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Docket No. 50-305

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
ATTN: Mr. E. W.James
Senior Vice President
Post Office Box 1200
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated March 17, 1978, as supplemented by letters dated April 10, and May 12, 1978.

The amendment incorporates changes to Appendix A Technical Specifications to support operation in Cycle 4. The Technical Specification limiting control rod insertion during power operation is changed to maintain the shutdown margin required near end of Cycle 4 operation.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation related to the license amendment and Notice of Issuance of License Amendment are also enclosed. The Notice is being forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

JRBuchanan
CMiles
BHarless
RDiggs
JSaltzman
JMcGough

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 21 to DPR-43
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/encl:
See next page

EID concurrence is subject to changes as annotated on working copy of safety evaluation

concurred by phone 5/25/78

Const. 1
GD

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SURNAME	TVWambach:lb	Olmstead	ASchwencer	RBaer	P-Check	
DATE	5/18/78	5/23/78	5/25/78	5/22/78	5/24/78	

NRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 — 626-624

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

May 25, 1978

Docket No. 50-305

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
ATTN: Mr. E. W.James
Senior Vice President
Post Office Box 1200
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

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The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated March 17, 1978, as supplemented by letters dated April 10, and May 12, 1978.

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Sincerely,

A. Schwencer, Chief
~~Operating Reactors Branch #1~~
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 21 to DPR-43
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/encl:
See next page

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Chairman Kewaunee County Board
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Kewaunee, Wisconsin 54216

Mr. Lester Huber
Chairman, Town of Carlton
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Chief, Energy Systems
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Washington, D.C. 20460

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Activities Branch
Region V Office
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR
230 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-305

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 21
License No. DPR-43

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission)has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (the licensee) dated March 17, 1978, as supplemented by letters dated April 10, and May 12, 1978, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all application requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 21 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications."

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 25, 1978

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 21

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43

DOCKET NO. 50-305

Change the Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A of License No. DPR-43 as indicated below. The revised pages contain the captioned amendment number and marginal lines to reflect the area of change.

Remove	Insert
3.10-5	3.10-5
3.10-15	3.10-15
Fig. TS 3.10-3	Fig. TS 3.10-3
3.10-7c	3.10-7c

c. Quadrant Power Tilt Limits

1. Except for physics tests, whenever the indicated quadrant power tilt ratio exceeds 1.02, one of the following actions shall be taken within two hours:

   A. Eliminate the tilt.

   B. Restrict maximum core power level two percent for every one percent of indicated power tilt ratio exceeding 1.0.

2. If the tilt condition is not eliminated after 24 hours, reduce power to 50 percent or lower.

3. Except for low power physics tests, if the indicated quadrant tilt exceeds 1.09 and there is simultaneous indication of a misaligned rod:

   A. Restrict maximum core power level by 2 percent of rated values for every one percent of indicated power tilt ratio exceeding 1.0.

   B. If the tilt condition is not eliminated within 12 hours, the reactor shall be brought to a minimum load condition ($\leq$ 30 Mwe).

4. If the indicated quadrant tilt exceeds 1.09 and there is no simultaneous indication of rod misalignment, the reactor shall immediately be brought to a No Load condition ($\leq$ 5% reactor power).

d. Rod Insertion Limits

1. The shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn when the reactor is critical or approaching criticality.

2. 2. The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion; insertion limit is shown in Figure TS 3.10-4. Core 4 insertion limits shall be in accordance with Figure TS 3.10-3 to assure sufficient shutdown margin for the cycle.

3. Insertion limit does not apply during physics tests or during periodic exercise of individual rods. However, the shutdown margin indicated in Figure TS 3.10-1 must be maintained except for the low power physics test

Trip shutdown reactivity is provided consistent with plant safety analysis assumptions. To maintain the required trip reactivity, the rod insertion limits of Figure TS 3.10-4 must be observed. In addition, for hot shutdown conditions, the shutdown margin of Figure TS 3.10-1 must be provided for protection against the steambreak accident. To assure adequate at power shutdown margin during operation of Core 4, the shutdown margin of Figure TS 3.10-3 shall apply.

Rod insertion limits are used to assure adequate trip reactivity, to assure meeting power distribution limits, and to limit the consequences of a hypothetical rod ejection accident. The available control rod reactivity or excess beyond needs, decreases with decreasing boron concentration, because the negative reactivity required to reduce the core power level from full power to zero power is largest when the boron concentration is low.

The intent of the test to measure control rod worth and shutdown margin (Specification 3.10.d.3) is to measure the worth of all rods less the worth of the worst case of an assumed stuck rod; that is, the most reactive rod. The measurement would be anticipated as part of the initial startup program and infrequently over the life of the plant, to be associated primarily with determinations of special interest, such as end-of-life cooldown or startup of fuel cycles which deviate from normal equilibrium conditions in terms of fuel loading patterns and anticipated control bank worths. These measurements will augment the normal fuel cycle design calculations and place the knowledge of shutdown capability on a firm experimental as well as analytical basis.

Operation with abnormal rod configuration during low power and zero power testing is permitted because of the brief period of the test and because special precautions are taken during the test.

Control Rod Insertion Limits
as a Function of Power
Kewaunee Nuclear Plant
Unit 1 - Cycle 4



FIGURE TS 3.10-3 Amendment No. 21

$$\sigma_j = \left[\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\bar{R}_j - R_{ij})^2 \right]^{1/2} \Big/ \bar{R}_j$$

or .02 whichever is greater

Performance of partial flux maps may be terminated if it can be shown that $\left[F_j(Z)\right]_s$ exceeds $F_j(Z)$ by 10% or if axial offset has changed less than 2% in any 8 hour period following initiation of the partial mapping procedures.

3.10.n The total, accumulated exposure of each fuel assembly during each cycle shall be less than the predicted exposure for clad flattening during that cycle.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 21 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-43

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-305

Introduction

By the application dated March 19, 1978,(1) as supplemented April 10(2) and May 12, 1978,(3) Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (the licensee) proposed to change the Technical Specifications for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Station. The proposed change would reduce the control rod insertion limit to maintain the shutdown margin at end of Cycle 4 operation. This change is associated with the refueling of the core for Cycle 4 operation and has been incorporated in the licensee's safety analysis of Cycle 4. This refueling consists of the replacement of 41 burned fuel assemblies by 40 fresh assemblies and one twice-burned assembly. This report covers our evaluation of all the significant safety related aspects of cycle 4 operation resulting from this refueling.

Evaluation

Fuel Mechanical Design

The mechanical design of the fresh region 6 fuel assemblies is identical to the region 5 fuel loaded in the last core reload except for a modification to the hold-down springs. The region 6 fuel has double leaf hold-down springs instead of the previously used single leaf springs. Double leaf springs are asserted to provide increased in-core hold-down force margin. The double leaf springs are designed and manufactured to meet or exceed the mechanical design which we previously found acceptable for single leaf springs. Therefore, the double leaf springs are acceptable for use.

Reactor Design

Core Loading

The Cycle 4 core loading will consist of 41 twice burned assemblies, 40 once burned assemblies and 40 fresh fuel assemblies. The fuel management scheme employed is relatively new in the industry. Conventional 3 batch fuel management, in which fresh fuel assemblies are located on the core periphery and once and twice burned fuel assemblies are arranged in a checkerboard fashion in the core interior, has been replaced by what is commonly termed an in-out-in fuel management scheme. In this scheme, in general, fresh fuel is located in the interior of the core during its first residence cycle, moved to the core periphery for its second residence cycle, and located in the core interior during its third residence cycle. Fresh fixed burnable poison rods (224 for Cycle 4) are used in fresh fuel assemblies to tailor power distributions. Experience with this fuel management scheme was gained during Cycle 3, a transitional fuel cycle between three batch out-in and in-out-in fuel management. Comparisons of measured and predicted power distributions during Cycle 3 previously presented to the Commission, show generally good agreement. On this basis modification of the fuel management scheme is acceptable.

Control Strategy

A sub-set[6] of the standard "18 case" constant axial offset control, CAOC, study was performed by W to demonstrate that using CAOC, the peak to average linear heat generation rate, F_q, will not exceed 2.16 during steady state and load follow operations. This peaking factor is less than the current Technical Specification value of 2.25. The reduced value was required to accommodate the recently found error in the Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model. The reduced value is to be used on an interim basis until resolution of this issue. This issue is the subject of an exemption to 10 CFR 50.46(a)1. issued May 17, 1978, and is addressed in the Safety Evaluation Report accompanying that exemption.[7] The current Technical Specifications require periodic in-core mapping. These maps may be used to insure that axial dependent values of F_{xy} assumed in the CAOC analysis are not violated. The use of a sub-set analysis has been previously approved for other plants. Fuel vendor predicted values of F_q and F_{xy} vs. core height are within the bounds of previously approved values. On these bases the CAOC analysis is considered acceptable.

Shutdown Margin

Values of fuel vendor predicted shutdown margin (scrammable rod worth less shutdown requirements) from hot full power at begining and end of Cycle 4 are 2.33 and 2.05% $\Delta\rho$ respectively. The required shutdown margins to accommodate the current Steam Line Break accident analyses at begining and end of cycle are 1.00 and 2.00% $\Delta\rho$. Hence there is little predicted excess margin at end of cycle, 0.05% $\Delta\rho$, to accommodate potential fuel vendor predictive errors and calculational uncertainties. The small excess margin was achieved by reducing the rod insertion allowance by 0.05% $\Delta\rho$ at end of cycle by restricting bank D insertion at power. Restriction of the bank D insertion increases the reserved or scrammable control rod reactivity. The restricted insertion is implemented by the proposed change to the Technical Specifications which is considered acceptable.

The control rod worth is to be confirmed at hot zero power begining of cycle. This test is considered important when viewed in the context of the predicted minimal excess shutdown margin at end of cycle. This test is discussed in greater detail later in this report.

Kinetics Characteristics

Fuel vendor predicted values of reactivity coefficients with the exception of the most negative doppler coefficient are predicted to be within the bounds of values used in the safety analyses. The values used in the safety analysis are extreme rather than expectation values. There is no basis to suspect that the reload fuel will sufficiently perturb the reactivity coefficients such that they are outside the bounds of the extreme values used in the safety analysis.

The most negative doppler coefficient used in the safety analysis is more negative than used in previous analyses. The change is due to revisions of the fuel temperature models and corresponding reductions of the predicted fuel temperatures. The doppler coefficient is more negative at lower fuel temperature. The magnitude and direction of the reported change is judged reasonable.

A slower trip reactivity insertion rate was used by W in the Cycle 4 safety analysis. The change is not the result of the reload but rather the result of revision of the fuel vendors modeling. Specifically more bottom skewed axial flux distribution was used to calculate the trip reactivity as a function of core height. Assumed rod positions vs. time after scram initiation have not been altered. The change is in a conservative direction.

Accident Analysis

Loss of Coolant Accident:

Staff concerns related to upper plenum injection modeling and the recently discovered error in the W ECCS evaluation model have been resolved. The upper plenum injection modeling modification is the subject of another Safety Evaluation Report[9] which concludes that no change in operating limits are required.

An exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Section 50.46(a)1 has been issued to permit operation pending submittal by the licensee of an ECCS analysis correcting the Zirc-water reaction heat generation rate.[7,8] The peak to average linear heat rate will be administratively restricted to a value of 2.16 at full power until this reanalysis is submitted and approved.

Steamline Break Accident:

The Steamline Break accident was not reanalyzed for Cycle 4 (predicted input values are within the bounds of previous analyses). However the methods used in the reference analyses which predicted a minimum DNBR greater than 1.30 are currently being generically reviewed by the staff. The hypothetical steamline break is a design basis event for which limited clad failure is permitted. If clad failure were to occur the release path available would be through the steam generators which would be assumed to be leaking at the maximum permitted Technical Specification value. Because of this tortuous leak path a significant fraction of the fuel rods could be failed without exceeding the site boundary dose rate limits. The relative power density predicted during the course of steamline break with all control rods except the most reactive rod inserted is highly non-uniform. The predicted minimum DNBR during the transient would occur near the region of the stuck rod and be restricted to a small region of the core. Even if departure from nucleate boiling were to occur, and even if clad failure were to occur, the staff would judge that a relatively small fraction of the fuel rods would fail and hence site boundary dose rate limits would not be violated. On this basis, operation during Cycle 4 is deemed acceptable by the staff.

Loss of Flow Accident:

The Loss of Flow accident assuming the revised scram reactivity insertion rate was reanalyzed. The fuel vendor predicted that the minimum DNBR met the design basis of 1.3. Based on the relative insensitivity of the gross core behavior during this hypothetical accident to cycle specific input values and the staff's prior review of the Loss of Flow accident for W two loop plants such as Kewaunee the staff accepts this conclusion.

Locked Rotor Accident:

The Locked Rotor accident was reanalyzed due to a slower trip reactivity insertion rate. The W predicted number of fuel rods expected to experience DNBR increased to 40%. The Locked Rotor Accident is a condition 4 accident for which limited clad failure is permitted. The radioactive release path assuming clad failure is through the steam generator to the secondary side of the plant at the assumed maximum permitted Technical Specification leak rate value. Assuming no loss of offsite power, the Kewaunee design basis, normal cooldown and cleanup systems would function and potential radioactive release would result in an insignificant fraction of the dose at the site boundary permitted by 10 CFR Part 100. On this basis the staff accepts the analysis.

Ejected Rod Accident:

The hot full power begining and end of cycle ejected rod accident was reanalyzed by the vendor due to small increases in W predicted values of post ejected peaking, and ejected rod worths. The changes are of the magnitude associated with a typical reload. Previously approved analytical methods were used. Predicted results of the W analysis are acceptable.

Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal at Power and Uncontrolled Rod Bank Withdrawn from Subcritical Accidents:

These accidents were reanalyzed by the fuel vendor using the revised slower trip reactivity rate. W found the effect of the slower trip reactivity rate to be small and predicted the minimum DNBR to remain above 1.30. These assertions are consistent with staff expectations and on this basis the analysis is considered acceptable.

Other Accidents:

All postulated transients and accidents which were reported in the Final Safety Analysis Report were reviewed by the licensee. With the exception of the accidents specifically addressed above, Cycle 4 values of key input parameters to specific safety analyses are predicted to be within the bounds of the input values to previously approved reference analyses, or the results of analyses have been shown insensitive to changes of specific input parameters and hence need not be reanalysed. The staff accepts this conclusion.

Technical Specifications

It has been proposed that Figure TS 3.10-3, "Control Rod Insertion Limits as a Function of Power, Kewaunee Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Cycle 4" be amended to restrict bank D insertion at power. The change reduces the control bank bite insertion allowance and in turn increases the scrammable reactivity available at hot full power. The proposed amendment is conservative and prudent.

Startup Testing

Planned startup tests and acceptance criteria have been provided to the staff by the licensee. The licensee has stated that "the results of the Physics/Startup tests for Cycle 4 will be made available to the Staff 45 days after startup and a formal Physics Test Report will be docketed 90 days after Cycle 4 startup."

The Technical Specification which requires measurement of shutdown margin does not specify the method to be used. Confirmation of shutdown margin will be performed using a recently proposed rod swap technique. A single control bank is measured using boron dilution techniques. Other control banks are swapped (calibrated against) one at a time with this first reference bank to determine their reactivity worths. The tests confirm the validity of the design models to calculate rodded reactor state points (hot zero power, begining of cycle). The design model is used to predict shutdown worths at other state points, e.g., hot full power, end of cycle. State points directly related to the safety analysis (such as the all rods in reactivity worth) are not measured. Special attention has been given to this confirmatory testing in light of the minimal predicted excess shutdown margin at end of cycle. To ensure that the predictive capability of the shutdown margin is reliably verified, the licensee has agreed to the following test criteria: (1) $\pm$10% agreement of measurement and prediction of the reference bank, (2) less than or equal to $\pm$20% agreement of any bank, and (3) less than or equal to 10% RMS deviation from prediction, where the root mean square sum is taken over the 6 individual bank measurements.

If any of these three criteria are not met, the staff is to be notified. The staff is to orally concur on licensee proposed corrective action prior to reactor power ascension above 5% of rated power if the three criteria are not met. Alternately, the licensee may measure total shutdown worth less the most reactive control rod directly.

Environmental Conclusions

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

Conclusion

The licensee's reload submittal stated that some of the parameters listed in Table 15-2 of the Standard Format (Reg. Guide 1.70, Rev. 2) were outside of the range used in the reference safety analyses. As a result the submittal indicated that certain accidents such as bank withdrawal from subcriticality, rod withdrawal from power, loss of flow, and locked rotor have changed and been reanalyzed and are intended to become the new reference safety analyses for future cycles. The results of these reanalyses have been found acceptable for Cycle 4 as addressed in previous sections of this SER. However, detailed results of these analyses as described in Section 15 of the Standard Format were not submitted.

Unless this information (Section 15) and the analyses and supporting information, as described in Section 4 of the Standard Format, are submitted, the analyses submitted for Cycle 4 will not be considered acceptable as a reference safety analysis for future cycles.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: May 25, 1978

REFERENCES

1. E. W. James, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, to A. Schwencer NRC, "Proposed Technical Specification Amendment No. 33," March 17, 1978.

2. E. W. James, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, to V. Stello, NRC, "ECCS-Zirc/Water Reaction Correction", April 10, 1978.

3. E. W. James, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, to A. Schwencer, NRC, "Kewaunee Reload Safety Evaluation Cycle 4", May 12, 1978.

4. D. H. Risher, et al, "Safety Analysis for the Revised Fuel Rod Internal Pressure Design Basis", WCAP-8963, June 1977.

5. J. V. Miller (Ed.), "Improved Analytical Model used in Westinghouse Fuel Rod Design Computations," WCAP-8720, October 1976.

6. C. Eicheldinger, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, to J. Stolz, NRC, Westinghouse designation NS-CS-1749, April 6, 1978.

7. A. Schwencer, NRC, to E. W. James, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, May 17, 1978.

8. E. W. James, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, to E. Case, "Request for Exemption, Kewaun Cycle 4," May 12, 1978.

9. A. Schwencer, NRC, to E. W. James, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, May 16, 1978.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-305

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

MADISON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 issued to Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Wisconsin Power and Light Company, and Madison Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant located in Kewaunee, Wisconsin. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment incorporates changes to the Appendix A Technical Specifications to support operation in Cycle 4. The Technical Specification limiting control rod insertion during power operation is changed to maintain the shutdown margin required near end of Cycle 4 operation.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated March 17, 1978, as supplemented by letters dated April 10, and May 12, 1978, (2) Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the Kewaunee Public Library, 314 Milwaukee Street, Kewaunee, Wisconsin 54216. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 25th day of May 1978.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors