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July 19, 1983

Docket No. 50-302

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*w/cy of NSHC initial & final determination

Mr. Walter S. Wilgus
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Florida Power Corporation
ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Licensing
& Fuel Management
P. O. Box 14042; M.A.C. H-2
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Dear Mr. Wilgus:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 65 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3). The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated June 24, 1983.

This amendment provides for the option of using a roving fire watch patrol in lieu of a continuous fire watch when required by a non-functional fire barrier penetration. Use of this option requires verification that fire detectors are operable. The TS pages forwarded herewith are somewhat different than those proposed in your submittal. These changes were discussed with your staff on July 15, 1983.

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Opportunity for Hearing will be included in the Commission's next Monthly Federal Register Notice to be published on or about August 24, 1983.

Sincerely,
"ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
JOHN F. STOLZ"

John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 65
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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this office has no legal objection
7/19/83

based on prior OELD concurrence as to category & action set forth in ltr to use Fed. Reg. notice

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SURNAME	RIngram	RHernan:cf	JStolz	GLainas			
DATE	7/18/83	7/18/83	7/18/83	7/19/83	7/18/83		

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Crystal River Unit No
Florida Power Corporation

cc w/enclosure(s):
Mr. S. A. Brandimore
Florida Power Corporation
Vice President and General Counsel
P. O. Box 14042
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Mr. Wilbur Langely, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
Citrus County
Iverness, Florida 36250

Regional Radiation Representative
EPA Region IV
345 Courtland Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Mr. Robert B. Borsum
Babcock & Wilcox
Nuclear Power Generation Division
Suite 220, 7910 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Mr. Tom Stetka, Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Route #3, Box 717
Crystal River, Florida 32629

Nuclear Plant Manager
Florida Power Corporation
P. O. Box 219
Crystal River, Florida 32629

Bureau of Intergovernmental Relations
660 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Ulray Clark, Administrator
Radiological Health Services
Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services
1323 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Administrator
Department of Environmental Regulation
Power Plant Siting Section
State of Florida
2600 Blair Stone Road
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Attorney General
Department of Legal Affairs
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
CITY OF ALACHUA
CITY OF BUSHNELL
CITY OF GAINESVILLE
CITY OF KISSIMMEE
CITY OF LEESBURG
CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILITIES COMMISSION, CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH
CITY OF OCALA
ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO
SEBRING UTILITIES COMMISSION
SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE

DOCKET NO. 50-302

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 65
License No. DPR-72

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al (the licensees) dated June 24, 1983, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 65 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 19, 1983

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 65

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72

DOCKET NO. 50-302

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Pages
3/4 7-47
B 3/4 7-6

3/4 7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.12 All fire barrier penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, firedoors and fire dampers) in fire zone boundaries protecting safety related areas shall be functional.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.12 Each of the above required fire barrier penetrations shall be verified to be functional:

a. At least once per 18 months by a visual inspection.

b. Prior to returning a fire barrier penetration to functional status following repairs or maintenance by performance of a visual inspection of the affected fire barrier penetration(s).

3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION EXHAUST SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Building ventilation exhaust system ensures that suitable ambient conditions for personnel and equipment are maintained for all operating periods and that the effects of post accident contitions in the Auxiliary Building are mitigated. Supply and exhaust duct systems are arranged to direct air from areas of low to higher activity eventually directing it to the main exhaust filter system and from there through the fans to the exhaust vent. The main exhaust filters include roughing, HEPA, and charcoal cells.

3/4.7.9 HYDRAULIC SNUBBERS

The hydraulic snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. The only snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems, and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

The inspection frequency applicable to snubbers containing seals fabricated from materials which have been demonstrated compatible with their operating environment is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures. The number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of these snubbers determines the time interval for the next required inspection of these snubbers. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less than 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

To provide further assurance of snubber reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested during plant shutdowns at 18 month intervals. These tests will include stroking of the snubbers to verify proper piston movement, lock-up and bleed. Observed failures of these sample snubbers will require functional testing of additional units. To minimize personnel exposures, snubbers installed in high radiation zones or in especially difficult to remove locations may be exempted from these functional testing requirements provided the OPERABILITY of these snubbers was demonstrated during functional testing at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system, deluge and sprinklers, hose stations and Halon. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the affected equipment can be restored to service.

In the event that the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant. The requirement for a twenty-four hour report to the Commission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate fire suppression capability for the continued protection of the nuclear plant.

3/4.7.12 PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspection.

Fire barrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and dampers are considered functional when the visually observed condition is the same as the as-designed condition. For those fire barrier penetrations that are not in the as-designed condition, an evaluation shall be performed to show that the modification has not degraded the fire rating of the fire barrier penetration.

During periods of time when a barrier is not functional, either 1) a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier, or 2) the fire detectors on at least one side of the affected barrier must be verified OPERABLE and an hourly fire watch patrol established, until the barrier is restored to functional status.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-302

Introduction

By letter dated June 24, 1983, Florida Power Corporation (FPC or the licensee) proposed a change to the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Technical Specifications (TSs). This TS change provides the option of using a roving fire watch patrol in lieu of a continuous fire watch when required by a non-functional fire barrier penetration. Use of this option requires verification that fire detectors are operational.

Background

On June 14, 1983, Florida Power Corporation discovered that a large number of fire dampers in various building ventilation systems have not been certified by the manufacturer to be able to sustain a fire for a 3-hour period. The devices are only certified for a 1 1/2-hour rating. NRC regulations require such devices to be certified with a 3-hour rating. Consequently, Florida Power Corporation has considered the subject dampers to be non-functional and, as required by the current Crystal River Unit 3 Technical Specifications, is required to maintain a continuous fire watch at each damper.

Evaluation

The current CR-3 Technical Specification addressing Penetration Fire Barriers (3.7.12) requires establishment of a continuous fire watch when any barrier is non-functional. Other courses of action exist that can be taken to mitigate the consequences of a fire and that will require less expenditure of manpower costs. The availability of another approved course of action also allows more operational flexibility to determine the most effective action to take.

In the case particular to CR-3, the discovery that installed fire dampers are certified as one and a half hour fire barriers (rather than the required three hours) has lead to the establishment of a large number of fire watches. This is requiring considerably more manpower than would be necessary to maintain a roving fire watch and to verify the operability of the fire detection systems.

The option to establish a roving fire watch and verify the operability of the fire detection system or establish a continuous fire watch assures that a fire in the affected area is detected early enough to initiate protective actions. This requirement is consistent with NUREG-0103, Revision 4, Standard Technical Specifications for Babcock and Wilcox Pressurized Water Reactors. Thus, issuance of a license amendment including this requirement will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

(2) Create the probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee is taking action to correct the deficiencies which presently require a fire watch and will restore the fire dampers to functional status on an expedited basis and a schedule agreeable to the staff.

Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration (NSHC)

On July 8, 1983, a press release was issued to the local media by the Commission seeking public comment on its proposed determination that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. No public comments were received. The State of Florida was consulted on this matter and had no comments on the proposed determination.

The Commission has provided guidance concerning decision as to whether an amendment involves NSHC by providing certain examples. One of the examples of actions considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations is a change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan, or equivalent. The amendment is only a minor change from the present Technical Specifications to the Standard Technical Specifications. The change discussed herein constitutes a change of the Crystal River Unit 3 Technical Specifications to agree with the correspondent section of the Standard Technical Specifications approved by the NRC for reactor plants designed by Babcock and Wilcox (published as NUREG-0103, Revision 4 dated Fall 1980). The Crystal River reactor plant is of Babcock and Wilcox design. The current Technical Specifications for the Crystal River facility were approved in February 1978 and were based upon a previous revision of the Standard Technical Specifications. At that time, no consideration was given for the existence of installed fire detection systems for those plants which had them, and the only mitigative

action approved for non-functional fire barrier components was establishment of a continuous fire watch. Subsequently, the NRC revised the Standard Technical Specifications to allow the option of a roving fire watch in lieu of a continuous fire watch provided a fire detection system on at least one side of the affected fire barrier is installed and operable.

The nature of this change is to allow reliance upon installed fire detection devices, which are a part of the NRC-approved fire protection system, for continuous fire protection, and to provide backup fire detection capabilities by use of visual observation in each space on a once-per-hour basis by a fire watch. Since the fire dampers in question have been certified to be able to withstand a fire for at least 1-1/2 hours, allowance of this option is considered by the NRC as providing adequate fire protection. On the basis discussed above, the Commission has determined that this amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: July 19, 1983

Principal Contributors: R. Hernan.