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Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation

Note 1: Overtemperature ΔT

The Overtemperature ΔT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT by more than 4.3% (Unit 1) and 4.5% (Unit 2) of RTP.

$$\Delta T \frac{(1+\tau_1 s)}{(1+\tau_2 s)} \left(\frac{1}{1+\tau_3 s}\right) \leq \Delta T_0 \left\{ K_1 - K_2 \frac{(1+\tau_4 s)}{(1+\tau_5 s)} \left[T \frac{1}{(1+\tau_6 s)} - T' \right] + K_3 (P - P') - f_1 (\Delta I) \right\}$$

Where: ΔT is the measured RCS ΔT by loop narrow range RTDs, °F.

 ΔT_0 is the indicated ΔT at RTP, °F.

s is the Laplace transform operator, sec⁻¹.

T is the measured RCS average temperature, °F.

T is the nominal T_{avg} at RTP (allowed by Safety Analysis), \leq 585.1°F (Unit 1) < 590.8°F (Unit 2).

P is the measured pressurizer pressure, psig

P is the nominal RCS operating pressure, = 2235 psig

- K_1 = Overtemperature ΔT reactor NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, as presented in the COLR,
- K_2 = Overtemperature ΔT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR,
- K_3 = Overtemperature ΔT reactor trip depressurization setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR,
- τ_1, τ_2 = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for ΔT , as presented in the COLR,
- τ_3 = Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for ΔT , as presented in the COLR,
- τ_4 , τ_5 = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T_{avg} , as presented in the COLR,
- τ_6 = Time constant utilized in the measured T_{avg} lag compensator, as presented in the COLR, and
- $f_1(\Delta I)$ = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
 - (i) for $q_t q_b$ between the "positive" and "negative" $f_1(\Delta I)$ breakpoints as presented in the COLR; $f_1(\Delta I) = 0$, where q_t and q_b are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and $q_t + q_b$ is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER;
 - (ii) for each percent ΔI that the magnitude of $q_t q_b$ is more negative than the $f_1(\Delta I)$ "negative" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the ΔT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the $f_1(\Delta I)$ "negative" slope presented in the COLR; and

(continued)

Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation

(iii) for each percent ΔI that the magnitude of $q_t - q_b$ is more positive than the $f_1(\Delta I)$ "positive" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the ΔT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the $f_1(\Delta I)$ "positive" slope presented in the COLR.

Note 2: Overpower ΔT

The Overpower ΔT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT by more than 2.6% (Unit 1) and 3.1% (Unit 2) of RTP.

$$\Delta T \frac{(1+\tau_1 s)}{(1+\tau_2 s)} \left(\frac{1}{1+\tau_3 s}\right) \leq \Delta T_0 \left\{ K_4 - K_5 \frac{\tau_7 s}{1+\tau_7 s} \left(\frac{1}{1+\tau_6 s}\right) T - K_6 \left[T \frac{1}{1+\tau_6 s} - T''\right] - f_2 (\Delta I) \right\}$$

Where: ΔT is the measured RCS ΔT by loop narrow range RTDs, °F.

 ΔT_0 is the indicated ΔT at RTP, °F.

s is the Laplace transform operator, sec⁻¹.

T is the measured RCS average temperature, °F.

T["] is the nominal T_{avg} at RTP (calibration temperature for ΔT instrumentation),

< 585.1°F (Unit 1) < 590.8°F (Unit 2).

- K_4 = Overpower ΔT reactor NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT as presented in the COLR,
- $K_5 = 0.02/°F$ for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature,
- K_6 = Overpower ΔT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient as presented in the COLR for T > T^{*} and K_6 = 0 for T \leq T^{*},
- τ_1, τ_2 = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for ΔT , as presented in the COLR,
- τ_3 = Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for ΔT , as presented in the COLR,
- τ_6 = Time constant utilized in the measured T_{avg} lag compensator, as presented in the COLR,
- τ_7 = Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for T_{avg}, as presented in the COLR, and
- $f_2(\Delta I)$ = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
 - (i) for $q_t q_b$ between the "positive" and "negative" $f_2(\Delta I)$ breakpoints as presented in the COLR; $f_2(\Delta I) = 0$, where q_t and q_b are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and $q_t + q_b$ is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER;

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

against positive reactivity additions or power excursions in MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6.

3. Power Range Neutron Flux – High Positive Rate

The Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip uses the same channels as discussed for Function 2 above.

The Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip Function ensures that protection is provided against rapid increases in neutron flux that are characteristic of an RCCA drive rod housing rupture and the accompanying ejection of the RCCA. This Function compliments the Power Range Neutron Flux-High and Low Setpoint trip Functions to ensure that the criteria are met for a rod ejection from the power range.

The LCO requires all four of the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate channels to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 1 or 2, when there is a potential to add a large amount of positive reactivity from a rod ejection accident (REA), the Power Range Neutron Flux—High Positive Rate trip must be OPERABLE. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because other RTS trip Functions and administrative controls will provide protection against positive reactivity additions. In MODE 6, no rods are withdrawn and the SDM is increased during refueling operations. The reactor vessel head is also removed or the closure bolts are detensioned preventing any pressure buildup. In addition, the NIS power range detectors cannot detect neutron levels present in this mode.

4. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux

The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power

Catawba Units 1 and 2