

September 9, 1996

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.  
President, TVA Nuclear and  
Chief Nuclear Officer  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
6A Lookout Place  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT FOR THE WATTS BAR  
NUCLEAR PLANT ON ICE CONDENSER LOWER INLET DOORS SURVEILLANCE  
(TAC NO. M96231)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.3 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. This amendment is in response to your application dated July 31, 1996.

The amendment revises Technical Specification 3.6.12 to allow a one-time extension of the 3-month surveillance requirement for the ice condenser lower inlet doors.

A copy of the safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Robert E. Martin, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-390

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 3 to NPF-90  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-390

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 3  
License No. NPF-90

1. The Nuclear Regulator Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated July 31, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 3, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented no later than 30 days of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 9, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO AMENDMENT NO. 3  
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90  
DOCKET NO. 50-390

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3.6-32  
3.6-33  
3.6-34  
-  
B 3.6-80  
B 3.6-81  
B 3.6-82  
B 3.6-83

Insert Pages

3.6-32  
3.6-33  
3.6-34  
3.6-34a  
B 3.6-80  
B 3.6-81  
B 3.6-82  
B 3.6-83

## ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met.	C.1 Restore ice condenser door to OPERABLE status and closed positions.	48 hours
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
	<u>AND</u> D.2 Be in MODE 5.	36 hours

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.12.1 Verify all inlet doors indicate closed by the Inlet Door Position Monitoring System.	12 hours
SR 3.6.12.2 Verify, by visual inspection, each intermediate deck door is closed and not impaired by ice, frost, or debris.	7 days

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.12.3 Verify, by visual inspection, each inlet door is not impaired by ice, frost, or debris.</p>	<p>-----NOTE----- The 3 month performance due September 9, 1996 (per SR 3.0.2) may be extended until October 21, 1996. ----- 3 months during first year after receipt of license  <u>AND</u> 18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.6.12.4 Verify torque required to cause each inlet door to begin to open is <math>\leq 675</math> in-lb.</p>	<p>-----NOTE----- The 3 month performance due September 9, 1996 (per SR 3.0.2) may be extended until October 21, 1996. ----- 3 months during first year after receipt of license  <u>AND</u> 18 months</p>

(continued)

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.12.5 Perform a torque test on a sampling of <math>\geq 50\%</math> of the inlet doors.</p>	<p>-----NOTE----- The 3 month performance due September 9, 1996 (per SR 3.0.2) may be extended until October 21, 1996. -----</p> <p>3 months during first year after receipt of license</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.6.12.6 Verify for each intermediate deck door:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. No visual evidence of structural deterioration;</li> <li>b. Free movement of the vent assemblies; and</li> <li>c. Free movement of the door.</li> </ul>	<p>3 months during first year after receipt of license</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>18 months</p>

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.12.7 Verify, by visual inspection, each top deck door:  a. Is in place;  b. Free movement of top deck vent assembly; and  c. Has no condensation, frost, or ice formed on the door that would restrict its opening.	92 days

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.6.12.3

Verifying, by visual inspection, that the ice condenser inlet doors are not impaired by ice, frost, or debris provides assurance that the doors are free to open in the event of a DBA. For this unit, the Frequency of 18 months (3 months during the first year after receipt of license - the 3 month performances during the first year after receipt of license may be extended to coincide with plant outages) is based on door design, which does not allow water condensation to freeze, and operating experience, which indicates that the inlet doors very rarely fail to meet their SR acceptance criteria. Because of high radiation in the vicinity of the inlet doors during power operation, this Surveillance is normally performed during a shutdown. The surveillance frequency is modified by a Note that permits a one time extension until October 21, 1996 for performance of the three month surveillance whose due date (with 25 percent extension) falls on September 9, 1996. This provision allows performance of the surveillance to coincide with the plant mid-cycle outage and is justified by Reference 3.

SR 3.6.12.4

Verifying the opening torque of the inlet doors provides assurance that no doors have become stuck in the closed position. The value of 675 in-lb is based on the design opening pressure on the doors of 1.0 lb/ft<sup>2</sup>. For this unit, the Frequency of 18 months (3 months during the first year after receipt of license - the 3 month performances during the first year after receipt of license may be extended to coincide with plant outages) is based on the passive nature of the closing mechanism (i.e., once adjusted, there are no known factors that would change the setting, except possibly a buildup of ice; ice buildup is not likely, however, because of the door design, which does not allow water condensation to freeze). Operating experience indicates that the inlet doors usually meet their SR acceptance criteria. Because of high radiation in the vicinity of the inlet doors during power operation, this Surveillance is normally performed during a shutdown. The surveillance frequency is modified by a Note that permits a one time extension until October 21, 1996 for performance of the three month surveillance whose due date (with 25 percent extension) falls on September 9, 1996. This provision

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.12.4 (continued)

allows performance of the surveillance to coincide with the plant mid-cycle outage and is justified by Reference 3.

SR 3.6.12.5

The torque test Surveillance ensures that the inlet doors have not developed excessive friction and that the return springs are producing a door return torque within limits. The torque test consists of the following:

1. Verify that the torque,  $T(\text{OPEN})$ , required to cause opening motion at the  $40^\circ$  open position is  $\leq 195$  in-lb;
2. Verify that the torque,  $T(\text{CLOSE})$ , required to hold the door stationary (i.e., keep it from closing) at the  $40^\circ$  open position is  $\geq 78$  in-lb; and
3. Calculate the frictional torque,  $T(\text{FRICT}) = 0.5 \{T(\text{OPEN}) - T(\text{CLOSE})\}$ , and verify that the  $T(\text{FRICT})$  is  $\leq 40$  in-lb.

The purpose of the friction and return torque Specifications is to ensure that, in the event of a small break LOCA or SLB, all of the 24 door pairs open uniformly. This assures that, during the initial blowdown phase, the steam and water mixture entering the lower compartment does not pass through part of the ice condenser, depleting the ice there, while bypassing the ice in other bays. The Frequency of 18 months (3 months during the first year after receipt of license - the 3 month performances during the first year after receipt of license may be extended to coincide with plant outages) is based on the passive nature of the closing mechanism (i.e., once adjusted, there are no known factors that would change the setting, except possibly a buildup of ice; ice buildup is not likely, however, because of the door design, which does not allow water condensation to freeze). Operating experience indicates that the inlet doors very rarely fail to meet their SR acceptance criteria. Because of high radiation in the vicinity of the inlet doors during power operation, this Surveillance is normally performed during a shutdown. The surveillance frequency is modified by a Note that permits a one time extension until October 21, 1996 for

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.12.5 (continued)

performance of the three month surveillance whose due date (with 25 percent extension) falls on September 9, 1996. This provision allows performance of the surveillance to coincide with the plant mid-cycle outage and is justified by Reference 3.

SR 3.6.12.6

Verifying the OPERABILITY of the intermediate deck doors provides assurance that the intermediate deck doors are free to open in the event of a DBA. The verification consists of visually inspecting the intermediate doors for structural deterioration, verifying free movement of the vent assemblies, and ascertaining free movement of each door when lifted with the applicable force shown below:

	<u>Door</u>	<u>Lifting Force</u>
a.	Adjacent to crane wall	< 37.4 lb
b.	Paired with door adjacent to crane wall	≦ 33.8 lb
c.	Adjacent to containment wall	≦ 31.8 lb
d.	Paired with door adjacent to containment wall	≦ 31.0 lb

The 18 month Frequency (3 months during the first year after receipt of license) is based on the passive design of the intermediate deck doors, the frequency of personnel entry into the intermediate deck, and the fact that SR 3.6.12.2 confirms on a 7 day Frequency that the doors are not impaired by ice, frost, or debris, which are ways a door would fail the opening force test (i.e., by sticking or from increased door weight).

SR 3.6.12.7

Verifying, by visual inspection, that the top deck doors are in place, not obstructed, and verifying free movement of the vent assembly provides assurance that the doors are performing their function of keeping warm air out of the ice condenser during normal operation, and would not be

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.12.7 (continued)

obstructed if called upon to open in response to a DBA. The Frequency of 92 days is based on engineering judgment, which considered such factors as the following:

- a. The relative inaccessibility and lack of traffic in the vicinity of the doors make it unlikely that a door would be inadvertently left open;
- b. Excessive air leakage would be detected by temperature monitoring in the ice condenser; and
- c. The light construction of the doors would ensure that, in the event of a DBA, air and gases passing through the ice condenser would find a flow path, even if a door were obstructed.

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REFERENCES

1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analysis."
  2. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix K, "ECCS Evaluation Models."
  3. TVA Letter to NRC dated July 31, 1996 - Proposed License Amendment - Containment Systems
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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-390

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 31, 1996, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, (WBN) Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment would effect a one-time, 42-day extension of the interval of the Surveillance Requirements (SR) for testing and inspection of the ice condenser lower doors. In particular, these are SR 3.6.12.3, which requires visual inspection of the doors, and SRs 3.6.12.4 and 3.6.12.5, which require torque testing of the doors. The normal surveillance frequency is three months during the first year of operation. The proposed extension would be in addition to the 25 percent extension of surveillance intervals allowed by SR 3.0.2.

In its submittal, the licensee indicates that the extension is being requested so that the surveillance will coincide with the mid-cycle outage scheduled to begin October 21, 1996. TVA states that performance of the surveillances during shutdown helps maintain radiation dose limits to workers As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA).

2.0 BACKGROUND

Ice Condenser and Lower Inlet Door Design

WBN is a four-loop Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with an ice condenser containment. In this containment design, steam generated from a design basis Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) or Main Steamline Break (MSLB) is condensed by passing through large amounts of borated ice within the containment, thereby limiting containment pressure to below design limits (13.5 psig) to ensure that 10 CFR Part 100 radiation dose limits to the public are not exceeded. Steam is directed through normally closed lower doors in the lower compartment of containment and up through borated ice flake compartments which are arranged vertically along the inner circumference of the containment vessel. A deck separates the upper and lower compartments and ensures that the steam is directed into the ice condenser. The quantity of ice provided is adequate to absorb the energy contained in the initial blowdown of steam and water from a design basis accident (DBA) and much of the residual heat load that would enter containment following the initial blowdown.

ENCLOSURE 2

to 675 in-lbs to ensure that steam from a LOCA or MSLB is condensed and containment pressure limited, thus necessitating SR 3.6.12.4. For small break LOCAs, the design basis is that the doors open uniformly to avoid steam maldistribution that could unevenly melt ice in the condenser; SR 3.6.12.5 is therefore necessary. SR 3.6.12.3 addresses both of these concerns.

In its submittal, the licensee summarized the results of past surveillances, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

With regard to past visual inspections per SR 3.6.12.3, the licensee states that the four previous visual inspections conducted to date have all been successful.

With regard to SR 3.6.12.4, the four previous opening torque tests identified no failures. The values obtained ranged from 160.5 in-lbs. to 601.875 in-lbs, compared to an acceptance criteria of less than or equal to 675 in-lbs.

Of the previous four performances of SR 3.6.12.5, the last performance on May 13, 1996, revealed doors that did not meet the acceptance criteria. In particular, 15 of the doors failed the test for opening at 40°, with three of these doors not meeting the criteria for frictional torque. The doors were exercised in place and yielded successful re-test results. In testing conducted on May 17, 1996, prior to startup, all doors met the acceptance criteria.

The licensee provided a review conducted by Westinghouse<sup>1</sup> to assess the impact that the out-of-tolerance doors from the May 13, 1996, test would have on the design basis analyses. In particular, the review considered the containment subcompartment analysis, the long-term LOCA containment pressure analysis, the long-term main steamline break containment pressure analysis, the maximum reverse differential pressure analysis, and the deck bypass analysis. The conclusions of this review are summarized below, and may be applied to the general case of minor deviations in door opening characteristics.

For the large break LOCA analysis, peak containment pressure is not reached until approximately 1 hour following event occurrence (when ice bed meltout has occurred). For this event, opening of the doors is limited by door inertia and not by the flow proportioning characteristics of the doors. Therefore, minor deviations in the opening of the doors would not be expected to affect the peak pressure. For small break LOCAs, the flow proportioning capacity of the doors is important. However, small deviations in door opening characteristics on the order of those discovered during the May 13 testing would not be expected to appreciably affect the flow modulating capability.

Peak containment atmospheric temperature is based on an MSLB. For large breaks, the opening of the doors is limited by door inertia and not the flow proportioning characteristics of the doors. For smaller breaks, Westinghouse indicated that any deviations in door opening would not significantly affect the peak temperature. Westinghouse concluded that the long-term MSLB design

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<sup>1</sup> Letter, J.W. Irons, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, to J.E. Maddox, TVA, WAT-D-10237, dated June 20, 1996

There are 24 pairs of lower inlet doors which are vertically hinged and installed around the lower circumference of the ice condenser. The performance requirements of the doors for DBAs are to open completely and uniformly under accident pressure, such that steam is fully and evenly vented to the ice condenser. Venting the proper amount of steam minimizes the peak internal containment pressure, while even steam distribution prevents melting of the ice in a particular region of the condenser, an occurrence which could limit the degree of pressure suppression. The doors are designed to open at a differential pressure of 1 pound-per-square foot (psf).

### TS Changes

SR 3.6.12.3 currently requires verifying every 3 months, by visual inspection, that each inlet door is not impaired by ice, frost, or debris. The basis for the SR is to provide assurance that the doors are free to open. The inspection frequency is based on door design, which does not allow water condensation to freeze, and on operational experience that shows the doors rarely fail the surveillance.

SR 3.6.12.4 currently requires verifying every 3 months that the torque required to cause each inlet door to begin to open is less than or equal to 675 in-lbs. The test provides assurance that the doors will not stick in the closed position when called upon. The frequency is based on the passive nature of the closing mechanism, which makes it unlikely that the opening torque would change due to a mechanism setting change, and on the ice-resistant characteristics of the door.

SR 3.6.12.5 currently requires performing a torque test every 3 months on a sampling of at least 50% of the inlet doors. The test measures the torque required to cause opening when the door is at the 40° open position, the torque required to hold the door stationary at a 40° open position, and the difference between the two measurements (i.e., the frictional torque). The purpose of the SR is to ensure that all doors open uniformly under DBA LOCA conditions. Again, the frequency is based on the passive nature and ice-resistant feature of the door design.

The proposed amendment would add the following note to the frequency of each of the aforementioned surveillances: "The 3-month performance, due September 9, 1996 (per SR 3.0.2), may be extended until October 21, 1996."

The staff points out that after the first year of licensed plant operation, the 3-month frequency of all three surveillances switches to 18 months (this is part of the current TS and is not part of the proposed change).

### 3.0 EVALUATION

The staff's review focused on the results of past lower door surveillances, the ability of the ice condenser to accommodate deviations in lower door performance, and the impact of the requested 42-day interval increase in consideration of the margin in the ice condenser design, the regular surveillance interval, and the ALARA principle.

From a design basis accident perspective, it is important in the event of a large-break LOCA for the doors to open under a torque of less than or equal

basis containment analysis would remain bounding with the deviations in the door opening characteristics.

Westinghouse concluded that the limiting design basis subcompartment analysis, which occurs for a large break LOCA, would not be compromised by the out-of-tolerance doors. Westinghouse reasoned that delayed door opening would change the impulse pressures on subcompartment walls, but since the opening of the doors is driven more by inertia than by the flow proportioning ability of the doors, and because the blowdown pressures are on the order of pounds-per-square inch (psi) and not psf, the current licensing basis would not be affected. Similar arguments apply for the small break LOCA case.

For the maximum reverse differential pressure across the operating deck, Westinghouse concluded that the design basis analysis would remain bounding. The deviations do not affect operating parameters or assumptions used in the analysis, nor would they create conditions more limiting than those currently assumed.

Finally, for the design basis deck steam bypass analysis, Westinghouse concluded that substantial margin would remain between the design leakage and the amount which can be tolerated without exceeding the containment design pressure. It is important to minimize leakage past the deck which separates the upper and lower containment compartments, since any steam which leaks above the upper deck bypasses the ice condenser and pressurizes containment. The Westinghouse analysis reasoned that flow could bypass the ice condenser with the doors out-of-tolerance, thus resulting in a lower acceptable bypass leakage value, but margin would still be expected to exist.

The licensee stated that there is a degree of margin in the weight of ice installed in the condenser. The weight of ice initially loaded into Watts Bar is 2,877,685 lbs., which is approximately 20 percent more than the required TS value and approximately 30 percent more than the value assumed in the safety analysis. The licensee presented the results of an analysis which indicated that if four doors (from bay 3 and bay 5) were assumed not to open, then 240,442 lbs. of ice would be unavailable. This amount is about 50 percent of the margin between the required TS ice weight and the amount loaded initially. The licensee indicated that the margin in the initially installed ice weight is sufficient to accommodate 8 doors not opening. The staff notes that, although some reduction in the initially loaded ice weight would be expected to occur due to sublimation, adequate margin to accommodate decreased door performance would still exist.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's evaluations, including that provided by Westinghouse, and finds that there is sufficient margin in the design to accommodate door malfunctions which could be reasonably postulated to occur. The staff also finds that the requested increase of 42 days is a relatively minor amount of time considering that the surveillance frequency will soon be decreased to once every 18 months. Finally, waiting to conduct the surveillances during shutdown would maintain radiation doses to workers ALARA without an appreciable decrease in plant safety. On the bases of these considerations, the staff concludes that the proposed change is acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 41431 dated August 8, 1996). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: H. Dawson

Date: September 9, 1996