October 18, 1993

Docket No. 50-305

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Mr. C. A. Schrock
Manager - Nuclear Engineering
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
Post Office Box 19002
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54307-9002

Dear Mr. Schrock:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 102 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43 (TAC NO. M85773)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 102to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. This amendment revises the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated January 20, 1993. This amendment also completes your implementation of the recommendations of Generic Letter (GL) 89-19, "Request for Action Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47 'Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants' pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)," dated September 20, 1989, which you had initially responded to in a March 19, 1990, letter.

The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.5-4, Table 4.1-1, and the TS Section 3.5 basis. The revision to Table 3.5-4 and Table 4.1-1 incorporates feedwater isolation specifications for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The basis for TS Section 3.5 has been revised to provide background information on the Main Feedwater Isolation system. In addition, administrative changes have been made to convert TS Section 3.5 and its basis along with Tables TS 3.5-4 and TS 4.1-1 to the WordPerfect software. The administrative changes also correct minor typographical errors and format inconsistences. Also, Technical Specification TABLE TS 4.1-1 page 4 of 8 which was issued as part of License Amendment No. 101 on September 30, 1993, is being reissued to correct a typographical error.

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A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by Richard J. Laufer

Richard J. Laufer, Acting Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 102 to License No. DPR-43
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

* See previous concurrence

PD3-3:LA	PD3-3:PM	PD3-3:PM	* HICB:BC	PD3-3:PD	* OGC-OWFN
MRushbrook	RLaufer/bj/	AHansen	JWermiel	JHannon	CBarth
10/ /93	10/13/93	10/13/93	9/10/93	10/14/93	9/16/93

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\KEWAUNEE\KEW85773.AMD

Mr. C. A. Schrock
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

MADISON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-305

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 102
License No. DPR-43

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Wisconsin Power and Light Company, and Madison Gas and Electric Company (the licensees) dated January 20, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 102, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensees shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and is to be implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John N. Hannon

John N. Hannon, Director
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of issuance: October 18, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 102

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43

DOCKET NO. 50-305

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
TS B3.5-2	TS B3.5-2
TS B3.5-3	TS B3.5-3
TS B3.5-4	TS B3.5-4
Table TS 3.5-4 (2 pages)	Table TS 3.5-4 (2 pages)
Table TS 4.1-1 Page 3 of 8	Table TS 4.1-1 Page 3 of 8
*Page 4 of 8	*Page 4 of 8

* This page which was issued as part of License Amendment No. 101 on September 30, 1993, is being reissued to correct a typographical error.

Containment Isolation

A containment isolation signal is initiated by any signal causing automatic initiation of Safety Injection or may be initiated manually. The containment isolation system provides the means of isolating the various pipes passing through the containment walls as required to prevent the release of radioactivity to the outside environment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.

Steam Line Isolation

In the event of a steam line break, the steam line isolation valve of the affected line is automatically isolated to prevent continuous, uncontrolled steam release from more than one steam generator. The steam lines are isolated on Hi-Hi containment pressure or high steam flow in coincidence with Lo-Lo T_{avg} and Safety Injection or Hi-Hi steam flow in coincidence with Safety Injection. Adequate protection is afforded for breaks inside or outside the containment even under the assumption that the steam line check valves do not function properly.

Main Feedwater Isolation

Main feedwater isolation actuation occurs as a result of a Hi-Hi steam generator water level to prevent steam generator overfill conditions. Steam generator overfill may result in damage to secondary components; for example, high moisture steam could erode the turbine blades at an accelerated rate.

Setting Limits

1. The high containment pressure limit is set at about 10% of the maximum internal pressure. Initiation of Safety Injection protects against loss-of-coolant[2] or steam line break[3] accidents as discussed in the safety analysis.

2. The Hi-Hi containment pressure limit is set at about 50% of the maximum internal containment pressure for initiation of containment spray and at about 30% for initiation of steam line isolation. Initiation of containment spray and steam line isolation protects against large loss-of-coolant or steam line break accidents as discussed in the safety analysis.

3. The pressurizer low-pressure limit is set substantially below system operating pressure limits. However, it is sufficiently high to protect against a loss-of-coolant accident as shown in the safety analysis.

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[2]USAR Section 14.3

[3]USAR Section 14.2.5

4. The steam line low-pressure signal is lead/lag compensated and its setpoint is set well above the pressure expected in the event of a large steam line break accident as shown in the safety analysis.

5. The high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 20% of nominal full-load flow at the no-load pressure and the Hi-Hi steam line flow limit is set at approximately 120% of nominal full-load flow at the full-load pressure in order to protect against large steam line break accidents. The coincident Lo-Lo T_{avg} setting limit for steam line isolation initiation is set below its HOT SHUTDOWN value. The safety analysis shows that these settings provide protection in the event of a large steam line break.

6. The setpoints and associated ranges for the undervoltage relays have been established to always maintain motor voltages at or above 80% of their nameplate rating, to prevent prolonged operation of motors below 90% of their nameplate rating, and to prevent prolonged operation of 480 V MCC starter contactors at inrush currents. All safeguard motors were designed to accelerate their loads to operating speed with 80% nameplate voltage, but not necessarily within their design temperature rise. Prolonged operation below 90% of nameplate voltage may result in shortening of motor insulation life, but short-term operation below 90% of nameplate voltage will not result in unacceptable effects due to the service factor provided in the motors and the conservative insulation system used on the motors. Prolonged operation of MCC contactors at inrush currents may result in blown control fuses and inoperable equipment; therefore operation will be limited to a time less than it takes for a fuse to blow.

   The primary safeguard buses undervoltage trip (85.0% of nominal bus voltage) is designed to protect against a loss of voltage to the safeguard bus and assures that safeguard protection action will proceed as assumed in the USAR. The associated time delay feature prevents inadvertent actuation of the undervoltage relays from voltage dips, while assuring that the diesel generators will reach full capacity before the Safety Injection pump loads are sequenced on.

   The safeguard buses second level undervoltage trip (93.6% nominal bus voltage) is designed to protect against prolonged operation below 90% of nameplate voltage of safeguard pumps. The time delay of less than 7.4 seconds ensures that engineered safeguards equipment operates within the time delay assumptions of the accident analyses. The time delay will prevent blown control fuses in 480 V MCC's; the MCC control fuses are the limiting component for long-term low voltage operation. The time delay is long enough to prevent inadvertent actuation of the second level UV relays from voltage dips due to large motor starts (except reactor coolant pump starts with a safeguards bus below 3980 volts). Up to 7.4 seconds of operation of safeguard pumps between 80% and 90% of nameplate voltage is acceptable due to the service factor and conservative insulation designed into the motors.

Each relay in the undervoltage protection channels will fail safe and is alarmed to alert the operator to the failure.

A blackout signal which occurs during the sequence loading following a Safety Injection signal will result in a re-initiation of the sequence loading logic at time step 0 as long as the Safety Injection signal has not been reset. The Kewaunee Emergency Procedures warn the operators that a Blackout Signal occurring after reset of Safety Injection will not actuate the sequence loading and instructs to re-initiate Safety Injection if needed.

Instrument OPERATING Conditions

During plant OPERATIONS, the complete protective instrumentation systems will normally be in service. Reactor safety is provided by the Reactor Protection Systems, which automatically initiates appropriate action to prevent exceeding established limits. Safety is not compromised, however, by continuing OPERATION with certain instrumentation channels out of service since provisions were made for this in the plant design. This specification outlines LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the Reactor Control and PROTECTION SYSTEM when any one or more of the channels is out of service.

Almost all reactor protection channels are supplied with sufficient redundancy to provide the capability for CHANNEL CALIBRATION and test at power. Exceptions are backup channels such as reactor coolant pump breakers. The removal of one trip channel on process control equipment is accomplished by placing that channel bistable in a tripped mode; e.g., a two-out-of-three circuit becomes a one-out-of-two circuit. The source and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation system channels are not intentionally placed in a tripped mode since these are one-out-of-two trips, and the trips are therefore bypassed during testing. Testing does not trip the system unless a trip condition exists in another channel.

The OPERABILITY of the instrumentation noted in Table TS 3.5-6 assures that sufficient information is available on these selected plant parameters to aid the operator in identification of an accident and assessment of plant conditions during and following an accident. In the event the instrumentation noted in Table TS 3.5-6 is not OPERABLE, the operator is given instruction on compensatory actions.

TABLE TS 3.5-4

INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS FOR ISOLATION FUNCTIONS

		1	2	3	4	5	6
NO.	FUNCTIONAL UNIT	NO. OF CHANNELS	NO. OF CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS	MINIMUM DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY	PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS	OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 3 OR 4 CANNOT BE MET
1	Containment Isolation						
	a. Safety Injection	Refer to Item No. 1 of Table TS 3.5-3					HOT SHUTDOWN[1]
	b. Manual	2	1	1	-		HOT SHUTDOWN
2	Steam Line Isolation						
	a. Hi-Hi Steam Flow with Safety Injection	2/loop	1	1	-		HOT SHUTDOWN[1]
	b. Hi Steam Flow and 2 of 4 Lo-Lo T_{avg} with Safety Injection	2/loop	1	1	-		HOT SHUTDOWN[1]
	c. Hi-Hi Containment Pressure	3	2	2	-		HOT SHUTDOWN[1]
	d. Manual	1/loop	1/loop	1/loop	-		HOT SHUTDOWN

[1] If minimum conditions are not met within 24 hours, steps shall be taken to place the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN condition.

Amendment No. ~~60~~,102

TABLE TS 3.5-4

INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS FOR ISOLATION FUNCTIONS

		1	2	3	4	5	6
NO.	FUNCTIONAL UNIT	NO. OF CHANNELS	NO. OF CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS	MINIMUM DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY	PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS	OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 3 OR 4 CANNOT BE MET
3	Containment Ventilation Isolation						
	a. High Containment Radiation	2	1	1	-	-	These channels are not required to activate containment ventilation isolation when the containment purge and ventilation system isolation valves are maintained closed.[2]
	b. Safety Injection	Refer to Item 1 of Table TS 3.5-3					
	c. Containment Spray	Refer to Item 3 of Table TS 3.5-3					
4	Main Feedwater Isolation						
	a. Hi-Hi Steam Generator Level	3	2	2	1		HOT SHUTDOWN

[2]The detectors are required for Reactor Coolant System leak detection as referenced in TS 3.1.d.5.

Amendment No. ~~83~~,102

TABLE TS 4.1-1

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS

CHANNEL DESCRIPTION	CHECK	CALIBRATE	TEST	REMARKS
11. a. Steam Generator Low Level	Each shift	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months(a)	Monthly	(a) Only if test indicates calibration required
b. Steam Generator High Level	Each shift	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months(a)	Monthly	(a) Only if test indicates calibration required
12. Steam Generator Flow Mismatch	Each shift	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months(a)	Monthly	(a) Only if test indicates calibration required
13. Charging Flow	Each shift	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months	Not applicable	
14. Residual Heat Removal Pump Flow	Each shift (when in operation)	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months	Not applicable	
15. Boric Acid Tank Level	Daily	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months	Monthly	
16. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level	Weekly	Annually	Not applicable	
17. Volume Control Tank Level	Each shift	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months	Not applicable	

* Reference TS 4.1.d

Amendment No. ~~59~~,~~64~~,~~80~~,~~98~~,~~101~~,102

TABLE TS 4.1-1

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS

CHANNEL DESCRIPTION	CHECK	CALIBRATE	TEST	REMARKS
18. a. Containment Pressure (SIS signal)	Each shift	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months(b)	Monthly(a)	(a) Isolation Valve Signal (b) Only if test indicates calibration required
b. Containment Pressure (Steamline Isolation)	Each shift(a)	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months(a)(b)	Monthly(a)	(a) Narrow range containment pressure (-3.0, +3.0 psig excluded) (b) Only if test indicates calibration required
c. Containment Pressure (Containment Spray Act)	Each shift	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months(a)	Monthly	(a) Only if test indicates calibration required
d. Annulus Pressure (Vacuum Breaker)	Not applicable	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months(a)	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months	(a) Only if test indicates calibration required
19. Radiation Monitoring System	Daily*	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months	Monthly	Includes only channels R11 thru R15, R19, R21, and R23
20. Boric Acid Make-Up Flow Channel	Not applicable	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months	Not applicable	
21. Containment Sump Level	Not applicable	Not applicable	Each refueling cycle not to exceed 18 months	

* Reference TS 4.1.d

Amendment No. ~~59~~,~~64~~,~~80~~,~~98~~, 101

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATING TO AMENDMENT NO. 102 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

MADISON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-305

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 19, 1990, the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC), the licensee, submitted their response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-19, "Request for Action Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47 'Safety Implication of Control Systems in Light Water Reactor (LWR) Nuclear Power Plants' pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)." In this submittal, the licensee described the provisions that were in place at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to fulfill the GL 89-19 requirements. In a letter dated January 20, 1993, the licensee submitted a request for revision to the KNPP Technical Specifications (TS) that would further satisfy the recommendations of GL 89-19. The amendment would revise TS Table 3.5-4, Table 4.1-1, and the TS Section 3.5 basis. The revision to Table 3.5-4 and Table 4.1-1 would incorporate feedwater isolation specifications. The basis for TS Section 3.5 would be revised to provide background information on the Main Feedwater Isolation system. In addition, administrative changes would be made to convert TS Section 3.5 and its basis along with Tables TS 3.5-4 and TS 4.1-1 to the WordPerfect software. The administrative changes would also correct minor typographical errors and format inconsistences.

2.0 BACKGROUND

By GL 89-19 dated September 20, 1989, the NRC recommended that a system be provided to mitigate main feedwater overfill events for all boiling and pressurized water reactors (BWRs and PWRs) that currently do not have such protection. This action was part of the technical resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-47. Furthermore, it was requested that all LWR plants have Technical Specifications that address the operability of the overfill protection systems.

Overfill protection for each LWR consists of protection channels that initiate the termination of main feedwater (MFW) flow to the reactor vessel for a BWR or to the steam generators (S/G's) for a PWR, on sensing a high water level condition. The overfill protection mitigates the consequences of MFW control system failures as an event which could lead to overfill conditions, as well

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as limiting the operating water level to within the bounds of the assumptions used in the safety analysis. Both functions fall within the scope of the criteria for determining the content of TS as established by the Commission's Interim Policy Statement on TS dated February 6, 1987 (52 FR 3788).

3.0 EVALUATION

The KNPP is a Westinghouse designed PWR with a 2-out-of-3 high S/G narrow range level initiating logic for overfill protection. Enclosure 2 to GL 89-19 designated plants with this design as Group I plants and concluded that the design was acceptable provided that: (1) the overfill protection system is sufficiently separate from the control portion of the MFW control system so that it is not powered from the same power source, not located in the same cabinet, and not routed so that a fire is likely to affect both systems, and (2) the plant procedures and TS include requirements to periodically verify operability of the system.

The licensee's March 19, 1990, submittal described how the KNPP's design meets the above review criteria. A description of their design and the NRC staff's assessment follows. Requirement (1) has been separated into three distinct parts for review.

Requirement 1A: The overfill protection system is sufficiently separate from the control portion of the MFW control system so that it is not powered from the same power source.

The KNPP overfill protection system consists of three channels of S/G narrow range level instrumentation per S/G. Each channel consists of a transmitter loop portion (safeguards protection) and a control circuit portion (non-safeguards). The transmitter loop portion of each channel includes the level transmitter, power supply, bistables, and electrical isolation device. The three transmitter loops are powered by different instrument buses. The control circuit portion supplies inputs to the control room indication and the plant process computer. Two of the channels also provide inputs to the ATWS mitigating systems actuation circuitry (AMSAC) while the third channel feeds the S/G level control circuitry. The S/G level control circuitry is powered by the same instrument bus as one of the non-control feeding level channels.

The licensee described the design as sufficiently separate for two reasons. First, the isolation device will prevent a postulated control circuitry failure from disabling its associated level channel. These isolation devices are used for both the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and AMSAC and as such, they were reviewed and approved by the NRC in safety evaluations dated April 8, 1987, and August 25, 1988, respectively. Second, the overfill protection bistables are a de-energize to actuate design. If a S/G level control circuitry failure propagates back to its instrument bus supply due to improper fuse coordination, it will de-energize that bus. This will de-energize one of the non-controlling level channels including the associated high level bistable and will thereby trip in one of the two required inputs for feedwater (FW) isolation. The staff has reviewed the licensee's design with regard to requirement 1A above and finds it acceptable.

Requirement 1B: The overfill protection system is sufficiently separate from the control portion of the MFW control system so that it is not located in the same cabinet.

The KNPP S/G level channel output signal cabling enters the relay room and runs to the Foxboro analog racks designated as RR107, 109, 113, and 115. The S/G high level bistables and the isolation devices are located in these cabinets. The S/G overfill protection system is actuated by these bistables and is located in the Engineered Safeguard cabinets designated as RR125 through RR129. The MFW control system is located in the Feedwater Loop A and B cabinet RR118 and receives its input from the isolation devices. Since the overfill protection is not located in the same cabinet as the MFW control system, the staff finds the licensee's design acceptable with regard to requirement 1B above.

Requirement 1C: The overfill protection system is sufficiently separate from the control portion of the MFW control system and not routed so that fire is likely to affect both systems.

Note: As specified in GL 89-19, common mode failures that could disable overfill protection and the feedwater control system, but would still result in a feedwater pump trip, are considered acceptable failure modes.

The most reliable method of overfill protection at the KNPP is the closure of the MFW control valves and the bypass control valves. These valves are air-operated and fail closed on loss of air. The overfill protection system controls the solenoid valves which maintain air pressure on the control valve positioners. Loss of air pressure or electrical power to either redundant train of solenoid valves will result in closing the MFW control valves and bypass control valves. Any fire which affects the S/G level signal upstream of the high level bistables will fail the current signal either high or low. A high current will actuate the overfill protection system. A low current will trip the reactor and subsequently isolate MFW on low average coolant temperature in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). In either case, feedwater flow is effectively stopped. The MFW control valve system is designated as safety related and all components and cabling are installed/routed in such a manner as to provide the proper amount of train separation. The staff, therefore, finds this design acceptable with regard to requirement 1C above.

Requirement 2: The plant procedures and TS include requirements to periodically verify the operability of the overfill protection system.

In their March 19, 1990, submittal, the licensee stated that the operation of the S/G overfill protection system is verified through the performance of surveillance procedures but not through TS requirements. The licensee further

stated that they would consider including appropriate limiting conditions of operation and surveillance requirements for the overfill protection system in future TS upgrades.

In their January 20, 1993, submittal, the licensee requested a TS amendment to add limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the S/G overfill protection system. The licensee is proposing the following changes to TS Section 3.5 Basis and Tables TS 3.5-4 and TS 4.1-1 to satisfy the recommendations of GL 89-19:

1) Adding item 4, "Main Feedwater Isolation," to KNPP's TS Table TS 3.5-4 to incorporate Limiting Conditions for Operations for feedwater isolation;

2) Revising item 11 of Table TS 4.1-1 to require surveillance of both low and high steam generator water level instrumentation;

3) Adding a description of the function of the MFW isolation system to the basis section of TS 3.5; and

4) Making administrative changes to convert TS section 3.5 and its basis along with Tables TS 3.5-4 and TS 4.1-1 to the WordPerfect software and to correct minor typographical errors and format inconsistencies.

KNPP's existing TS for systems that initiate safety actions define requirements which the NRC has previously reviewed and found to be in conformance with the applicable regulatory requirements for TS; namely those setforth in 10 CFR 50.36 in regard to Limiting Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety System Settings (Setpoints), and Surveillance Requirements. The licensee has proposed TS for the overfill protection system which are equivalent to similar existing TS for Steam Line Isolation and are also consistent with the Westinghouse Standard TS. The proposed TS for the overfill protection system insure operability of the system at appropriate times, are consistent with existing requirements for systems providing a commensurate level of safety and are therefore acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Wisconsin State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 36448). Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion setforth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Laufer

Date: October 18, 1993