September 1, 1989

Docket No. 50-341

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Operations
Detroit Edison Company
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, Michigan 48166

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Dear Mr. Sylvia:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43: (TAC NO. 73339)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 37 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 for the Fermi-2 facility. This amendment consists of changes to the Plant Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your letter dated May 10, 1989.

The amendment revises the TS to reflect design changes for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) scheduled to be completed during the upcoming refueling outage scheduled for September 1989. The design change will eliminate the Backup Manual Scram function and add further redundancy to the RPS capability to manually initiate a scram.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are enclosed.

Sincerely,

John F. Stang, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V & Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 37 to NPF-43
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

DFO1

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

DOCUMENT NAME: FERMI2 AMENDMENT

LA/PD31:DRSP	PM/PD31:DRSP	BC/SICB	(A)D/PD31:DRSP	OGC
PShuttleworth	JStang	SNewberry	~~LYandell:bj~~ J.THOMAS	Bachmann
08/4/89	08/4/89	08/28/89	08/29/89	08/16/89

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

September 1, 1989

Docket No. 50-341

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Operations
Detroit Edison Company
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, Michigan 48166

Dear Mr. Sylvia:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43:
(TAC NO. 73339)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 37 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 for the Fermi-2 facility. This amendment consists of changes to the Plant Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your letter dated May 10, 1989.

The amendment revises the TS to reflect design changes for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) scheduled to be completed during the upcoming refueling outage scheduled for September 1989. The design change will eliminate the Backup Manual Scram function and add further redundancy to the RPS capability to manually initiate a scram.

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John F. Stang

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Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V & Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 37 to NPF-43
2. Safety Evaluation
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cc w/enclosures:
See next page

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY

WOLVERINE POWER SUPPLY COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED

DOCKET NO. 50-341

FERMI-2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 37
License No. NPF-43

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Detroit Edison Company (the licensee) dated May 10, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 37, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. DECo shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance with full implementation within 90 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John Thoma

John Thoma, Acting Director
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V & Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 1, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 37

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43

DOCKET NO. 50-341

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
2-4	2-4
B 2-9	B 2-9
3/4 3-3	3/4 3-3
3/4 3-6	3/4 3-6
3/4 3-8	3/4 3-8

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

2.2.1 The reactor protection system instrumentation setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTION:

With a reactor protection system instrumentation setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2.2.1-1, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3.3.1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

TABLE 2.2.1-1

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUES
1. Intermediate Range Monitor, Neutron Flux-High	≤ 120/125 divisions of full scale	≤ 122/125 divisions of full scale
2. Average Power Range Monitor:		
a. Neutron Flux-Upscale, Setdown	≤ 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER	≤ 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER
b. Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-Upscale		
1) Flow Biased	≤ 0.66 W+51%, with a maximum of	≤ 0.66 W+54%, with a maximum of
2) High Flow Clamped	≤ 113.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER	≤ 115.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER
c. Fixed Neutron Flux-Upscale	≤ 118% of RATED THERMAL POWER	≤ 120% of RATED THERMAL POWER
d. Inoperative	N.A.	N.A.
3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High	≤ 1068 psig	≤ 1088 psig
4. Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - Level 3	≥ 173.4 inches*	≥ 171.9 inches
5. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure	≤ 8% closed	≤ 12% closed
6. Main Steam Line Radiation - High	≤ 3.0 x full power background	≤ 3.6 x full power background
7. Drywell Pressure - High	≤ 1.68 psig	≤ 1.88 psig
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High		
a. Float Switch	≤ 594'8"	≤ 596'0"
b. Level Transmitter	≤ 592'6"	≤ 596'0"
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure	≤ 5% closed	≤ 7% closed
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure	Initiation of fast closure	N.A.
11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position	N.A.	N.A.
12. Manual Scram	N.A.	N.A.
13. Deleted		

*See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS(Continued)

8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High

The scram discharge volume receives the water displaced by the motion of the control rod drive pistons during a reactor scram. Should this volume fill up to a point where there is insufficient volume to accept the displaced water at pressures below 65 psig, control rod insertion would be hindered. The reactor is therefore tripped when the water level has reached a point high enough to indicate that it is indeed filling up, but the volume is still great enough to accommodate the water from the movement of the rods at pressures below 65 psig when they are tripped.

9. Turbine Stop Valve-Closure

The turbine stop valve closure trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increases that would result from closure of the stop valves. With a trip setting of 7% of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in heat flux is such that adequate thermal margins are maintained during the worst case transient.

10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure

The turbine control valve fast closure trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from fast closure of the turbine control valves due to load rejection with or without coincident failure of the turbine bypass valves. The turbine control valve (TCV) fast closure signal is generated independently in each valve control logic and connected directly to the Reactor Protection System. The signal to the Reactor Protection System is generated simultaneously with the deenergizing of the solenoid dump valves which produces control valve fast closure. Therefore, when TCV fast closure occurs, a scram trip signal is initiated.

11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position

The reactor mode switch Shutdown position is a redundant channel to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provides additional manual reactor trip capability.

12. Manual Scram

The Manual Scram is a redundant channel to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provides manual reactor trip capability.

13. Deleted

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)	ACTION
6. Main Steam Line Radiation - High	1, 2(f)	2	5
7. Drywell Pressure - High	1, 2(h)	2	1
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High			
a. Float Switches	1, 2	2	1
	5(i)	2	3
b. Level Transmitters	1, 2	2	1
	5(i)	2	3
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure	1(j)	4	6
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure	1(j)	2	6
11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position	1, 2	2	1
	3, 4	2	7
	5	2	3
12. Manual Scram	1, 2	2	1
	3, 4	2	8
	5	2	9
13. Deleted			

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 1 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

ACTION 2 - Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted in the core and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within 1 hour.

ACTION 3 - Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS and insert all insertable control rods within 1 hour.

ACTION 4 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours.

ACTION 5 - Be in STARTUP with the main steam line isolation valves closed within 6 hours or in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

ACTION 6 - Initiate a reduction in THERMAL POWER within 15 minutes and reduce turbine first stage pressure to $\leq$ 154 psig, equivalent to THERMAL POWER less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 2 hours.

ACTION 7 - Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted within 1 hour.

ACTION 8 - Lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within 1 hour.

ACTION 9 - Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, and insert all insertable control rods and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within 1 hour.

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

TABLE NOTATIONS

(a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

(b) This function shall be automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is in the Run position.

(c) Unless adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated per Specification 3.1.1, the "shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn.*

(d) When the "shorting links" are removed, the Minimum OPERABLE Channels Per Trip System is 4 APRMs, 6 IRMs and per Specification 3.9.2, 2 SRMs.

(e) An APRM channel is inoperable if there are less than 2 LPRM inputs per level or less than 14 LPRM inputs to an APRM channel.

(f) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is removed per Specification 3.10.1.

(g) This function shall be automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is not in the Run position.

(h) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required.

(i) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

(j) This function shall be automatically bypassed when turbine first stage pressure is $\leq$ 154 psig, equivalent to THERMAL POWER less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

*Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

TABLE 3.3.1-2

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	RESPONSE TIME (Seconds)
1. Intermediate Range Monitors:	
a. Neutron Flux - High	NA
b. Inoperative	NA
2. Average Power Range Monitor*:	
a. Neutron Flux - High, Setdown	NA
b. Flow Biased Neutron Flux - High	6 ± 1**
c. Fixed Neutron Flux - High	$\leq$ 0.09
d. Inoperative	NA
3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High	$\leq$ 0.55
4. Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - Level 3	$\leq$ 1.05
5. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure	$\leq$ 0.06
6. Main Steam Line Radiation - High	NA
7. Drywell Pressure - High	NA
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High	
a. Float Switch	NA
b. Level Transmitter	NA
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure	$\leq$ 0.06
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure	$\leq$ 0.08***
11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position	NA
12. Manual Scram	NA
13. Deleted	

*Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time shall be measured from the detector output or from the input of the first electronic component in the channel.

**Including simulated thermal power time constant.

***Measured from deenergization of K-37 relay which inputs the turbine control valve closure signal to the RPS.

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION[a]	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1. Intermediate Range Monitors:				
a. Neutron Flux - High	S/U,S,(b) S	S/U[c], W W	SA SA	2 3, 4, 5
b. Inoperative	NA	W	NA	2, 3, 4, 5
2. Average Power Range Monitor[f]:				
a. Neutron Flux - High, Setdown	S/U,S,(b) S	S/U[c], W W	SA SA	2 3, 5
b. Flow Biased Neutron Flux - High	S	S/U[c], W	W[d][e],SA,R[h]	1
c. Fixed Neutron Flux - High	S	S/U[c], W	W[d], SA	1
d. Inoperative	NA	W	NA	1, 2, 3, 5
3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High	S	M	R	1, 2
4. Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - Level 3	S	M	R	1, 2
5. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure	NA	M	R	1
6. Main Steam Line Radiation - High	S	M	R	1, 2[i]
7. Drywell Pressure - High	S	M	R	1, 2

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High				
a. Float Switch	NA	Q	R	1, 2, 5(j)
b. Level Transmitter	S	M	R	1, 2, 5(j)
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure	NA	M	R	1
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure	NA	M	NA	1
11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position	NA	R	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
12. Manual Scram	NA	M	NA	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
13. Deleted				

(a) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(b) The IRM and SRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least ½ decades during each startup after entering OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and the IRM and APRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least ½ decades during each controlled shutdown, if not performed within the previous 7 days.
(c) Within 24 hours prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days.
(d) This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM channel to conform to the power values calculated by a heat balance during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 when THERMAL POWER ≥ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust the APRM channel if the absolute difference is greater than 2% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Any APRM channel gain adjustment made in compliance with Specification 3.2.2 shall not be included in determining the absolute difference.
(e) This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM flow biased channel to conform to a calibrated flow signal.
(f) The LPRMs shall be calibrated at least once per 1000 effective full power hours (EFPH) using the TIP system.
(g) Deleted.
(h) This calibration shall consist of verifying the 6 ± 1 second simulated thermal power time constant.
(i) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is removed per Specification 3.10.1.
(j) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY

WOLVERINE POWER SUPPLY COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED

FERMI-2

DOCKET NO. 50-341

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 10, 1989, the Detroit Edison Company (DECo or the licensee) requested amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 for Fermi-2. The proposed amendment would revise the TS to reflect design changes for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) to be completed during the upcoming refueling outage scheduled to start September 1989. The design change will eliminate the Backup Manual Scram function and add further redundancy to the RPS capability to manually initiate a scram.

2.0 EVALUATION

The Fermi-2 RPS currently includes three means of manually initiating a reactor scram. These means are:

- Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position,
- Manual Scram,
- Backup Manual Scram.

During the staff's initial review of the manual scram system done in 1981, concerns were raised that the system did not meet the requirements of IEEE Standard 279-1971, Section 4.2 and 4.17. The licensee chose to modify the system and provide a backup manual scram system. The system consisted of a second set of pushbuttons that concurrently trip the power feed to each division of the reactor trip system. This design was different from the Generic Electric design in 1981 which initiates a manual backup scram by opening logic contacts in the reactor trip system. The backup manual scram breakers are wired electrically between the respective RPS system distribution cabinets and the associated half of the RPS logic cabinet.

Actuating the Backup Manual Scram causes the additional action of isolating the reactor from the main condenser by closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV). This occurs because the isolation actuation logics are powered from common power supplies with the RPS and are also deenergized by the opening of the Backup Manual Scram breakers. The concurrent MSIV isolation with Backup Manual Scram actuation is highly undesirable since it removes the availability

of the main condenser as a heat sink. During conditions when a manual scram is underway, but not completed, it is desirable that the main condenser be available as a heat sink in order to reduce the severity of the transient and to reduce challenges to the Safety Relief Valves.

To alleviate this problem, the licensee committed to complete the following RPS modifications during Fermi-2's first refueling outage:

- Removal of the current Backup Manual Scram function. The pushbutton operators from this function will be used for two additional Manual Scram channels (one for each trip system). Combined with the two existing channels this will result in each trip system having two channels for Manual Scram.

- Upgrade of the RPS capability of manually initiating a scram to meet all regulatory and design requirements for redundancy. This upgrade will result in a similar configuration for the Reactor Mode Switch Position function, i.e., four channels with two channels in each trip system.

The elimination of the Back-up Manual Scram function from the RPS requires that the line items associated with the function be eliminated from Table 2.2.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Setpoints; Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation; Table 3.3.1-2, Reactor Protection System Response Times; and Table 4.3.1.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements. The description of the Backup Manual Scram function is also deleted from Bases Section 2.2.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Setpoints.

The Technical Specification change associated with the additions is to increase the Minimum Operable Channels per Trip System requirement of Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, from one to two for these trip functions (Manual Scram and Reactor Mode Switch Position). This will require both channels in each trip system to be normally OPERABLE in all OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. The existing ACTIONS and Surveillance Requirements remain appropriate for the modified design. This proposal also brings Fermi-2 Technical Specifications into agreement with the BWR 4 Standard Technical Specifications, which indicate a two channel per trip system requirement for the Manual Scram and Reactor Mode Switch Position Scram functions.

The design change to replace the Back-up Manual Scram function with two additional redundant Manual Scram channels and the associated Technical Specification changes act to enhance safety at Fermi-2. The new design provides an alternative method to meet the regulatory requirement for manual scram redundancy while avoiding the potentially undesirable effects of the MSIV isolation which occurs concurrently with the present Backup Manual Scram design. The Technical Specification changes properly reflect the new design and are in accordance with BWR 4 Standard Technical Specification. Based on the above evaluation the staff finds the proposed changes to the TS to be acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, 51.32 and 51.35, an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact have been prepared and publish in the Federal Register on August 29, 1989 (54 FR35734). Accordingly, based upon the environmental assessment, we have determined that the issuance of this amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: John Stang

Date: September 1, 1989

7590-01

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY

WOLVERINE POWER SUPPLY COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-341

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued Amendment No. 37 to Operating License No. NPF-43 issued to Detroit Edision Company (the licensee), which revised the Technical Specifications (TS) for operation of Fermi-2, located in Monroe County, Michigan.

The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment revises the TS to reflect design changes for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) scheduled to be completed during the upcoming refueling outage scheduled for September 1989. The design change will eliminate the Backup Manual Scram function and add further redundancy to the RPS capability to manually initiate a scram.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment and Opportunity for Hearing in connection with this action was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on August 1, 1989 (54 FR 31749). No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

The Commission has prepared an Environmental Assessment related to the action and has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement. Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission has concluded that the issuance of this amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment dated May 10, 1989, (2) Amendment No. 37 to License No. NPF-43, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation and (4) the Commission's Environmental Assessment. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, Gelman Building, 2120 L Street NW, Washington, D.C., and at the Local Public Document Room. A copy of items (2), (3) and (4) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V & Special Projects.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 1st day of September 1989.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



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