

July 16, 1982

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Docket No. 50-302

Mr. John A. Hancock  
Vice President, Nuclear Operations  
Florida Power Corporation  
ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Licensing  
P. O. Box 14042; M.A.C. H-2  
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Dear Mr. Hancock:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 56 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3). The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your request dated May 28, 1982.

This amendment allows operation of CR-3 at a power level no greater than 2475 MWt with the Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors (RCP PMs) bypassed provided there are four reactor coolant pumps in operation. Three reactor coolant pump operation with the RCP PMs bypassed has not been approved because you did not provide for our review sufficient information on the Reactor Protective System (RPS) setpoint uncertainties and the influence of these uncertainties on the analysis for three pump operation with the RCP PMs bypassed.

With regard to surveillance testing of the RCP PMs, we agree that the testing can be discontinued when the RCP PMs are removed from service (bypassed) and the reactor power level is within TS limits. However, operability of the monitors is to be verified prior to their being returned to service.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ SIGNED BY

Sydney Miner, Project Manager  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Licensing

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PDR ADDCK 05000302  
P PDR

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 56 to DPR-72
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

FR NOTICE  
AMENDMENT  
SL: ORAB  
GHOLAHAN  
7/16/82

OFFICE	cc w/enclosures	ORB#4:DL	ORB#4:DL	ORB#4:DL	AD:OR:DL	OELD
SURNAME	See next page	RIngram;cf	SMiner	JStolz	TNovak	N. KARMAN
DATE		7/15/82	7/15/82	7/15/82	7/15/82	7/16/82



UNITED STATES  
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555  
 July 19, 1982

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Docket No. 50-302

Docketing and Service Section  
 Office of the Secretary of the Commission

SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNIT NO. 3

Two signed originals of the Federal Register Notice identified below are enclosed for your transmittal to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Additional conformed copies (12) of the Notice are enclosed for your use.

- Notice of Receipt of Application for Construction Permit(s) and Operating License(s).
- Notice of Receipt of Partial Application for Construction Permit(s) and Facility License(s); Time for Submission of Views on Antitrust Matters.
- Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report.
- Notice of Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License.
- Notice of Receipt of Application for Facility License(s); Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report; and Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility License(s) and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing.
- Notice of Availability of NRC Draft/Final Environmental Statement.
- Notice of Limited Work Authorization.
- Notice of Availability of Safety Evaluation Report.
- Notice of Issuance of Construction Permit(s).
- Notice of Issuance of Facility Operating License(s) or Amendment(s).
- Other: Amendment No. 56.  
Referenced documents have been provided PDR.

Division of Licensing, ORB#4  
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:  
 As Stated

OFFICE →	ORB#4:DL					
SURNAME →	RIngram;cf					
DATE →	7/19/82					

Crystal River Unit No. 3  
Florida Power Corporation

50-302

cc w/enclosure(s):  
Mr. S. A. Brandimore  
Florida Power Corporation  
Vice President and General Counsel  
P. O. Box 14042  
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Mr. Wilbur Langely, Chairman  
Board of County Commissioners  
Citrus County  
Iverness, Florida 36250

Regional Radiation Representative  
EPA Region IV  
345 Courtland Street, N.E.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Crystal River Public Library  
668 N. W. First Avenue  
Crystal River, Florida 32629

Mr. Robert B. Borsum  
Babcock & Wilcox  
Nuclear Power Generation Division  
Suite 220, 7910 Woodmont Avenue  
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Mr. Tom Stetka, Resident Inspector  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Route #3, Box 717  
Crystal River, Florida 32629

Mr. T. C. Lutkehaus  
Nuclear Plant Manager  
Florida Power Corporation  
P. O. Box 219  
Crystal River, Florida 32629

cc w/enclosure(s) & incoming dtd.:  
5/28/82  
Bureau of Intergovernmental Relations  
660 Apalachee Parkway  
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Administrator  
Department of Environmental Regulation  
Power Plant Siting Section  
State of Florida  
2600 Blair Stone Road  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Attorney General  
Department of Legal Affairs  
The Capitol  
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION  
CITY OF ALACHUA  
CITY OF BUSHNELL  
CITY OF GAINESVILLE  
CITY OF KISSIMMEE  
CITY OF LEESBURG  
CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILITIES COMMISSION, CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH  
CITY OF OCALA  
ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO  
SEBRING UTILITIES COMMISSION  
SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.  
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE

DOCKET NO. 50-302

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 56  
License No. DPR-72

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al (the licensees) dated May 28, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.56 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 16, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 56

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72

DOCKET NO. 50-302

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

2-3

2-5

2-7

B2-4

B2-5

B2-6

3/4 3-3




FIGURE 2.1-2  
 REACTOR CORE SAFETY LIMIT

\*Operation with three reactor coolant pumps with RCCPMs bypassed is not permitted.

## SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

#### REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SETPOINTS

2.2.1 The Reactor Protection System instrumentation setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.

#### ACTION:

With a Reactor Protection System instrumentation setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2.2-1, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3.3.1.1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.



TABLE 2.2-1  
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

<u>FUNCTION UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
1. Manual Reactor Trip	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
2. Nuclear Overpower	$\leq 102.0\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with four pumps operating  $\leq 79.92\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with three pumps operating (3)	$\leq 102.0\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with four pumps operating  $\leq 79.92\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with three pumps operating (3)
3. RCS Outlet Temperature - High	$\leq 618^{\circ}\text{F}$	$\leq 618^{\circ}\text{F}$
4. Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow and AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE (1)	Trip Setpoint not to exceed the limit line of Figure 2.2-1	Allowable Values not to exceed the limit line of Figure 2.2-1
5. RCS Pressure - Low (1)	$\geq 1800$ psig	$\geq 1800$ psig
6. RCS Pressure - High	$\leq 2300$ psig	$\leq 2300$ psig
7. RCS Pressure - Variable Low (1)	$\geq (11.59 T_{\text{out}} \text{ } ^{\circ}\text{F} - 5037.8)$ psig	$\geq (11.59 T_{\text{out}} \text{ } ^{\circ}\text{F} - 5037.8)$ psig

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

<u>FUNCTION UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
8. Pump Status Based on Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors (1) (2)	More than one pump drawing $\leq$ 3900 kw or $\geq$ 9000 kw	More than one pump drawing $\leq$ 3900 kw or $\geq$ 9000 kw
9. Reactor Containment Vessel Pressure High	$\leq$ 4 psig	$\leq$ 4 psig

- (1) Trip may be manually bypassed when RCS pressure  $\leq$  1720 psig by actuating Shutdown Bypass provided that:
- The Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint is  $\leq$  5% of RATED THERMAL POWER
  - The Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure - High Trip Setpoint of  $\leq$  1720 psig is imposed, and
  - The Shutdown Bypass is removed when RCS Pressure  $>$  1800 psig.
- (2) Trip may be manually bypassed when reactor power is less than or equal to 2300 MWt.
- (3) Operation with three reactor coolant pumps with RCPs bypassed is not permitted.




FIGURE 2.2-1

TRIP SETPOINT FOR NUCLEAR OVERPOWER BASED ON  
RCS FLOW AND AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE

\*Operation with three reactor coolant pumps with RCPs bypassed is not permitted.

## SAFETY LIMITS

### BASES

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For each curve of BASES Figure 2.1, a pressure-temperature point above and to the left of the curve would result in a DNBR greater than 1.30 or a local quality at the point of minimum DNBR less than 22% for that particular reactor coolant pump situation. The 1.30 DNBR curve for three pump operation is more restrictive than any other reactor coolant pump situation because any pressure/temperature point above and to the left of the three pump curve will be above and to the left of the other curves.

#### 2.1.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

The restriction of this Safety Limit protects the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System from overpressurization and thereby prevents the release of radionuclides contained in the reactor coolant from reaching the containment atmosphere.

The reactor pressure vessel and pressurizer are designed to Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code which permits a maximum transient pressure of 110%, 2750 psig, of design pressure. The Reactor Coolant System piping, valves and fittings, are designed to USAS B 31.7, February, 1968 Draft Edition, which permits a maximum transient pressure of 110%, 2750 psig, of component design pressure. The Safety Limit of 2750 psig is therefore consistent with the design criteria and associated code requirements.

The entire Reactor Coolant System is hydrotested at 3125 psig, 125% of design pressure, to demonstrate integrity prior to initial operation.

## 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### BASES

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#### 2.2.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

The Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Trip Setpoint specified in Table 2.2-1 are the values at which the Reactor trips are set for each parameter. The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the reactor core and reactor coolant system are prevented from exceeding their safety limits. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

The Shutdown Bypass provides for bypassing certain functions of the Reactor Protection System in order to permit control rod drive tests, zero power PHYSICS TESTS and certain startup and shutdown procedures. The purpose of the Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure-High trip is to prevent normal operation with Shutdown Bypass activated. This high pressure trip setpoint is lower than the normal low pressure trip setpoint so that the reactor must be tripped before the bypass is initiated. The Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint of  $\leq 5.0\%$  prevents any significant reactor power from being produced. Sufficient natural circulation would be available to remove 5.0% of RATED THERMAL POWER if none of the reactor coolant pumps were operating.

#### Manual Reactor Trip

The Manual Reactor Trip is a redundant channel to the automatic Reactor Protection System instrumentation channels and provides manual reactor trip capability.

#### Nuclear Overpower

A Nuclear Overpower trip at high power level (neutron flux) provides reactor core protection against reactivity excursions which are too rapid to be protected by temperature and pressure protective circuitry.

During normal station operation, reactor trip is initiated when the reactor power level reaches 102.03% of rated power. Due to calibration and instrument errors, the maximum actual power at which a trip would be actuated could be 109.15% which was used in the safety analysis.

## LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### BASES

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#### RCS Outlet Temperature - High

The RCS Outlet Temperature High trip  $\leq 618^{\circ}\text{F}$  prevents the reactor outlet temperature from exceeding the design limits and acts as a backup trip for all power excursion transients.

#### Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow and AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE

The power level trip setpoint produced by the reactor coolant system flow is based on a flux-to-flow ratio which has been established to accommodate flow decreasing transients from high power.

The power level trip setpoint produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides both high power level and low flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decreases. The power level setpoint produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides overpower DNB protection for all modes of pump operation. For every flow rate there is a maximum permissible power level, and for every power level there is a minimum permissible low flow rate. Typical power level and low flow rate combinations for the pump situations of Table 2.2-1 are as follows:

1. Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is  $\geq 101.3\%$  and reactor flow rate is 100%, or flow rate is  $\leq 96.03\%$  and power level is 97.28%.
2. Trip would occur when three reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is  $> 79.92\%$  and reactor flow rate is 74.7%, or flow rate is  $\leq 70.09\%$  and power is 75%. Operation with three reactor coolant pumps with RCP's bypassed is not permitted.

For safety calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level were used.

## LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### BASES

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The AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE boundaries are established in order to prevent reactor thermal limits from being exceeded. These thermal limits are either power peaking kw/ft limits or DNBR limits. The AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE reduces the power level trip produced by the flux-to-flow ratio such that the boundaries of Figure 2.2-1 are produced. The flux-to-flow ratio reduces the power level trip and associated reactor power-reactor power-imbalance boundaries by 1.013% for a 1% flow reduction.

### RCS Pressure - Low, High, and Variable Low

The High and Low trips are provided to limit the pressure range in which reactor operation is permitted.

During a slow reactivity insertion startup accident from low power or a slow reactivity insertion from high power, the RCS Pressure-High setpoint is reached before the Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint. The trip setpoint for RCS Pressure-High, 2300 psig, has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit, 2750 psig, for any design transient. The RCS Pressure-High trip is backed up by the pressurizer code safety valves for RCS over pressure protection and is, therefore, set lower than the set pressure for these valves, 2500 psig. The RCS Pressure-High trip also backs up the Nuclear Overpower trip.

The RCS Pressure-Low, 1800 psig, and RCS Pressure-Variable Low, (11.59 Tout °F - 5037.8) psig, Trip Setpoints have been established to maintain the DNB ratio greater than or equal to 1.30 for those design accidents that result in a pressure reduction. It also prevents reactor operation at pressures below the valid range of DNB correlation limits, protecting against DNB.

Due to the calibration and instrumentation errors, the safety analysis used a RCS Pressure-Variable Low Trip Setpoint of (11.59 Tout °F - 5077.8) psig.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

\*With the control rod drive trip breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

\*\*When Shutdown Bypass is actuated.

#The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

##High voltage to detector may be de-energized above 10-10 amps on both Intermediate Range channels.

(a) Trip may be manually bypassed when RCS pressure  $\leq$  1720 psig by actuating Shutdown Bypass provided that:

(1) The Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint is  $\leq$  5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,

(2) The Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure - High Trip Setpoint of  $\leq$  1720 psig is imposed, and

(3) The Shutdown Bypass is removed when RCS pressure  $>$  1800 psig.

(b) Trip may be manually bypassed when reactor power is less than or equal to 2475 Mwt and 4 reactor coolant pumps are operating.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and/or open the control rod drive trip breakers.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.



TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

and the inoperable channel above may be bypassed for up to 30 minutes in any 24 hour period when necessary to test the trip breaker associated with the logic of the channel being tested per Specification 4.3.1.1, and

- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to  $< 75\%$  of RATED THERMAL and the Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint is reduced to  $\leq 85\%$  of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours or the QUADRANT POWER TILT is monitored at least once per 12 hours.

ACTION 3 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, and the inoperable channel above may be bypassed for up to 30 minutes in any 24 hour period when necessary to test the trip breaker associated with the logic of the channel being tested per Specification 4.3.1.1.

Action 4 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL Power level:

- a.  $< 5\%$  of RATED THERMAL POWER restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above  $5\%$  of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- b.  $>5\%$  of RATED THERMAL POWER, POWER OPERATION may continue.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 56 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-302

Introduction

In a May 28, 1982 letter, Florida Power Corporation (the licensee) requested a Technical Specification (TS) change to allow operation up to 97.3% of full power (2475 Mwt) with the Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors (RCPs) out of service. The RCPs provide a fast (0.620 ms) reactor trip signal on loss of power to the reactor coolant pumps. This system was added to CR-3 as part of a previous power level upgrade (2452 Mwt to 2544 Mwt). Since then, plant operations have been interrupted a number of times due to spurious operation of the RCPs. Therefore, the licensee proposed to operate CR-3 at 90.4% without the RCPs until they could establish the cause of the RCP trips and implement a fix. We approved operation at this level. The licensee now proposes to increase the reactor power level from 90.4% to 97.3% with the RCPs out of service.

The licensee's letter includes proposed TS changes addressing operation at reduced power without the RCPs for both three pump and four pump operation.

Discussion

The licensee has submitted a summary of the results of analysis of the four pump loss of coolant flow and three pump loss of coolant flow (for three pump operation) without taking credit for the RCPs. The analysis relied on the Flux/Flow Trip, and shows that the minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) during a loss of coolant flow would be 1.30.

Evaluation

The analysis of the four pump loss of flow was done with the same codes, methods and correlation as previously used in CR-3 licensing analyses. The analysis results indicate that the minimum DNBR would be 1.30 which is the DNBR limit. The analysis therefore demonstrates acceptable results.

Previous analyses for the four pump loss of flow indicated a minimum DNBR of 1.43 when the event was initiated from 2300 Mwt (90.4% power). We have independently determined that the reduction in minimum DNBR from 1.43 to 1.30 is consistent with an increase from 90.4% power to 97.3% power.

Several questions remain unresolved relative to the three pump loss of coolant flow analysis. The licensee's April 9, 1982 letter on this subject states that steady state thermal-hydraulic analyses indicated that a loss of coolant flow during three pump operation from 1725 Mwt (75% of 2300 Mwt) would satisfy the DNBR criteria. In the absence of an analysis of the three pump loss of coolant flow transient at 1725 Mwt, we rejected the licensee's April 9, 1982, proposed TS change. The licensee's May 28, 1982 submittal indicates that the analysis of the three pump loss of coolant flow provides the basis for operation only up to 1400 Mwt. In subsequent discussions, the licensee indicated that uncertainties in the Reactor Protection System (RPS) setpoints for three pump operation caused the three pump loss of coolant flow to be more severe than expected. At present, the licensee has not provided sufficient information on the RPS setpoint uncertainties and the influence of these uncertainties on the three pump loss of coolant flow for us to approve the requested TS change to allow operation up to 1400 Mwt for three pump operation with the RCPs out of service.

#### Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

#### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: July 16, 1982

The following NRC personnel have contributed to this Safety Evaluation:  
G. Holahan and S. Miner.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-302FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET ALNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 56 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72, issued to Florida Power Corporation, City of Alachua, City of Bushnell, City of Gainesville, City of Kissimmee, City of Leesburg, City of New Smyrna Beach and Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach, City of Ocala, Orlando Utilities Commission and City of Orlando, Sebring Utilities Commission, Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc., and the City of Tallahassee (the licensees) which revised the Technical Specifications (TSs) for operation for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (the facility) located in Citrus County, Florida. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment allows operation of the facility at a power level no greater than 2475 MWt with the Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors bypassed provided there are four reactor coolant pumps in operation.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since

-2-


the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated May 28, 1982, (2) Amendment No. 56 to License No. DPR-72, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., and at the Crystal River Public Library, 668 N.W. First Avenue, Crystal River, Florida. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 16th day of July 1982.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Sydney Miner, Acting Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Licensing