



Florida Power

A Progress Energy Company

Crystal River Nuclear Plant
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72

Ref: RIS 2001-21

February 6, 2002
3F0202-04

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3 – Estimated Licensing Actions for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003

Reference: NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-21, “Licensing Action Estimates for Operating Reactors”

Dear Sir:

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) hereby voluntarily submits information on licensing actions that are currently planned for NRC Fiscal Years (FY) 2002 and 2003. This submittal is in response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-21, dated November 16, 2001.

FPC anticipates that eight licensing actions will be submitted during the remainder of FY 2002, and that eight licensing actions will be submitted in FY 2003.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Sid Powell, Supervisor, Licensing and Regulatory Programs at (352) 563-4883.

Sincerely,

Dale E. Young
Vice President
Crystal River Nuclear Plant

DEY/ff

Attachment

xc: NRR Project Manager
Regional Administrator, Region II
Senior Resident Inspector
Donna M. Skay

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Table of Estimated Licensing Actions

PLANT NAME UNIT NO. DOCKET NO.	LICENSING ACTION	ESTIMATED DATE OF SUBMITTAL MM/YY	SAFETY, OPERATIONAL, OR ECONOMIC BENEFIT
Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302	Risk-based determination of shutdown for missed Surveillance (SR 3.0.3)	02/02	Potential to avoid an unjustified shutdown due to missed surveillance (CLIIP for TSTF-258).
	Revise Section 1.0 Definition - "Channel Functional Test"	03/02	Adopt NUREG 1430, Rev 2 change to improve clarity for Operations staff.
	Power Uprate 24 MWt to 2568 MWt	04/02	Increase power level for economic gains.
	Core Flood Line Break Operator Response Time for RCP trip	05/02	Resolve B&W plant preliminary safety concern, PSC 2-00.
	Emergency Diesel Generator Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension	05/02	Perform preventative maintenance and inspections during operational vs. outage periods
	Revise containment closure requirements in Mode 6 to facilitate installation of new reactor head	06/02	Optimize outage work duration for next refueling outage when replacement head will be installed to resolve Alloy 600 nozzle cracking.
	Change Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for Containment Isolation Valves	10/02	Change SR to require monthly checks only for valves not locked sealed or otherwise secured in position (NUREG-1430, Rev 2. improvement). Reduces Operator dose and frees Operations resources for other tasks.
	Decrease BWST Boric Acid Concentration	11/02	Reduce reliance on heat tracing to prevent boric acid precipitation.
	ITS 3.0.8 Delay declaring inoperable due to Snubbers for 72 hours (TSTF-372)	02/03	Allows operational flexibility when a snubber is found inoperable and facilitates testing on-line (expected to be a CLIIP).
	Risk-based ISI/IST programs	03/03	Reduce inspection scope to minimize impact on outage resources.
	Extend AOT for Low Pressure Injection and Building Spray to 7 days (TSTF-430)	03/03	Facilitates on-line maintenance and reduces risk of unwarranted shutdown (expected to be a CLIIP).
	Change ITS 5.6.2.10 and Other Sections to Implement NEI 97-06 Guidelines for Steam Generator Inspection	04/03	Implement Industry initiative for control of steam generator inspection programs. ITS 5.6.2.10 will also be changed to allow use of additional inspection probes.
	Increased flexibility in Mode Restraints LCO 3.0.4 (Risk Informed Technical Specification Initiative 3 – TSTF 359)	05/03	Allows mode changes with equipment inoperable based on risk evaluation (expected to be a CLIIP).
	Technical Specification End States (Risk Informed Technical Specification Initiative 1 - TSTF 431)	06/03	Technical Specification required shutdown Mode is not always the safest condition for the plant, e.g., Mode 3 may be safer if the decay heat removal system is inoperable (expected to be a CLIIP).
	ITS 3.8.4, DC Sources (TSTF-360)	07/03	Reduces potential for plant shutdown and increases SR flexibility.
	Risk informed AOTs with backstops (Risk Informed Technical Specification Initiative 4b – TSTF 424)	08/03	Plant shutdown may involve more risk than extending the AOT depending on what equipment is inoperable and other conditions of the plant (expected to be a CLIIP).