

February 1, 1993

Docket No. 50-305

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Mr. C. A. Schrock  
 Manager - Nuclear Engineering  
 Wisconsin Public Service Corporation  
 Post Office Box 19002  
 Green Bay, Wisconsin 54307-9002

Dear Mr. Schrock:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 97 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43  
(TAC NO. M84062)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 97 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. This amendment revises the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated July 8, 1992, as superseded August 20, 1992.

The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.4, "Steam and Power Conversion System," TS Section 4.8, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," and their respective bases. The changes incorporate an NRC staff recommendation regarding the required minimum condensate storage tank inventory, additional restrictions on the operation of the auxiliary feedwater system, and revisions to the surveillance requirements for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. In addition, administrative changes were made.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

**ORIGINAL SIGNED BY**

Allen G. Hansen, Project Manager  
 Project Directorate III-3  
 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

040031

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No.97 to License No. DPR-43
  2. Safety Evaluation
- cc w/enclosures: See next page

OFFICE	PD3-3:LA	PD3-3:PE	PD3-3:PM	BC:SPLB	BC:OTSB
NAME	PKreutzer	MWebb/bj <i>mwd</i>	AHansen <i>(H)</i>	CMcCracken	CGrimes <i>(CG)</i>
DATE	1/15/93	1/15/93	1/15/93	1/17/93	1/25/93

OFFICE	PD3-3:PD	OGC
NAME	JHannon	<i>CPW</i>
DATE	1/26/93	1/28/93

2/1/93

included M. Taylor's comment - JRM

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\KEWAUNEE\KEW84062.AMD

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*dbp*

Mr. C. A. Schrock  
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

cc:

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

MADISON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-305

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 97  
License No. DPR-43

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Wisconsin Power and Light Company, and Madison Gas and Electric Company (the licensees) dated July 8, 1992, as superseded August 20, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 97, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensees shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and is to be implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Allen G. Hansen, Project Manager  
Project Directorate III-3  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of issuance: February 1, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 97

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43

DOCKET NO. 50-305

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
3.4-1	3.4-1
3.4-1a	-
3.4-2	3.4-2
3.4-3	3.4-3
-	3.4-4
-	3.4-5
4.8-1	4.8-1
4.8-2	4.8-2

### 3.4 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM

#### APPLICABILITY

Applies to the OPERATING status of the Steam and Power Conversion System.

#### OBJECTIVE

To assure minimum conditions of steam-relieving capacity and auxiliary feedwater supply necessary to assure the capability of removing decay heat from the reactor, and to limit the concentrations of water activity that might be released by steam relief to the atmosphere.

#### SPECIFICATION

##### a. Steam Generators

1. The reactor shall not be heated  $> 350^{\circ}\text{F}$  unless the following conditions are satisfied.
  - A. Two steam generators are OPERABLE.
    1. System piping and valves directly associated with providing auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators are OPERABLE.
    2. Five main steam safety valves per OPERABLE steam generator are OPERABLE, except during required surveillance tests or during in-service testing of these valves and steam generators in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a, provided that at least two main steam safety valves associated with the steam generator under test are OPERABLE.
  - B. A minimum of 39,000 gallons of water is available in the condensate storage tanks and the Service Water System is capable of delivering an unlimited supply from Lake Michigan.
  - C. The iodine-131 activity on the secondary side of the steam generators does not exceed  $1.0 \mu\text{Ci/cc}$ .
2. If, when the reactor is  $> 350^{\circ}\text{F}$ , any one of the conditions of TS 3.4.a.1 cannot be met within 48 hours, then within 1 hour action shall be initiated to:
  - Achieve HOT STANDBY within 6 hours
  - Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours
  - Achieve and maintain the Reactor Coolant System  $< 350^{\circ}\text{F}$  within an additional 12 hours

b. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

1. The reactor shall not be heated  $> 350^{\circ}\text{F}$  unless the following conditions are met:
  - A. Both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps shall be operable.
  - B. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump shall be operable, or if not demonstrated operable prior to  $> 350^{\circ}\text{F}$ , it shall be declared inoperable when  $350^{\circ}\text{F}$  is exceeded.
2. If, when the reactor is  $> 350^{\circ}\text{F}$ , any one of the following conditions of inoperability may exist during the time interval specified. If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified, then within 1 hour action shall be initiated to:
  - Achieve HOT STANDBY within 6 hours
  - Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours
  - Achieve and maintain the Reactor Coolant System  $< 350^{\circ}\text{F}$  within an additional 12 hours
  - A. One auxiliary feedwater pump may be inoperable for 72 hours.
  - B. Two auxiliary feedwater pumps may be inoperable for 4 hours.
3. If, when the reactor is  $> 350^{\circ}\text{F}$ , three auxiliary feedwater pumps are discovered to be inoperable, all LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION requiring MODE changes shall be suspended until at least one auxiliary feedwater pump is restored to OPERABLE status. Upon discovery, action shall be initiated immediately to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status.

c. Turbine Overspeed Protection System

1. Reactor power shall not exceed 50% of rated power unless two of the three turbine overspeed protection systems are OPERABLE, except as provided by TS 3.4.c.2.
2. If two or more of the turbine overspeed protection systems are inoperable, then maintain power  $< 50\%$  of rated power. When only two systems are OPERABLE, an individual system may be blocked for no longer than 4 hours to allow for testing.

## BASIS

### Steam Generators (TS 3.4.a)

Two steam generators are required to be OPERABLE when the average reactor coolant temperature is  $> 350^{\circ}\text{F}$  to ensure that sufficient heat removal capability exists for power operation and decay heat removal. Although one steam generator would provide sufficient decay heat removal capability, two steam generators are required in order to provide the necessary redundancy to meet the single failure criterion. An OPERABLE steam generator is defined by TS 3.4.a.

The ten main steam safety valves (five per steam generator) have a total combined rated capability of 7,660,380 lbs./hr at 1181 lbs. pressure. The maximum full-power steam flow at 1721 MWTH is 7,449,000 lbs./hr; therefore, the main steam safety valves will be able to relieve the total maximum steam flow if necessary. The requirement that five main steam safety valves per OPERABLE steam generator are available will assure sufficient steam relief capability.

Testing of the main steam system while the plant is in HOT SHUTDOWN conditions is permitted provided that at least two main steam safety valves associated with the steam generator under test are available to provide sufficient relief capacity to protect the system during the test.

The specified minimum water supply in the condensate storage tanks is sufficient for 4 hours of decay heat removal. The 4 hours are based on the Kewaunee site specific station blackout (loss of all AC power) coping duration requirement. When AC power is available, unlimited replenishment of the condensate storage supply is available from Lake Michigan through the Service Water System.

The secondary coolant activity is based on a postulated release of the contents of one steam generator to the atmosphere. This could happen, for example, as a result of a steam break accident combined with failure of a steam line isolation valve. The limiting dose for this case results from iodine-131 because of its low MPC, and because its long half-life relative to the other iodine isotopes results in its greater concentration in the liquid. The accident is assumed to occur at zero load when the steam generators contain maximum water. With allowance for plate-out retention in water droplets, one-tenth of the contained iodine is assumed released from the plant. The maximum inhalation dose at the site boundary is then as follows:

$$\text{Dose (rem)} = C \cdot V/10 \cdot B(t) \cdot X/Q \cdot \text{DCF}$$

where:

C	=	secondary coolant activity, 1.0 $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$
V	=	water volume in one steam generator, 3,510 $\text{ft}^3 = 99 \text{ m}^3$
B(t)	=	breathing rate, $3.47 \times 10^{-4} \text{ m}^3/\text{sec}$
X/Q	=	$2.9 \times 10^{-4} \text{ sec/m}^3$
DCF	=	$1.48 \times 10^6 \text{ rem/Ci}$ iodine-131 inhaled

The resultant dose is < 1.5 rem.

#### Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (TS 3.4.b)

In the unlikely event of complete loss of electrical power to the plant, continued capability of decay heat removal would be assured by the availability of either the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and by steam discharge to the atmosphere through the main steam safety valves. Each motor-driven pump is normally aligned to both steam generators; the discharge of the turbine-driven pump, which starts automatically, is aligned to backup both motor-driven pumps. Any single auxiliary feedwater pump can supply sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat from the reactor.

It is acceptable to exceed 350°F with an inoperable turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. However, operability of the pump must be demonstrated within 72 hours after exceeding 350°F or a plant shutdown must be initiated.

With no auxiliary feedwater pumps OPERABLE, action shall be taken to restore a pump as soon as possible. The action with three pumps inoperable is to maintain the plant in an operating condition in which the auxiliary feedwater system is not needed for heat removal. When one pump is restored, then the LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION specified in TS 3.4.b.2 are applied. Should the plant shutdown be initiated with no auxiliary feedwater pumps available, there would be no feedwater to the steam generator to cool the plant to 350°F when the Residual Heat Removal System could be placed in operation.

#### Turbine Overspeed Protection System (TS 3.4.c)

Turbine overspeed protection is provided to limit the possibility of turbine missiles. Overspeed protection is provided by three independent systems based on diverse operating principles. The three systems are the electro-hydraulic (E-H) system, the mechanical trip system, and the redundant overspeed trip system (ROST). The E-H and mechanical systems are single channel and operate on a one-out-of-one to trip logic; the ROST system is a three channel system, requiring two-out-of-three channels to trip.

**REFERENCES**

USAR Section 10  
USAR Section 14.1

## 4.8 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM<sup>(1)</sup>

### APPLICABILITY

Applies to periodic testing requirements of the turbine-driven and motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.

### OBJECTIVE

To verify the OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater equipment and its ability to respond properly when required.

### SPECIFICATION

- a. The OPERABILITY of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps as required by TS 3.4.b.1.A shall be demonstrated quarterly during power operation and within one week after the pumps are required to be operable by the Technical Specifications, if the test surveillance interval expired during the shutdown period.
- b. The OPERABILITY of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump as required by TS 3.4.b.1.B shall be demonstrated quarterly during power operation and within 72 hours after exceeding 350°F, if the test surveillance interval expired during the shutdown period.
- c. The valves on the discharge side of the turbine-driven pump that direct flow to either steam generator shall be tested by operator action whenever the turbine-driven pump is tested.
- d. The service water supply valves to the auxiliary feedwater pump suction shall be tested by operator action following the auxiliary feedwater pump tests.
- e. These tests shall be considered satisfactory if control board indication or visual observation of the equipment demonstrate that all components have operated properly.

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<sup>(1)</sup>USAR Section 6.6

## BASIS

The Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) mitigates the consequences of any event that causes a loss of normal feedwater. The design basis of the AFW System is to remove decay and residual heat by delivering the minimum required flow to at least one steam generator until the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is cooled to the point of placing the Residual Heat Removal System into operation.

In accordance with ASME Code Section XI, Subsection IWP, an in-service test of each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be run nominally every 3 months (quarterly) during normal plant operation. It is recommended that this test frequency be maintained during shutdown periods if this can be reasonably accomplished, although this is not mandatory. If the normally scheduled test is not performed during a plant shutdown, then the motor-driven pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 1 week exceeding 350°F; and the turbine-driven pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 72 hours of exceeding 350°.

Quarterly testing of the AFW pumps is used to detect degradation of the component. This type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump's developed head at one point of the pump characteristic curve. This verifies that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance.

TS 3.4.b requires all three AFW pumps be OPERABLE prior to heating the RCS average temperature > 350°F. It is acceptable to heat the RCS to > 350°F with the turbine-driven pump inoperable for a limited time period of 72 hours. The wording of TS 3.4.b.2.B and TS 4.8.b allows delaying the testing until the steam flow is consistent with the conditions under which the performance acceptance criteria were generated.

The discharge valves of the two motor-operated pumps are normally open, as are the suction valves from the condensate storage tanks and the two valves on a cross tie line that directs the turbine-driven pump discharge to either or both steam generators. The only valve required to function upon initiation of auxiliary feedwater flow is the steam admission valve on the turbine-driven pump. Proper opening of the steam admission valve will be demonstrated each time the turbine-driven pump is tested.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATING TO AMENDMENT NO. 97 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

MADISON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-305

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 8, 1992, as superseded August 20, 1992, the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC), the licensee, submitted a request for revision to the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) Technical Specifications (TS). The amendment would revise TS Section 3.4, "Steam and Power Conversion System," TS Section 4.8, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," and their respective bases. The proposed changes incorporate an NRC staff recommendation regarding the required minimum condensate storage tank inventory, additional restrictions on the operation of the auxiliary feedwater system, and revisions to the surveillance requirements for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. In addition, administrative changes were proposed.

The proposed technical changes consist of the following:

1. The minimum required inventory for the condensate storage tanks (CSTs) would be raised from 30,000 gallons to 39,000 gallons;
2. The specification would be revised to allow reactor coolant system heatup greater than 350°F for 72 hours with an inoperable turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump;
3. A new specification would be added that reduces the allowed outage time for two inoperable AFW pumps from the existing 48 hours to 4 hours;
4. A new specification would be added which would suspend all limiting conditions for operation (LCO) action statements requiring mode changes when all three AFW pumps are inoperable. This specification would require immediate actions to restore at least one AFW pump to operable status.

## 2.0 BACKGROUND

The AFW System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) upon the loss of the normal feedwater supply. The AFW pumps take suction from the CSTs and pump to the steam generator (SG) secondary side. The SGs function as a heat sink for core decay heat. One AFW pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the plant to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions. The RHR system is capable of removing decay and residual heat when the RCS is at or below an average coolant temperature of 350°F.

The AFW system consists of two motor-driven AFW pumps and one steam turbine-driven pump configured into three trains. Each motor-driven pump is normally aligned to both SGs. The turbine-driven pump, which starts automatically, is aligned to backup the motor driven pumps. Each motor-driven and turbine-driven pump is capable of providing 100% of AFW flow capacity to the SGs.

## 3.0 EVALUATION

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's review of the proposed amendment included assessments of each of the four proposed technical changes as well as the administrative changes.

### Required Condensate Storage Tank Inventory

The suction of the AFW pumps is normally aligned to the CSTs with operator action required to transfer pump suction to the service water (SW) system. The SW system is capable of supplying a source of cooling water from Lake Michigan. The current CST TS inventory requirement of 30,000 gallons provides a sufficient inventory for a minimum of 90 minutes at hot shutdown plus a suitable margin to prevent a loss of net positive suction head prior to transfer to the SW system. The proposed specification to increase the minimum amount required to 39,000 gallons will assure greater than 4 hours of heat removal capability is available via the CSTs.

In a November 20, 1990, Safety Evaluation (SE) addressing Kewaunee's implementation of the Station Blackout (SBO) Rule, the NRC staff recommended a TS amendment to increase the minimum required CST inventory. The licensee determined that a minimum of 39,000 gallons in the CSTs satisfies the 4-hour SBO coping duration requirement to remove heat. This determination was not affected by the licensee's supplemental SBO proposal dated September 18, 1992. The licensee has also determined that the increased minimum inventory requirement is bounded by the normal steady state inventory previously considered in the safe shutdown assessment of internal flooding for KNPP so that an increased flood hazard does not exist. The staff agrees with the proposed change to increase the capacity of the AFW supply; this change improves the AFW system's ability to mitigate a loss of feedwater event and will not adversely affect the health and safety of the public. The staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

### Reactor Coolant System Heatup with an Inoperable Turbine-driven AFW Pump

Existing TS 3.4 requires all three AFW pumps to be operable prior to heating the RCS above an average temperature of 350°F. However, if modifications or maintenance have been performed on one of the pumps, that pump cannot be considered operable until it has been satisfactorily surveillance tested. If maintenance or modifications are performed when the RCS is above 350°F, sufficient steam flow is available to test the turbine-driven AFW pump. However, maintenance or modification activities may be scheduled to coincide with a plant shutdown. During the subsequent plant startup there is inadequate steam flow to demonstrate complete operability of the turbine-driven pump prior to heating the RCS above 350°F. Therefore, the proposed changes to TS 3.4.b.a.B and 4.8.b would allow delaying the pump test for up to 72 hours to allow for steam conditions consistent with the conditions under which the performance acceptance criteria were established.

Allowing the RCS to heat above 350°F without testing the turbine-driven AFW pump could reduce the degree of redundancy of the AFW system. For this reason, the proposed specification designates a 72-hour limit in which to complete the testing. The 72-hour limit is consistent with the intent of the action statement which allows one AFW pump to be inoperable when the RCS is greater than 350°F. This temporary relaxation in redundancy balances the overall reliability of the AFW system versus allowing a reasonable time to perform the appropriate test procedures and to evaluate the results. The staff agrees that the proposed change will not create a significant safety concern because each of the motor-driven AFW pumps (which are capable of providing 100% AFW system flow) must be operable prior to heating the plant above 350°F. Therefore, the change maintains a degree of redundancy for SG heat removal for the time limit imposed by the limiting condition for operation (LCO) while providing greater operational flexibility, which the staff finds acceptable.

### Allowed Outage Time for Two Inoperable AFW Pumps

Proposed TS 3.4.b.2.B reduces the allowed outage time (AOT) for two AFW pumps to be inoperable from 48 hours to 4 hours prior to requiring action to shut down and cool down to less than 350°F. The licensee has concluded that the reduction in AOT provides additional restrictions which will result in increased availability of the AFW system. The licensee has also determined that the proposed change results in a reduction in instantaneous core melt frequency.

The staff agrees that the proposed reduction in AOT will provide additional assurance of AFW availability to mitigate loss of feedwater events and represents an enhancement to safety and, therefore, finds the proposed change acceptable.

### Suspension of All LCOs for Three Inoperable AFW Pumps

Proposed new TS 3.4.b.3 requires that if the three AFW pumps are identified as inoperable with RCS temperature greater than 350°F, all LCOs requiring mode changes shall be suspended until at least one AFW pump is restored to operable status. Existing TS 3.4.b allows a 48-hour LCO with three inoperable AFW pumps.

If all three AFW trains are inoperable, the unit is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety-related means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for conducting a cooldown with nonsafety-related equipment. In such a condition, the unit should not be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that might result in a unit trip. Actions should be initiated immediately to restore at least one AFW pump to operable status.

The staff's review indicates that the new specification will not reduce the margin of safety of the plant; rather it is a precautionary measure that will maintain the plant in an operating condition in which the AFW system is not relied upon for heat removal. Consequently, it will not adversely affect the health or safety of the public. In addition, the proposed change is consistent with the staff's position regarding three inoperable AFW pumps expressed in NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," Section 3.7.5.D.1, dated September 1992. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

### Administrative Changes

Sections 3.4 and 4.8 would be reformatted and minor editorial changes have been proposed. Since these changes are administrative, the staff finds them acceptable.

### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Wisconsin State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or a change to a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 37574 and 57 FR 61123). Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria

for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). This amendment also involves changes in recordkeeping, reporting or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, with respect to these items, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: M. Webb

Date: February 1, 1993