

Docket No. 50-305

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Mr. C. W. Giesler, Vice President
Nuclear Power
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
Post Office Box 1200
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

Dear Mr. Giesler:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 47 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 for Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated August 18, 1982, as supplemented September 15, 1982.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to include rearrangement of the Table of Contents, correction of typographical errors and other administrative changes.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
M. Grotenhuis

Marshall Grotenhuis, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 47 to DPR-43
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc w/encs:
See next page

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*Concurrence, AS REQUESTED,
LTP only in Form
Amendment and
F.A. Notice only*

OFFICE	DL:ORB#1	DL:ORB#1	DL:ORB#1	DL:OR	OELD	
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DATE	11/10/82	11/10/82	11/15/82	11/15/82	11/17/82	

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION
WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
MADISON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-305

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 47
License No. DPR-43

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Wisconsin Power and Light Company and Madison Gas and Electric Company (the licensees) dated August 18, 1982 as supplemented September 15, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 47, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 29, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 47 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43

DOCKET NO. 50-305

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5. Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV), and PORV Block Valves.

a. Two PORV's and their associated block valves shall be operable during hot standby and operating modes.

1. If a pressurizer PORV is inoperable, the PORV shall be restored to an operable condition within one hour or the associated block valve shall be closed and maintained closed by administrative procedures to prevent inadvertent opening.
2. If a PORV block valve is inoperable, the block valve shall be restored to an operable condition within one hour or the block valve shall be closed with power removed from the valve; otherwise the unit shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition using normal operating procedures.

6. Pressurizer Heaters

- A. At least one group of pressurizer heaters shall have an emergency power supply available when the average RCS temperature is greater than 350°F.

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- F.1. Isolation valves 8806A (S19A), 8801A (S111A) and 8801B (S111B) in the discharge of the high head SIS and block valve 8809C (S13) are in the open position with their power breaker locked out
2. Accumulator isolation valves 8800A (S120A) and 8800B (S120B) shall be opened with their power breaker locked out before reactor coolant system pressure exceeds 1000 psig.
- G. Automatic valves, instrumentation, piping, and interlocks associated with the above components and required to function during accident and/or post-accident conditions are operable.
- H. During the Monthly Valve Operation Surveillance Testing of the Safety Injection System it is permissible to close the hand operated valve isolating the Concentrated Boric Acid Tanks from the Safety Injection Pump Suction. During this short test period an operator shall stand by the valve to open it if Safety Injection is required. He will have headset communication with the Control Room. At completion of the test he will verify the valve is returned to open, and this will be checked by at least one additional person.
2. During power operation or recovery from inadvertent trip, any one of the following conditions of inoperability may exist during the time intervals specified. The reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition if operability is not restored within the time specified, and it shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition if operability is not restored within an additional 48 hours.
- A. ONE safety injection pump may be out of service, provided the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours. The other safety injection pump shall be tested to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable pump.
- B. ONE residual heat removal pump may be out of service, provided the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours. The other residual heat removal pump shall be tested to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable pump.
- C. ONE residual heat exchanger may be out of service for a period of no more than 48 hours.

Each relay in the undervoltage protection channels will fail safe and is alarmed to alert the operator to the failure.

A blackout signal which occurs during the sequence loading following a safety injection signal will result in a reinitiation of the sequence loading logic at time step 0 as long as the Safety Injection signal has not been re-set. The Kewaunee Emergency Procedures warn the operators that a Blackout Signal occurring after reset of Safety Injection will not actuate the sequence loading and instructs to re-initiate Safety Injection if needed.

Instrument Operating Conditions

During plant operations, the complete protective instrumentation systems will normally be in service. Reactor safety is provided by the Reactor Protection Systems, which automatically initiates appropriate action to prevent exceeding established limits. Safety is not compromised, however, by continuing operation with certain instrumentation channels out of service since provisions were made for this in the plant design. This specification outlines limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the Reactor Control and Protection System when any one or more of the channels is out of service.

Almost all reactor protection channels are supplied with sufficient redundancy to provide the capability for channel calibration and test at power. Exceptions are backup channels such as reactor coolant pump breakers. The removal of one trip channel on process control equipment is accomplished by placing that channel bistable in a tripped mode; e.g., a two-out-of-three circuit becomes a one-out-of-two circuit. The source and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation system channels are not intentionally placed in a tripped mode since these are one-out-of-two trips, and the trips are therefore bypassed during testing. Testing does not trip the system unless a trip condition exists in another channel.

The operability of the instrumentation noted in Table 3.5-5 assures that sufficient information is available on these selected plant parameters to aid the operator in identification of an accident and assessment of plant conditions during and following an accident. In the event the instrumentation noted in Table 3.5-5 is not operable, the operator is given instruction on compensatory actions.

References:

- (1) FSAR Section 7.5
- (2) FSAR Section 14.3
- (3) FSAR Section 14.2.5

Amendment No. 47

Specification 3.9.a.7 limits the amount of radioactivity that may be inadvertently released to the environment.

b. Airborne Effluents

1. The release rate of gross gaseous activity, except for halogens and particulates with half-lives longer than eight days, shall be limited to $3.6 \times 10^{-12} \frac{\text{sec}}{\text{cc}} \left(\sum \frac{Q_i}{\text{MPC}_i} \right) \leq 1$ where Q_i is the release rate in $\mu\text{Ci/sec}$ for isotope i , and MPC_i is the maximum permissible concentration of isotope i as defined in Appendix B, table II, Column 1, 10 CFR 20. The $3.6 \times 10^{-12} \text{ sec/cc}$ value includes the conversion factor of m^3 to cc .
2. The release rate of halogens and particulates with half-lives greater than eight days released to the environs as part of airborne effluents, shall be controlled such that the release rate over any one hour period does not exceed $5.1 \times 10^{-1} \mu\text{Ci/sec}$.
3.
 - a. The release rates of gross gaseous activity shall not exceed 16 percent of the value specified in 3.9.b.1 above, when averaged over any calendar quarter.
 - b. The release rates of halogens and particulates with half-lives greater than eight days shall not exceed 12 percent of the value specified in 3.9.b.2 above, when averaged over any calendar quarter.
4. During release of gaseous wastes, the following conditions shall be met:
 - a. The gross activity monitor, the iodine activity sampler and particulate activity sampler located in the release path shall be operable.
 - b. Automatic isolation devices capable of terminating the gaseous release shall be operable.

- c. For effluent streams having continuous monitoring capability, the gross, halogen, and particulate activity and flowrate shall be monitored and recorded.

For effluent streams without continuous monitoring capability the gross, halogen, and particulate activity along with the release volume shall be monitored and recorded.

5. Radioactive gaseous wastes collected in the gas decay tanks shall be held up a minimum of 45 days, except for those gaseous wastes resulting from purge and fill operations associated with refueling and reactor startup. Releases of radioactive gaseous wastes at less than 1/100 the limits specified by 3.9.b.1 and 3.9.b.2 are permitted at any time as required for operational flexibility.
6. Reactor containment building purge shall be filtered through the purge filter (HEPA - charcoal) whenever the concentration of iodine and particulate isotopes exceeds the occupational MPC inside the reactor building.
7. The maximum activity to be contained in one gas decay tank shall not exceed 43,500 curies. (Equivalent to Xe-133).
8. Gaseous waste from the condenser air ejector shall be filtered through HEPA filters provided in the Auxiliary Building Vent System.
9. When the annual projected release rate of radioactive materials in gaseous wastes, averaged over a calendar quarter exceeds twice the annual objectives, the licensee shall notify the Director, Directorate

where:

P is the fraction of full power at which the core is operating

K(Z) is the function given in Figure TS 3.10-2

Z is the core height location for the FQ of interest

$F_Q^T(E_j)$ is the function given in Figure TS 3.10-6

Ej is exposure of the fuel rod for the FQ of interest

B. $F_{\Delta H}^N$ Limits For All Fuel

$F_{\Delta H}^N \times 1.04 \leq 1.55 (1 + 0.2(1 - P))$ For 0 to 24,000 MWD/MTU burnup fuel

$F_{\Delta H}^N \times 1.04 \leq 1.52 (1 + 0.2(1 - P))$ For greater than 24,000 MWD/MTU burnup fuel

where:

P is the fraction of full power at which the core is operating

2. If, for any measured hot channel factor, the relationships specified in 3.10.b.1 are not true, reactor power shall be reduced by a fractional amount of the design power to a value for which the relationships are true, and the high neutron flux trip setpoint shall be reduced by the same fractional amount. If subsequent incore mapping cannot, within a 24 hour period, demonstrate that the hot channel factors are met, the overpower ΔT and overtemperature ΔT trip setpoints shall be similarly reduced.
3. Following initial loading and at regular effective full power monthly intervals thereafter, power distribution maps using the movable detection system shall be made to confirm that the hot channel factor limits of specification 3.10.b.1 are satisfied.
4. The measured $F_Q^{EQ}(Z)$ hot channel factors under equilibrium conditions shall satisfy the following relationship for the central axial 80% of the core:
 - A. Westinghouse Electric Corporation Fuel
$$F_Q^{EQ}(Z) \times 1.03 \times 1.05 \times V(Z) \leq (2.22/P) \times K(Z)$$
 - B. Exxon Nuclear Company Fuel
$$F_Q^{EQ}(Z) \times 1.03 \times 1.05 \times V(Z) \leq F_Q^T(E_j)/P \times K(Z)$$

to measure control rod worth and shutdown margin. For this test, the reactor may be critical with all but one high worth rod inserted and the part length rods fully withdrawn.

e. Rod Misalignment Limitations

This specification defines allowable limits for misaligned rod cluster control assemblies. In specifications 3.10.e.1 and 3.10.e.2, the magnitude, in steps, of an indicated rod misalignment may be determined by comparison of the respective bank demand step counter to the analog individual rod position indicator, the rod position as noted on the plant process computer, or through the conditioning module output voltage via a correlation of rod position vs. voltage.

1. When reactor power is greater than or equal to 85% of rating the rod cluster control assembly shall be maintained within ± 12 steps from their respective banks. If a rod cluster control assembly is misaligned from its bank by more than ± 12 steps when reactor power is greater than or equal to 85%, the rod will be realigned or the core power peaking factors shall be determined within 4 hours, and specification 3.10.b applied. If peaking factors are not determined within 4 hours, the reactor power shall be reduced to less than 85% of rating.
2. When reactor power is less than 85% of rating, the rod cluster control assemblies shall be maintained within ± 24 steps from their respective banks. If a rod cluster control assembly is misaligned from its bank by more than ± 24 steps when reactor power is less than 85%, the rod will be realigned or the core power peaking factors shall be determined within 4 hours, and specification 3-10.b applied.
3. And, in addition to 3.10.e.1 and 3.10.e.2 above, if the misaligned rod cluster control assembly is not realigned within 8 hours, the rod shall be declared inoperable.

BASIS

SHUTDOWN REACTIVITY

Trip shutdown reactivity is provided consistent with plant safety analysis assumptions. To maintain the required trip reactivity, the rod insertion limits of Figure TS 3.10-3 must be observed. In addition, for hot shutdown conditions, the shutdown margin of Figure TS 3.10-1 must be provided for protection against the steamline break accident which requires more shutdown reactivity at end of core life (due to a more negative moderator temperature coefficient at end-of-life boron concentrations).

Rod insertion limits are used to assure adequate trip reactivity, to assure meeting power distribution limits, and to limit the consequences of a hypothetical rod ejection accident. The available control rod reactivity or excess beyond needs decreases with decreasing boron concentration, because the negative reactivity required to reduce the core power level from full power to zero power is largest when the boron concentration is low.

The exception to the rod insertion limits in Specification 3.10.d.3 is to allow the measurement of the worth of all rods less the worth of the worst case of an assumed stuck rod; that is, the most reactive rod. The measurement would be anticipated as part of the initial startup program and infrequently over the life of the plant, to be associated primarily with determinations of special interest, such as end-of-life cooldown or startup of fuel cycles which deviate from normal equilibrium conditions in terms of fuel loading patterns and anticipated control bank worths. These measurements will augment the normal fuel cycle design calculations and place the knowledge of shutdown capability on a firm experimental as well as analytical basis.

- (5) Letter from E. R. Mathews, (WPSC), to D. G. Eisenhut, (NRC), dated January 8, 1980, submitting information on Clad Swelling and Fuel Blockage Models.
- (6) Letter from E. R. Mathews, (WPSC), to A. Schwencer, (NRC), dated December 14, 1979, submitting the ECCS Re-analysis properly accounting for the zirconium/water reaction.
- (7) George C. Cooke, Philip J. Valentine: "Exposure Sensitivity Study for ENC XN-1 Reload Fuel at Kewaunee Using the ENC-WREM-IIA PWR Evaluation Model, WN-NF-79-72," Exxon Nuclear Company, October, 1979.
- (8) Letter from L. C. O'Malley, (Exxon Nuclear Company) to E. D. Novak, (WPSC), providing FQ exposure dependence as a function of rod burnup. February 25, 1981
- (9) XN-NF-77-57 Exxon Nuclear Power Distribution Control for Pressurized Water Reactor, Phase II, January, 1978.

TABLE TS 3.5-1 (Page 1 of 2)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES INITIATION INSTRUMENT SETTING LIMITS

<u>NO.</u>	<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL</u>	<u>SETTING LIMIT</u>
1	High Containment Pressure (Hi)	Safety Injection ⁽¹⁾	≤ 4 psig
2	High Containment Pressure (Hi-Hi)	a. Containment Spray	≤ 23 psig
		b. Steam Line Isolation of Both Lines	≤ 17 psig
3	Pressurizer Low Pressure	Safety Injection ⁽¹⁾	≥ 1815 psig
4	Low Steam Line Pressure	Safety Injection ⁽¹⁾	≥ 500 psig
		Lead Time Constant	≥ 12 seconds
		Lag Time Constant	≤ 2 seconds
5	High Steam Flow in a Steam Line Coincident with Safety Injection and Low T_{avg}	Steam Line Isolation Affected Line ⁽²⁾	\leq d/p corresponding to 0.745×10^6 lb/hr at 1005 psig $\geq 540^\circ$ F
6	High-High Steam Flow in a Steam Line Coincident with Safety Injection	Steam Line Isolation of Affected Line ⁽²⁾	\leq d/p corresponding to 4.5×10^6 lb/hr at 735 psig
7	Forebay Level	Trip circ. water pumps	
8	Containment Purge and Vent System Radiation Particulate Detector Radioactive Gas Detector	Containment Ventilation Isolation	\leq value of Radiation Levels in exhaust duct as defined in Note ⁽³⁾

TABLE TS 3.15-1

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>Fire Area</u>	<u>Detectors</u>	<u>Minimum # Required</u>	<u>Required Actions</u>	
AX-21	4160 Switchgear Room	3	2	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
AX-23	Special Vent Filter Housings	9	9	If filter housing is in operation with charcoal filters in service establish an hourly fire watch inspection. If not in service establish a 4-hour inspection frequency.
AX-23	Auxiliary Building	4	2	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
AX-24	Fuel Handling Area	3	3	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
AX-30	Relay Room	19	6	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
AX-32	Cable run area	11	8	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
AX-35	Control Room	13	0	Control room is continuously manned
AX-37	CRD Room	7	4	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
SB-65	Shield Building	6	2	Establish a four hour fire watch inspection
SC-70	Screenhouse	4	2	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
TU-90/91	D/G 1A and day tank room	7	5	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
TU-92/93	D/G 1B and day tank room	7	5	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
TU 94	Cardox Room	1	1	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
TU 95	Air Compressor & Pump Room	5	4	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
TU 97	Battery Room 1A	1	1	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection
TU 98	Battery Room 1B	1	1	Establish an hourly fire watch inspection

Table TS 3.15-1

TABLE TS 3.15-2

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

Location

1. Adjacent to S/G Blowdown Tank and 4160 V Switchgear Rooms
2. Adjacent to Main Shop, Tank and Pump Room near Door 78
3. Adjacent to Control Room and A/C Equipment Room, 606 elevation near stairs
4. Screenhouse, north stairway leading to lower level
5. Adjacent to D/G 1A and D/G 1A day tank rooms
6. Adjacent to D/G 1B and D/G 1B day tank rooms
7. Air Compressor and Pump Room near Auxiliary Feedwater Area Panel
8. Adjacent to Oil Storage Room "B" and SWPT Pressure Filter Assembly
9. Adjacent to Battery Rooms 1A and 1B
10. Aux. Building Basement North of Freight elevator (A)
11. Aux. Building Basement North of Laundry Pumps on south wall of valve gallery.
12. Aux Building Basement solid radwaste handling area, west of MCC 1-45G
13. Aux Building Mezz. Southwest of BA Transfer Pumps
14. Aux Building Mezz. South of S/G Blowdown Tank
15. Aux Building Operating Floor West of entrance to BA Tank Room
16. Aux Building Operating Floor East Side of RWST
17. Stair well at 616 elevation next to "G" wall

Table TS 3.15-2

- c) Verifying that each high pressure pump auto-start setpoint is >100 psig.

5. Deleted

c. Spray/Sprinkler Systems

Each of the spray and/or sprinkler systems in Specification 3.15.c shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
2. At least once per 18 months:
 - a) By performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system, and:
 1. Verifying that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions, and
 2. Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
 - b) By visual inspection of the spray headers to verify their integrity, and
 - c) By visual inspection of each nozzle to verify no blockage.
3. At least once per three years by performing an air flow test through each open head spray/sprinkler header and verifying each open head spray/sprinkler nozzle is unobstructed.

d. Low Pressure CO₂ Systems

Each of the low pressure CO₂ systems in Specification 3.15.d shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1. At least once per 7 days by verifying CO₂ storage tank level and pressure, and
2. At least once per 18 months by verifying:
 - a) The system valves and associated ventilation dampers actuate manually and automatically, upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal, and

TABLE TS 4.10-1 (Page 1 of 6)

Operational Environmental Radiological Surveillance Program

Type of Sample	Location	Sampling Frequency	Type of Analysis	Frequency of Analysis	Reporting Units	Approximate Minimum Detectable Level	Comments
A. Airborne Particulates	K-1f	Weekly	Gross alpha	Weekly	pCi/m ³	4×10^{-4} pCi/m ³	On all samples
	K-2		Gross beta	Weekly	pCi/m ³	1×10^{-3} pCi/m ³	On all samples
	K-7		Gamma Scan	Quarterly	pCi/m ³		Quarterly composite for each station
	K-8						
	K-15						
	K-16						
B. Airborne Iodine	Same as A	Bi-weekly	I-131	Bi-weekly	pCi/m ³	1×10^{-2} pCi/m ³	On all samples
C. Ambient Beta-Gamma	K-1f	Quarterly	Beta-Gamma	Quarterly	mrems/Q	10 mrem	On all samples
	K-2						On all samples
	K-3						
	K-4						
	K-5						
	K-6						
	K-7						
	K-8						
	K-15						
	K-16						
TLD (5 chips in each packet)		Annually	Beta-Gamma	Annually	mrems/A		

TABLE TS 4.10-1 (Page 5 of 6)

Operational Environmental Radiological Surveillance Program

Type of Sample	Location	Sampling Frequency	Type of Analysis	Frequency of Analysis	Reporting Units	Approximate Minimum Detectable Level	Comments
M. Bottom Sediments	500' North of discharge (on the beach)	4 times per year	Gross alpha	4/year	pCi/g	Same as Soil	May, July, Sept., Nov.
	K-1d		Gross beta	4/year	pCi/g		April or May, June August, and October
	500' South of discharge (on the beach)		Sr-89	4/year	pCi/g		April or May, June, August, and October
	K-9 K-14		Sr-90	4/year	pCi/g		April or May, June August, and October
N. Deleted							
O. Periphyton (Slime) and Aquatic Plants	K-1a	Semi-annually	Gross alpha	Semi-annually	pCi/g	0.11 pCi/g wet wt.	2nd and 3rd quarters if available in sufficient quantity
	K-1b		Gross beta	Semi-annually	pCi/g	0.1 pCi/g wet wt.	2nd and 3rd quarters if available in sufficient quantity
	K-1d			Semi-annually	pCi/g	0.01 pCi/g wet wt.	2nd and 3rd quarters if available in sufficient quantity
	K-1e K-9 K-14		Sr-89	Semi-annually	pCi/g	0.007 pCi/g wet wt.	2nd and 3rd quarters if available in sufficient quantity
			Sr-90	Semi-annually	pCi/g		

steady state conditions greater than or equal to 1% $\Delta K/K$; a calculated reactivity balance indicating a shutdown margin less conservative than specified in the technical specifications; short-term reactivity increases that correspond to a reactor period of less than 5 seconds or, if subcritical, an unplanned reactivity insertion of more than .50¢ or occurrence of any unplanned criticality.

- (5) Failure or malfunction of one or more components which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of system(s) used to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.
- (6) Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

Note: For items 6.9.2.a(5) and 6.9.2.a(6) reduced redundancy that does not result in a loss of system function need not be reported under this section but may be reportable under items 6.9.2.b(2) and 6.9.2.b(3) below.

- (7) Conditions arising from natural or man-made events that, as a direct result of the event require plant shutdown, operation of safety systems, or other protective measures required by technical specifications.
- (8) Errors discovered in the transient or accident analyses or in the methods used for such analyses as described in the safety analysis report or in the bases for the technical specifications

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the Plant Operating License.

- a. Records of a complete set of as-built drawings for the plant as originally licensed and all print changes showing modifications made to the plant.
- b. Records of new and spent fuel inventory, fuel transfers, and assembly burnup histories.
- c. Records of plant radiation and contamination surveys.
- d. Records of radiation exposure of all plant personnel, and others who enter radiation control areas.
- e. Records of radioactivity in liquid and gaseous wastes released to the environment.
- f. Records of transient or operational cycles for these facility components.
- g. Records of training and qualification for current members of the plant staff.
- h. Records of in-service inspections performed pursuant to these Technical Specifications.
- i. Records of meetings of the NSRAC and PORC.
- j. Records for Environmental Qualification which are covered under the provisions of paragraph 6.14.

6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM

Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.

ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

AND BASES

APPENDIX B

<u>Section</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page ES</u>
1.0	Definitions	
2.0	Environmental Protection Condition	Deleted
2.2	Chemicals	Deleted
2.2.1	Chlorination of Circulating Water Systems	Deleted
2.2.2	Suspended and Dissolved Solids	Deleted
2.2.3	Treatment Chemicals	Deleted
3.0	Monitoring Requirements	Deleted
3.2	Chemicals	Deleted
3.2.1	Chlorination of Circulating Water System	Deleted
3.2.2	Suspended and Dissolved Solids	Deleted
3.2.3	Treatment Chemicals	Deleted
4.0	Environmental Surveillance & Special Studies	Deleted
4.1	Biological	Deleted
4.1.1	Aquatic	Deleted
4.2.2	De-icing Operation	Deleted
5.0	Administrative Controls	
5.1	Organization, Review and Audit	Deleted
5.1.a	Organization	Deleted
5.1.b	Review and Audit	Deleted
5.2	Actions to be Taken in the Event of Violation of the Environmental Technical Specifications	Deleted Deleted
5.3	Operating Procedures	Deleted
5.4	Plant Reporting Requirements	Deleted
5.4.a	Annual Environmental Operating Report	Deleted
5.4.b	Reporting Requirement - 24 Hours and Subsequent Two-Week Followup Report	Deleted Deleted
5.4.c	Reporting Requirement - 30 Days	Deleted
5.4.d	Changes to the Plant or Procedures	Deleted
5.4.e	General Reporting Requirements	Deleted
5.5	Record Retention	
5.5.a	Record Retention - 5 Years	Deleted
5.5.b	Record Retention - Life of Plant	Deleted



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 47 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

MADISON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-305

Introduction

On August 18, as supplemented September 15, 1982, the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (the licensee) submitted an amendment request which would change the Technical Specifications for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The proposed Technical Specifications would rearrange the Table of Contents, correction of typographical errors and make other administrative changes.

Evaluation

The changes proposed are as follows:

1. A reorganization of the Table of Contents, Appendix A. Specification titles were included for Specifications 3.10.k, 3.10.l, and 3.10.m. Existing specification numbers, titles, and page numbers were included under Sections 3.15, 4.2, and 4.15. Existing specification numbers, titles, and page numbers were added under Sections 6.9.1 and 6.9.2. The title of Section 6.11 was changed to make it consistent with Page TS 6.24. The title to Specification 6.12 was included to retain consistency with Page TS 6-24.a. Existing Tables 3.1-2 and 3.5-5 were included to be consistent with KNPP TS Section 3 Tables. The titles of Figures 3.1-4, 3.10-3, 3.10-4, 3.10-5, 3.10-6, and 3.10-7 have been changed to retain consistency with KNPP TS Section 3 Figures.
2. Clarification of the conditions under which the reactor can be made critical with regard to automatic valves, instrumentation, piping, and interlocks associated with safety injection and residual heat removal systems. The words "are operable" have been added at the end of this specification. (TS page 3.3-2)

3. Amendment No. 42 which was issued by the Commission on April 30, 1982, accidentally deleted a paragraph that was included under Amendment No. 38 which was issued by the Commission on November 6, 1981. The text of Page TS 3.5-6 has been revised to include the deleted paragraph.
4. The wording has been changed to clarify which monitors and samplers shall be operable during the release of gaseous wastes. (TS page 3.9-6)
5. The redundancy has been removed from this specification clarifying its intent while maintaining consistency with its basis. (TS page 3.9-7)
6. A date has been added to the correspondence from Exxon Nuclear Company to WPSC. (TS page 3.10-21)
7. The revision to the setting limit for functional unit No. 5 of Table TS 3.5-1 (p. 1 of 2) specifies the desirable range of operation.
8. The value of "one percent" concerning reactivity anomalies involving disagreement with the predicted value of a reactivity balance under steady state conditions has been changed to " $1\% \Delta K/k$ " for clarity. (TS page 6-17)
9. Sections 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0 which were removed by Amendments 43 and 35 have been included in the Table of Contents to show what was deleted. Existing specification numbers, titles, and page numbers were added under Sections 5.1, 5.4, and 5.5. The text of Page ES i was reorganized for ease in reading.
10. The remaining Environmental Technical Specifications have been removed from the KNPP Technical Specifications and Operating License; the definitions in Section ES 1.0 no longer apply; Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 no longer apply because there are no limits on Environmental Specifications as the Environmental Specifications were previously deleted; Section 5.4.1, Annual Environmental Operating Report, is covered under Technical Specification 6.9.3 for radiological releases; non-radiological releases are reported monthly to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources; Sections 5.4.b and 5.4.c are not applicable because the specifications requiring reporting have been deleted; Section 5.4.d, written reports concerning changes to the plant or plant procedures, is covered under 10 CFR 50.59; and Section 5.4.e is no longer applicable because the NRC monitoring programs have been eliminated. All plant documents covered by Section 5.5 are kept on file either permanently or for six years by other sections in KNPP Technical Specifications.

11. In addition to the above Proposed Amendment several pages affected by previous amendments were issued by the NRC without change bars, or with other minor administrative errors. This submittal requests the pertinent change bars be included along with their respective amendment number, and the other errors also be corrected. The affected pages are Table 3.15-1, Table 3.15-2, TS page 3.10-2, TS page 3.10-6, and TS page 3.10-8. The other changes made for historical reasons are explained below.
- (a) Amendment No. 39 issued by the Commission (4/21/82) revised TS 4.15.b.5. Amendment 39 also indicated that 4.15.b.4.C was changed; however, specification 4.15.b.4.c was revised by NRC Amendment No. 25. (TS page 4.15-2)
 - (b) Amendment 17 (1/1/78) issued by the Commission approved the revisions of Pages TS 3.1-3 through 3.1-8. This revision shifted the text of page TS 3.1-8 to page TS 3.1-7. Amendment 40 (4/21/82) issued by the NRC called for the removal of page TS 3.1-8 which did not exist. A blank page numbered TS 3.1-8 is included in the KNPP TS for historical purposes.
 - (c) Table TS 4.10-1 page (1 of 6) and page (5 of 6) have been revised to maintain consistency with the method for footnoting revisions to KNPP TS.
 - (d) Amendment No. 45 (6/2/82) made the requested revision of specification 3.1.a.6 in regard to "Pressurizer Heaters," however the change bar was included with specification 3.1.a.5 instead of specification 3.1.a.6. The change bar has been moved to specification 3.1.a.6 for historical purposes. (TS page 3.1-2a)

Our review of the above changes confirm that they are all administrative changes and are acceptable to the staff.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: November 29, 1982

Principal Contributor:

M. Grotenhuis

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-305WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONWISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANYMADISON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 47 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43, issued to Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Wisconsin Power and Light Company, and Madison Gas and Electric Company (the licensees), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Kewaunee Nuclear Plant (the facility) located in Kewaunee, Wisconsin. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to include rearrangement of the Table of Contents, correction of typographical errors and other administrative changes.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since this amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.


- 2 -

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated August 18, 1982, as supplemented on September 15, 1982, (2) Amendment No. 47 to License No. DPR-43 and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D. C. and at the Kewaunee Public Library, 822 Juneau Street, Kewaunee, Wisconsin 54216. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 29th day of November, 1982.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing