

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3.7.15 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration

LCO 3.7.15            The SFP boron concentration shall be  $\geq$  1720 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:    When fuel assemblies are stored in the Spent Fuel Pool.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. SFP boron concentration not within limit.	A.1 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the SFP.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> A.2 Initiate action to restore SFP boron concentration to within limit.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.15.1    Verify the SFP boron concentration is within limit.	7 days

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3.7.16 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage

LCO 3.7.16      The combination of initial enrichment, burnup, and decay time of each fuel assembly stored in Region II shall be within the requirements of Table 3.7.16-1.

APPLICABILITY:      Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in Region II of either the spent fuel pool or the north tilt pit.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Requirements of the LCO not met.	A.1      Initiate action to move the noncomplying fuel assembly from Region II.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.16.1      Verify by administrative means the combination of initial enrichment, burnup, and decay time of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Table 3.7.16-1.	Prior to storing the fuel assembly in Region II

TABLE 3.7.16-1 (page 1 of 1)

Spent Fuel Minimum Burnup and Decay Requirements  
for Storage in Region II of the Spent Fuel Pool and North Tilt Pit

Initial Enrichment (Wt%)	Burnup (GWD/MTU) No Decay	Burnup (GWD/MTU) 1 Year Decay	Burnup (GWD/MTU) 3 Year Decay	Burnup (GWD/MTU) 5 Year Decay	Burnup (GWD/MTU) 8 Year Decay
≤ 1.14	0	0	0	0	0
>1.14	3.477	3.477	3.477	3.477	3.477
1.20	3.477	3.477	3.477	3.477	3.477
1.40	7.951	7.844	7.464	7.178	6.857
1.60	11.615	11.354	10.768	10.319	9.847
1.80	14.936	14.535	13.767	13.187	12.570
2.00	18.021	17.502	16.561	15.875	15.117
2.20	21.002	20.417	19.313	18.499	17.611
2.40	23.900	23.201	21.953	21.034	20.050
2.60	26.680	25.905	24.497	23.487	22.378
2.80	29.388	28.528	27.006	25.879	24.678
3.00	32.044	31.114	29.457	28.243	26.942
3.20	34.468	33.457	31.698	30.397	29.008
3.40	36.848	35.783	33.920	32.544	31.079
3.60	39.152	38.026	36.059	34.615	33.077
3.80	41.419	40.226	38.163	36.650	35.049
4.00	43.661	42.422	40.257	38.673	37.007
4.20	45.987	44.684	42.415	40.778	39.028
4.40	48.322	46.950	44.588	42.877	41.041
4.60	50.580	49.158	46.690	44.911	43.003

- (a) Linear interpolation between two consecutive points will yield acceptable results.
- (b) Comparison of nominal assembly average burnup numbers to these in the table is acceptable if measurement uncertainty is ≤ 10%.

## 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES

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### 4.1 Site Location

The Palisades Nuclear Plant is located on property owned by Consumers Energy on the eastern shore of Lake Michigan approximately four and one-half miles south of the southern city limits of South Haven, Michigan. The minimum distance to the boundary of the exclusion area as defined in 10 CFR 100.3 shall be 677 meters.

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### 4.2 Reactor Core

#### 4.2.1 Fuel Assemblies

The reactor core shall contain 204 fuel assemblies. Each assembly shall consist of a matrix of zircaloy-4 clad fuel rods with an initial composition of depleted, natural, or slightly enriched uranium dioxide (UO<sub>2</sub>) as fuel material. Limited substitutions of zirconium alloy or stainless steel filler rods for fuel rods, in accordance with approved applications of fuel rod configurations, may be used. Fuel assemblies shall be limited to those fuel designs that have been analyzed with applicable NRC staff approved codes and methods and shown by tests or analyses to comply with all fuel safety design bases. A limited number of lead test assemblies that have not completed representative testing may be placed in nonlimiting core regions. A core plug or plugs may be used to replace one or more fuel assemblies subject to the analysis of the resulting power distribution. Poison may be placed in the fuel bundles for long-term reactivity control.

#### 4.2.2 Control Rod Assemblies

The reactor core shall contain 45 control rods. Four of these control rods may consist of part-length absorbers. The control material shall be silver-indium-cadmium, as approved by the NRC.

### 4.3 Fuel Storage

#### 4.3.1 Criticality

4.3.1.1 The Region I fuel storage racks (See Figure B 3.7.16-1) are designed and shall be maintained with:

- a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum planar average U-235 enrichment of 4.95 weight percent;

## 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES

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### 4.3 Fuel Storage

#### 4.3.1 Criticality (continued)

- b.  $K_{\text{eff}} \leq 0.95$  if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes allowances for uncertainties as described in Section 9.11 of the FSAR.
- c. A nominal 10.25 inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies with the exception of the single Type E rack which has a nominal 11.25 inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies; and
- d. New or irradiated fuel assemblies.

4.3.1.2 The Region II fuel storage racks (See Figure B 3.7.16-1) are designed and shall be maintained with;

- a. Fuel assemblies having maximum planar average U-235 enrichment of 4.60 weight percent;
- b.  $K_{\text{eff}} < 1.0$  if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes allowances for uncertainties as described in Section 9.11 of the FSAR.
- c.  $K_{\text{eff}} \leq 0.95$  if fully flooded with water borated to 850 ppm, which includes allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.11 of the FSAR.
- d. A nominal 9.17 inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies; and
- e. New or irradiated fuel assemblies which meet the initial enrichment, burnup, and decay time requirements of Table 3.7.16-1.

4.3.1.3 The new fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

- a. Twenty four unirradiated fuel assemblies having a maximum planar average U-235 enrichment of 4.95 weight percent, and stored in accordance with the pattern shown in Figure 4.3-1, or  
  
Thirty six unirradiated fuel assemblies having a maximum planar average U-235 enrichment of 4.05 weight percent, and stored in accordance with the pattern shown in Figure 4.3-1;
- b.  $K_{\text{eff}} \leq 0.95$  when flooded with either full density or low density (optimum moderation) water including allowances for uncertainties as described in Section 9.11 of the FSAR.

## 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES

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### 4.3 Fuel Storage

#### 4.3.1 Criticality (continued)

- c. The pitch of the new fuel storage rack lattice being  $\geq 9.375$  inches and every other position in the lattice being permanently occupied by an 8" x 8" structural steel or core plugs, resulting in a nominal 13.26 inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies placed in alternating storage locations.

#### 4.3.2 Drainage


The spent fuel storage pool cooling system suction and discharge piping is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 644 ft 5 inches.

#### 4.3.3 Capacity

The spent fuel storage pool and north tilt pit are designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 892 fuel assemblies.

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4.0 DESIGN FEATURES



Note: If any assemblies containing fuel enrichments greater than 4.05% U-235 are stored in the New Fuel Storage Rack, the center row must remain empty.

Figure 4.3-1 (page 1 of 1)  
New Fuel Storage Rack Arrangement

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.15 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration

BASES

**BACKGROUND** As described in LCO 3.7.16, "Fuel Assembly Storage," fuel assemblies are stored in the fuel storage racks in accordance with criteria based on initial enrichment, discharge burnup, and decay time.

The criteria were based on the assumption that 850 ppm of soluble boron was present in the spent fuel pool. The pool is required to be maintained at a boron concentration of  $\geq 1720$  ppm. Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c) (2) requires that criticality control be achieved without credit for soluble boron. However, in 1998 the NRC documented requirements that could be established to maintain criticality below 0.95. This is documented in "Guidance on the Regulatory Requirements for Criticality Analysis of Fuel Storage at Light-Water Reactor Power Plants", Laurence I. Kopp, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Reactor Systems Branch, February 1998. The precedent of taking credit for soluble boron in spent fuel pool water to provide criticality control has also been established. Soluble boron credit was used in the Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology described in WCAP-14416-NP-A and that methodology was approved for use by an NRC Safety Evaluation dated October 25, 1996. The criteria discussed above was developed using a method that closely followed the Westinghouse methodology. Additionally the requirements specified by the NRC guidance are in place at Palisades.

**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** A fuel assembly could be inadvertently loaded into a fuel storage rack location not allowed by LCO 3.7.16 (e.g., an insufficiently depleted or insufficiently decayed fuel assembly). Another type of postulated accident is associated with a fuel assembly that is dropped onto the fully loaded fuel pool storage rack. Either incident could have a positive reactivity effect, decreasing the margin to criticality. However, the negative reactivity effect of the soluble boron compensates for the increased reactivity caused by either one of the two postulated accident scenarios.

The concentration of dissolved boron in the SFP satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2).

**LCO** The specified concentration of dissolved boron in the SFP preserves the assumptions used in the analyses of the potential accident scenarios described above. This concentration of dissolved boron is the minimum required concentration for fuel assembly storage and movement within the SFP.

**APPLICABILITY** This LCO applies whenever fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool.

BASES

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

A.1. and A.2.

When the concentration of boron in the spent fuel pool is less than required, immediate action must be taken to preclude an accident from happening or to mitigate the consequences of an accident in progress. This is most efficiently achieved by immediately suspending the movement of fuel assemblies. This does not preclude the movement of fuel assemblies to a safe position. In addition, action must be immediately initiated to restore boron concentration to within limit.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.15.1

This SR verifies that the concentration of boron in the spent fuel pool is within the required limit. As long as this SR is met, the analyzed incidents are fully addressed. The 7 day Frequency is appropriate because no major replenishment of pool water is expected to take place over a short period of time.

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REFERENCES

None

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## B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

### B 3.7.16 Fuel Assembly Storage

#### BASES

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##### BACKGROUND

The fuel storage facility is designed to store either new (nonirradiated) nuclear fuel assemblies, or used (irradiated) fuel assemblies in a vertical configuration underwater. The storage pool is sized to store 892 fuel assemblies, which includes storage for failed fuel canisters. The fuel storage racks are grouped into two regions, Region I and Region II per Figure 3.7.16-1. The racks are designed as a Seismic Category I structure able to withstand seismic events. Region I contains racks in the spent fuel pool having a 10.25 inch center-to-center spacing and a single rack in the north tilt pit having an 11.25 inch by 10.69 inch center-to-center spacing. Region II contains racks in both the spent fuel pool and the north tilt pit having a 9.17 inch center-to-center spacing. Because of the smaller spacing and poison concentration, Region II racks have more limitations for fuel storage than Region I racks. Further information on these limitations can be found in Section 4.0, "Design Features." These limitations (e.g., enrichment, burnup) are sufficient to maintain a  $k_{eff}$  of  $\leq 0.95$  for fuel of original enrichment of up to 4.95% for Region I, and 4.6% for Region II.

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##### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The fuel storage facility was originally designed for noncriticality by use of adequate spacing, and "flux trap" construction whereby the fuel assemblies are inserted into neutron absorbing stainless steel cans. The current criticality calculations also take credit for soluble boron to prevent criticality.

The spent fuel assembly storage meets the requirements specified in "Guidance on the Regulatory Requirements for Criticality Analysis of Fuel Storage at Light-Water Reactor Power Plants", Laurence I. Kopp, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Reactor Systems Branch, February 1998." This document established the requirements for use of soluble boron to maintain  $k_{eff}$  below 0.95.

The spent fuel assembly storage satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2).

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##### LCO

The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool, according to Table 3.7.16-1, in the accompanying LCO, ensures that the  $k_{eff}$  of the spent fuel pool will always remain  $< 0.95$  assuming the pool to be flooded with water, borated to 850 ppm. The restrictions are consistent with the criticality safety analysis performed for the spent fuel pool according to Table 3.7.16-1, in the accompanying LCO. Fuel assemblies not meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.16-1 shall be stored in accordance with Specification 4.3.1.1.

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##### APPLICABILITY

This LCO applies whenever any fuel assembly is stored in Region II of either the spent fuel pool or the north tilt pit.

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BASES

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, in either case, inability to move fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in Region II the spent fuel pool is not in accordance with Table 3.7.16-1, immediate action must be taken to make the necessary fuel assembly movement(s) to bring the configuration into compliance with Table 3.7.16-1.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.16.1

This SR verifies by administrative means that the combination of initial enrichment, burnup, and decay time of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Table 3.7.16-1 in the accompanying LCO prior to placing the fuel assembly in a Region II storage location.

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REFERENCES

None

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**BASES**





Figure B 3.7.16-1 (page 1 of 1)  
 Spent Fuel Pool Arrangement