating or safety analyses, the proposed changes do not reduce any safety margins, do not increase the probability or consequences of any accidents previously analyzed or create the possibility of a new or different type of accident. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed changes to TS 3/4.3.3.8 and TS Tables 3.3-6 and 4.3-3, involve no significant hazards considerations.

The licensee has proposed changes to the fire detection instrumentation descriptions contained in TS Table 3.3-11. These instruments are required to be operable and to undergo surveillance in accordance with TS 3/4.3.3.7, "Fire Detection Instrumentation". The proposed changes are of several types as follows:

- One heat detector was replaced with a smoke detector and three more smoke detectors were added as a result of structural modifications to the 69 level access control area. The area includes a laboratory where a smoke detector would be more suitable for fire detection.

- Several duplicate entries occur in TS Table 3.3-11. Both the North South Corridor Room 410 and North South Corridor Room 308 were listed twice. The number of fire detectors in these areas has not been reduced, only the duplicate listings should be eliminated.

- Additional clarification has been proposed as follows: The room numbers and room names should be changed to reflect their proper names. The Intake Structure has been listed as a common structure. Although the Intake Structure is a single room, the equipment in each

side is dedicated to its respective unit. To provide clarification, the fire detector instrumentation serving the Unit 1 side of Intake Structure should be exclusively listed in the Unit 1 Technical Specification and similarly for Unit 2.

- The last clarification concerns the Protecto Wire Instrumentation. The existing entries in TS Table 3.3-11 list this instrument location as the Southwest and Northeast Containment Electrical Penetration Rooms. Actually, the instrument meters are located in these rooms, but the Protecto Wires monitor cable trays rather than the rooms themselves. The Protecto Wires are also not conventional heat detectors. If a fire occurs in the cable tray, the insulation between the wire melts and the wires short. The new electrical resistance corresponds to a wire length which can then be used to determine the location of the fire. A footnote is proposed for TS Table 3.3-11 to clarify the special nature of these detectors.

As noted above, the modification to the first detection instrument deployment strategy on the 69' level access control area provides a superior degree of fire detection capability; thus the safety margin associated with fire detection will not be reduced. The remaining proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-11 do not in any way impact existing fire detection capability. Thus, we conclude that the overall ability to detect and suppress fires has not been decreased; therefore, the probability or consequences of accidents involving fires will not be increased. In addition, no new or different kind of fire-related accidents are expected to occur. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-11 involve no significant hazards considerations.

The licensee has proposed changes to TS 3/4.6.5 in response to NRC's Generic Letter (GL) 83-37, "NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications", dated November 1, 1983. The hydrogen monitors are required to determine post-LOCA, containment, hydrogen concentrations.

The purpose of GL 83-37 was to provide model TS associated with system/procedural improvements deemed necessary following the accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2). The proposed TS change clarifies the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) by providing an appropriate remedial action when two hydrogen monitors become inoperable. Although the LCO requires two hydrogen monitors to be operable, the required remedial action is only applicable when one hydrogen monitor

is inoperable. The existing LCO allows a single hydrogen monitor to be inoperable for up to 30 days after which the reactor must be shut down within 6 hours. The proposed LCO would require that, when both hydrogen monitors become inoperable, one monitor must be made operable within 72 hours or the reactor must be shut down within 6 hours.

Based upon our review, we conclude that the proposed remedial action, when two hydrogen monitors are inoperable, is consistent with the importance of the subject equipment.

The licensee has also proposed a change to the surveillance requirements for the hydrogen monitors. The proposed change would add periodic test to the existing calibration requirements of TS 4.6.5.1. The periodic test involves a biweekly demonstration of operability of which is performed by drawing and analyzing gas from the waste decay tank. The additional proposed surveillance requirement does provide a valid test of system operability at an appropriate frequency. Although the model TS also suggest a more frequent "check" of instrument operability, this type of qualitative observation is meaningless since the hydrogen monitors are maintained in a de-powered state until required.

The proposed changes to TS 3/4.6.5.1 result in increased reliability of the hydrogen monitors in accordance with GL 83-37. Since reliability of these monitors is improved, the probability or consequences of accidents involving hydrogen generation will not be increased and no new or different type of accident will result. Since no changes in equipment design or operation are involved, no reduction in safety margins will result. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed changes involve no significant hazards considerations.

Finally, the licensee has proposed changes to the limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) as specified in TS 3/4.7.1.2. At the present time, the Unit 1 TS 3.7.1.2a.1.(b) would allow up to 14 days for a motor-driven AFW pump to be inoperable. In addition TS 3.7.1.2a.2.(b) allows up to 30 days for a steam-turbine-driven AFW pump to be inoperable. The licensee has proposed that the maximum period of inoperability for either motor-driven or steam-turbine-driven AFW pumps be reduced to 7 days. This proposed change is consistent with the Unit 2 TS

The proposed change to Unit 1 TS 3.7.1.2 would improve the availability of the Unit 1 AFW pumps by substantially

reducing the allowable out-of-service times. Since overall AFW reliability improvement would result, neither the probability of accidents resulting from AFW failure would increase nor would the consequences of accidents requiring AFW mitigation be more severe. No new or different type of accident would be created since there are no changes proposed in AFW operating modes. Finally, since the availability of AFW would improve, safety margins would increase for accidents that require AFW mitigation. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed change to Unit 1 TS 3.7.1.2 involves no significant hazards considerations.

The licensee has also proposed a change to Unit 2 TS 3.7.1.2c which specifies remedial action to be taken when AFW components are inoperable for the purpose of testing. The wording of TS 3.7.1.2c would be changed to allow more than one AFW pump to be inoperable for the purpose of logic testing. For example, testing of the AFW automatic actuation system requires that two of three AFW pumps be momentarily made inoperable. This proposed change is consistent with the Unit 1 TS.

The proposed change to Unit 2 TS 3.7.1.2c would only insignificantly decrease the availability of the AFW system. Moreover, the existing TS 3.7.1.2c requires a dedicated operator to be stationed at the AFW pumps (with direct communication to the control room) to promptly restore full AFW capability in the event of an accident. For this reason, we conclude that neither the probability of accidents resulting from AFW failure would increase nor would the consequences of accidents requiring AFW mitigation be more severe. No new or different type of accident would be created since there are no changes proposed in AFW operating modes. Finally, since the availability of AFW would not be significantly reduced, safety margins would not be reduced for accidents requiring AFW mitigation. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed changes to Unit 2 TS 3.7.1.2c involve no significant hazards considerations.

The licensee has proposed the following changes to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS 3/4.7.1.2:

- Delete the note addressing Unit 1, Cycle 7, system inoperability. This note is no longer applicable.
- Correct the spelling of "standby" in a note in the Unit 2 TS. This change would correct a typographical error.
- Correct the spelling of "characteristics" in the Unit 1 TS. This

change would correct a typographical error.

- Add the word "and" to a Unit 1 surveillance requirement. This change would correct a clerical error.
- Add a close parenthesis to a Unit 2 surveillance requirement. This change would correct a clerical error.

These proposed changes are minor in nature and do not affect the AFW system or related analyses and are administrative in nature. One example provided in 48 FR 14870 of amendments not likely to involve significant hazards considerations is example (i) which provides for "A purely administrative change to technical specifications: for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature." These minor changes to the AFW TS are consistent with this example. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that these changes to TS 3/4.7.1.2 involve no significant hazards considerations.

*Local Public Document Room*  
location: Calvert County Library, Prince Frederick, Maryland.

*Attorney for licensee:* George F. Trowbridge, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Carolina Power & Light Company,**  
**Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324,**  
**Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North Carolina**

*Date of application for amendment:*  
December 10, 1984, as supplemented  
June 28, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:*  
The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to accomplish the following:

(1) Make changes to properly reflect the direct current (DC) system design at the Brunswick (BSEP) facilities. The DC system designed at BSEP consists of four 125 Vdc batteries and chargers per unit. Each of the 125 Vdc batteries and its associated charger provide 125 Vdc control and instrumentation power for various safety-related and balance of plant (BOP) loads. Two of the batteries and their associated chargers are connected to form the Division I 250 Vdc power supply. The other two form the Division II 250 Vdc power supply. Therefore, an inoperable battery and/or an inoperable charger renders the 250V division inoperable. BSEP has been analyzed for the loss of one DC division. Results from this analysis reflect that sufficient emergency core cooling

system (ECCS) equipment is maintained to mitigate the postulated events.

Because the system has been analyzed for a complete loss of one division, the 7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO) is applicable regardless of the number of inoperable batteries and/or chargers in the one division.

(2) Provide for an orderly shutdown upon loss of both DC divisions. Loss of more than one division of DC power per unit could result in less than the minimum ECCS requirements.

Therefore, an orderly shutdown of the unit is warranted with both DC divisions declared inoperable. When one or more batteries and/or its associated charger in both divisions is declared inoperable, the action statement requiring hot shutdown is applicable.

(3) Provide a means to verify that not more than two 37.5 KVA power conversion modules are aligned to the "B" division bus. The "B" Division Batteries provide the normal feed to the Lighting and Communication Inverter for its respective unit. It also provides the alternate feed to the Plant uninterruptible power supply (UPS) (normally fed from "A" Division) and the opposite unit reflects that the resultant value of all three of the 37.5 KVA power conversion modules aligned to the "B" Division Batteries during the design basis accident (DBA) would exceed the 916 ampere value. Therefore, a restriction will be placed to allow a maximum of two inverters (one Plant UPS and one Lighting and Communications Inverter) or (Both Lighting and Communications Inverters) to be fed from the "B" Division Batteries at the same time.

(4) Update the operability surveillance requirements. The present surveillance requirements to determine the battery's operability status are not as conservative as those specified in the Standard Technical Specifications. Because the present Technical Specifications are not within the battery manufacturer's recommended limits, adoption of the Standard Technical Specification surveillance requirements 4.8.2.3.2.a and 4.8.2.3.2.b is warranted. These surveillance requirements are within the battery manufacturer's recommended limits.

(5) Revise the test values and test duration based on the new DC load study. Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) has performed a detailed DC system load study. The study reflects that the 1-minute loading values are less than the 916 ampere maximum value. The first 1-minute duty cycle profiles were formulated in accordance with the IEEE-485-1983, IEEE-308-1971 and other BSEP-committed design codes and

standards. Therefore, the recommended test values of 916 amperes for the first 60 seconds of the profile test, adequately demonstrate the battery's capability to supply the worst case ampacities if required. By design, the Class 1E chargers will supply the DC load after the diesel generators reenergizes the AC buses, approximately 10 seconds after the loss of off-site power. However, the battery's ability to supply the ampacities, without charger support will be demonstrated. This testing serves as an early warning of degradation between the required 60-month discharge capacity testing. The recommended test values for the remainder of the first 30 minutes and the remainder of the 4-hour test are greater than duty cycle profile ampere values. The total test time of 4 hours was selected as an adequate time to notice any signs of degradation. The 18-month test is to demonstrate the battery's ability to handle the duty cycle, profile discharge rates, rather than the ampere-hour capacity of the battery. Revisions made to the 30-minute and 4-hour test capacities are more restrictive.

(6) Allow performance of the 60-month discharge test to supersede the battery service test to be consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0123).

(7) Provide a new table for the parameters to which the surveillance requirements of Section 4.8.2.3.2 must be performed.

(8) Provide limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for distribution. The present TS treat the 125/250 Vdc system as a unitized system. The 250 Vdc divisions are not shared, while certain circuits of the 125 Vdc divisions are.

The 125 Vdc divisions are shared between units, because they provide 125 Vdc control power for the on-site Class 1E AC Power Distribution System. The on-site Class 1E AC Power Distribution System is shared between units in that three of the four AC divisions between the two units are required to maintain the minimum ECCS requirements. When the DC control power for diesel generators, 4160V emergency buses, 480V emergency buses, or electronic switching system (ESS) logic cabinets is transferred to its alternate source, a single failure to the DC system could make two of the four AC divisions inoperable.

The LCOs placed on both units when a transfer has been affected limits the amount of time the units are allowed to operate with the transfer in place. The surveillance requirements on these circuits will provide control of the

transfers and provide added assurance of DC power availability.

(9) To include associated administrative changes, such as update the index, change format, renumber certain items and renumber certain pages.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* Item 1 reflects the DC system design of BSEP which has been analyzed for the complete loss of one division, i.e., at least one battery plus the associated chargers. The proposed change is within this analyzed loss and is more restrictive.

Item 2 requires an orderly shutdown with no delay time if a battery and charger in each division is inoperable. Formerly, there was a delay time of 3 days to restore operability before shutdown was required. This is a more restrictive condition.

Item 3 permits only two 37.5 KVA power conversion modules to be aligned to the "B" Division Batteries rather than three. This is a more restrictive condition.

Item 4, the present surveillance requirements, are revised to conform to the Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0123). This is a more restrictive condition.

Item 5 represents some more restrictive requirements but also includes a less restrictive surveillance requirement because the 60-second load profile test has been reduced from values ranging from 1040 amps for some batteries to 1212 amps for the top value of battery 1A2, to a constant value of 916 amps for all batteries and the 8-hour load profile test has been reduced to 4 hours. However, based on the detailed load study, the first 1-minute loading values are less than the 916 amp maximum value and can supply the worst core ampacities.

Item 6 permits the 60-month discharge test to supersede the battery service test. The 60-month test is a more restrictive test.

Item 7 provides new parameters to which the surveillance test in TS 4.8.2.3.2 must be performed. These parameters are more restrictive than before and are also consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0123).

Item 8 provides control and limits the time the unit is allowed to operate when the DC control power is transferred to its alternate source. This is a more restrictive limiting condition for operation.

Item 9 includes the remaining items which are administrative in nature.

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing certain examples (48 FR 14670). One of the examples of actions involving no significant hazards considerations, i.e., example (i), relates to purely administrative changes to the Technical Specifications, for example to achieve consistency throughout the Technical Specifications, correction of an error or a change in nomenclature. Another of the examples of actions involving no significant hazards considerations, i.e., example (ii), relates to a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently in the Technical Specifications.

Item 9 is in the category of example (i). Items 1, 2, 3, 4, part of 5, 6, 7 and 8 are in category (ii).

Item 5 also contains some limits that are less restrictive. Based on the above discussion of Item 5, the staff concludes that this item will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because, although the limits are less restrictive, the profiles were in accord with IEEE-485-1983, IEEE-308-1971 and other BSEP-committed design codes. In addition, the Class 1E chargers will supply the DC load from the diesel generators about 10 seconds after a loss of off-site power.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the proposed change introduces no new mode of plant operation and no physical modifications are required to be performed to the plant.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. It is anticipated that any reduction in the margin of safety would be insignificant for the same reason given in (1) above.

Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the criteria for a no significant hazards consideration determination, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), are met. The staff has, therefore, made a proposed determination that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Southport, Brunswick County Library, 109 W. Moore Street, Southport, North Carolina 28461.

*Attorney for licensee:* George F. Trowbridge, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Domenic B. Vassallo.

**Carolina Power & Light Company,  
Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324,  
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1  
and 2, Brunswick County, North  
Carolina**

*Date of application for amendment:* June 18, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would change Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3.5.8-1 by 1) deleting the requirements for radioactivity monitors on the individual branches of the Reactor Building Component Cooling Water (RBCCW) (Service Water) System and 2) revising applicability condition note "\*\*\*\*" to reflect the correct plant configuration. Both of these changes represent limiting conditions for operation (LCO) for equipment which was included in the TS on the basis of future plans for modifications. The modifications were part of the radiological environmental effluent review of the facilities and the current version of these TS was included as part of Amendment Nos. 62 and 88, dated December 27, 1983. The main service water effluent monitor is operable and is controlled by the TS. The monitor on the individual branches of the service water system has not been installed and change 1) above represents the licensee proposal not to install it. The stabilization pond effluent sampler and effluent flow measuring device have both been installed and change 2) and above represents the fact that they are now operable.

The stabilization pond effluent sampler and the stabilization pond effluent flow measuring device, both of which were part of the radiological environmental effluent review approved by our Safety Evaluation dated December 27, 1983, are now installed and operational. The related limiting condition of operation would be incorporated into the TS and this represents an additional limitation not currently in the TS.

The Service Water System provides cooling for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchangers A and B, Reactor Building Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers, and RHR Division I and II Pump Seal Coolers. Table 3.3.5.8-1 of the TS indicates that effluent radiation monitors will be located on each of the components identified above. The purpose of this license amendment is to delete the reference to these five monitors.

The basis for the conclusion that these radioactivity monitors are not necessary is demonstrated by the following:

(1) Potential radioactivity level in the service water effluent is detected by the

main service water effluent monitors. These instruments are equipped with alarm setpoints, which are calculated in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), to ensure the alarm will occur prior to exceeding limits set forth in 10 CFR 20. The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with General Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

(2) Procedures have been developed such that, if the main service water effluent monitor alarms, the source of contamination can be located by grab sampling at each component.

(3) As required by TS 3.3.5.8, during periods that the service water effluent radioactivity monitor is inoperable, service water samples are taken once per 12 hours and analyzed using gamma spectroscopy.

These service water radiation monitors were included in the Brunswick Technical Specifications as part of the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications contained in NUREG-0473. The intent of NUREG-0473 specification 3.3.7.11 is to ensure compliance to 10 CFR 20 liquid effluent radioactivity limits. For the above reasons, the existing main service water effluent radioactivity monitors meet this intent. In addition, the installation of the service water monitor on each of the above-mentioned components is not cost-effective.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The NRC staff has reviewed this request and determined that the proposed amendments do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or create the possibility of a new accident as no physical alteration of plant configuration or changes to setpoints or operating parameters is involved. This change deletes the reference to radiation monitors that were to be added to the radioactive liquid effluent monitoring system. Because the RBCCW service water effluent is adequately monitored with the existing main service water effluent monitor, no reduction in a margin of safety is involved. This change also involves an increased control of effluents by adding a new limiting condition of operation for the stabilization pond. Based on the above reasoning, the staff has determined that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)

involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, the staff proposes that the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Southport, Brunswick County, Library, 109 W. Moore Street, Southport, North Carolina 28461.

*Attorney for licensee:* George F. Trowbridge, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC, 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Domenic B. Vassallo.

**Carolina Power & Light Company,  
Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324,  
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1  
and 2, Brunswick County, North  
Carolina**

*Date of application for amendment:* July 1, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:*

The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to change the surveillance requirements for the Reactor Protection System Instrumentation and the Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation as given in Table 4.3.1-1 and 4.3.4-1 of the Brunswick-1 and Brunswick-2 TS.

At specified intervals and/or prior to each reactor startup, the monitors associated with the Control Rod Withdrawal Block and the Reactor Protection System are required to have channel functional tests performed. However, when the Reactor Mode Switch (RMS) is in the shutdown position, existing circuitry in the RMS prohibits testing of some of these instruments. In order to perform the channel functional test on these instruments without excessive circuit jumping, this TS change would allow the RMS to be temporarily placed in a position other than that corresponding to the actual plant Operational Condition (OC). It should be noted that no change in the actual plant operation condition, will occur, only a change in the position of the RMS. Instruments affected by these proposed changes are identified as Items 2.a and 2.b of TS Table 4.3.1-1 and Items 1.b, 1.d, and 4.a of TS Table 4.3.4-1.

A similar condition exists for other instruments associated with the Control Rod Block and Reactor Protection System when the plant is in OC 1 (Run). Section 4.0.4 of the TS prohibits entry into an operational condition unless all Surveillance Requirements associated with the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) applicable to the OC to be entered have been performed within the applicable surveillance interval or as otherwise specified. Therefore, in order

to enter OC 2 (Startup/Hot Standby) from OC 1, the surveillance tests required for OC 2 must be performed. However, the channel functional test circuitry of some instrumentation is bypassed when the RMS is in the RUN position, thereby prohibiting performance of the channel functional test. The proposed TS change would allow for performance of the required surveillance test to be completed within 12 hours of entering OC 2 from OC 1 for the affected instruments. Instruments affected by this change are identified as Items 1.a and 1.b of TS Table 4.3.1-1 and Items 1.d, 3.a, 3.c, and 3.d of TS Table 4.3.4-1.

In addition to the changes described above, a weekly channel functional test is added to the Neutron Flux-High trip function of the Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) during OC 2 (Item 1.a, Table 4.3.1-1). This ensures that the trip function is periodically tested during extended unit operation in OC 2 (greater than 7 days). This surveillance requirement is currently in effect for the IRM inoperative trip function and is consistent with the Standard Technical Specification (NUREG-0123).

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:*

We have reviewed this request and determined that the proposed amendment does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated as there is no physical alternation of the plant configuration or changes to setpoints or operating parameters. The operational condition of the plant is based on RMS position and average reactor coolant temperature. The RMS position controls only the logic circuitry of the plant; none of the other parameter dictating an OC will be varied when performing the required channel functional test.

Our review also verified that the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new kind of accident because the control rods will be fully inserted and remain so until all LCOs are met for the performance of required surveillance during Startup/Hot Standby, Shutdown or Refueling modes. Also, performing a channel functional test in the actual logic configuration in which the components will be required during the surveillance addressed by this request is preferable to the extensive use of jumpers currently employed to accomplish the channel functional test.

The addition of footnote (d) to Items 1.a and 1.b of Table 4.3.1-1 and to Items 1.d, 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, and 3.d of Table 4.3.4-1 allows for performance of the required surveillance within 12 hours of entering OC 2 from OC 1. This change is consistent with existing allowances for

the APRMs and IRMs in the respective tables and does not constitute a significant change in a margin of safety.

Based on our review of the amendment request and the above discussion, the Commission proposes to determine that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, this request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Southport, Brunswick County Library, 109 W. Moore Street, Southport, North Carolina 28461.

*Attorney for licensee:* George F. Trowbridge, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Domenic B. Vassallo.

**Commonwealth Edison Company,  
Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-  
455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle  
County, Illinois**

*Date of application for amendment:* June 26, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:*

The amendment would revise the Technical Specification Section 6.12.2. The proposed change would allow personnel to enter areas with radiation levels greater than 1000 mR/h during certain emergencies without an approved Radiation Work Permit (RWP). During emergency situations involving personnel injury or potential damage to major equipment, the proposed change would allow for continuous surveillance and radiation monitoring of the area by a qualified individual in lieu of an approved RWP.

*Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:* Based on the three criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 for defining a significant hazards consideration, operation of Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The probability of an accident previously evaluated remains unchanged since the proposed change only involves an administrative control associated with radiation protection of workers. The consequences of an accident previously evaluated also remain unchanged since the offsite doses that have been

predicated for previously evaluated accidents will remain unchanged.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because radiation protection for workers will still be in effect. The proposed change allows for an alternate means of providing radiation protection for workers during certain emergencies.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the administrative radiation exposure limits for workers are not affected by this change.

Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Rockford Public Library, 215 N. Wyman Street, Rockford, Illinois 61103.

*Attorney for licensee:* Michael Miller, Isham, Lincoln & Beale, One First National Plaza, 42nd Floor, Chicago, Illinois 60603.

*NRC Branch Chief:* B.J. Youngblood.

**Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304, Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Benton County, Illinois**

*Date of application for amendments:* June 28, 1985.

*Description of amendments request:* These amendments would modify Sections 3.22, 4.22, and 6.5.B of the Technical Specifications. These changes are being submitted in order to convert these Sections to the Standardized Technical Specification's content. In all categories, with the exception of hydraulic snubber visual inspection and functional testing, the proposed Technical Specifications will impose additional restrictions that are not included in the present Technical Specifications.

While the proposed programs for hydraulic snubber visual inspections and functional testing have not been significantly altered, the acceptance criteria for these activities have been more closely defined. Thus, these constraints also constitute an additional control not included in the present Technical Specifications.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission's examples of actions involving no significant hazards consideration (48 FR 14870) include: (ii) a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications; for example, a more stringent surveillance requirement.

The above changes to Sections 3.22, 4.22 and 6.5.B all involve additional

restrictions or controls that are not included in the present Technical Specifications, and fit example (ii).

The staff therefore proposes that these amendments do not involve significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Zion-Benton Library District, 2600 Emmaus Avenue, Zion, Illinois 60099.

*Attorney to licensee:* P. Steptoe, Esq., Isham, Lincoln and Beale, Counselors at Law, Three First National Plaza, 51st Floor, Chicago, Illinois 60602.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Steven A. Varga.

**Duquesne Light Company, Docket No. 50-334, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1, Shippingport, Pennsylvania**

*Date of amendment request:* December 12, 1984, as supplemented June 27, 1985

*Description of amendment request:* Regarding the request for amendment dated December 12, 1984, the Commission has issued a proposed no significant hazards determination on February 27, 1985 (50 FR 7986). The June 1985 request, however, expands the scope of the December 1984 request as follows:

The expanded scope of the proposed amendment would revise applicable specifications to allow the use of the Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pumps with an open Reactor Collant System (RCS) vent of 3.14 square inches in place of a charging pump when in Modes 5 and 6. Applicable surveillance requirements would be added to require demonstration of LHSI pump operability and verification of an open vent when used in place of the charging pump. The Mode 5 and 6 Action statement would also be revised to specify action to be taken when no charging pump or LHSI pump is operable. The Bases would be revised to provide justification for using a LHSI pump in place of a charging pump.

The use of the LHSI pumps in conjunction with an open RCS vent in lieu of a charging pump when in Modes 5 and 6 will allow the removal of the latter from service for inspection, modification or maintenance.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* Modes 5 and 6 refer to cold shut down refueling, respectively. The requested amendment would permit use of either the charging pump or the LHSI pumps during these modes. Therefore, the plant would continue to have the capability to provide reactivity control and coolant makeup, via use of either type of pumps. On such basis, we conclude that the proposed amendment, as described in the June 27, 1985 submittal, would not

involve any significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously analyzed, and would involve no reduction in the margin of safety. We, therefore, propose to characterize the proposed amendment as involving no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* B.F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esquire, Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Steven A. Varga.

**Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska**

*Date of amendment request:* April 26, 1985, as supplemented May 5, and June 14, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) in the following areas: (1) Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) and Control Room Ventilation System flow and operability requirements; (2) Reactor Vessel Water Level trip settings; (3) clarification of Refueling Interlock requirements; (4) deletion of Equipment Qualification (EQ) program deadline date; and (5) correction of typographical errors and other editorial changes.

(1) *SGTS and Control Room Ventilation System.* The proposed changes to the SGTS and control room ventilation system TS would revise the limiting conditions for operation (LCO) for each system to specify the numerical values for design flow rate for filter bypass limits, flow velocity for filter effectiveness limits, and system fan capacities. At present, the numerical values for these parameters are not provided in the system LCOs. The proposed change would also add the numerical value of reactor building pressure that must be obtained from SGTS operation. The current SGTS LCO does not address this requirement. In addition to the above, wording changes are proposed to clarify the Bases section for both the SGTS and the control room ventilation systems.

(2) *Reaction Vessel Water Level Trip.* The proposed amendment would change the containment isolation trip setting for the reactor water sample valves from reactor low-low water level (greater than or equal to -37 in.) to reactor low-low-low water level (greater than

-145.5 in.). This change is reflected in the Notes to Table 3.2.A, "Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Instrumentation." This change is proposed to permit closure of the reactor water sample valves on the same signal that is used to close the main steam isolation valves (MSIV). The use of the reactor low-low water level trip for MSIV closure was previously found to be acceptable in the NRC letter dated March 4, 1983 which issued Amendment No. 83 to the Cooper Nuclear Station Facility Operating License.

In conjunction with the above proposed change, the licensee also proposes to delete the entry for reactor low-low water level instruments from Table 3.2.A. With the change of trip setting for the reactor water sample valves from the low-low level to the low-low-low level, the low-low level instrumentation would not be used for any containment or reactor vessel isolation function and can be deleted from the table. In addition to the above, changes are proposed to clarify the Bases section for the primary containment isolation functions.

(3) *Refueling Interlock Requirements.* This proposed change would revise an LCO for refueling interlocks during core alteration operations. The objective of core alteration LCOs is to ensure that core reactivity is within the capability of the control rods and to prevent criticality refueling.

The current TS permit any number of control rods to be withdrawn or removed from the reactor when the reactor mode switch is locked in the "refuel" position and certain conditions are satisfied. That is, the refueling interlock, which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn, may be bypassed with one control rod withdrawn provided: (a) The fuel assemblies in the cell controlled by that control rod have been removed from the core and (b) all other refueling interlocks are operable. The proposed amendment would revise the latter condition to state that all other refueling interlocks shall be operable when fuel is present in the reactor vessel. The current requirement is for all other refueling interlocks to be operable whether fuel is present in the core or not. The intent of the proposed change is to bring this section of the TS into conformance with the Standard Technical Specifications for Boiling Water Reactors.

(4) *Equipment Qualification Program Deadline.* The administrative controls section of the current TS specifies a deadline of June 30, 1982 for the environmental qualification of all

safety-related electrical equipment at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). However, this deadline is no longer applicable and has been removed by the NRC from the final rule governing equipment qualification, 10 CFR 50.49. Effective November 19, 1984, 10 CFR 50.49(g) was revised (49 FR 45571) to include the following statement: "The schedule in this paragraph supersedes the June 30, 1982 deadline, or any other previously imposed date, for environmental qualification of a electric equipment contained in certain nuclear power operating licenses." Therefore, since the equipment qualification program at CNS is subject to the schedule in 10 CFR 50.49, the licensee proposes to delete the June 30, 1982 date from the TS.

(5) *Correction of Typographical Errors and Other Editorial Changes.* The proposed amendment would correct typographical errors in the TS sections related to the standby liquid control system (Section 4.4) and the reactor core isolation colling system (Table 4.2.B). In addition, the licensee proposes to modify the administrative section of the TS to improve readability and understanding. These changes involve a condensation of the material to delete gaps in the administrative section pages. The content of the material would remain completely unchanged, e.g., there would be no deletions, wording modifications, syntax or sequence changes.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:*  
(1) *SGTS and Control Room Ventilation System.* The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). One of the examples of actions involving no significant hazards considerations, i.e., example (ii), related to a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently in the Technical Specifications. The proposed change, by adding absolute numerical values for design flow rates and flow velocities and by specifying a value for reactor building pressure, results in more restrictive LCOs for the SGTS and control room ventilation system. The proposed change is therefore, similar to example (ii) above. The Commission therefore proposes to determine that this action involves no significant hazards considerations.

(2) *Reactor Vessel Water Level Trip.* The licensee submittal of June 14, 1985 provided an evaluation of the proposed action and a basis for a proposed no significant hazards consideration. The licensee's proposed determination is

based on a previously-submitted accident analysis discussed below.

The accident of concern for the proposed change is radiation release through the reactor water sample lines for a break in the line outside primary containment. Lowering the setpoint for isolation of this line has the potential for an increased inventory loss through the line and increase in the off-site radiation dose. This accident was analyzed to support lowering the trip setpoint to -145.5 inches for closure of the MSIVs. General Electric (GE) Company report DEDE-22223 was submitted by licensee letter dated December 17, 1982 to support the TS change to lower the MSIV trip setting. The analysis showed that the 3/4-inch reactor water sample valves represent 0.04 percent of the flow area for the main steam lines. Consequently, the analysis demonstrated that the increase in the amount of inventory loss through the reactor water sample lines at the lower trip setpoint would be insignificant and would not affect the calculated radiation doses.

Based on the above, the licensee concluded that the proposed amendment will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because an analysis shows no increase in calculated radiation dose compared to the existing trip setting of -37 inches. This appears to be a reasonable result in view of the small size of the reactor water sample lines.

(2) Create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the calculated radiation dose is not affected and previous accident analyses remain bounding.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because the increased inventory loss is insignificant compared with that from a main steam line break outside containment which has been previously evaluated and approved by the NRC. The calculated radiation dose is shown by the licensee's analysis to be unaffected by the proposed change.

Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the criteria for a no significant hazards consideration as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) are met. The staff has, therefore, made a proposed determination that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

(3) *Refueling Interlock Requirements.* The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing

certain examples (48 FR 14870). One of the examples of actions involving no significant hazards considerations, i.e., example (vi), relates to a change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan (SRP). The proposed change, by specifying conditions for removal of refueling interlocks could, in some way, result in a reduction of a safety margin. However, the revised requirements would be consistent with NUREG-0123, the Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Since the STS serve as the basis for assessing conformance to SRP Chapter 16 and the change is consistent with the STS, this change is encompassed by example (vi). The Commission therefore proposes to determine that this action involves no significant hazards consideration.

*(4) Equipment Qualification Program Deadline and*

*(5) Correction of Typographical Errors and Other Editorial Changes.* The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). One of the examples of actions involving no significant hazards considerations, i.e., example (i), relates to purely administrative changes to the Technical Specifications, for example to achieve consistency throughout the Technical Specifications, correction of an error or a change in nomenclature. The proposed deletion of the equipment qualification program deadline date represents a correction to the TS. This date has been superseded by the revised schedule in 10 CFR 50.49(g). This change is a purely administrative change as are the correction of typographical errors and other editorial changes of this proposed amendment. These proposed revisions are therefore encompassed by example (i) cited above. On this basis, the Commission proposes to determine that these changes involve no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Auburn Public Library, 118 15th Street, Auburn, Nebraska 68305.

*Attorney for licensee:* Mr. G.D. Watson, Nebraska Public Power District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, Nebraska 68601.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Domenic B. Vassallo.

**Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-336, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, New London County, Connecticut**

*Date of amendment request:* June 11, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed change to the Technical Specifications (TS) would eliminate the 18-month battery service test during every 60th month, since the more stringent performance discharge test is performed at that time. The present TS requires a performance discharge test once every 60 months to demonstrate battery capacity. The performance discharge test is performed subsequent to satisfactory completion of the required 18-month battery service test. The proposed change would eliminate the battery service test when the 60-month battery discharge test is performed. The battery discharge test is sufficient to demonstrate that the battery meets design requirements. The elimination of the battery service test when the discharge test is performed reduces unnecessary testing and will contribute to the battery life expectancy. The proposed change also conforms to Revision 4 of Westinghouse PWR Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0452, Revision 4, Section 4.8.2.1.e).

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* Based on the above information, we conclude that the proposed Technical Specification change allows the more stringent performance discharge test to be used in lieu of the 18-month battery service test, thus eliminating unnecessary testing that would result in reduced battery life expectancy. Therefore, the proposed change would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Accordingly, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Waterford Public Library, Rope Ferry Road, Route 156, Waterford, Connecticut.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Garfield, Esq., Day, Berry and Howard, One Constitution Plaza, Hartford, Connecticut 06103.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-387, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania**

*Date of amendment request:* November 26, 1984.

*Description of amendment request:* In the November 26, 1984 submittal the licensee requested a change to License Conditions 2.A and 2.B(2) of NPF-14.

These License Conditions presently read:

2.A. This license applies to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, a boiling water nuclear reactor and associated equipment (the facility), owned by the licensee. The facility is located in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, and is described in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report as supplemented and amended through Amendment 48, and the licensee's Environmental Report as supplemented and amended through Amendment 48.

2.B.(2) PP&L, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor-operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended through Amendment 48.

The licensee has proposed to modify this wording such that the specific amendment number of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Environmental Report (ER) not be included in the License Conditions. For example: 2.A would read:

in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report as supplemented and amended, and the licensee's Environmental Report as supplemented and amended.

*Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:* At the time of issuance of the Susquehanna Unit 1 license, it was determined that in order for the licensee to be explicitly committed to the FSAR and ER accepted at the time of licensing the specific amendment numbers to FSAR and ER ought to be reflected in the License Conditions. Subsequently the staff has found that this initial determination causes an unnecessary restriction or the licensee without any contribution to overall safety. The licensee's proposal for Unit 1 is consistent with the as issued license conditions contained in the Unit 2 license. The basis for the licensee's proposal is 10 CFR 50.71(e) which states:

the updated FSAR shall be revised to include the effects of: all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the FSAR; all safety evaluations performed by

the licensee either in support of requested license amendments or in support of conclusions that changes did not involve an unreviewed safety question; and all analyses of new safety issues performed by or on behalf of the licensee at Commission request.

This regulation provides assurance that any FSAR change will be reviewed by the utility via the safety evaluation process and that any changes that result in a safety question not previously reviewed and approved by the staff shall be submitted at that time to the staff for review and approval. In addition 10 CFR 50.59(b) requires the licensee to maintain records that shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change, test or experiment does not involve an unreviewed safety question. Additionally the staff finds the inclusion of the specific amendment number for the ER to be unnecessary as the licensee is not required and does not update the ER subsequent to licensing but is accountable for and abides by the plant specific Environmental Protection Plan.

In view of the present requirements, incorporation of specific FSAR and ER amendment numbers in License Conditions 2.A and 2.B(2) serves no useful purpose. Deletion of these FSAR and ER amendment numbers from these License Conditions thus would not: (1) Significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) significantly reduce a margin of safety. On this basis, the staff proposes to determine that this license amendment does not involve significant hazards considerations.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Osterhout Free Library, Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701.

*Attorney for Licensee:* Jay Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 1800 M Street NW., Washington, D.C.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Walter R. Butler.

**Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania**

*Date of amendment request:* June 24, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The NRC staff in NUREG 0737 Item III.D.1.1 required the establishment of the leakage reduction program outlined in Technical Specification 6.8.4a. The present listing in the Technical

Specifications is not complete. The licensee has proposed to change the Technical Specifications to add the Residual Heat Removal and Post Accident Sampling Systems to the listing of "Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment" in Technical Specification 6.8.4a in order to complete the listing and accurately reflect that contained in the FSAR Section 18.1.69.

*Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:* The licensee in his letter dated June 24, 1985, stated that the proposed change does not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new and different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in margin of safety. The NRC staff agrees with the licensee's evaluation in this regard and proposes to find the proposed change to not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the no significant hazards consideration standards by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). One of the examples of actions not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration, example (ii), is a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restrictions, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications: for example, a more stringent surveillance requirement. Since the licensee has proposed to add systems subject to controls and requirements to the Technical Specifications, the staff proposes to find that this change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as it is encompassed by the example (ii).

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Osterhout Free Library, Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701.

*Attorney for licensee:* Jay Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* W. Butler.

**Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey**

*Date of amendments request:* October 15, 1984.

*Description of amendments request:* The amendments request would change the *APPLICABILITY* Section of Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 for Unit No. 1, and 3.4.2 for Unit 2, Safety Valves to read as follows:

*"APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of all RCS cold legs is greater than 312 °F."*

Remove the reference to the Overpressurization Protection System from the Safety Value Technical Specification Bases for Unit No. 2.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). The examples of actions which involve no significant hazards consideration include changes which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan (Example vi).

Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 requires that an Overpressure Protection System shall be OPERABLE when the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 312 °F, except when the vessel head is removed. As stated in the Technical Specification Bases, the OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. Previously submitted analyses of the most limiting heat input and mass input transients indicate that the RCS pressure will not exceed the Appendix G curve limit of 460 psig with RCS temperatures above 100 °F. When the Overpressure Protection System is OPERABLE. Based on the results of these analyses, we have determined that the need does not exist for the OPERABILITY of a Pressurizer Code Safety Valve with a lift setting of 2485 psig ± 1% when RCS cold leg temperature is less than or equal to 312 °F. The results of the change will remain within acceptable criteria with respect to Overpressure Protection Systems specified in Standard Review Plan 5.2.

Based on the above, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Salem Free Library, 122 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08709.

*Attorney for licensee:* Conner and Wetterhann, Suite 1050, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Steven A. Varga.

**South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Sumner Nuclear Station Unit 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina.**

*Date of amendment request:* March 15, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The amendment would make administrative changes to Technical Specifications. These administrative changes include a change in a position title, adding listings to the Index for a previously approved amendment, adding clarification to better identify monitoring instruments listed in the surveillance tables, and correcting the design negative pressure differential of the reactor building listed in Technical Specification bases to be in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report, which is also a more conservative value.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided certain examples (48 FR 14870) of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations. One of the examples (i) relates to administrative changes to Technical Specifications such as a change to achieve consistency throughout Technical Specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature. The amendment involved here is similar in that it corrects errors in Technical Specifications, updates the Index, and changes and clarifies titles in the Technical Specifications. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that this change does not involve significant hazards considerations.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Fairfield County Library, Garden and Washington Streets, Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180.

*Attorney for licensee:* Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, P.O. Box 764, Columbia 29218.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Elinor G. Adensam.

**Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3, Limestone County, Alabama**

*Date of amendment request:* June 26, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The amendments would modify the Technical Specifications (TS) to revise the definition of "secondary containment integrity". Under the current definition, secondary containment integrity does not exist when any penetration is isolated by only a single valve which is closed and deactivated. (The other valve in the

penetration must be operable). This condition does not permit maintenance on an automatic isolation valve when secondary containment integrity is required. Under the proposed amendment, a secondary containment penetration would be considered to have integrity if one of the two isolation valves serving a penetration is closed and deenergized. This will permit maintenance on the other valve.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided guidance for the application of criteria for no significant hazards consideration determination by providing examples of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations (48 FR 14870). These examples include: (vi) A change which either may result in some increase to the probability of consequence of a previously-analyzed accident or reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the result of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan (SRP); for example, a change resulting from the application of a small refinement of a previously used calculational model or design method.

If one of two valves in a penetration is made inoperable (for example, to perform maintenance), deactivating the other in the closed position provides integrity for that penetration. The revised definition would be consistent with Section 1.30.a.2 of the BWR Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0123) which serves as the basis for assessing technical specification conformance to the SRP. The proposed change is therefore encompassed by example (vi).

Since the application for amendment involves proposed changes that are encompassed by an example for which no significant hazards consideration exists, the staff has made a proposed determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Athens Public Library, South and Forest, Athens, Alabama 35611.

*Attorney for licensee:* H.S. Sanger, Jr., Esquire, General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 Commerce Avenue E 11B 33C, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Domenic B. Vassallo.

**Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee**

*Date of amendment request:* (1) May 6, 1985. (2) May 21, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* (1) Acoustic Monitoring System. Accident monitoring instrumentation is installed at Sequoyah to ensure that sufficient information is available to the operator on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. Sequoyah has four separate methods of determining safety valve positions, any two of which are required to be operable at all times. One method is acoustic flow monitors mounted on each safety valve line. The proposed change requires that one of the two required operable indications at all times must be the acoustic monitor system instead of any two of the other available methods. (2) Three loop plant operation. Sequoyah is a four loop plant operation; however, the Technical Specifications were originally issued with provisions for future 3-loop operations. The licensee requests deletion of this aspect of the Technical Specifications because TVA has no plans to pursue approval for this mode of operation. Deletion of this type of operation will eliminate the possibility of a Technical Specifications provision from being inappropriately applied.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided certain examples (48 FR 14870) of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations. The first request does not match any of those examples. However, the staff has reviewed the licensee's request and has determined that identifying the acoustic monitor as one of the two required operable indications of system parameters will not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Rather, the requirement for maintaining the acoustic monitor system operable at all times will increase the margin of safety for plant operations. Significant leakage rates from the safety or relief valves are more readily detected from acoustic devices than from water level indications. The combination of position and leakage flow indications from the valves will enable the operator to more accurately assess plant conditions. The second

request to eliminate 3-loop operational provisions does match example (i) namely, this proposed change is purely an administrative change to the technical specifications because the current provisions are not utilized in the operation of the facility. The Commission proposes to determine that the changes identified in this notice do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Chattanooga-Hamilton County Bicentennial Library, 1001 Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401.

*Attorney for licensee:* Mr. Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Esquire, General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 Commerce Avenue, E11 B33, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Elinor Adensam.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company and Old Dominion Electric Cooperative, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Louisa County, Virginia**

*Date of amendment request:* October 15, 1984 and February 14, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed Technical Specification (TS) changes would revise the nominal Intermediate Range (IR) Neutron flux trip setpoint from a presently specified "equivalent to less than or equal to  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  (0.0004) amperes." The maximum allowable setpoint for the proposed IR setpoint of 0.0004 amperes would be 0.0005 amperes which is equivalent to 70 percent of rated thermal power. Because the IR flux detectors are located outside the core, the IR signal has been shown historically to be sensitive to the core loading pattern in use. For example, the high-burnup, low leakage patterns currently in use at North Anna give a different IR detector response than the more traditional type of pattern used for the initial core loadings. In addition, because the detectors do not cover the full core length as do the power range channels, the detector response is also sensitive to the core axial flux distribution. As a result, such effects as varying core burnups or control rod positions also can have a significant impact on the IR channel response. The variability in the channel response has made it difficult to maintain the channels in proper calibration. As a result of these difficulties, the licensee performed a safety evaluation which justifies a change to the Technical Specifications to allow the IR trip setpoint to be specified in terms of a fixed IR current. Upon implementation of this change, the IR trip will be consistent with all of the other reactor trips in that the trip

setpoint specified in the Technical Specifications and reflected in plant operating documents will be expressed in the same units as the channel's indicated output.

A review of the accident analysis provided in Chapter 15 of the North Anna Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) confirms that none of the accident analyses take credit for the IR high flux trips for protection or mitigation of accidents. Those accidents which are initiated from powers below permissive P-10 (where the IR trip would be unblocked) include the Hot Zero Power (HZP) rod ejection event, the uncontrolled rod withdrawal from subcritical, inadvertent boron dilution from hot, cold or refueling shutdown, and excessive heat removal at no load conditions. The review showed that the results and conclusions as stated in the FSAR with respect to these accidents are not impacted in any way by the Intermediate Range channels.

In addition sensitivities studies were performed to assess the effects of varying assumed high power trip setpoints on the analysis of rod withdrawal from subcritical and rod ejection accidents (low power reactivity addition events). In this way a measure of the impact of the proposed IR setpoint on the effectiveness of the redundant protection afforded by the high power trip channels could be made. The results of these studies indicated energy release was increased by a fraction of a percent and peak fuel and clad temperatures increased by only a few degrees.

The significance of these results is that the potential increase in effective flux trip setpoint resulting from the proposed change will have no impact on its contribution to the overall reliability and effectiveness of the reactor protection system.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided guidance concerning the no significant hazards consideration by providing certain examples (48 FR 14879). Example (vi) of a no significant hazards consideration involves a change which may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system as specified in the Standard Review Plan. The proposed change as discussed above falls within the scope of example (vi). The changes have been reviewed with respect to the accident analyses in the North Anna FSAR which are in accordance with the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan 7.2. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendment

does not involve significant hazards considerations.

*Local Public Document Room locations:* Board of Supervisors Office, Louisa County Courthouse, Louisa, Virginia 23093 and the Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

*Attorney for licensee:* Michael W. Maupin, Esq., Hunton, Williams, Gay and Gibson, P.O. Box 1535, Richmond, Virginia 23212.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia**

*Date of amendment request:* February 7, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed change would allow NA-1&2 to operate at less than 70 percent of full power with a small, positive Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC). The present TS do not allow NA1&2 to be brought critical unless the moderator coefficient is negative, except during physics testing. The proposed change would allow a small positive MTC below 70 percent power and would change to a zero (0) MTC at 70 percent power and above. A power dependent MTC was chosen to minimize the effect of the MTC upon accidents initiated from high power levels. Also, normal core physical phenomena result in the MTC becoming more negative as the power level increases. The proposed change would provide a reasonable degree of flexibility in core design and plant operation for future cycles. The proposed change is similar to NRC approved TS for other facilities.

To assess the effect on accident analysis for plant operation with a slightly positive MTC, a safety analysis of transients sensitive to a zero or positive MTC was performed. These transients included control rod assembly withdrawal from subcritical, control rod assembly withdrawal at power, loss of reactor coolant flow, loss of external load, locked rotor, and control rod ejection. The analysis employed a constant moderator temperature coefficient independent of power level. The results of the analysis are therefore conservative, since a positive MTC is precluded by the proposed change for power operations at 70 percent of power and above. Analyses of the transients in Section 15 of the NA-1&2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) that are affected by a positive MTC indicated that the analyses meet the

appropriate transient acceptance criteria. In some cases the results showed a small incremental decrease in safety margins. However, in all cases the small increase was enveloped by appropriate safety margins specified in the NA-1&2 UFSAR.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* One of the Commission's examples (48 FR 14870) involving no significant hazards relates to a requested change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan; for example, a change resulting from the application of a small refinement of a previously used calculational model or design method. The proposed change as described above falls within the scope of the Commission's example as stated above. Therefore, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room locations:* Board of Supervisors Office, Louisa County Courthouse, Louisa, Virginia 23093 and the Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

*Attorney for licensee:* Michael W. Maupin, Esq., Hunton, Williams, Gay and Gibson, P.O. Box 1535, Richmond, Virginia 23212.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia

*Date of amendment request:* March 29, 1985 and July 1, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed change would extend the time period that one of the redundant Service Water System (SWS) headers could be out of service. The NA-1&2 Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4.1 currently limits the time period that one of the SWS headers can be inoperable to 72 hours. The proposed change would extend the allowable time that one header could be out of service from 72 hours to 168 hours provided 3 out of 4 service water pumps and 1 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps are operable during the 168 hour Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO). In addition, the proposed change is specified as being applicable only for

the period of time that the currently planned SWS mechanical and chemical cleaning of pipe and installation of new discharge headers and spray arrays and refurbishment of the SWS is in progress.

The (SWS) is a common system to both NA-1&2 and is designed for the removal of heat resulting from the simultaneous operation of various systems and components of the two reactor units. There are two independent sources of water that provide the ultimate heat sink for the NA units. These are the Service Water Reservoir and the North Anna Reservoir. The SWS is designed with redundant supply and return headers which are supplied by four service water pumps and two auxiliary service water pumps. Two pumps are required to provide adequate flow for both units during normal operation and design basis accident conditions as specified in the NA-1&2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

In order to evaluate the impact on plant safety resulting from operation of the SWS in an extended 168 hour LCO condition, a probabilistic safety assessment was performed by the licensee. The analysis included: (1) A reliability study of the SWS in normal operation (two main headers operable); (2) a reliability study of the SWS in a 72 hour LCO; and (3) a reliability study of the SWS in the extended 168 hour LCO; and (4) sensitivity studies to investigate the reliability of systems supported by SW and potential changes in system operation or maintenance to enhance SWS reliability.

The analysis was based upon a qualitative and quantitative probabilistic evaluation of the reliability of the SWS. The qualitative system evaluation included the performance of a failure modes and effects analysis which identified potential failure mechanisms and evaluated their consequences in terms of system performance. The quantitative system evaluation consisted of a fault tree analysis of the SWS and applicable support system. The fault tree was analyzed assigning probabilities to the basic events contained in the tree. These were derived from system and component failure data and human error data and models. Industry data sources and NA-1&2 plant-specific operating experience were reviewed to develop the data base for the analysis.

The results of the quantitative analysis of the SWS (pumps and major headers) indicate that the system failure probability increases from  $3.2 \times 10^{-5}$  to  $4.0 \times 10^{-5}$  when the time period for the LCO is extended from 72 hours to 168 hours. This small increase in failure

probability of the SWS due to extension of the LCO condition would result in a negligible increase in overall plant risk. The results of sensitivity cases for investigating the reliability of service water flow to selected systems supported by service water also indicated an increase in failure probability due to extension of the LCO conditions. This increase in failure probability was also judged to be insignificant.

Based on the results of the reliability study, a significant contributor to SWS failures was determined to be pump unavailability due to maintenance. A sensitivity study was therefore performed to evaluate the impact of reducing the maintenance activity on the service water pumps during the extended LCO condition. This pre-condition would limit maintenance activities such that 3 out of 4 service water pumps and 1 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps are available at the beginning of the extended LCO condition. The result of this action reduces the SWS failure probability for the extended LCO case from  $4.0 \times 10^{-5}$  to  $2.0 \times 10^{-5}$ . The failure probability of the selected systems supported by service water was also investigated for the reduced maintenance case. The result was that the failure probability for service water flow to the supported systems was also reduced for the extended LCO condition.

Based on the results of the probabilistic safety assessment, it was concluded that extension of the LCO time period would result in a negligible increase in risk. The probability of a service water system failure increases from  $3.2 \times 10^{-5}$  to  $4.0 \times 10^{-5}$  when the time period for the LCO is extended from 72 hours to 168 hours. However, since the proposed revision to the TS requires that 3 out of 4 service water pumps and 1 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps be operable during the extended header outage, the failure probability will be reduced from  $4.0 \times 10^{-5}$  to  $2.0 \times 10^{-5}$ . Therefore, the reliability of the Service Water System for the 168 hour extended LCO condition will be by a small margin increased over that of the 72 hour LCO condition as governed by the current NA-1&2 TS.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR Part 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance

with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the probabilistic safety assessment as described above, it was concluded there will be no increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously analyzed. The reliability of the SWS for the extended 168 hour LCO condition will be increased over that of the 72 hour LCO condition as allowed by the current NA-1&2 TS. In addition, the operation of the nuclear units under the extended LCO does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident not previously analyzed. The units are licensed to operate with only one heater operable under current LCO restrictions. This does not change as a result of extending the time period.

Finally, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any technical specification will not be reduced. The probability of failure of the SWS during the extended LCO has not been increased under the proposed change to the TS.

Therefore, based on the above, the proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously considered, will not create the possibility of a new different accident from any evaluated previously, and will not significantly reduce a safety margin. On this basis, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the standards for determining that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration are met, and that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room locations:* Board of Supervisors Office, Louisa County Courthouse, Louisa, Virginia 23093 and the Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

*Attorney for licensee:* Michael W. Maupin, Esq., Huton, Williams, Gay and Gibson, P.O. Box 1535, Richmond, Virginia 23212.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia**

*Date of amendments request:* April 12, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) by adding Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for the reactor trip bypass breakers, undervoltage trip logic and shunt trip logic. The proposed changes are in accordance with the NRC Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 24, 1984 which addressed Auto Shunt Trip Modifications and the need for additional testing of Reactor Trip Breakers and associated equipment. To meet the requirements specified in Generic Letter 83-28, the proposed changes to the TS would add LCOs and SRs for reactor trip breakers, undervoltage trip logic and shunt trip logic. Revised LCO's SR's have been added to require reactor trip bypass breaker testing prior to the routine testing of the reactor trip breakers to provide added assurance for the operability of the bypass breaker during the testing of the main breaker. In addition, LCO's and SR's are being added which require operability and surveillance of both the undervoltage and shunt trip logic features.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of these standards by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications, Example (ii), is explicitly considered not likely to involve significant hazards. The proposed changes add LCO's, action statements and surveillance requirements for reactor trip bypass breaker, undervoltage trip logic and shunt trip logic as required by the NRC Generic Letter 83-28. Therefore, the proposed change is enveloped by example (ii). Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the changes involve no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room locations:* Board of Supervisors Office, Louisa County Courthouse, Louisa, Virginia 23093 and the Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

*Attorney for licensee:* Michael W. Maupin, Esquire, Hunton, Williams, Gay

and Gibson P.O. Box 1535, Richmond, Virginia 23212.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia**

*Date of amendment request:* April 30, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) would revise the pressure temperature limit curves and accompanying changes to the reactor heatup rate limits and the low temperature overpressure protection Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) setpoints.

In accordance with TS Section 3/4.4.9 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices G and H, pressure-temperature limit curves have been updated to be applied during heatup and cooldown. The updated curves, which are valid through 10 Effective Full Power Years (EFPY), are based on conservative extrapolated vessel irradiation levels which reflect the results of evaluations of the first surveillance capsules removed as part of the Reactor vessel materials surveillance programs for the two units. Measured Cycle 1 flux data derived from these capsules were combined with an analytical study of predicted core power distributions for all cycles up to and including the current operating cycles to project 10 EFPY neutron fluence values. These projected neutron fluences were used to predict the irradiation-induced reference transition temperature (RTndt) increases at 10 EFPY. The increases were calculated on the methodology of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1, (Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials). The updated RTndt values are compared to the values currently shown in the Technical Specifications in Table 1. The updated RTndt values were then used to develop revised heatup and cooldown pressure-temperature limits in accordance with the methods of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. The assumptions used to develop the curves are consistent with the currently specified curves with the exception of the reactor coolant heatup rate limit, which was reduced from the current value of 100°F/hr to 60°F/hr. The heatup rate limit specified in TS 3.4.9.1, has been reduced accordingly. The limits include corrections for temperature and pressure measurement uncertainties as well as for the pressure drop from the reactor vessel bellline to the point of pressure

measurement. Updated PROV setpoints for overpressure protection at low reactor coolant temperatures have been developed based on the revised heatup and cooldown limits.

Section 3.4.9.3 of the Unit 1 TS has also been amended to reflect the fact that overpressure protection can also be provided by a pressurizer steam bubble when the temperature of the Reactor Coolant System cold legs is between 320 °F. and 375 °F. A maximum water volume of at least 457 cu. ft. has been selected in such a case to provide at least 10 minutes for operator response in the event of a malfunction resulting in maximum flow from one charging pump.

In summary, revised heatup and cooldown limits and the associated PORV setpoints have been developed to conservatively reflect the effects of irradiation on the North Anna Units 1 and 2 pressure vessel mechanical characteristics through 10 EFPY of operation. The evaluation indicates that all of the acceptance criteria for transient analysis specified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are met and appropriate safety margins maintained.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR Part 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

As discussed above, none of the accidents evaluated in the UFSAR will be impacted by the proposed update, neither the probability of their occurrence nor the severity of the consequences will increase. In addition, since the proposed changes only serve to restrict the plant operating envelope, no new accident types or equipment malfunction scenarios are introduced. Finally, while the applicability of the pressure-temperature limit curves has been extended to 10 EFPY, the safety margins have been preserved by reductions in the limits and in the associated low-temperature overpressure protection setpoints.

Therefore, based on the above, the proposed amendments will not result in a significant increase in the probability

or consequences of an accident previously considered, will not create the possibility of a new or different accident from any evaluated previously, and will not significantly reduce a safety margin. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the standards for determining that the proposed changes involves no significant hazards consideration are met, and that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed changes would not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room locations:* Board of Supervisors Office, Louisa County Courthouse, Louisa, Virginia 23093 and the Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 23212.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin**

*Date of amendment request:* June 4, 1976 as modified January 28, 1980, October 7, 1983, December 20, 1984 and April 12, 1985

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would permit operation after approval of changes to the plant's Technical Specifications (TS) that would assure continued compliance with Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, and 10 CFR 50.36a, and 50.34a. These proposed TS are intended to ensure that releases of radioactive material to unrestricted areas during normal operation remain as low as is reasonably achievable. Specifically, the proposed TS define limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent monitoring. Additional environmental sampling locations have been added to the present sampling locations. Additional managerial review responsibilities and reporting requirements would be added relating to radioactive releases.

The NRC staff has issued previously its proposed determination that the earlier versions of these amendment requests did not involve a significant hazards consideration (48 FR 38382 at 38430, August 23, 1983, 48 FR 52804 at 52840, November 22, 1983; and 50 FR 7979 at 8011, February 27, 1985).

This newest version of the proposed amendments addresses NRC staff comments on previous submittals. The newest version of these proposed amendments adds definitions for

gaseous and liquid radioactive effluent treatment systems for clarification purposes, modifies Tables 15.7.7-2 and 15.7.7-3 for lower limit of detection and notification levels for I-131 in accordance with staff guidance, and modifies certain operability requirements which have been identified as unnecessary based on the revised cost benefit analysis contained in the April 12, 1985 submittal.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). One of the examples of actions involving no significant hazards considerations relates to additional limitations, restrictions or controls not presently included in the technical specification (TS). In the case of the proposed technical specifications, they constitute an additional requirement for monitoring and control of radioactive effluents not presently in the technical specifications and are intended to meet the intent of the Commission's regulations (10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, 10 CFR 50.34a, and 10 CFR 50.36a) and related staff guidance (NUREG-0472). Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Joseph P. Mann Public Library, 1515 16th Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin**

*Date of amendment request:* April 10, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments provide Technical Specification (TS) changes revising the limiting conditions for operation (LCOS) for reactor coolant pumps. Specifically, they require that at least one reactor coolant pump shall be operating when the reactor is critical; above 10 percent power, both reactor coolant pumps shall be operating; if one reactor coolant pump ceases operating, power shall immediately be reduced below 10 percent; if both reactor coolant pumps cease operating, the reactor shall be shut down and reactor trip breakers opened within 1 hour. Further,

additional limitations have also been provided for reactor coolant pumps with regard to subcritical operation.

Administrative renumbering of several TS was also proposed.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:*

The Commission has provided certain examples (48 FR 14870) of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations. One of the examples is example (ii), a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently in the technical specifications. Another example is example (i), a purely administrative change to the technical specifications.

The licensee's proposed changes involve additional limitations and restrictions relating to reactor coolant pumps required for critical and subcritical operation and administrative renumbering of technical specifications. Therefore, they meet the Commission's examples of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations.

Based upon the above, the staff proposes to determine that the amendments involve no significant hazards considerations.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Joseph P. Mann Public Library, 1515 16th Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin**

*Date of amendment request:* April 26, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications to remove the restrictions on movement of loads over the spent fuel pool following crane modification to meet the single failure criteria of NUREG-0612. Surveillance requirements for the auxiliary building crane have also been revised to reflect crane upgrades to meet single failure criteria and to delete limit switch inspection criteria previously in the Technical Specifications. Limit switches to restrict movement over the spent fuel pool were removed following the NUREG-0612 crane upgrades.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided guidance by providing examples of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations (48 FR 14870). One of the

examples of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations is example (iv), a relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation from an operating restriction that was imposed because acceptable operation was not yet demonstrated.

License amendments No. 35 to DPR-24 and 41 to DPR-27 were issued imposing interim restrictions on operations involving movement of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool because of delays in the installation of a single failure proof crane. Further interim restrictions were requested as a result of the NRC staff's evaluation on heavy load handling on auxiliary building crane movement and loading. These were incorporated on April 28, 1985 into licenses DPR-24 and 27 by amendments 91 and 95, respectively.

The licensee plans to complete single failure proof crane modifications and testing by August 1, 1985. Upon completion of these modifications, the interim restrictions on movement of loads over the spent fuel pool imposed by the license amendments 41, 45, 91 and 95 would no longer be necessary. Therefore, the staff has determined that the licensee's proposed amendments meet the Commission's example (iv) of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations.

Based on the above, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendments involve no significant hazards considerations.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Joseph P. Mann Public Library, 1515 16th Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin**

*Date of amendment request:* June 17, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The amendments would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) by changing the Reactor Vessel Surveillance capsule Removal Schedule for Point Beach Units 1 and 2 contained in Tables 15.3.1-1 and 15.3.1-2 and the associated bases in the T.S.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided guidance concerning which actions are likely to involve no significant hazards considerations (48 FR 14870). One of the

examples of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations is example (vii), "a change to make a license conform to changes in the regulations, where the license change results in very minor changes to facility operations clearly in keeping with the regulations."

The proposed changes to the capsule surveillance schedule were prompted by changes to 10 CFR 50 Appendix H which were made in May 1983. The new Appendix H deleted the surveillance capsule withdrawal schedules previously prescribed therein, and incorporated by reference ASTM E185-82 "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels." ASTM E185-82 states that:

The withdrawal schedule of the final two capsules is adjusted by the load factor so the exposure of the second to last capsule does not exceed the peak end-of-life (EOL) fluence on the inside surface of the vessel, and so the exposure of the final capsule does not exceed twice the EOL vessel inside surface peak fluence. The decision on when to test specimens from the final capsule need not be made until the results from the preceding capsules are known.

The proposed changes would extend the approximate removal dates for the final capsule in Unit 1 to a period corresponding to 110% of the peak EOL fluence on the inside surface of the vessel. The change would extend the approximate removal dates for the last two capsules in Unit 2 to the periods corresponding to 90% and 110% of the peak EOL fluence on the inside of the vessel.

The licensee's proposed changes agree with the guidance in ASTM E185-82 which has been incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50 Appendix H. Therefore, the staff finds that the licensee's proposed changes meet the Commission's example (vii) of actions likely not to involve a significant hazards consideration.

Based on the above, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Joseph P. Mann Public Library, 1516 Sixteenth Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*NRC Branch Chief:* Edward J. Butcher, Acting.

**Yankee Atomic Power Company,  
Docket No. 50-29, Yankee Nuclear  
Power Station, Franklin County,  
Massachusetts**

*Date of amendment request:* March 18, 1985, as supplemented May 9, 1985 and May 30, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed changed would modify the pressurizer code safety value setpoint tolerance in the Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for the Main Coolant system.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As discussed in Licensee Event Report (LER) 84-11, the replacement pressurizer code safety values were set by the manufacturer to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III tolerance of  $\pm 1\%$ . One of the new safety values was found to be out of the existing TS tolerance of  $+0, -3\%$ . This is not in conformance with the existing TS tolerance. The existing tolerance is based on the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII (which allowed a setpoint of  $\pm 3\%$ ), and additional analysis, used as the design basis for the Yankee plant. The proposed change expands the existing tolerance to allow for a positive setpoint error, and provides the Overpressurization Protection Report as required by ASME Section III. Since the Yankee plant was designed to ASME Section VIII, the proposed change falls within the design code used for the design basis for the reactor vessel, pressurizer, and steam generators, and the Overpressurization Protection Report is intended to demonstrate the design basis for the Yankee plant remains acceptable with the new tolerance. The proposed change would, therefore: (1) Not involve any significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; and (3) not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on this discussion, the staff proposes to determine that the requested action would not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Greenfield Community College, 1 College Drive, Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301.

*Attorney for licensee:* Thomas Dignan, Esquire, Ropes and Gray, 225 Franklin Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02110.

*NRC Branch Chief:* John A. Zwolinski.

**PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED NOTICES  
OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE  
OF AMENDMENTS TO OPERATING  
LICENSES AND PROPOSED NO  
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS  
CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION  
AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING**

The following notices were previously published as separate individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were published as individual notices because time did not allow the Commission to wait for this bi-weekly notice. They are repeated here because the bi-weekly notice lists all amendments proposed to be issued involving no significant hazards consideration.

For details, see the individual notice in the **Federal Register** on the day and page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period of the original notice.

**Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket No. 50-247, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Westchester County, New York**

*Date of application for amendment:* February 28, 1985, as supplemented July 5, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment would revise the Technical Specifications to reflect revised pressure temperatures limitations for reactor coolant system heat up, cooldown and hydrostatic test through fifteen effective full power years.

*Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register:* April 23, 1985 (50 FR 16002) and reissued July 10, 1985 (50 FR 28131).

*Expiration date of individual notice:* July 22, 1985, 5:00 p.m.

*Local Public Document Room location:* White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York, 10610.

**Florida Power Corporation, et al.,  
Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit  
No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus  
County, Florida**

*Date of amendment request:* February 14, 1985, as revised June 19, 1985.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specifications (TSs) to revise the Reactor Coolant System pressure/temperature curves in TS 3.4.9.1 to take into consideration the analysis of the previously removed Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule B and changes in the licensee's fuel management philosophy. These revisions will extend the applicability of the curves from 5 effective full power years (EFPY) to 8 EFPY and will assure compliance with 10 CFR 50. Appendix

G. In addition, the proposed amendment would delete the Criticality Limit Curve on Figure 3.4-2 and remove from TS 4.4.9.1.2 the Reactor Vessel Material Irradiation Surveillance Schedule (Table 4.4.5).

*Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register:* June 26, 1985 (50 FR 26420).

*Expiration date of individual notice:* July 26, 1985.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Crystal River Public Library, 668 NW. First Avenue, Crystal River, Florida.

**Florida Power Corporation, et al.,  
Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit  
No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus  
County, Florida**

*Date of amendment request:* May 1, 1985, as revised June 14, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specification (TSs) related to the High Pressure Injection (HPI) Flow Balance Testing, HPI Pump and Valve Test, and the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Load Test to allow testing during appropriate operating modes. Specifically, the proposed amendment is needed to provide clarification and resolve conflicts between current TSs and commitments made to the Commission involving low temperature over-pressurization protection, as follows:

1. TS 4.5.2.g currently requires HPI flow balance testing of pump and discharge lines during shutdown. However, pressure-temperature considerations prevent testing during Modes 4, 5, or 6. Thus, Mode 3 is the most appropriate time to perform the test.

2. TS 4.5.2.f currently requires that the HPI valve manual actuation be performed during shutdown (Modes 4 and 5), which conflicts with low temperature overpressure commitments which require "racking out" of these valves in these modes. The TS amendment would allow actuation of valves during Mode 6.

3. TS 4.8.1.1.2.c. presently requires that tests be performed during shutdown (Modes 4 or 5) which, for TS 4.8.1.1.2.c.3 and 5, conflict with low temperature over pressurization protection commitments. The amendment would permit those tests to be performed in Mode 3. In addition, the 18-month frequency requirement would also be changed for this cycle only to permit performance of these tests during the startup for Cycle 6. The specification would be changed to permit other tests

in this section to be performed in Mode 6.

*Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register:* June 21, 1985 (50 FR 25802).

*Expiration date of individual notice:* July 22, 1985.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Crystal River Public Library, 66 NW. First Avenue, Crystal River, Florida.

#### NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

During the period since publication of the last bi-weekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated. No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see: (1) The applications for amendments, (2) the amendments, and (3) the Commission's related letters, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessments as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC., and at the local public document rooms for the particular facilities involved. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

**Arkansas Power and Light Company, Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Pope County, Arkansas**

*Date of application for amendment:* January 23, 1984.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment added a license condition pertaining to the IAEA safeguards inspection program at ANO-2.

*Date of issuance:* July 16, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 16, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 67.

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-8.* Amendment added a license condition.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* April 25, 1984 (49 FR 17850 at 17853 and 17854).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a letter dated July 16, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received. No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, Arkansas 72801.

**Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North Carolina**

*Date of application for amendment:* March 6, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendments change the Technical Specifications (TS) for Unit 1 with regard to Tables 3.3.5.3-1 and 4.3.5.3-1 (Accident Monitoring Instrumentation) and Section 3/4.6.2.1 (Suppression Chamber) to incorporate the inclusion of a suppression pool temperature monitoring system (SPTMS) which meets the acceptance criteria of NUREG-0661, Appendix A. The channel check for items 4.3.5.3-1.4 is being changed from monthly to daily to provide consistency with TS 4.6.2.1.d.1 for Unit 1 and Unit 2. In addition, TS sections 3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4.6.4.1 (Drywell-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers) have been modified to more closely conform to the guidance of the BWR-4 Standard Technical Specifications (STS), NUREG-0123. The other Unit 2 change is made to eliminate redundancy in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.1.b.2.b.

*Date of issuance:* July 8, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 8, 1985.

*Amendment Nos.:* 85 and 111.

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* April 23, 1985 (50 FR 15999).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 8, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Southport, Brunswick County Library, 109 W. Moore Street, Southport, North Carolina 28461.

**Duke Power Company, Dockets Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Oconee County, South Carolina**

*Date of application for amendment:* March 19, 1985, as supplemented May 1, 1985.

*Brief description of amendments:* These amendments revise the Station's common Technical Specifications to allow a one-time extension of the allowable period of inoperability from 24 hours to 10 days per battery for the installation of new batteries and battery racks used to start the two Keowee Hydro Station power units, which units serve as the on-site emergency power source for the Oconee Nuclear Station.

*Date of issuance:* July 17, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 17, 1985.

*Amendments Nos.:* 141, 141 and 138.

*Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 4, 1985 (50 FR 23547).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 17, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Oconee County Library, 501 West Southbroad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina.

**Duquesne Light Company, Docket No. 50-334, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1, Shippingport, Pennsylvania**

*Date of application for amendment:* March 21, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment changes the Technical Specifications for Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 as follows: (1) Section 3.5.5, "Refueling Water Storage Tank", is deleted and the same requirements are incorporated into Section 3.1.2.8.b, "Borated Water Sources", (2) Table 4.12-1 is revised to correct an editorial error, and (3) Section 6.13, "Environmental Qualification", is deleted to comply with the Commission's final rule for removal of the June 30, 1982 deadline for qualification of all safety-related electrical equipment.

*Date of issuance:* July 10, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 10, 1985.

*Amendment No.* 95.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-66.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 21, 1985 (50 FR 20976).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 10, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.

**Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida**

*Date of application for amendment:* August 30, 1984, as supplemented June 17, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment revises the location of several remote shutdown monitoring instruments from the ES Switchgear Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel. Incorporation of the new Remote Shutdown System into the Technical Specifications will be completed in a separate action.

*Date of issuance:* July 3, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 3, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 75.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-72.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* November 21, 1984 (49 FR 45949).

Since the initial notice, the licensee requested the Commission, by letter dated June 17, 1985, to consider at this time only that portion of the August 30, 1984 request dealing with revising the location of remote shutdown instrumentation. This change is encompassed by the initial notice. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 3, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Crystal River Public Library, 668 NW. First Avenue, Crystal River, Florida.

**Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida**

*Date of application for amendment:* January 23, 1985, as supplemented June 6 and 28, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment changes the Technical Specifications (TSs) to include requirements for the upgraded Emergency Feedwater System (EFW). The new specifications provide operability and surveillance requirements for EFW manual initiation and automatic actuation logic and are in conformance with the B&W Standard Technical Specifications.

*Date of issuance:* July 16, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 16, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 78.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-72.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 21, 1985, 50 FR 20979.

Since the initial notice, the licensee informed the Commission by letters dated June 6 and June 28, 1985, of proposed corrections to TS Table 3.3-5 and deletes the previously proposed change in the main feedwater isolation time in Table 3.3-5. The Commission's staff found that these changes only corrected administrative errors in the January 23, 1985, submittal and did not affect the scope of the amendment referenced in the initial notice. The response time change deletion returned the requirement to that of the existing TS and therefore reduced the scope of the amendment. Accordingly, these changes did not warrant renouncing.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 16, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Crystal River Public Library, 668 NW. First Avenue, Crystal River, Florida.

**Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida**

*Date of application for amendment:* February 27, 1985, as supplemented June 25, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment allows for the replacement of six manual valves with eight remote-manual valves to provide capability to install a hydrogen recombiner.

*Date of issuance:* July 3, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 3, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 76.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-72.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 21, 1985 (50 FR 20979).

Since the initial notice, by letter dated June 25, 1985, the licensee supplemented the February 27, 1985 application. This

supplement confirmed that the new valves meet or exceed the design and performance requirements of the original valves. In addition, the type of valve operator was corrected from solenoid to remote-manual when the licensee discovered a documentation error. Although the original notice identified the replacement valves as solenoid-operated, the purpose of the requested amendment was to add valves to provide the capability to install a hydrogen recombiner should that become necessary at some future time. The type of operator has little significance as long as containment isolation design and performance requirements are met. The number of valves and configuration of piping necessary to provide the capability to install a hydrogen recombiner have not changed from the original amendment request. Since the provision of that capability is the essential matter in this amendment request, and not the type of valve operators, it was determined that renouncing was not warranted.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 3, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Crystal River Public Library, 668 N.W. First Avenue, Crystal River, Florida.

**Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida**

*Date of application for amendment:* April 25, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment revises the Technical Specifications to support the operation of Crystal River Unit No. 3 at full rated power during Cycle 6 operation.

*Date of issuance:* July 16, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 16, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 77.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-72.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 13, 1985 (50 FR 24849).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 16, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Crystal River Public Library, 668 N.W. First Avenue, Crystal River, Florida.

**Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket No. 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2, Appling County, Georgia**

*Date of application for amendment:* February 5, 1981.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revised the TSs for Hatch Unit 2 to clarify the definition of the term Operable and to specify certain conditions under which a system, subsystem, train, component or device may be considered operable when the normal or emergency power source providing power to the system, subsystem, etc. is Inoperable.

*Date of issuance:* July 16, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 16, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 49.

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-5.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* October 26, 1983 (48 FR 49586).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 16, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Appling County Public Library, 301 Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia.

**Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy Center, Linn County, Iowa**

*Date of application for amendment:* February 20, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revises the DAEC operating license, extending the effectiveness of the licensee's Integrated Scheduling Plan for plant modifications from the current expiration date of May 3, 1985 to May 3, 1987.

*Date of issuance:* July 9, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 9, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 125.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-49.* Amendment revised the license.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* April 23, 1985 (50 FR 16006).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 9, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Cedar Rapids Public Library, 500 First Street, S. E., Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401.

**Northern States Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota**

*Date of application for amendment:* April 5, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment changed the Technical Specifications by including the operability and surveillance requirements associated with the automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment and the manual reactor trip circuits.

*Date of issuance:* June 26, 1985.

*Effective date:* Unit 1, June 26, 1985. Unit 2—Cycle 10 startup scheduled for November 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 75 and 68.

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 21, 1985 (50 FR 20967).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 26, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Environmental Conservation Library, Minneapolis Public Library, 300 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

**Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket No. 50-133, Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit No. 3, Humboldt, California**

*Date of Application for amendment:* July 30, 1984.

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment modifies Facility Operating License No. DPR-7 to possess-but-not-operate status. Action on the balance of the above application will be taken at a later date.

*Date of issuance:* July 16, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 16, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 19.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-7.* This amendment revised the license.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* March 27, 1985 (50 FR 12152).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 16, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Eureka-Humboldt County Library, 421 I Street (County Courthouse), Eureka, California 95501.

**Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company, Dockets Nos. 50-277 and 59-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units Nos. 2 and 3, York County, Pennsylvania**

*Date of application for amendments:* January 4, 1985.

*Brief description of amendments:* These amendments make the reporting requirements in the Technical Specifications (TSs) consistent with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. These changes: (1) Add the definition of Reportable Events to the Definition Section 1.0, (2) delete the prompt and 30-day reporting specifications because these requirements have been superseded by 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, (3) revise specific nomenclature to conform with 10 CFR 50.73 and (4) delete from the TSs the reporting requirement for failures of a safety or relieve valve because 10 CFR 50.73 now requires reporting such failures.

*Date of issuance:* July 17, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 17, 1985.

*Amendments Nos.:* 110 and 113.

*Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* February 27, 1985 (50 FR 7999).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 17, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

**Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey**

*Date of application for amendment:* February 8, 1985.

*Brief description of amendments:* The amendments provide four additional modifications to the Technical Specifications previously issued as part of the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications in Amendment Nos. 59 and 28 for Salem Units 1 and 2, respectively.

*Date of issuance:* May 28, 1985.

*Effective date:* May 28, 1985.

*Amendments Nos.:* 63 and 65.

*Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75:* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* March 27, 1985 (50 FR 12161).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 28, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Salem Free Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079.

**Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Docket No. 50-244, R. E. Gianna Nuclear Power Plant, Wayne County, New York**

*Date of application for amendment:* February 25, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment changes the Technical Specifications to reflect an updated management organization by illustrating those changes in an updated management organization chart.

*Date of issuance:* July 10, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 10, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 7.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-18.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 21, 1985 (50 FR 20987).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 10, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Rochester Public Library, 115 South Avenue, Rochester, New York 14610.

**Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Docket No. 50-312, Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Sacramento County, California**

*Date of application for amendment:* October 27, 1980, as supplemented May 30, 1984.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to incorporate requirements for redundant decay heat removal capability during all modes of facility operation.

*Date of issuance:* July 3, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 3, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 71.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-54.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* December 21, 1983 (48 FR 56509); and January 23, 1985 (50 FR 3054).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 3, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Sacramento City-County Library, 828 I Street, Sacramento, California.

**Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3, Limestone County, Alabama**

*Date of application for amendment:* December 21, 1984.

*Brief description of amendments:* The amendments change the Technical Specifications to correct typographical errors and clarify mechanical vacuum pump requirements. The proposed amendments relating to shift overtime limitations will be addressed separately in future correspondence and have not been included.

*Date of Issuance:* July 8, 1985.

*Effective date:* Within 90 days of the date of issuance.

*Amendment Nos.:* 119, 114 and 90. *Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* February 27, 1985 (50 FR 8009).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 8, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Athens Public Library, South and Forrest, Athens, Alabama 35611.

**The Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio**

*Date of application for amendment:* March 16, 1979, as revised by letters dated December 23, 1982, July 13, 1983, August 18, 1983, March 15, 1984, and November 1, 1984.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TSs) to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.36a. The amendment updates those portions of the TSs addressing radioactive effluent management including monitoring, reporting and environmental surveillance. This amendment deletes Appendix B, Part I, TSs relating to these matters and adds appropriate Limiting Conditions for Operation, Surveillance Requirements, reporting requirements and environmental monitoring requirements to Appendix A.

*Date of issuance:* July 2, 1985.

*Effective date:* October 30, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 86.

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-3.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* November 22, 1983 (48 FR 52836); May 23, 1984 (49 FR 21847); and February 27, 1985 (50 FR 8009).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 2, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

**Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-271, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont**

*Date of application for amendment:* May 20, 1983, as revised February 7, 1984, and superseded October 22, 1984, and supplemented November 6, 1984.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revises the Technical Specifications pertaining to safety-related shock suppressors.

*Date of issuance:* July 9, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 9, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 89.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-28.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* August 23, 1983 (48 FR 38426), April 25, 1984 (49 FR 17876) and January 23, 1985 (50 FR 3056).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 9, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301.

**Washington Public Power Supply System, Docket No. 50-397, WNP-2, Richland, Washington**

*Date of amendment request:* April 19, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment request:* This amendment revises the WNP-2 license by modifying the Technical Specifications Drywell Average Air Temperature, Surveillance Requirements, 4.6.1.7, to provide a description of the locations of the thermocouples used to measure the drywell average temperature instead of the specific elevations and azimuths currently employed.

*Date of issuance:* July 18, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 18, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 15.

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-21.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 4, 1985 (50 FR 23557)

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 18, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: None.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Richland Public Library, Swift and Northgate Streets, Richland, Washington 99352.

**Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin**

*Date of application for amendments:* February 29, 1984 as modified June 7, 1984.

*Brief description of amendments:* The amendments incorporate Limiting Conditions for Operation and surveillance requirements for accident monitoring instrumentation installed in response to NUREG-0737 "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements".

*Date of issuance:* July 18, 1985.

*Effective date:* 20 days from the effective date.

*Amendment Nos.:* 92 and 96.

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27.* Amendments revise the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 20, 1984 (49 FR 25350 at 25381). Renoticed September 28, 1984 (49 FR 38390 at 38413).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 18, 1985.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Joseph P. Mann Library, 1516 Sixteenth Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin.

**NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND FINAL DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING (EXIGENT OR EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES)**

During the period since publication of the last bi-weekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the

Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Because of exigent or emergency circumstances associated with the date the amendment was needed, there was not time for the Commission to publish, for public comment before issuance, its usual 30-day Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing. For exigent circumstances, a press release seeking public comment as to the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination was used, and the State was consulted by telephone. In circumstances where failure to act in a timely way would have resulted, for example, in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant, a shorter public comment period (less than 30 days) has been offered and the State consulted by telephone whenever possible.

Under its regulations, the Commission may issue and make an amendment immediately effective, notwithstanding the pendency before it of a request for a hearing from any person, in advance of the holding and completion of any required hearing, where it has determined that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

The Commission has applied the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is contained in the documents related to this action. Accordingly, the amendments have been issued and made effective as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see: (1) The application for amendment, (2) the amendment to Facility Operating License, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment, as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H. Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

The Commission is also offering an opportunity for a hearing with respect to the issuance of the amendments. By August 30, 1985, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR § 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of

the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

Since the Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if a hearing is requested, it will not stay the effectiveness of the amendment. Any hearing held would take place while the amendment is in effect.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C., by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at (800) 325-6000 (in Missouri (800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to (*Branch Chief*): petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this **Federal Register** notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to rule on the petition and/or request, that the petitioner has made a substantial showing of good cause for the granting of a late petition and/or request. That determination will be based upon a balancing of the factors

specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

**Carolina Power & Light Company,  
Docket No. 50-324, Brunswick Steam  
Electric Plant, Unit 2, Brunswick County,  
North Carolina**

*Date of application for amendment:*  
July 12, 1985.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment changes the Technical Specifications by revising the allowed maximum average temperature of the primary containment air from 135 °F to 140 °F for a period of 30 days from the effective date of this amendment.

*Date of issuance:* July 12, 1985.

*Effective date:* July 12, 1985.

*Amendment No.:* 112.

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-62.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration: No.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment and final determination of no significant hazards consideration are considered in a Safety Evaluation dated July 12, 1985.

*Local Public Document Room  
Location:* Southport, Brunswick County Library, 109 W. Moore Street, Southport, North Carolina 28461.

*Attorney for licensee:* George F. Trowbridge, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 25th day of July 1985.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Edward J. Butcher,**

*Acting Chief, Operating Reactors Branch No. 3, Division of Licensing.*

[FR Doc. 85-18173 Filed 7-30-85; 8:45 am]

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