

September 14, 1999

Mr. James Scarola, Vice President
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
Post Office Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165

SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF
AMENDMENT RE: CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS (TAC NO. MA3691)

Dear Mr. Scarola:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued Amendment No. 90 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-63 for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1, in response to your request dated September 23, 1998, as supplemented on December 7, 1998, and August 10, 1999. This amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.6.1.3, "Containment Air Locks," and its associated bases, to clarify the requirements for locking an air lock door shut and to make it consistent with NUREG-1431, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," dated April 1995.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Richard J. Laufer, Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-400

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 90 to NPF-63
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 14, 1999

Mr. James Scarola, Vice President
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
Post Office Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165

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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Richard J. Laufer".

Richard J. Laufer, Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-400

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 90 to NPF-63
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

AMENDMENT NO. 90 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-63 - HARRIS, UNIT 1

Docket File

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PDII Reading

JZwolinski/SBlack

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AGill

cc: Harris Service List



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, et al.

DOCKET NO. 50-400

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 90
License No. NPF-63

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Carolina Power & Light Company, (the licensee), dated September 23, 1998, as supplemented on December 7, 1998, and August 10, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-63 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 90, are hereby incorporated into this license. Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Sheri R. Peterson, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 14, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 90

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-63

DOCKET NO. 50-400

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page

3/4 6-4

3/4 6-5

B3/4 6-1

Insert Page

3/4 6-4

3/4 6-4a

3/4 6-5

B3/4 6-1

B3/4 6-1a

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE:

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

..... Notes

1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock components.
2. A separate ACTION is allowed for each air lock.
3. Enter 3.6.1.1 LCO for "Containment Integrity" when the air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Specification 3.6.1.2.a.
4. Locking a Personnel Air Lock door shut consists of locking the associated manual pumping stations and deactivating the electronic mechanisms used to open a Personnel Air Lock door once the associated air lock door is shut. Locking an Emergency Air Lock door shut consists of locking the mechanical operator.

.....

- a. One or more containment air locks with one containment air lock door inoperable:#
 1. Within one hour, verify the OPERABLE door is closed in the affected air lock, and
 2. Within 24 hours, lock the OPERABLE door closed in the affected air lock, and
 3. Once per 31 days, verify the OPERABLE door is locked closed in the affected air lock*, or
 4. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

1. ACTIONS 3.6.1.3.a.1, 3.6.1.3.a.2, 3.6.1.3.a.3, and 3.6.1.3.a.4 are not applicable if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable and ACTION 3.6.1.3.c is entered.

2. Entry and exit is permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks are inoperable.

* Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified closed by administrative means.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

-
- b. One or more containment air locks with containment air lock interlock mechanism inoperable.##
1. Within one hour, verify an OPERABLE door is closed in the affected air lock, and
 2. Within 24 hours, lock an OPERABLE door closed in the affected air lock, and
 3. Once per 31 days, verify the OPERABLE door is locked closed in the affected air lock*, or
 4. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. One or more containment air locks inoperable for reasons other than 3.6.1.3.a or 3.6.1.3.b.
1. Immediately initiate action to evaluate overall containment leakage rate per LCO 3.6.1.2, and
 2. Within one hour, verify a door is closed in the affected air lock, and
 3. Within 24 hours, restore air lock to OPERABLE status, or
 4. Otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

1. ACTIONS 3.6.1.3.b.1, 3.6.1.3.b.2, 3.6.1.3.b.3, and 3.6.1.3.b.4 are not applicable if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable and ACTION 3.6.1.3.c is entered.

2. Entry and exit of containment is permissible under the control of a dedicated individual.

* Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified closed by administrative means.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Performing required air lock leakage rate testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions###. The acceptance criteria for air lock testing are:
 - 1. Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq .05$ La when tested at \geq Pa.
 - 2. For each door, leakage rate is $\leq .01$ La when tested at \geq 41 psig.
- b. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in the air lock can be opened at a time**.

-
- ### 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall airlock leakage test.
 - 2. Results shall be evaluated against Specification 3.6.1.2.a in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.

** Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the containment air lock. (If Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.b has not been performed in the last 6 months, then perform Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.b during the next containment entry through the associated air lock.)

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure, P_a . As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to $0.75 L_a$, during performance of the periodic test, to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.

A one time extension of the test interval specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.a is allowed for performance of the third Type A test of the first 10-year service period during Refueling Outage No. 7.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

Action statement "a" has been modified by a note. The note allows use of the air lock for entry and exit for seven days under administrative controls if both air locks have an inoperable door. This seven day restriction begins when a door in the second air lock is discovered to be inoperable. Containment entry may be required to perform Technical Specification surveillances and actions, as well as other activities on equipment inside containment that are required by Technical Specifications (TS) or other activities that support TS required equipment. In addition, containment entry may be required to perform repairs on vital plant equipment, which if not repaired, could lead to a plant transient or a reactor trip. This note is not intended to preclude performing other activities (i.e., non-TS required activities or repairs on non-vital plant equipment) if the containment is entered, using the inoperable air lock, to perform an allowed activity listed above. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize containment during the short time that an OPERABLE door is expected to be open.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS (Continued)

Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions. HNP has an approved exemption to Appendix J Option A, paragraph III.D.2 of 10 CFR 50 in that the Overall air lock leakage test is required to be performed if maintenance has been performed that could affect the air lock sealing capability prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. This is in contrast to the Appendix J requirement if air locks are opened during periods when containment integrity is not required by the plant's Technical Specifications shall be tested at the end of such periods.

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that: (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of -2 psig, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 45 psig.

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a postulated main steam line break event is 41.2 psig using a value of 1.9 psig for initial positive containment pressure. However, since the instrument tolerance for containment pressure is 1.32 psig and the high-one setpoint is 3.0 psig, the pressure limit was reduced from the high-one setpoint by slightly more than the tolerance and was set at 1.6 psig. This value will prevent spurious safety injection signals caused by instrument drift during normal operation. The -1" wg was chosen to be consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-400

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 23, 1998, as supplemented on December 7, 1998, and August 10, 1999, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L, the licensee) requested a revision to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP). The licensee proposed changing Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.6.1.3, "Containment Air Locks," and its associated bases, to clarify the requirements for locking an air lock door shut and to make it consistent with NUREG-1431, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," (STS) dated April 1995.

The supplemental submittals dated December 7, 1998, and August 10, 1999, contained clarifying information only and did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for personnel and equipment access during all modes of operation. For HNP, access into the concrete containment structure is provided by one of each of the following: an equipment hatch, a personnel air lock (PAL), and a personnel emergency air lock (EAL). The equipment hatch is not addressed in this proposed amendment. The personnel air lock (PAL) has a 9-foot inside diameter with two breech doors that open outwardly from each end of the air lock. Doors of the PAL are hydraulically sealed and electrically interlocked. They are normally operated by control panels located inside and outside of containment. The control panels are capable of opening and closing both air lock doors. There are two control panels inside the air lock that control an associated door (either inner or outer door). The electrical interlock prevents the inner and outer doors from opening simultaneously when doors are operated at the control panels. During plant shutdown, it is necessary to open both doors at the same time to facilitate transferring equipment into and out of containment. Therefore, a means to defeat the electrical interlock is provided. Manual pumping stations are located on the inside and outside of each door to provide means of opening one or both doors that bypass the electrical interlock. The manual pumping stations are under strict administrative controls.

The personnel EAL has an outside diameter of 5 feet with a 2.5-foot diameter door located at each end of the air lock. The EAL doors are in series and mechanically interlocked to ensure that one door cannot be opened until the second door is sealed. Violation of this interlock can

only be made by use of special tools and procedures under strict administrative control. EAL doors can also be locked by locking the mechanical operator.

Each of the personnel and the emergency air locks is a welded steel assembly having two doors which are double-gasketed with material resistant to radiation. Provisions are made to pressurize the space between the gaskets. The doors of each lock are equipped with quick acting valves for equalizing the pressure across each door and the doors are not operable unless pressure is equalized. There is a visual indication outside each door showing whether the opposite door is open or closed and whether its valve is open or closed. Provisions have been made outside each door for remotely closing and latching the opposite door so that in the event that one door is accidentally left open it can be closed by remote control.

3.0 EVALUATION

CP&L has proposed changing their current TS to align it more closely with the STS, and to clarify the unique features of the air locks at HNP.

The current Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in TS 3.6.1.3 lists two conditions for an operable air lock as shown below:

LCO 3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and
- b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 La at Pa.

The proposed HNP TS states the following:

LCO 3.6.1.3 Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE:

This proposed change is consistent with the STS. In addition, CP&L has proposed action notes with the above LCO which are consistent with the STS even though they are formatted differently. The staff has reviewed the proposed LCO and associated notes and finds that they provide an appropriate level of control on the air locks equivalent to the STS. Therefore, the proposed LCO and notes are acceptable.

Additionally, CP&L has added a note to clarify unique characteristics of the methods for locking the PAL and EAL doors at HNP. Currently HNP TS 3.6.1.3 Action a.1 requires locking an inoperable door. The PAL door design at HNP does not permit locking a PAL door to comply with this TS action. However, the mechanisms used to operate the PAL doors can either be locked or power can be removed from the mechanism to prevent operation. The normal method of opening PAL doors relies on electrical power in order to operate. Removing the electrical power used by the various control panels to open a PAL door will prevent inadvertent operation of an inoperable PAL door via the normal means. The associated pumping stations for PAL doors are capable of being locked to prevent inadvertent operation. Therefore, HNP proposes

to clarify the current TS 3/4.6.1.3 by adding a note that permits locking the mechanisms used to open a PAL door once the PAL door is shut to satisfy the TS requirement to lock an inoperable air lock door.

The proposed note also clarifies the method of locking an Emergency Air Lock door by stating that, "Locking Emergency Air Lock doors shut consists of locking the mechanical operator." Thus, HNP LCO 3.6.1.3 adds the following note:

Locking a Personnel Air Lock door shut consists of locking the associated manual pumping stations and deactivating the electronic mechanisms used to open a Personnel Air Lock door once the associated air lock door is shut. Locking an Emergency Air Lock door shut consists of locking the mechanical operator.

The staff finds that adding this note is acceptable because it is consistent with HNP methods of locking the PAL and EAL doors. It also allows the doors to be secured in the closed position and it provides clarification for operator actions in case of an inoperable door.

In addition, the current HNP TS does not differentiate between an inoperable containment air lock door and an inoperable containment air lock interlock mechanism. This created confusion to the operators of HNP when they were trying to implement the current HNP TS. They found it confusing to determine the relationship between interlock operability and door airlock operability. The STS clarifies this confusion by separating the two conditions. The proposed action statements now clearly identify each condition. Action statement 3.6.1.3.a states the actions to be taken when a containment air lock door is inoperable and action 3.6.1.3.b states the actions to be taken if a containment air lock interlock mechanism is inoperable. The staff reviewed the proposed change and agrees that it alleviates the confusion between interlock operability and door airlock operability and is consistent with the STS. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed change acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of North Carolina official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 56239). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: A. Gill

Date: September 14, 1999

Mr. James Scarola
Carolina Power & Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Unit 1

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